THE 

ELEMENTS 

O F 

MORAL SCIENCE. 

BY FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D., 

PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY, AND PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

THIRD EDITION. 
BOSTON: 

GOULD, KENDALL AND LINCOLN, 

SOLD BY THE PRINCIPAL BOOKSELLERS THROUGHOUT THE 
UNITED STATES. 

1 836. 



Ml 25/ 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by 
FRANCIS WAYLAND, 
In the District Clerk's Office of the District Court of Rhode Island. 



Transfer 
Engineers School Li by* 
June 29,1931 



POWER PRESS OF WILLIAM S. DAMRELL, 

39 Washington Street. . . .Boston. 



PREFACE. 



In presenting to the public a new treatise 
upon Moral Science, it may not be improper to 
state the circumstances which led to the under- 
taking, and the design which it is intended to 
accomplish. 

When it became my duty to instruct in Moral 
Philosophy, in Brown University, the text-book 
in use was the work of Dr. Paley. From many 
of his principles I found myself compelled to 
dissent, and, at first, contented myself with stat- 
ing to my classes my objections to the author, 
and offering my views, in the form of familiar 
conversations, upon several of the topics which 
he discusses. These views, for my own conve- 
nience, I soon committed to paper, and deliver- 
ed, in the form of lectures. In a few years, 
these lectures had become so far extended, that, 
to my surprise, they contained, by themselves, 
the elements of a different system from that of 
the text-book which I was teaching. To avoid 
the inconvenience of teaching two different sys- 
tems, I undertook to reduce them to order, and 
make such additions, as would render the work 
in some measure complete within itself. I thus 



iv 



PREFACE. 



relinquished the work of Dr. Paley, and, for 
some time, have been in the habit of instruct- 
ing solely by lecture. The success of the at- 
tempt exceeded my expectations, and encouraged 
me to hope, that the publication of what I had 
delivered to my classes, might, in some small 
degree, facilitate the study of moral science. 

From these circumstances the work has de- 
rived its character. Being designed for the 
purposes of instruction, its aim is, to be simple, 
clear, and purely didactic. I have rarely gone 
into extended discussion, but have contented 
myself with the attempt to state the moral law, 
and the reason of it, in as few and as compre- 
hensive terms as possible. The illustration of 
the principles, and the application of them to 
cases of ordinary life, I have generally left to 
be performed by the instructer, or by the stu- 
dent himself. Hence, also, I have omitted ev- 
ery thing which relates to the history of opin- 
ions, and have made but little allusion even to 
the opinions themselves, of those from whom I 
dissent. To have acted otherwise, would have 
extended the undertaking greatly beyond the 
limits which I had assigned to myself ; and it 
seemed to me not to belong to the design which 
I had in view. A work which should attempt to 
exhibit what was true, appeared to me more 
desirable than one which should point out what 
was exploded, discuss what was doubtful, or 
disprove what was false. 

In the course of the work, I have quoted but 
few authorities, as, in preparing it, I have refer- 
red to but few books. 1 make this remark in 



PREFACE. 



V 



no manner for the sake of laying claim to origi- 
nality, but to avoid the imputation of using the 
labors of others without acknowledgment. 
When I commenced the undertaking, I attempt- 
ed to read extensively, but soon found it so dif- 
ficult to arrive at any definite results, in this 
manner, that the necessities of my situation 
obliged me to rely upon my own reflection. That 
I have thus come to the same conclusions with 
many others, I should be unwilling to doubt. 
When this coincidence of opinion has come to 
my knowledge, I have mentioned it. When it 
is not mentioned, it is because I have not 
known it. 

The author to whom I am under the greatest 
obligations is Bishop Butler. The chapter on 
Conscience is, as 1 suppose, but little more than 
a development of his ideas on the same subject. 
How much more I owe to this incomparable 
writer, I know not. As it was the study of his 
sermons on human nature, that first turned my 
attention to this subject, there are, doubtless, 
many trains of thought which I have derived 
from him, which I have not been able to trace 
back to their source, as they have long since 
become incorporated with my own reflections. 
The article on the Sabbath, as is stated in the 
text, is derived chiefly from the tract of Mr. J. 
J. Gurney, on the same subject. Entertaining 
those views of the Sacred Scriptures, which I 
have expressed in the work itself, it is scarcely 
necessary to add here, that I consider them the 
great source of moral truth ; and that a system 
of ethics will be true just in proportion as it 
2* 



vi 



PREFACE. 



develops their meaning. To do this has been 
my object; and to have, in ever so humble a 
manner, accomplished it, I shall consider as the 
greatest possible success. 

It is not without much diffidence, that I have 
ventured to lay before the public a work on this 
important subject. That something of this sort 
was needed, has long been universally confessed. 
My professional duty led me to undertake it ; 
and I trust that the hope of usefulness has in- 
duced me to prepare it for publication. If I 
have not been so happy as to elucidate truth, I 
have endeavored to express myself in such a 
manner, that the reader shall have as little trouble 
as possible in detecting my errors. And if it 
shall be found, that I have thrown any light 
whatever upon the science of human duty, I 
shall have unspeakable cause for gratitude to 
that Spirit, whose inspiration alone teacheth 
man understanding. And my cause for grati- 
tude will scarcely be less, should my failure in- 
cite some one, better able than myself to do 
justice to the subject, to a more successful un- 
dertaking. 

Brown University, April, 1835. 



PREFACE 

TO THE 

SECOND EDITION. 



A second edition of the Elements of Moral 
Science having been demanded, within a much 
shorter period than was anticipated, I have giv- 
en to the revisal of it all the attention which 
my avocations have permitted. 

The first edition, owing to circumstances 
which could not be foreseen, was, unfortunately, 
in several places inaccurate in typographical ex- 
ecution. I have endeavored, I hope with better 
success, to render the present edition, in this 
respect, less liable to censure. In a few cases, 
single words and modes of expression have also 
been changed. I have, however, confined 
myself to verbal corrections, and have, in no 
case that I remember, intentionally altered the 
sense. 

Having understood that the work has been 
introduced, as a text-book, into some of our 
highest seminaries of education, I hope that I 



viii 



PREFACE. 



may be forgiven, if I suggest a few hints as to 
the manner in which I suppose it may be most 
successfully used for this purpose. 

1 . In the recitation room, let neither instruct- 
er nor pupil ever make use of the book. 

2. Let the portion previously assigned for the 
exercise, be so mastered by the pupil, both in 
plan and illustration, that he will be able to re- 
cite it in order, and explain the connection of 
the different parts with each other, without the 
necessity of assistance from his instructed To 
give the language of the author is not, of course, 
desirable. It is sufficient that he give the idea. 
The questions of the instructer should have 
respect to principles that may be deduced from 
the text, practical application of the doctrines, 
objections which may be raised, &c. 

5. Let the lesson which was recited on one 
day, be invariably reviewed on the day succeed- 
ing. 

4. As soon as any considerable progress has 
been made in the work, let a review from the 
beginning; be commenced. This should com- 
prebend, for one exercise, as much as had been 
previously recited in two or three clays ; and 
should be confined to a brief analysis of the 
argument, with a mere mention of the illustra- 
tions. 

5. As soon as the whole portion thus far re- 
cited, has been reviewed, let a new review be 



PREFACE. 



ix 



commenced, and continued in the same manner ; 
and thus on successively, until the work is com- 
pleted. By pursuing this method, a class will, 
at any period of the course of study, be enabled, 
with the slightest effort, to recall whatever they 
have already acquired ; and when the work is 
completed, they will be able to pursue the whole 
thread of the argument, from the beginning to 
the end ; and thus to retain a knowledge, not 
only of the individual principles, but also of their 
relations to each other. 

But the advantages of this mode of study are 
not confined to that of a more perfect knowl- 
edge of this or of any other book. By present- 
ing the whole field of thought at one view be- 
fore the mind, it will cultivate the power of 
pursuing an extended range of argument ; of 
examining and deciding upon a connected chain 
of reasoning ; and will, in no small degree, ac- 
custom the student to carry forward in his own 
mind a train of original investigation. 

I have been emboldened to make these sug- 
gestions, not in the least because I suppose the 
present work worthy of any peculiar attention 
from an instructer, but simply because, having 
been long in the habit of pursuing this method, 
and having witnessed its results in my own 
classes, I have thought it my duty to suggest it 
to those w ho are engaged in the same profession 
with myself. Other instructers may have suc- 
ceeded better with other methods. I have suc- 
ceeded best with this. 



X 



PREFACE . 



At the suggestion of some of his friends, the 
author has it in contemplation to prepare a small 
abridgment of the present work, in duodecimo, 
for the use of schools and academies. It will 
be published as soon as his engagements will 
permit. 

Brown University, September, 1835. 



PLAN OF THE WORK. 



CONTENTS 

AND 



BOOK FIRST. 

THEORETICAL ETHICS. 

CHAPTER FIRST. p ag e. 

OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR NOTION OF THE MORAL QUALITY 

OF ACTIONS, , 19 

SECTION I. 

Of Moral Law, 19 

Of law in general, . 19 

Of moral law, 20 

SECTION II. 

What is a moral Jlction 1 22 

Of action, 22 

Of moral action, 25 

SECTION III. 

In what part of an Action do we discover its moral Quality I . . . 26 

The intention, 27 

When is intention wrong ? 27 

SECTION IV. 

Whence do we derive our Notion of the moral Quality of Ac- 
tions ? 29 

Is it a modification of any other idea ? 29 

Is it an exercise of the judgment? 31 



Xll 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Is it derived from association ? 31 

Ts it derived from the idea of the greatest amount of happiness ? 32 

General view cf the subject, 40 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL, SENSE, 45 

SECTION I. 

Js there a Conscience ? 45 

Question considered, 46 

Objections answered, 46 

SECTION II. 

Of the Manner in which the Decision of Conscience is expressed, 50 

Its discriminating power, 50 

Its impulsive power, 51 

A source of pleasure or of pain, 53 

Illustrations, 54 

SECTION III. 

The Authority of Conscience, 56 

From the conceptions which we form of it, 56 

By a comparison of the actions of men and inferior animals, . . 58 
From the necessity of this supremacy to the accomplishment of 

its object, , 59 

SECTION IV. 

Law by which Conscience is governed, . . 68 

As a discriminating power, 69 

As an impulsive power, 72 

As a source of pleasure or pain, . . 73 

SECTION V. 

Rules for moral Conduct, 77 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE, 82 

SECTION I. 

Of Virtue in general, 82 

SECTION II. 

Of Virtue in imperfect Beings, 85 

Limit of moral obligation, 86 

Moral relations of habit, t ...... 92 



CONTENTS. xiil 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

Page. 

HUMAN HAPPINESS, 97 

The gratification of desire, 97 

Within limits, 99 

CHAPTER FIFTH. 

OF SELF-LOVE, 102 

Nature of self-love, 102 

Its relative rank, 105 

CHAPTER SIXTH. 

IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE; NECESSITY OF SOME AD- 
DITIONAL MORAL LIGHT, 109 

Imperfection of conscience, 109 

Necessity of additional light, Ill 

What light might be expected, 113 

CHAPTER SEVENTH. 

OF NATURAL RELIGION, 116 

SECTION I. 

Of the Manner in which we learn our Duty by the Light of Na- 
ture, 116 

From general consequences, 117 

Objection considered, 120 

SECTION II. 

How far we may learn our Duty by the Light of JYature i .... 124 

Knowledge acquired in this manner, 124 

Motives which it presents, 125 

SECTION III. 

Defects of the System of Natural Religion, 127 

From facts, 127" 

From the nature of the case, 129 ; 

CHAPTER EIGHTH. 

RELATIONS BETWEEN NATURAL AND REVEALED RELI- 
GION, 133' 

What expectations to be entertained, 133 

These are realized by revelation, 134 

CHAPTER NINTH. 

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES, 138 

2 



xiv 



CONTENTS. 



SECTION I. 

Page. 

A Vieio of the Holy Scriptures, , 138 

TheiOld Testament, 139 

The New Testament, 140 

SECTION II. 

In what Manner are we to ascertain our Duty by the Holy 

Scriptures ? 141 

What is excluded, 142 

What is included, 144 

Our means of moral instruction, 145 



BOOK SECOND. 

PRACTICAL. ETHICS. 

PART FIRST. 

LOVE TO GOD, OR PIETY. 
CHAPTER FIRST. 

GENERAL, OBLIGATION TO SUPREME LOVE TO GOD, 152 

Relation between God and man, 152 

Rights and obligations arising from this relation, 154 

These suited to our nature, 163 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT, 166 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

OF PRAYER, 171 

Nature of prayer, 171 

Kinds of prayer, 172 

Duty of prayer, 174 

" " from our condition, 174 

" " from the Scriptures, 175 

The utility of prayer, 176 



CONTENTS. XV 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

Page. 

OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH, 180 

Original institution of the Sabbath, 180 

The Mosaic Sabbath, 183 

The Christian Sabbath, 185 

The day to be observed, 185 

The manner of its observance, 188 

Duty of magistrates in respect to it, ...... 190 



PART SECOND. 

DUTIES TO MAN. 

DIVISION FIRST. RECIPROCITY. 

DIVISION SECOND. BENEVOLENCE. 

DIVISION FIRST. 

RECIPROCITY. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES ILLUSTRATED, AND THE DUTIES OF 



RECIPROCITY CLASSIFIED, 192 

Nature of human equality, 192 

Subject illustrated, 193 

Teaching of the Scriptures, 196 

Classification of the duties of reciprocity, 200 



CLASS FIRST. 

JUSTICE AND VERACITY. 
OF JUSTICE. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 



PERSONAL LIBERTY, 202 

SECTION I. 

Nature of personal Liberty, 202 

Physical Liberty, '. 203 

Intellectual liberty, = 204 

Religious Liberty, 206 

Exceptions, 207 



xvi 



CONTENTS. 



SECTION IT. 

Page. 

Modes in which personal Liberty may be violated, 208 

By the individual, as in domestic slavery, 208 

Its nature and effects, 209 

Doctrine of the Scriptures, 211 

Duties of masters, 215 

Duties of slaves, 216 

Personal liberty violated by society, 217 

Violation of physical liberty, 218 

Violation of intellectual liberty, 219 

Violation of religious liberty, 226 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS PROPERTY, 230 

SECTION I. 

The Right of Property, 230 

Definition, 230 

On what the right of property is founded, 230 

Modes in which the right of property may be acquired, 233 

SECTION II. 

Modes in which the Right of Property may be violated by the In- 
dividual, 237 

Without consent,— 1. Theft. 2. Robbery, 238 

By consent fraudulently obtained, 239 

(a.) Where no equivalent is offered, 239 

(6.) Where the equivalent is different from what it purports to 

be, 239 

1. Where the equivalent is material, and the transfer perpetual, 239 
The law of buyer and seller, 239 

2. When the transfer is temporary, 244 

Interest or loan of money, 245 

Loan of other property, 248 

Insurance, , 250 

3. Where the equivalent is immaterial, 251 

Of master and servant, 251 

Of principal and agent, 252 

Of representatives, 254 

SECTION III. 

Right of Property as violated by Society, 256 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER, 260 

Nature of the obligation, 260 

Violated by weakening the moral restraints of men, 262 

Violated by exciting their evil dispositions, 263 



CONTENTS. Xvii 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

Page. 

JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION, 267 

Nature of the obligation, 267 

Giving publicity to bad actions, 269 

Unjust conclusions respecting character, 270 

Assigning bad motives unnecessarily, 271 

Ridicule and mimicry, 272 

Our duty to reveal the bad actions of others, 275 

Our duty to promote the ends of public justice, 275 

Our duty to protect the innocent, and for the good of the offender, 275 

Duty of historians, 276 

Duty of the public press, 277 

OF VERACITY. 

CH^TER FIRST. 

VERACITY OF THE ?AST A0^lESENT, 279 

Law of veracity, * 279 

What it forbids, 280 

Necessity of such a law, 282 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

VERACITY OF THE FUTURE, 285 

Of promises, 285 

Their intention and obligation, 285 

When promises are not binding, , , 286 

Of contracts, 287 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

OF OATHS, . 291 

The theory of oaths, . . « 291 

Lawfulness of oaths, 293 

Interpretation of oaths, 294 

Different kinds of oaths, 294 

CLASS SECOND. 

DUTIES WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 

SEXES, 296 

CHAPTER FDaST. 

GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY, 298 

What this moral law forbids, 298 

What it commands, — exclusive union, 299 

union for life, . . . , 301 

Precepts of religion on this subject, 303 

H 



xviii 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 

Page. 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, 306 

The nature of the contract, 306 

Duties imposed by the contract, 309 

Chastity, 309 

Mutual affection, 311 

Mutual assistance,, 311 

Relation of parties as to authority, 312 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

THE LAW OF PARENTS, 315 

Relation of the parties to each other, 315 

Duties of parents, 317 

Support or maintenance, . . . 317 

Physical education, 318 

Intellectual education, 319 

Moral education, 323 

Rights of parents, 325 

Duration of these rights, 325 

Of instructers, 326 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

THE LAW OF CHILDREN,. 328 

Duties of children, 328 

Obedience, 328 

Reverence, 330 

Filial affection, 331 

Necessary maintenance, , 331 

Rights of children, 331 

Duration of these rights and obligations, 332 

Duties of pupils, 332 



CLASS THIRD. 

DUTIES OF MAN AS A MEMBER OF CIVIL SOCIETY, 335 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

OF CIVIL SOCIETY, 336 

SECTION I. 

Of a simple Society, 336 

Nature of the contract, , 336 

Manner in which governed, 338 

Limits of the power of a majority, 338 

Durability of corporations, 339 



CONTENTS. Xix 
SECTION II. 

Page. 

Of civil Society, 341 

Civil society an institution of God, 342 

Conclusions from the above, 344 

Of the nature and limitations of civil society, 346 

Of what is esseutial to civil society, 347 

The compact entered into by the individual and society, 349 

Of the accidental modifications of civil society, 352 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

OF THE MODE IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF SOCIETY ARE 

ACCOMPLISHED, 356 

The parts of a government, 357 

What form of government is preferable, 359 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

DUTIES OF THE OFFICERS OF A GOVERNMENT, 362 

Of legislative officers, 362 

Of judicial officers, 364 

Of executive officers, , 365 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

DUTIES OF CITIZENS, 367 

As individuals, 367 

As constituent members of society, 368 

When the compact is violated, 370 



DIVISION SECOND. 

THE LAW OF BENEVOLENCE. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

GENERAL OBLIGATION, AND DIVISION OF THE SUB JECT, . 373 



Nature and proof of the obligation from our constitution, 373 

Proof from the Holy Scriptures, 375 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

BENEVOLENCE TO THE UNHAPPY, . . „ 380 

SECTION I. 

Unhappiness from physical condition, 380 

Objects of charity. 380 

Laws affecting the recipient, 381 



XX CONTENTS. 

Page. 

Laws affecting the benefactor, 382 

Poor laws, 383 

Voluntary associations, 384 

SECTION II. 

Unhappiness from intellectual condition) , 386 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED, 390 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

BENEVOLENCE TO THE INJURIOUS . . , 393 

Injury committed by an individual against an individual, 393 

Injury committed by an individual against society, 395 

Injury committed by a society against a society, 396 

Of war, 397 

NOTE. 

Duties to Brutes, 401 



BOOK FIRST. 

THEORETICAL ETHICS. 



THEORETICAL ETHICS. 



CHAPTER FIRST. 

OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR NOTION OF THE MORAL 
QUALITY OF ACTIONS. 

SECTION I. 

OF MORAL LAW. 

Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, is the Science of Moral 
Law. 

The first question which presents itself is, What is 
moral law? Let us inquire, first, what is law; and, 
secondly, what is moral law. 

By the term law, I think, we generally mean a form 
of expression, denoting either a mode of existence, or an 
order of sequence. 

Thus, the first of Sir Isaac Newton's laws, namely, 
that every body will continue in a state of rest, or of uni- 
form motion in a right line, unless compelled by some 
force to change its state, denotes a mode of existence. 

The third law of motion, that, to every action of one 
body upon another, there is an equal and contrary reac- 
tion, denotes an order of sequence ; that is, it declares 
the general fact, that, if one event occurs, the constitu- 
tion of things under which we exist, is such, that the 
other event will a'lso occur. 

3 



20 



OF MORAL LAW. 



The axioms in Mathematics are laws of the same kind. 
Thus, the axiom, "if equals be added to equals, the 
wholes will be equal," denotes an order of sequence, in 
respect to quantity. 

Of the same nature are the laws of Chemistry. Such, 
for instance, is the law that, if soda be saturated with 
muriatic acid, the result will be common salt. 

Thus, also, in Intellectual Philosophy. If a picture 
of a visible object be formed upon the retina, and the im- 
pression be communicated, by the nerves, to the brain, 
the result will be an act of perception. 

The meaning of law, when referring to civil society, is 
substantially the same. It expresses an established order 
of sequence between a specified action, and a particular 
mode of reward or of punishment. Such, in general, is 
the meaning of law. 

Moral Philosophy takes it for granted that there is in 
human action a moral quality ; that is, that a human action 
may be right or wrong. Every one knows that we may 
contemplate the same action as wise or unwise ; as cour- 
teous or impolite ; as graceful or awkward ; and, also, as 
right or wrong. It can have escaped the observation of 
no one, that there are consequences distinct from each 
other, which follow an action, and which are connected, 
respectively, with each of its attributes. To take, for 
instance, a moral quality. Two men may both utter 
what is false ; the one intending to speak the truth, the 
other intending to deceive. Now, some of the conse- 
quences of this act are common to both cases, namely, 
that the hearers may, in both cases, be deceived. But it 
is equally manifest, that there are also consequences pe- 
culiar to the case in which the speaker intended to de- 
ceive ; as, for example, the effects upon his own moral 
character, and the estimation in which he is held by the 
community. And thus, in general, moral philosophy 
proceeds upon the supposition that there exists in the ac- 
tions of men a moral quality, and that there are certain 
sequences connected by our Creator with the exhibition 
of that quality. 



OF MORAL LAW. 



21 



A moral law is, therefore, a form of expression deno- 
ting an order of sequence established between the moral 
quality of actions, and their results. 

Moral Philosophy, or Ethics, is the science which 
classifies and illustrates moral law. 

Here it may be worth while to remark, that an order 
of sequence established, supposes of necessity an Estab- 
lisher. Hence Moral Philosophy, as well as every other 
science, proceeds upon the supposition of the existence 
of a universal cause, the Creator of all things, who has 
made every thing as it is, and who has subjected all things 
to the relations which they sustain. And hence, as all 
relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of His , y 
enactment, an order of sequence once discovered in morals, 
is just as invariable as an order of sequence in physics. 

Such being the fact, it is evident, that the moral laws 
of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, 
any more than the physical laws. The results which 
God has connected with actions, will inevitably occur, all 
the created power in the universe to the contrary not- 
withstanding. Nor can these consequences be eluded or 
averted, any more than the sequences which follow by the 
laws of gravitation. What should we think of a man 
who expected to leap from a precipice, and, by some act 
of sagacity, elude the effect of the accelerating power of 
gravity ; or, of another, who, by the exercise of his own 
will, determined to render himself imponderable? Every 
one who believes God to have established an order of 
sequences in morals, must see that it is equally absurd, to 
expect to violate, with impunity, any moral law of the 
Creator. 

Yet men have always flattered themselves with the 
hope that they could violate moral law, and escape the 
consequences which God has established. The reason is 
obvious. In physics, the consequent follows the antece- 
dent, often immediately, and most commonly after a 
stated interval. In morals, the result is frequently long 
delayed ; and the time of its occurrence is always uncer- 
tain, Hence, because sentence against an evil work is 



22 



OF MORAL ACTION. 



not executed speedily, therefore the hearts of the sons of 
men are fully set in them to do evil. But time, whether 
long or short, has neither power nor tendency to change 
the order of an established sequence. The time required 
for vegetation, in different orders of plants, may vary ; but 
yet wheat will always produce wheat, and an acorn will 
always produce an oak. That such is the case in morals, 
a heathen poet has taught us, 

Raro, antecedentem scelestum 
Deseruit, pede poena claudo. 

Hor. Lib. 3. Car. 2. 

A higher authority has admonished us, Be not deceived ; 
God is not mocked ; whatsoever a man soweth, that shall 
he also reap. It is also to be remembered, that, in mor- 
als as well as in physics, the harvest is always more 
abundant than the seed from which it springs. 



SECTION II. 

WHAT IS A MORAL ACTION? 

Action, from actum, the supine of the Latin verb ago, 
I do, signifies something done ; the putting forth of some 
power. 

But under what circumstances must power be put forth, 
in order to render it a moral action ? 

1. A machine is, in common conversation, said to be 
powerful. A vegetable is said to put forth its leaves, a 
tree to bend its branches, or a vine to run towards a prop ; 
but we never speak of these instances of power, as ac- 
tions. 

2. Action is never affirmed, but of beings possessed of 
a will ; that is, of those in whom the putting forth of 
power is immediately consequent upon their determination 
to put it forth. Could ,we conceive of animate beings, 
whose exertions had no connection with their will, we 
should not speak of such exertions as actions. 



OF MOUAL ACTION. 



23 



3. Action, so far as we know, is only affirmed of 
beings possessed of intelligence ; that is, who are capable 
of comprehending a particular end, and of adopting the 
means necessary to accomplish it. An action is some- 
thing done; that is, some change effected. But man 
effects change, only by means of stated antecedents. An 
action, therefore, in such a being, supposes some change 
in view, and some means employed for the purpose of 
effecting it. 

We do not, however, affirm this as essential. Suppose 
a being so constituted as to be able to effect changes 
without the use of means; action would then not involve 
the necessity of intelligence, in the sense in which it is 
here explained. All that would be necessary, would be 
the previous conception of the change which he intended 
to effect. 

4. All this exists in man. He is voluntary and intelli- 
gent, capable of foreseeing the result of an exertion of 
power, and that exertion of power is subject to his will. 
This is sufficient to render man the subject of govern- 
ment, He can foresee the results of a particular action, 
and can will, or not will, to accomplish it. And other re- 
suits can be connected with the action, of such a nature, 
as to influence his will in one direction or in another. 
Thus, a man may know that stabbing another will pro- 
duce death. He has it in his power to will or not to will 
it. But such other consequences may be by society con- 
nected with the act, that, though on many accounts he 
would desire to do it, yet, on other and graver accounts, 
he would prefer not to do it. This is sufficient to ren- 
der man a subject of government. But is this all that 
is necessary to constitute man a moral agent ; that is, to 
render him a subject of moral government ? 

May not all this be affirmed of brutes ? Are they not 

voluntary, and even, to some extent, intelligent agents ? 

Do they not, frequently, at least, comprehend the relation 

of means to an end, and voluntarily put forth the power 

necessary for the accomplishment of that end ? Do they 

not manifestly design to injure us, and also select the 
3 # 



24 



OF MORAL ACTION. 



most appropriate means for effecting their purpose ? And 
can we not connect such results with their actions, as 
shall influence their will, and prevent or excite the exer- 
cise of their power? We do this, whenever we caress 
or intimidate them, to prevent them from injuring us, or 
to excite them to labor. They are, then, subjects of gov- 
ernment, as truly as man. 

Is there, then, no difference between the intelligent 
and voluntary action of a brute, and the moral action of 
a man ? Suppose a brute and a man both to perform the 
same action ; as, for instance, suppose the brute to kill its 
offspring, and the man to murder his child. Are these 
actions of the same character ? Do we entertain the same 
feelings towards the authors of them ? Do we treat the 
authors in the same manner, and with the design of pro- 
ducing in them the same result ? 

I think no one can answer these questions in the affir- 
mative. We pity the brute, but we are filled with in- 
dignation against the man. In the one case, we say 
there has been harm done, in the other, injury com- 
mitted. We feel that the man deserves punishment : we 
have no such feeling towards the brute. We say that 
the man has done wrong ; but we never affirm this of the 
brute. We may attempt to produce in the brute such a 
recollection of the offence, as may deter him from the act 
in future ; but we can do no more. We attempt, in the 
other case, to make the man sensible of the act as wrong, 
and to produce in him a radical change of character ; so 
that he not only would not commit the crime again, but 
would be inherently averse to the commission of it. 

These considerations are, I think, sufficient to render 
it evident, that we perceive an element in the actions of 
men, which does not exist in the actions of brutes. 
What is this element ? 

If we should ask a child, he would tell us that the man 
knows better. This would be his mode of explaining it. 

But what is meant by knowing better ? Did not the 
brute and the man both know that the result of their ac- 
tion would be harm ? Did not both intend that it should 



OF MORAL ACTION. 



be harm ? In what respect, then, did the one know letter 
than the other ? 

I think that a plain man or a child would answer, the 
man Jcnew that he ought not to do it, and that the brute 
did not ~know that he ought not to do it ; or he might 
say, the man knew, and the brute did not know, that it 
was wrong ; but whatever terms he might employ, they 
would involve the same idea. I do not know that a phi- 
losopher could give a more satisfactory answer. 

If the question, then, be asked, what is a moral action ? 
we may answer, it is the voluntary action of an intelli- 
gent agent, who is capable of distinguishing between right 
and wrong, or of distinguishing what he ought, from what 
he ought not, to do. 

It is, however, to be remarked, that, although action is 
defined to be the putting forth of power, it is not inten- 
ded to be asserted, that the moral quality exists only 
where power is actually exerted. It is manifest, that 
our thoughts and resolutions may be deserving either 
of praise or of blame ; that is, may be either right or 
wrong, where they do not appear in action. When the 
will consents to the performance of an action, though the 
act be not done, the omniscient Deity justly considers us 
as either virtuous or vicious. 

From what has been said, it may be seen that there 
exists, in the actions of men, an element which does not 
exist in the actions of brutes. Hence, though both are 
subjects of government, the government of the one should 
be constructed upon principles different from that of the 
other. We can operate upon brutes only by fear of pun- 
ishment, and hope of reward. We can operate upon 
man, not only in this manner, but, also, by an appeal to 
his consciousness of right and wrong ; and by the use of 
such means as may improve his moral nature. Hence, 
all modes of punishment which treat men as we treat 
brutes, are as un philosophical as they are thoughtless, 
cruel and vindictive. Such are those systems of criminal 
jurisprudence, which have in view nothing more than the 
infliction of pain upon the offender. The leading object 



26 



IN WHAT PART OF AN ACTION DO WE 



of all such systems should be to reclaim the vicious. 
Such was the result to which all the investigations of 
Howard led. Such is the improvement which Prison 
Discipline societies are laboring to effect. 

And it is worthy of remark, that the Christian precept 
respecting the treatment of injuries, proceeds precisely 
upon this principle. The New Testament teaches us to 
love our enemies, to do good to those that hate us, to 
overcome evil with good ; that is, to set before a man 
who does wrong, the strongest possible exemplification of 
the opposite moral quality, right. Now, it is manifest, 
that nothing would be so likely to show to an injurious 
person the turpitude of his own conduct, and to produce 
in him self-reproach and repentance, as precisely this sort 
of moral exhibition. Revenge and retaliation might, or 
might not, prevent a repetition of the injury to a particular 
individual. The requiting of evil with good, in addition to 
this effect, has an inherent tendency to produce sorrow 
for the act, and dislike to its moral quality ; and thus, by 
producing a change of character, to prevent the repeti- 
tion of the offence under all circumstances hereafter. 



SECTION III. 

IN WHAT PART OF AN ACTION DO WE DISCOVER ITS MORAL 
QUALITY ? 

In a deliberate action, four distinct elements may be 
commonly observed. These are — 

1. The outward act, as when I put money into the 
hands of another. 

2. The conception of this act, of which the external 
performance is the mere bodying forth. 

3. The resolution to carry that conception into effect 

4. The intention, or design, with which all this is done. 
Now, the moral quality does not belong to the exter- 



DISCOVER ITS MORAL QUALITY ? 



27 



nal act ; for the same external act may be performed by 
two men, while its moral character, is, in the two cases, 
entirely dissimilar. 

Nor does it belong to the conception, nor to the reso- 
lution to carry that conception into effect ; for the resolu- 
tion to perform an action can have no other character 
than that of the action itself. It must, then, reside in the 
intention. 

That such is the fact, may be illustrated by an exam- 
ple. A and B both give to C a piece of money. They 
both conceived of this action before they performed it. 
They both resolved to do precisely what they did. In 
all this, both actions coincide. A, however, gave it to C, 
with the intention of procuring the murder of a friend ; B, 
with the intention of relieving a family in distress. It is 
evident that, in this case, the intention gives to the ac- 
tion its character as right or wrong. 

That the moral quality of the action resides in the in- 
tention, may be evident from various other considerations. 

1. By reference to the intention, we inculpate or excul- 
pate others, or ourselves, without any respect to the hap- 
piness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an 
action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on 
the ground of intention, or, on the same ground, we hold 
him innocent. Thus of ourselves. We are conscious of 
guilt or of innocence, not from the result of an action, but 
from the intention by which we were actuated. 

2. We always distinguish between being the instrument 
of good, and intending it. We are grateful to one who 
is the cause of good, not in the proportion of the amount 
effected, but of the amount intended. 

Intention may be wrong in various ways. 

As, for instance, first, where we intend to injure anoth- 
er, as in cruelty, malice, revenge, deliberate slander. 

Here, however, it may be remarked, that we may in- 
tend to inflict pain, without intending wrong ; for we may 
be guilty of the violation of no right. Such is the case ? 
when pain is inflicted for the purposes of justice ; for it is 
manifest, that, if a man deserve pain, it is no violation of 



28 



IN WHAT PART OF AN ACTION, ETC. 



right to inflict it. Hence we see the difference between 
harm, injury and punishment. We harm another when 
we actually inflict pain ; we injure him when we inflict 
pain in violation of his rights ; we punish him when we 
inflict pain which he deserves, — and in so doing, there is, 
therefore, a violation of no right, 

2. Intention is wrong, where we act for the gratifica- 
tion of our own passions, without any respect to the hap- 
piness of others. Such is the case of seduction, ambition, 
and, in nations, commonly, of war. Every man is bound 
to restrain the indulgence of his passions within such lim- 
its, that they will work no ill to his neighbor. If they 
actually inflict injury, it is no excuse to say that he had 
no ill will to the individual injured. The Creator never 
conferred on him the right to destroy another's happiness 
for his own gratification. 

3. As the right and wrong of an action resides in the 
intention, it is evident, that, where an action is intended, 
though it be not actually performed, that intention is wor- 
thy of praise or blame, as much as the action itself, provi- 
ded the action itself be wholly out of our power. Thus 
God rewarded David for intending to build the temple, 
though he did not permit him actually to build it. 

4. As the right or wrong exists in the intention, wher- 
ever a particular intention is essential to virtuous action, 
the performance of the external act, without that intention, 
is destitute of the element of virtue. Thus, a child is 
bound to obey his parents, with the intention of thus 
manifesting his love and gratitude. If he do it from fear, 
or from hope of gain, the act is destitute of the virtue of 
filial obedience, and becomes merely the result of passion 
or self-interest. And thus our Savior charges upon the 
Jews the want of the proper intention, in all their deal- 
ings with God. " I know you," said he, " that ye have 
not the love of God in you." 

And, again, it is manifest, that our moral feelings, like 
our taste, may be excited by the conceptions of our own 
imagination, scarcely less than by the reality. These, 
therefore, may develop moral character. He who raedi- 



WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION, ETC. 29 

tates, with pleasure, upon fictions of pollution and crime, 
whether originating with himself or with others, renders it 
evident that nothing but opposing circumstances prevents 
him from being himself an actor in the crime which he 
loves. And still more, as the moral character of an ac- 
tion resides in the intention, and as whatever tends to 
corrupt the intention must be wrong, the meditating with 
pleasure upon vice, which has manifestly this tendency, 
must be wrong also. 

And here let me add, that the imagination of man is 
the fruitful parent both of virtue and vice. Thus saith 
the wise man, "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for 
out of it are the issues of life." No man becomes openly 
a villain, until his imagination has become familiar with 
conceptions of villany. The crimes which astonish us by 
their atrocity, were first arranged, and acted, and reacted, 
in the recesses of the criminal's own mind. Let the im- 
agination, then, be most carefully guarded, if we wish to 
escape from temptation, and make progress in virtue. Let 
no one flatter himself that he is innocent, if he love to med- 
itate upon any thing which he would blush to avow be- 
fore men, or fear to unveil before God. 



SECTION IV. 

WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION OF THE MORAL QUALITY 
OF ACTIONS? 

To this question several answers have been given. 
Some of them we shall proceed to consider. 

] . Is our notion of right and wrong a modification of 
any other idea ? 

The only modifications of which an idea is susceptible, 
are, first, that of greater or less vividness of impression, 
or, secondly, that of simplicity of composition. Thus, 
the quality of beauty may impress us more or less forcibly, 



30 



WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION OF 



in the contemplation of different objects ; or, on the other 
hand, the idea of beauty may be simple, or else combined, 
in our conceptions, with the idea of utility. 

Now, if our notion of right and wrong be a modification 
of some other idea, in the first sense, then one degree of 
the original quality will be destitute of any moral element, 
and another degree of it will possess a moral element ; and, 
by ascending higher in the scale, it may at last lose all its 
original character, and possess another, having no remains 
of resemblance to itself. This would be to say, that a 
quality, by becoming more intense, ceased to be itself ; as 
if a triangle, by becoming more perfect as a triangle, at 
last became a square. Thus, if it be said, that the idea of 
right and wrong is a modification of the idea of beauty, 
then the same object, if beautiful in one degree, would 
have no moral quality ; if beautiful in another degree, 
would begin to be virtuous ; and, if beautiful in the highest 
degree, would cease to be beautiful, and be purely virtu- 
ous or holy. What meaning could be attached to such 
an affirmation, I am not able to discover. 

The other meaning of a modification of an idea, is, that 
it is compounded with some other idea. Now, suppose 
our notion of right and wrong to be a modification in this 
latter sense. Then this notion either enters into the orig- 
inal elements of the compound idea, or it does not. If it 
does, then it is already present ; and this supposition does 
not account for its existence. If it does not enter into the 
elements of the compound idea, then these elements must 
exist either merely combined, but each possessing its orig- 
inal character, in which combination the moral idea is not 
involved ; or else they must lose their original character, 
and be merely the stated antecedents to another idea, which 
is an idea like neither of them, either separately or com- 
bined. In this latter case, it is manifest, that the consequent 
of an antecedent is no modification of the antecedent, but 
an entirely different subject, coming into existence under 
these particular circumstances, and in obedience to the 
laws of its own organization. Do we ever term a salt a 
modification of an acid, or of an alkali, or of an acid and 



THE MORAL QUALITY OF ACTIONS ? 



31 



alkali united ? Is the explosive power of gunpowder, a 
modification of the spark and the gunpowder? We think, 
then, it may be safely concluded, that the notion of right 
and wrong is not a modification of any other idea. 

If any one assert, that it universally ensues upon the 
combination of two other ideas, it will become him to show 
what those two ideas are, neither of which involves the 
notion of right and wrong, but upon the combination of 
which, this notion always arises, while the original ele- 
ments which precede it, entirely disappear. 

2. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived 
from an exercise of the judgment ? 

Judgment is that act oi the mind, by which, a subject 
and a predicate being known, we affirm, that the predicate 
belongs to the subject. Thus, he who knows what grass 
is, and what green is, affirms that grass is green. But in 
this act of the mind, the notion of the two things of which 
the affirmation is made, must exist before the act of judg- 
ment can be exerted. A man who had no notion of grass, 
nor of green, could never affirm the one of the other. And 
so of any other instances of this act. A man who had no 
notion of right or wrong, could never affirm this quality of 
any subject ; much less could he, by this faculty, acquire 
the original idea. And thus, in general, the judgment 
only affirms a relation to exist between two notions which 
previously existed in the mind ; but it can give us no orig- 
inal notions of quality, either in morals or in any thing 
else. 

3. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived 
from association ? 

The term association, is used to designate two habits of 
mind, considerably alike. The first is that, by which the 
sight or recollection of one object, calls to recollection some 
other object, to which it stands in some particular relation. 
Thus, the sight of a hearse may recall to recollection the 
death of a friend; or the sound of his native language, in 
a foreign country, may awaken in the breast of an exile all 
the recollections of home. The second case is, where a 
particular emotion, belonging to one train of circumstances, 
4 



32 



WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION 



is awakened by another, with which it has no necessary 
connection ; and this first emotion comes at last to be 
awakened by the accidental, instead of by the necessary, 
antecedent. Thus, the countenance of a person may be 
suited to awaken no emotion of pleasure in itself; but, if 
I become acquainted with him, and am pleased with his 
moral and intellectual character, a degree of pleasure is, 
at last, excited by his countenance, which, in the end, ap- 
pears to me agreeable, or, it may be, beautiful. 

Now, in both these cases, it is evident that no new idea 
is gained. In the one case, a well known idea is revived ; 
in the other, two known ideas are connected in a new re- 
lation : but this is all. Association is the faculty by which 
we transfer ; but we can transfer nothing which did not 
previously exist. We could never use the idea of right 
and wrong by association, unless we had already acquired 
it. In the acts of judgment and association, therefore, as 
the existence of the notion must be presupposed, neither of 
these acts will account for the origin of the notion itself. 

4. Is our notion of the moral quality of actions derived 
from the idea of the greatest amount of happiness? 

Thus, it is said, that our notion of right and wrong is 
derived from our idea of productiveness of happiness, or, 
in other words, that an action is right or wrong because it 
is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. 

When the affirmative of this question is asserted, it is, I 
presume, taken for granted, that the idea of right and 
wrong, and of productiveness of the greatest amount of 
happiness, are two distinct ideas. If they be not, then 
one cannot be derived from the other; for nothing can cor- 
rectly be said to be a cause of itself. We shall, therefore, 
consider them as different ideas, and inquire, in what sense 
it is true that the one is the cause of the other. 

When we speak of two events in nature, of which 
one is the cause of the other, we use the word in one of 
the following senses. First, we use it to denote stated 
antecedency merely ; as, when we say that sensation is the 
cause of perception, or, that a man perceives an external 
object, because an impression is made upon an organ of 



OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF ACTIONS ? 



33 



sense. Secondly, we use it to signify the fact, that the 
event or change of which we speak, may be referred to 
some law or fact, more general than itself. We say, in 
other words, that the fact in question is a species under 
some genus, with which it agrees as to generic qualities ; 
and from which it is distinguished by its specific differ- 
ences. Thus, when asked why a stone falls to the earth, 
we reply, because all matter is reciprocally attractive to 
all other matter. This is the generic fact, under which 
the fact in question is to be comprehended ; and its specific 
difference is, that it is a particular form of matter, attracted 
by a particular form of matter, and probably unlike the 
matter of the planets, the comets, or the sun. 

First. When it is said that an action is right, because 
it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, sup- 
pose because to be used in the first of these senses. It will 
then mean, that we are so constituted, that the idea of the 
greatest amount of happiness is always the stated antece- 
dent to the idea of right, or moral obligation. Now, this 
is a question purely of fact. It does not admit of a reason 
a priori. And, if it be the fact, it must be the universal 
fact ; that is to say, this consequent must always, under 
similar conditions, be preceded by this antecedent, and 
this antecedent be followed by this consequent. 

To facts, then, let us appeal. Is it a fact, that we are 
conscious of the existence of this connection ? When we 
are conscious that an act is right, is this consciousness pre- 
ceded by a conviction that this action will be productive 
of the greatest amount of happiness ? When we say it is 
wrong to lie or to steal, do we find this consciousness pre- 
ceded by the notion, that lying or stealing will not produce 
the greatest amount of happiness ? When we say that a 
murderer deserves death, do we find this notion preceded 
by the other, that murder will not produce the greatest 
amount of happiness, and that putting a murderer to death 
will produce it ? When we say that a man ought to obey 
God, his Creator and Preserver, do we find this conviction 
preceded by the other ; that the exercise of this affection 
will produce the greatest amount of happiness ? Now, I 
may have greatly mistaken the nature of moral affections ; 



34 



WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION 



but I am much deceived if many persons will not be found, 
who will declare, that, often as they have formed these 
judgments, the idea of the greatest amount of happiness 
never actually entered into their conception. 

Or take the case of children. When you would im- 
press upon a child the duty of obeying its parents, or of 
loving God, do you begin by explaining to it the idea of 
the greatest, amount of happiness ? Are we obliged to 
make use of this antecedent, in order to produce this con- 
sequent ? If so, it surely would take a much longer 
time than is actually required, to produce in* a child any 
moral sensibility. Do we not find children, well instructed 
into the consciousness of right and wrong, who could not 
be made to comprehend the notion of the greatest amount 
of happiness ? 

How do we attempt to arouse the consciences of the 
heathen ? When w r e tell them that they ought to obey 
God, and believe on Jesus Christ, do we begin by explain- 
ing to them that this course of life will produce the great- 
est amount of happiness ? Suppose we could never arouse 
them to duty, until we had produced a conviction of the 
amount of happiness which would result to the universe 
from piety, would a single one of them ever listen to us 
long enough to understand our doctrine ? 

Does the Bible any where assert, that the conviction of 
the greatest amount of happiness is necessary to the exist- 
ence of moral obligation ? If I mistake not, it presents a 
very different view of the subject. It declares that the 
heathen are without excuse. But why ? Because disobe- 
dience to God interferes with the greatest amount of hap- 
piness? No, but for a very different reason. " Because 
that ivhich may be known of God is manifest in them, 
for God hath showed it unto them ; so that they are 
without excuse." Rom. i, 19, 20. St. Paul here seems 
to assume-, that the revelation of God's eternal power 
and divinity, and the manifestation of his will, are suffi- 
cient, of themselves, without any other consideration, to 
make whatever he shall command obligatory upon his 
creatures. 

It seems, then, to me, by no means proved, that an ac- 



OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF ACTIONS ? 35 

tion is right because it is productive of the greatest amount 
of happiness ; if we mean by it that the one idea is the 
stated antecedent to the other, in our conceptions. 

Secondly. But let us take the other meaning of because. 
Suppose it said, that the idea of moral obligation is an idea 
comprehended under, and to be referred to, a more gen- 
eral idea, namely, that of the productiveness of the great- 
est amount of happiness. Now, if this be the case, then, 
manifestly, either the notion of the greatest amount of 
happiness, and the notion of right, must be equally exten- 
sive ; that is, must extend precisely to the same number 
of individual instances : or else their extent must be dif- 
ferent ; that is, the generic notion of the greatest amount 
of happiness must comprehend cases which are excluded 
from its species, the idea of right. If the latter be the 
case, then, there will be some cases in which an action 
would produce the greatest amount of happiness, which 
would not contain the moral element ; and, besides, if 
this were the case, it would become those who make this 
assertion, to show what is that other element, which, 
combining with the idea of the greatest amount of happi- 
ness, designates the subordinate and different idea, as the 
idea of moral obligation. This, however, would not be 
attempted, and it will be at once admitted, that these two 
ideas are, in their nature, coextensive ; that is, that what- 
ever is productive of the greatest amount of happiness, is 
right, and whatever is right, is productive of the greatest 
amount, of happiness. 

Let us suppose it then to be assumed, that the terms are 
precisely coextensive, viz., that they apply exactly to the 
same actions and in the same degrees. It would then be 
difficult to assign a meaning to the word because, cor- 
responding with either of the senses above stated. Nor, 
if two terms are precisely coextensive, do I see how it is 
possible to discover which of the two is to be referred to 
the other ; or, whether either is to be referred to either. 
If A and B are equally extensive, I do not see how we 
can determine whether A is to be referred to B, or B to 
be referred to A. 

4* 



36 WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION 

The only meaning which I can conceive as capable 
of being attached to the assertion, is this ; that we would 
not be under moral obligation to perform any action, un- 
less it were productive of the greatest amount of happi- 
ness ; thus making moral obligation rest upon this other 
idea, that of the greatest amount of happiness. 

Now, if this be asserted, it is, surely, from what has 
been said above, not self-evident ; for we manifestly do 
not instinctively and universally, as soon as this connec- 
tion is asserted, yield our assent to it, nor is it absurd to 
deny it ; and, therefore, the assertion is capable of proof, 
and we may justly demand the proof before we believe it. 
Let us, then, examine the proof on which it rests. 

It is, however, to be remarked, that, if the assertion be 
true, that we are under obligation to perform an action 
only on the ground that it is productive of the greatest 
good, the assertion must be taken in its widest sense. It 
must apply to actions affecting our relations, not only to 
man, but also to God ; for these are equally comprehend- 
ed within the notion of moral obligation. And thus, the 
assertion is, that we are not under obligation to perform any 
action whatever, under any circumstances, unless it be 
productive of the greatest amount of happiness. 

1. It is said, that these two always coincide ; that is, 
that we always are under obligation to do whatever is 
productive of the greatest amount of happiness ; and that, 
whatever we are under obligation to do, is productive of 
the greatest amount of happiness. Now, granting the 
premises, I do not see that the conclusion would follow. 
It is possible to conceive, that God may have created 
moral agents under obligations to certain courses of con- 
duct, and has so arranged the system of the universe, that 
the following of these courses shall be for the best, 
without making the obligation to rest at all upon the 
tendency to produce the greatest amount of happiness. 

A parent may require a child to do that which will be 
for the good of the family ; and yet there may be other 
reasons besides this, which render it the duty of the child 
to obey his parent. 

2. But, secondly, how do we know that these premises 



OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF ACTIONS ? 



37 



are true, that, whatever we are under obligation to do, 
is productive of the greatest amount of happiness ? It 
never can be known, unless we know the whole history 
of this universe from everlasting to everlasting. And, be- 
sides, we know that God always acts right, that is, deals 
with all beings according to their deserts ; but whether 
he always acts to promote the greatest happiness, I do 
not know that he has told us. His government could not 
be more perfectly right than it is ; but whether it could 
have involved less misery, or have produced more hap- 
piness, I do not know that we have the means of ascer- 
taining. As, therefore, the one quantity, so to speak, is 
fixed, that is, is as great as it can be, while we do not 
certainly know that the other is as great as it can be, we 
cannot affirm that right and the greatest amount of happi- 
ness always coincide ; nor, that we are under obligation to 
do nothing, unless it would tend to produce the greatest 
amount of happiness. 

3. Besides, suppose we are under no obligation to do 
any thing unless it were productive of the greatest amount 
of happiness, it would follow that we are under no obliga- 
tion to obey God, unless the production of the greatest 
amount of happiness were the controlling and universal 
principle of his government. That is, if his object, in 
creating and governing the universe, were any other, or, 
if it were doubtful whether it might not be any other, our 
obligation to obedience would either be annihilated, or 
would be contingent ; that is, it would be inversely as the 
degree of doubt which might exist. Now, as I have be- 
fore remarked, this may, or may not, be the ultimate end 
of God's government ; or it may be his own pleasure, or 
his own glory, or some other end, which he has not seen 
fit to reveal to us ; and, therefore, on the principle which 
we are discussing, our obligation to obedience seems a 
matter yet open for discussion. Now, if I mistake not, 
this is wholly at variance with the whole tenor of Scrip- 
ture and reason. I do not know that the Scriptures ever 
give us a reason why we ought to obey God, aside from 
his existence and attributes, or that they ever put this 
subject in a light susceptible of a question. 



38 WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION 

To this view of the subject, the following remarks of 
Bishop Butler manifestly tend : " Perhaps divine good- 
ness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in 
our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to 
produce happiness ; but a disposition to make the good, 
the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely 
perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures 
behave suitably with the nature which he has given them, 
to the relations which he has placed them to each other, 
and to that in which they stand to himself ; that relation 
to himself, which during their existence is ever necessary, 
and which is the most important one of all. I say, an 
infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral- 
piety of moral agents in and for itself, as well as upon 
account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness 
of his creation. Or the whole end for which God made 
and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond the 
reach of our faculties.: there may be somewhat in it, as 
impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind 
man to have a conception of colors." Analogy, part 1, 
ch. 2. 

Again. " Some men seem to think the only character 
of the Author of nature, to be that of single, absolute be- 
nevolence. This, considered as a principle of action, and 
infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest 
possible happiness, without regard to persons' behavior, 
otherwise than as such regard would produce the highest 
degrees of it. And, supposing this to be the only charac- 
ter of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing 
but benevolence, conducted by wisdom. Now surely this 
ought not to be asserted, unless it can be proved ; for we 
should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject. 
There may possibly be, in the creation, beings, to whom 
the Author of nature manifests himself under this most 
amiable of all characters, this of infinite, absolute benevo- 
lence ; for it is the most amiable, supposing it is not, as 
perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice ; but he mani- 
fests himself to us under the character of a Righteous 
Governor. He may, consistently with this, be simply and 



OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF ACTIONS ? 



39 



absolutely benevolent, in the sense now explained ; but he 
is, for he has given us a proof, in the constitution and 
government of the world, that he is, a Governor over 
servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our actions." 
Analogy, ch. 3. 

For these reasons, I think it is not proved that an action 
is right because it is productive of the greatest amount of 
happiness. It may be so, or it may not, but we ought not 
to believe it to be so without proof ; and it may even be 
doubted whether we are in possession of the media of 
proof, that is, whether it is a question fairly within the 
reach of the human faculties ; and, so far as we can learn 
from the Scriptures, I think their testimony is decidedly 
against the supposition. To me the Scriptures seem ex- 
plicitly to declare, that the will of God alone is sufficient 
to create the obligation to obedience in all his creatures ; 
and that this will, of itself, precludes every other inquiry. 
This seems to be the view of St. Paul, in the passage 
which we have quoted, as well as in several other places, 
in his Epistle to the Romans. To the same import is the 
prayer of our Savior, " I thank thee, O Father, Lord of 
heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things 
from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto 
babes ; even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy 
sight." 

It seems, therefore, to me, that these explanations of 
the origin of our moral sentiments are unsatisfactory. 
I believe the idea of a moral quality in actions to be 
ultimate, to arise under such circumstances as have 
been appointed by our Creator, and that we can assign 
for it no other reason, than that such is his will concerning 
us. 

If this be true, our only business will be, to state the 
circumstances under which our moral notions arise. In 
doing this, it would be presumption in me to expect that 
I shall be able to give an account of this subject more 
satisfactory to others, than theirs has been to me. I 
merely offer it as that which seems to me most accurately 
to correspond with the phenomena. 



40 



WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION 



The view which I take of this subject is briefly as 
follows : 

1. It is manifest to every one that we all stand in vari- 
ous and dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, 
created and uncreated, with which we are acquainted. 
Among our relations to created beings are those of man to 
man, or that of substantial equality, of parent and child, 
of benefactor and recipient, of husband and wife, of brother 
and brother, citizen and citizen, citizen and magistrate, 
and a thousand others. 

2. Now, it seems to me, that as soon as a human being 
comprehends the relation in which two human beings stand 
to each other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of 
moral obligation, connected, by our Creator, with the 
very conception of this relation. And the fact is the 
same, whether he be one of the parties or not. The 
nature of this feeling is, that the one ought to exercise 
certain dispositions towards the others to whom he is thus 
related ; and to act towards them in a manner correspond- 
ing with those dispositions. 

3. The nature of these dispositions varies of course 
with the relations. Thus, those of a parent to a child are 
different from those of a child to a parent ; those of a 
benefactor to a recipient, from those of a recipient to a 
benefactor : and both of them differ from that of a brother 
to a brother, or of a master to a servant. But different as 
these may be from each other, they are all pervaded by 
the same generic feeling, that of moral obligation; that is, 
we feel that we ought to be thus or thus disposed, and to 
act in this or that manner. 

4. This I suppose to be our constitution, in regard to 
created beings ; and such do I suppose would be our feel- 
ing, irrespectively of any notion of the Deity. That is, 
upon the conception of these and such like relations, there 
would immediately arise this feeling of moral obligation, to 
act towards those sustaining these relations, in a particular 
manner. 

5. But there is an Uncreated Being to whom we stand 
in relations infinitely more intimate and inconceivably 



OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF ACTIONS ? 



41 



more solemn, than any of those of which we have spoken. 
It is that Infinite Being, who stands to us in the relation 
of Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Lawgiver, and Judge; 
and to whom we stand in the relation of dependent, help- 
less, ignorant, and sinful creatures. How much this rela- 
tion involves, we cannot possibly know ; but so much as 
this we know, that it involves obligations greater than our 
intellect can estimate. We cannot contemplate it, with- 
out feeling that, from the very fact of its existence, we are 
under obligations to entertain the disposition of filial love 
and obedience towards God, and to act precisely as he 
shall condescend to direct. And this obligation arises, 
simply from the fact of the relation existing between the 
parties, and irrespectively of any other consideration ; and 
if it be not felt, when the relations are perceived, it can 
never be produced by any view of the consequences 
which would arise to the universe from exercising it. 

6. This relation, and its consequent obligation, involve, 
comprehend, and transcen d every other. Hence it places 
obligation to man, upon a new foundation. For if we be 
ourselves thus under illimitable obligations to God, and if, 
by virtue of the relation which he sustains to the creation, 
he is the Protector, Ruler, and Proprietor of all, we are 
under obligations to obey him in every thing. And as 
every other being is also his creature, we are bound to 
treat that creature as he its Proprietor shall direct. Hence 
we_ are bound to perform the obligation under which we 
stand to his creatures, not merely on account of our re- 
lations to them, but also on account of the relations in 
which we and they stand to God. 

And hence, in general, our feeling of moral obligation 
is a peculiar and instinctive impulse, arising at once by 
the principles of our constitution, as soon as the relations 
are perceived in which we stand to the beings, created 
and uncreated, with whom we are connected. 

The proof of this must rest, as I am aware, with every 
man's consciousness. A few illustrative remarks may, 
however, not be altogether useless. 

I think, if we reflect upon the subject, that the manner 



42 



WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION 



in which we attempt to awaken moral feelings, confirms 
the view which I have taken. In such a case, if I mis- 
take not, we always place before the mind the relation in 
which the parties stand to each other. 

If we wish to awaken in ourselves gratitude to another, 
we do not reflect that this affection will produce the 
greatest good; but we remember the individual in the 
relation of benefactor ; and we place this relation in the 
strongest possible light. If this will not produce gratitude, 
our effort, of necessity, fails. 

If we desire to inflame moral indignation against crime, 
we show the relations in which the parties stand to 
each other, and expect hence to produce a conviction 
of the greatness of the obligation which such turpitude 
violates. 

So, if we wish to overcome evil with good, we place 
ourselves in the relation of benefactor to the injurious per- 
son ; and, in spite of himself, he is frequently compelled 
to yield to the law of his nature ; and gratitude for 
favors, and sorrow for injury, spontaneously. arise in his 
bosom. 

And, in the plan of man's redemption, it seems to me 
that the Deity has acted on this principle. Irrespectively 
of a remedial dispensation, he is known to us only as a 
Creator, all wise and all powerful, perfect in holiness, 
justice, and truth. To our fallen nature, these attributes 
could minister nothing but terror. He, therefore, has re- 
vealed himself to us in the relation of a Savior and Re- 
deemer, a God forgiving transgression and iniquity ; and 
thus, by all the power of this new relation, he imposes 
upon us new obligations to gratitude, repentance, and 
love. 

And hence it is, that God always asserts, that, as from 
the fact of this new relation, our obligations to him are 
increased ; so, he who rejects the gospel is in a special 
manner a sinner, and is exposed to a more terrible con- 
demnation. The climax of all that is awful in the doom 
of the unbelieving, is expressed by the terms, " the wrath 
of the Lamb." 



OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF ACTIONS ? 



43 



Again. I am not much accustomed to such refined 
speculations ; but I think that obedience or love to God, 
from any more ultimate motive, than that this affection is 
due to him because he is God, and our God, is not piety. 
Thus, if a child say, I will obey my father, because it is 
for the happiness of the family ; what the character of this 
action would be, I am not prepared to say ; but I think 
the action would not be filial obedience. Filial obedi- 
ence is the obeying of another, because he is my father ; 
and it is filial obedience, only in so far as it proceeds 
from this motive. This will be evident, if we substitute 
for the love of the happiness of the family, the love of 
money, or some other such motive. Every one sees, that 
it would not be filial obedience, for a child to obey his 
parent because he would be well paid for it. 

Now, it seems to me, that the same principle applies in 
the other case. To feel under obligation to love God, 
because this affection would be productive of the greatest 
good, and not on account of what he is, and of the rela- 
tions in which he stands to us, seems to me not to be 
piety ; that is, not to be the feeling, which a creature is 
bound to exercise towards his Creator. If the obligation 
to the love of God can really arise from any thing more 
ultimate than the essential relation which he sustains to 
us, why may not this more ultimate motive be something 
else, as well as the love of the greatest good ? I do not 
say that any thing else would be as benevolent ; but I 
speak metaphysically, and say, that, if real piety, or love 
to God, may truly spring from any thing more ultimate 
than God himself, I do not see why it may not spring 
from one thing as well as from another; and thus, true 
piety might spring from various and dissimilar motives, no 
one of which has any real reference to God himself. 

My view of this subject, in few words, is as follows : 

1. We stand in relations to the several beings with 
which we are connected, such, that some of them, as 
soon as they are conceived, suggest to us the idea of moral 
obligation. 

2. Our relations to our fellow-men, suggest this convic- 

5 



44 WHENCE DO WE DERIVE OUR NOTION, ETC. 

tion, in a limited and restricted sense, corresponding to the 
idea of general or essential equality. 

3. The relation in which we stand to the Deity, sug- 
gests the conviction of universal and unlimited love and 
obedience. This binds us to proper dispositions towards 
Him; and, also, to such dispositions towards his creatures, 
as he shall appoint. 

4. Hence, our duties to man are enforced by a twofold 
obligation ; first, because of our relations to man as man ; 
and, secondly, because of our relation to man, as being, 
with ourselves, a creature of God. 

5. And hence an act, which is performed in obedience 
to our obligations to man, may be virtuous ; but it is not 
pious, unless it also be performed in obedience to our obliga- 
tions to God. 

6. And hence we see that two things are necessary, in 
order to constitute any being a moral agent. They are, 
first, that he possess an intellectual power, by which he 
can understand the relation in which he stands to the 
beings by whom he is surrounded ; secondly, that he pos- 
sess a moral power by which the feeling of obligation is 
suggested to him, as soon as the relation in which he stands 
is understood. This is sufficient to render him a moral 
agent. He is accountable, just in proportion to the op- 
portunity which he has enjoyed, for acquiring a know- 
ledge of the relations in which he stands, and of the man- 
ner in which his obligations are to be discharged. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL SENSE. 



SECTION I. 

IS THERE A CONSCIENCE ? 

By conscience, or the moral sense, is meant, that faculty 
by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by 
which we are capable of certain affections in respect to 
this quality. 

By faculty, is meant any particular part of our consti- 
tution, by which we become affected by the various qual- 
ities and relations of beings around us. Thus, by taste, 
we are conscious of the existence of beauty and deform- 
ity ; by perception, we acquire a knowledge of the exist- 
ence and qualities of the material world. And, in general, 
if we discern any quality in the universe, or produce or 
suffer any change, it seems almost a truism to say, that 
we have a faculty, or power, for so doing. A man who 
sees, must have eyes, or the faculty for seeing ; and if he 
have not eyes, this is considered a sufficient reason why 
he should not see. And thus, it is universally admitted, 
that there may be a thousand qualities in nature, of which 
we have no knowledge, for the simple reason, that we 
have not been created with the faculties for discerning 
them. There is a world without us, and a world within 
us, which exactly correspond to each other. Unless both 
exist, we can never be conscious of the existence of 
either. 

Now, that we do actually observe a moral quality in 
the actions of men, must, I think, be admitted. Every 



46 



IS THERE A CONSCIENCE? 



human being is conscious, that, from childhood, he has 
observed it. We do not say, that all men discern this 
quality with equal accuracy, any more than that they all 
see with equal distinctness : but we say, that all men per- 
ceive it in some actions ; and that there is a multitude of 
cases in which their perceptions of it will be found uni- 
versally to agree. And, moreover, this quality, and the 
v feeling which accompanies the perception of it, are un- 
like those derived from every other faculty. 

The question would then seem reduced to this, do we 
perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or by 
a combination of faculties ? I think it must be evident, 
from what has been already stated, that this notion is, in 
its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every 
other notion. Now, if this be the case, it seems self- 
evident, that we must have a distinct and separate facul- 
ty, to make us acquainted with the existence of this dis- 
tinct and separate quality. This is the case in respect 
to all other distinct qualities : it is, surely, reasonable to 
suppose, that it would be the case with this, unless some 
reason can be shown to the contrary. 

But, after all, this question is, to the moral philosopher, 
of but comparatively little importance. All that is ne- 
cessary to his investigations is, that it be admitted that 
there is such a quality, and that men are so constituted 
as to perceive it, and to be susceptible of certain affections 
in consequence of that perception. Whether these facts 
are accounted for, on the supposition of the existence of 
a single faculty, or of a combination of faculties, will not 
affect the question of moral obligation. All that is neces- 
sary to the prosecution of the science is, that it be admit- 
ted that there is such a quality in actions, and that man 
is endowed with a constitution capable of bringing him 
into relation to it. 

It may, however, be worth while to consider some of 
the objections which have been urged against the suppo- 
sition of the existence of such a faculty. 

1. It has been said, if such a faculty has been bestowed, 
it must have been bestowed universally : but it is not be 



IS THERE A CONSCIENCE? 



47 



stowed universally ; for, what some nations consider right, 
other nations consider wrong, as infanticide, parricide, 
duelling, he. 

To this it may be answered, first, the objection seems 
to admit the universality of the existence of conscience, 
or the power of discerning in certain actions a moral 
quality. It admits that, every where, men make this 
distinction ; but affirms, that, in different countries, they 
refer the quality to different actions. Now, how this dif- 
ference is to be accounted for, may be a question ; but 
the fact, as stated in the objection, shows the universality 
of the power of observing such a quality in actions. 

But, secondly, we have said that we discover the moral 
quality of actions in the intention. Now, it is not the 
fact, that this difference exists, as stated in the objection, 
if the intention of actions be considered. Where was it 
not considered right to intend the happiness of parents ? 
Where was it not considered wrong to intend their misery ? 
Where was it ever considered right to intend to requite 
kindness by injury ? and where was it ever considered 
wrong to intend to requite kindness with still greater 
kindness ? In regard to the manner in which these in- 
tentions may be fulfilled, there may be a difference ; but 
as to the moral quality of these intentions themselves, as 
well as of many others, there is a very universal agree- 
ment among men. 

2. And still more, it will be seen, on examination, that 
in these very cases, in which wrong actions are practised, 
they are justified on the ground of a good intention, or of 
some view of the relations between the parties, which, if 
true, would render them innocent. Thus, if infanticide 
is justified, it is on the ground, that this world is a place 
of misery, and that the infant is better off not to encoun- 
ter its troubles ; that is, that the parent wishes or intends 
well to the child : or else it is defended on the ground, 
that the relation between parent and child is such as con- 
fers on the one the right of life and death over the other ; 
and, therefore, that to take its life is as innocent as the 

slaying of a brute, or the destruction of a vegetable. 
5# 



48 



IS THERE A CONSCIENCE? 



Thus, also, are parricide, and revenge, and various other 
wrong actions defended. Where can the race of men be 
found, be they ever so savage, who need to be told that 
ingratitude is wrong, that parents ought to love their chil- 
dren, or that men ought to be submissive and obedient to 
the Supreme Divinity ? 

And still more, I think one of the strongest exemplifi- 
cations of the universality of moral distinctions, is found 
in the character of many of the ancient heathen. They 
perceived these distinctions, and felt and obeyed the im- 
pulses of conscience, even though at variance with all 
the examples of the deities whom they worshipped. 
Thus, says Rousseau, "Cast your eyes over all the 
nations of the world, and all the histories of nations. 
Amid so many inhuman and absurd superstitions, amid 
that prodigious diversity of manners and characters, you 
will find every where the same principles and distinctions 
of moral good and evil. The paganism of the ancient 
world produced, indeed, abominable gods, who, on earth, 
would have been shunned or punished as monsters ; and 
who offered, as a picture of supreme happiness, only 
crimes to commit, or passions to satiate. But vice, armed 
with this sacred authority, descended in vain from the 
eternal abode. She found, in the heart of man a moral 
instinct to repel her. The continence of Xenocrates 
was admired by those who celebrated the debaucheries 
of Jupiter. The chaste Lucretia adored the unchaste 
Venus. The most intrepid Roman sacrificed to fear. 
He invoked the god who dethroned his father, and died 
without a murmur by the hand of his own. The most 
contemptible divinities were served by the greatest men. 
The holy voice of nature, stronger than that of the gods, 
made itself heard, and respected, and obeyed on earth, 
and seemed to banish to the confines of heaven, guilt and 
the guilty." Quoted by Dr. Brown, Lecture 75. 

3. Again, the objection has been made in another form. 
It is said, that savages violate, without remorse or com- 
punction, the plainest principles of right. Such is the 
case, when they are guilty of revenge and licentiousness. 



IS THERE A CONSCIENCE ? 



49 



This objection has been partly considered before. It 
may, however, be added, 

First. No men nor any class of men violate every 
moral precept without compunction ; without the feeling 
of guilt, and the consciousness of desert of punishment. 

Second. Hence the objection will rather prove the 
existence of a defective or imperfect conscience, than that 
no such faculty exists. The same objection would prove 
us destitute of taste or of understanding ; because these 
faculties exist, in an imperfect state, among savages and 
uncultivated men. 

4. It has been objected, again, that, if we suppose this 
faculty to exist, it is, after all, useless ; for if a man please 
to violate it, and to suffer the pain, then this is the end 
of the question, and, as Dr. Paley says, " the moral in- 
stinct man has nothing more to offer." 

To this, it may be answered : 

The objection proceeds upon a mistake respecting the 
function of Conscience. Its use is, to teach us to dis- 
cern our moral obligations, and to impel us towards the * 
corresponding action. It is not pretended, by the be- 
lievers in a moral sense, that man may not, after all, do 
as he chooses. All that is contended for is, that he is 
constituted with such a faculty, and that the possession of 
it is necessary to his moral accountability. It is in his 
power to obey it or to disobey it, just as he pleases. The 
fact that a man may obey or disobey conscience, no more 
proves that it does not exist, than the fact that he some- 
times does, and sometimes does not obey, passion, proves 
that he is destitute of passion. 



50 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 



SECTION II. 

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE IS 
EXPRESSED. 

Whoever will attentively observe the operations of his 
own mind, when deciding upon a moral question, and 
when carrying that decision into effect, will, I think, be 
conscious of several distinct forms of moral feeling. These 
I suppose to be the following ; 

I. Suppose we are deliberating, respecting an action, 
before performing it. 

1. If we pause, and candidly consider the nature of an 
action, which involves, in any respect, our relations with 
others ; amidst the various qualities which characterize 
the action, we shall not fail to perceive its moral quality. 
We may perceive it to be gratifying or self-denying, 
courteous or uncivil, in favor of or against our interest ; 
but, distinct from all these, and differing from them all, 
we may always perceive, that it seems to us to be either 
right or wrong. Let a man recollect any of the cases in 
his own history, in which he has been called to act under 
important responsibility, and he will easily remember, 
both the fact, and the pain and distress produced by the 
conflict of these opposite impulsions. It is scarcely ne- 
cessary to remark, that we easily, or at least, with much 
greater ease, perceive this quality in the actions of others. 
We discern the mote in our brother's eye much sooner 
than the beam in our own eye. 

2. Besides this discriminating power, 1 think we may 
readily observe a distinct impulse to do that which we 
conceive to be right, and to leave undone that which we 
conceive to be wrong. This impulse we express by the 
words ought, and ought not. Thus, we say it is right to 
tell the truth ; and I ought to tell it. It is wrong to tell 
a lie ; and I ought not to tell it. Ought, and ought not, 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 



51 



seem to convey the abstract idea of right and wrong, to- 
gether with the other notion of impulsion to do, or not 
to do, a particular action. Thus, we use it always to 
designate a motive to action, as we do passion, or self- 
love, or any other motive power. If we are asked, why 
we performed any action, we reply, we acted thus, be- 
cause it gratified our desires, or because it was for our 
interest, upon the whole, or because we felt that we ought 
to act thus. Either of them is considered sufficient to 
account for the fact ; that is, either of them explains the 
motive or impulse, in obedience to which we acted. It 
is, also, manifest, that we use the term, not merely to de- 
signate an impulse, but, also, an obligation to act in con- 
formity with it. Thus, we say, we ought to do a thing, 
meaning that we are not only impelled towards the action, 
but that we are under an imperative obligation to act thus. 
This is still more distinctly seen, when we speak of an- 
other. When we say of a friend, that he ought to do any 
thing, as we cannot judge of the impulses which move 
him, we refer, principally, to this conviction of obligation, 
which, above every other, should govern him. 

The power of this impulse of conscience is most dis- 
tinctly seen, when it comes into collision with the im- 
pulse of strong and vehement passion. It is then, that 
the human soul is agitated to the full extent of its capac- 
ity for emotion. And this contest generally continues, 
specially if we have decided in opposition to conscience, 
until the action is commenced. The voice of conscience 
is then lost amid the whirlwind of passion ; and it is not 
heard until aft^r the deed is done. It is on this account, 
that this state of mind is frequently selected by the poets, 
as a subject for delineation. Shakspeare frequently al- 
ludes to all these offices of conscience, with the happiest 
effect. 

The constant monitory power of conscience is thus il~ 
lustrated, by one of the murderers about to assassinate 
the Duke of Clarence : " I '11 not meddle with it (con- 
science) ; it is a dangerous thing ; it makes a man a cow- 
ard : a man cannot steal, but it accuseth him ; a man 



52 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 



cannot swear, but it checks him. 'T is a blushing, shame- 
faced spirit, that mutinies in a man's bosom : it fills one 
full of obstacles. It made me once restore a purse of 
gold, that, by chance, I found. It beggars any man that 
keeps it." Richard III, Act i, Sc. 4. The whole 
scene is a striking exemplification of the workings of con- 
science, even in the bosoms of the most abandoned of 
men. The wicked Clarence appeals to the consciences 
of his murderers ; and they strengthen themselves against 
his appeals, by referring to his own atrocities, and thus 
awakening in their own bosoms the conviction that he 
ought to die. 

The state of mind of a man meditating a wicked act, 
and the temporary victory of conscience, is seen in the 
following extract from Macbeth. He recalls the relations 
in which Duncan stood to him, and these produce so 
strong a conviction of the wickedness of the murder, that 
he decides not to commit it. 

" If the assassination 
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch, 
With his surcease, success; that but this blow- 
Might be the be-all and the end-all here, 
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, — 
We 'd jump the life to come. — But, in these cases, 
We still have judgment here; that we but teach 
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return 
To plague the inventor. This even-handed justice 
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice 
To our own lips. He 's here in double trust: 
First, as I am his kinsman and his subject, 
Strong both against the deed ; then, as his host, 
Who should against his murderer shut the door, 
Not bear the knife myself. Besides, this Duncan 
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been 
So clear in his great office, that his virtues 
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against 
The deep damnation of his taking off. 

ifc it* 

I have no spur 
To prick the sides of my intent, but only 
Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps itself." 

Macbeth, Act i, Sc. 7. 

The anguish which attends upon an action not yet com- 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 



53 



menced, but only resolved upon, while we still doubt of 
its lawfulness, is finely illustrated by the same author, in 
the case of Brutus, who, though a man of great fortitude, 
was by the anguish of contending emotions deprived of 
sleep, and so changed in behavior, as to give his wife 
reason to suspect the cause of his disquietude : 

<£ Since Cassius first did whet me against Caesar, 
I have not slept. 

Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
And the first motion, all the interim is 
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream : 
The genius, and the mortal instruments, 
Are then in council; and the state of man, 
Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 
The nature of an insurrection." 

J. Ccesar, Act ii, Sc. 1. 

The same contest between conscience and the lower 
propensities, is, as I suppose, graphically described by the 
Apostle Paul, in the seventh chapter of his Epistle to the 
Romans. 

II. Suppose now an action to be done. I think that 
every one who examines his own heart will be conscious 
of another class of feelings consequent on those to which 
we have just alluded. 

1. If he have obeyed the impulses of conscience, and 
resisted successfully the impulses at variance with it, he 
will be conscious of a feeling of innocence, of self-appro- 
bation, of desert of reward. If the action have been 
done by another, he will feel towards him a sentiment of 
respect, of moral approbation, and a desire to see him re- 
warded, and, on many occasions, to reward him himself. 

2. If he have disobeyed the impulses of conscience, 
he will be conscious of guilt, of self-abasement, and self- 
disapprobation or remorse, and of desert of punishment. 
If it have been done by another, he will be conscious of 
a sentiment of moral disapprobation, and of a desire that 
the offender should be punished, and, in many cases, of a 
desire to punish him himself. Of course, I do not say 
that all these feelings can be traced, by reflection upon 
every action ; but I think, that in all cases in which our 



54 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 



moral sensibilities are at all aroused, we can trace some, 
and frequently all of them. 

In accordance with these remarks, several facts may be 
noticed. 

The boldness of innocence, and the timidity of guilt, 
so often observed by moralists and poets, may be thus 
easily accounted for. The virtuous man is conscious of 
deserving nothing but reward. Whom then should he 
fear? The guilty man is conscious of desert of punish- 
ment, and is aware that every one who knows of his of- 
fence desires to punish him ; and as he never is certain 
but that every one knows it, whom can he trust ? And, 
still more, there is with the feeling of desert of punish- 
ment a disposition to submit to punishment, arising from 
our own self-disapprobation and remorse. This depresses 
the spirit, and humbles the courage of the offender, far 
more than even the external circumstances by which he 
is surrounded. 

Thus, says Solomon, " the wicked flee, when no man 
pursueth ; but the righteous is bold as a lion." 

" What stronger breastplate than a heart untainted ? 
Thrice is he armed, who hath his quarrel just; 
And he but naked, though lock'd up in steel, 
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted.'" 

Sec. Part Henry VI, Act iii. Sc. 2. 

<c Suspicion always haunts the guilty mind; 
The thief doth fear each bush an officer." 

Sec. Part Henry VI, Act v, Sc. 6. 

" I feel within me 
A peace, above all earthly dignities, — 
A still and quiet conscience." 

Henry VIII, Act iii, Sc. 2. 

The effect of guilt. 

ct No wonder why 
I felt rebuked beneath his eye; 
I might have known, there was but one, 
Whose look could quell Lord Marmion." 

Marmion, Cant, vi, 17. 

" Curse on yon base marauder's lance, 
And doubly curs'd my failing brand! 
A sinful heart makes feeble hand." 

Marmion, Cant, vi, St. 32. 



THE DECISION OF CONSCIENCE. 



55 



It is in consequence of the same facts, that crime is, 
with so great certainty, detected. 

A man, before the commission of crime, can foresee no 
reason why he might not commit it, with the certainty of 
escaping detection. He can perceive no reason why he 
should be even suspected ; and can imagine a thousand 
methods, in which suspicion awakened, might with perfect 
ease be allayed. But, as soon as he becomes guilty, his 
relations to his fellow-men are entirely changed. He be- 
comes suspicious of every one, and thus sees every occur- 
rence through a false medium. Hence, he cannot act 
like an innocent man ; and this very difference in his con- 
duct, is very often the sure means of his detection. When 
to this effect, produced upon the mind by guilt, is added 
the fact, that every action must, by the condition of our 
being, be attended by antecedents and consequents be- 
yond our control, all of which lead directly to the dis- 
covery of the truth, it is not wonderful, that the guilty 
so rarely escape. Hence it has grown into a proverb, 
" murder will out ;" and such we generally find to be the 
fact. 

This effect of guilt upon human action has been fre- 
quently remarked. 

Thus, Macbeth, after the murder of Duncan : 

"How is it with me, when every noise appals me." 

Act ii, Sc. 2. 

" Guiltiness will speak, though tongues were out of use." 

The same fact is frequently asserted in the sacred 
Scriptures. Thus, " The Lord is known by the judg- 
ment that he executeth ; the wicked is snared in the work 
of his own hands." 

" Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go 
unpunished." 

I hope that I need not apologize for introducing into 
such a discussion so many illustrations from poetry. They 
are allowed, on all hands, to be accurate delineations of 
the workings of the human mind, and to have been made 
by most accurate observers. They were made, also, 
6 



56 THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

without the possibility of bias from any theory ; and there- 
fore are of greater value, when they serve to confirm any 
theoretical views, with which they miy chance to coin- 
cide. They show, at least, in what light poets, whose 
only object is to observe the human heart, have consider- 
ed conscience, and what they have supposed to be its 
functions, and its mode of operation. 



SECTION III. 

THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 

We have, thus far, endeavored to show, that there is in 
man a faculty denominated Conscience ; and that it is not 
merely a discriminating, but also an impulsive faculty. The 
next question to be considered is, what is the authority of 
this impulse. 

The object of the present section is, to show that this 
is the most authoritative impulse of which we find our- 
selves susceptible. 

The supremacy of Conscience may be illustrated in 
various ways. 

I. It is involved in the very conception which men 
form of this faculty. 

The various impulses of which we find ourselves sus- 
ceptible, can differ only in two respects, that of strength 
and that of authority. 

When we believe them to differ in nothing but strength, 
we feel ourselves perfectly at liberty to obey the strong- 
est. Thus, if different kinds of food be set before us, all 
equally healthy, we feel entirely at liberty to partake of 
that which we prefer ; that is, of that to which we are 
most strongly impelled. If a man is to decide between 
making a journey by land, or by water, he considers it a 
sufficient motive for choice, that the one mode of travel- 
ling is more pleasant to him than the other. But when 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



57 



our impulses differ, in authority, we feel obliged to neg- 
lect the difference in strength of impulse, and to obey 
that, be it ever so weak, which is of the higher authority. 
Thus, suppose our desire for any particular kind of food 
to be ever so strong, and we know that it would injure 
our health ; self-love would admonish us to leave it alone. 
Now, self-love being a more authoritative impulse than 
passion, we should feel an obligation to obey it, be its 
admonition ever so weak, and the impulse of appetite ev- 
er so vehement. If we yield to the impulse of appetite, 
be it ever so strong, in opposition to that of self-love, be 
it ever so weak, we feel a consciousness of self-degrada- 
tion, and of acting unworthily of our nature ; and, if we 
see another person acting in this manner, we cannot avoid 
feeling towards him a sentiment of contempt. " 'T is not 
in folly not to scorn a fool." And, in general, whenever 
we act in obedience to a lower, and in opposition to a 
higher sentiment, we feel this consciousness of degrada- 
tion, which we do not feel when the impulses differ only 
in degree. And conversely, whenever we feel this con- 
sciousness of degradation, for acting in obedience to one 
instead of to another, we may know that we have violat- 
ed that which is of the higher authority. 

If, now, we reflect upon our feelings consequent upon 
any moral action, I think we shall find, that we always 
are conscious of a sentiment of self-degradation, whenever 
we disobey the monition of conscience, be that monition 
ever so weak, to gratify the impulse of appetite, or pas- 
sion, or self-love, be that impulse ever so strong. Do 
we consider it any palliation of the guilt of murder, for 
the criminal to declare, that his vindictive feelings impel- 
led him much more strongly than his conscience ? where- 
as, if we perceived in these impulses no other difference 
than that of strength, we should consider this not merely 
an excuse, but a justification. And, that the impulse of 
conscience is of the highest authority, is evident from the 
fact, that we cannot conceive of any circumstances, in 
which we should not feel guilty and degraded, from act- 
ing in obedience to any impulse whatever, in opposition 



58 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



to the impulse of conscience. And thus, we cannot con- 
ceive of any more exalted character, than that of him, 
who, on all occasions, yields himself up implicitly to the 
impulses of conscience, all things else to the contrary 
notwithstanding. I think no higher evidence can be pro- 
duced, to show that we do really consider the impulse of 
conscience of higher authority than any other of which 
we are susceptible. 

II. The same truth may, I think, be rendered evident, 
by observing the feelings which arise within us, when we 
compare the actions of men with those of beings of an 
inferior order. 

Suppose a brute to act from appetite, and injure itself 
by gluttony ; or from passion, and injure another brute 
from anger: we feel nothing like moral disapprobation. 
We pity it, and strive to put it out of its power to act 
thus in future. We never feel that a brute is disgraced 
or degraded by such an action. But suppose a man to 
act thus, and we cannot avoid a feeling of disapprobation 
and of disgust ; a conviction that the man has done vio- 
lence to his nature. Thus, to call a man a brute, a sen- 
sualist, a glutton, is to speak of him in the most insulting 
manner : it is to say, in the strongest terms, that he has 
acted unworthily of himself, and of the nature with which 
his Creator has endowed him. 

Again. Let a brute act from deliberate selfishness ; 
that is, with deliberate caution seek its own happiness up- 
on the whole, unmindful of the impulsions of present ap- 
petite, but yet wholly regardless of the happiness of any 
other of its species. In no case do we feel disgust at 
such a course of action ; and in many cases, we, on the 
contrary, rather regard it with favor. We thus speak of 
the cunning of animals in taking their prey, in escaping 
danger, and in securing for themselves all the amount of 
gratification that may be in their power. We are sensi- 
ble, in these cases, that the animal has acted from the 
highest impulses of which his Creator has made it suscep- 
tible. But let a man act thus. Let him, careful merely 
of his own happiness upon the whole, be careful for noth- 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



59 



ing else, and be perfectly willing to sacrifice the happi- 
ness of others, to any amount whatsoever, to promote his 
own, to the least amount soever. Such has been fre- 
quently, the character of sensual and unfeeling tyrants. 
We are conscious, in such a case, of a sentiment of dis- 
gust and deep disapprobation. We feel that the man has 
not acted in obedience to the highest impulses of which 
he was susceptible ; and poets, and satirists, and histori- 
ans unite, in holding him up to the world, as an object of 
universal detestation and abhorrence. 

Again. Let another man, disregarding the impulses of 
passion, and appetite, and self-love, act, under all cir- 
cumstances, in obedience to the monitions of conscience, 
unmoved and unallured by pleasure, and unawed by pow- 
er ; and we instinctively feel that he has attained to the 
highest eminence to which our nature can aspire ; and 
that he has acted from the highest impulse of which his 
nature is susceptible. We are conscious of a conviction 
of his superiority, which nothing can outweigh ; of a feel- 
ing of veneration, allied to the reverence which is due to 
the Supreme Being. And, with this homage to virtue, 
all history is filled. The judge may condemn the inno- 
cent, but posterity will condemn the judge. The tyrant 
may murder the martyr, but after ages venerate the mar- 
tyr, and execrate the tyrant. And if we will look over 
the names of those, on whom all past time has united in 
conferring the tribute of praise-worthiness, we shall find 
them to be the names of those who, although they might 
differ in other respects, yet were similar in this, that they 
shone resplendent in the lustre of unsullied virtue. 

Now, as our Creator has constituted us such as we are, 
and as, by our very constitution, we do thus consider 
conscience to be the most authoritative impulse of our na- 
ture, it must be the most authoritative, unless we believe 
that He has deceived us, or, which is the same thing, that 
He has so formed us, as to give credit to a lie. 

HI. The supremacy of conscience may be also illus- 
trated, by showing the necessity of this supremacy, to 
6* 



60 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



the accomplishment of the object for which man was 
created. 

When we consider any work of art, as a system com- 
posed of parts, and arranged for the accomplishment of a 
given object, there are three several views which we 
may have of it, and all of them necessary to a complete 
and perfect knowledge of the thing. 

1. We must have a knowledge of the several parts of 
which it is composed. Thus, he who would understand 
a watch, must know the various wheels and springs which 
enter into the formation of the instrument. But this 
alone, as, for instance, if they were spread separately be- 
fore him, upon a table, would give him a very imperfect 
conception of a watch. 

2. He must, therefore, understand how these parts are 
put together, This will greatly increase his knowledge ; 
but it will still be imperfect, for he may yet be ignorant 
of the relations which the parts sustain to each other. 
A man might look at a steam-engine until he was fa- 
miliarly acquainted with its whole machinery, and yet not 
know whether the paddles were designed to move the 
piston-rod, or the piston-rod to move the paddles. 

3. It is necessary, therefore, that he should have a 
conception of the relation which the several parts sustain 
to each other ; that is, of the effect which every part was 
designed to produce upon every other part. When he 
has arrived at this idea, and has combined it with the oth- 
er ideas just mentioned, then, and not till then, is his 
knowledge of the instrument complete. 

It is manifest, that this last notion, that of the relations 
which the parts sustain to each other, is, frequently, of 
more importance than either of the others. He who has 
a conception of the cause of motion in a steam-engine, 
and of the manner in which the ends are accomplished, 
has a more valuable notion of the instrument, than he 
who has ever so accurate a knowledge of the several 
parts, without a conception of the relation. Thus, in 
the history of astronomy, the notion of the several parts 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



61 



of the solar system was known for ages, without being 
productive of any valuable result. The progress of as- 
tronomy is to be dated from the moment, when the rela- 
tion which the several parts hold to each other, was dis- 
covered by Copernicus. 

Suppose, now, we desire to ascertain what is the rela- 
tion which the several parts of any system are designed, 
by its author, to sustain to each other. 1 know of no 
other way, than to find out that series of relations, in obe- 
dience to which the system will accomplish the object 
for which it was constructed. Thus, if we desire to as- 
certain the relation which the parts of a watch are de- 
signed to sustain to each other, we inquire what is that 
series of relations, in obedience to which, it will accom- 
plish the purpose for which it was constructed, that is, to 
keep time. For instance, we should conduct the inquiry 
by trying each several part, and ascertaining by experi- 
ment, whether, on the supposition that it was the cause 
of motion, the result, namely, the keeping of time, 
could be effected. After we had tried them all, and had 
found, that under no other relation of the parts to each 
other, than that which assumes the mainspring to be the 
source of motion, and the balance wheel to be the regula- 
tor of the motion, the result could be produced ; we 
should conclude, with certainty, that this was the relation 
of the parts to each other, intended to be established by 
the maker of the watch. 

And, again, if an instrument were designed for several 
purposes, and if it was found, that not only a single pur- 
pose could not be accomplished, but that no one of them 
could be accomplished, under any other system of relations 
than that which had been at first discovered, we should 
arrive at the highest proof of which the case was suscep- 
tible, that such was the relation intended to be established 
between the parts, by the inventor of the machine. 

Now, man is a system composed of parts in the man- 
ner above stated. He has various powers, and faculties, 
and impulses ; and he is manifestly designed to produce 
some result. As to the ultimate design for which man 



62 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



was created, there may be a difference of opinion. In 
one view, however, I presume there will be no difference. 
It will be allowed by all that he was designed for the 
production of his own happiness. Look at his senses, 
his intellect, his affections, and at the external objects 
with which these are brought into relation ; and at the 
effects of the legitimate action of these powers upon their 
appropriate objects ; and no one can for a moment doubt, 
that this was one object for which man was created. Thus, 
it is as clear, that the eye was intended to be a source of 
pleasure, as that it was intended to be the instrument of 
vision. It is as clear, that the ear was intended to be a 
source of pleasure, as to be the organ of hearing. And 
thus of the other faculties. 

But when we consider man as an instrument for the 
production of happiness, it is manifest, that we must take 
into the account, man as a society, as well as man as an 
individual. The larger part of the happiness of the in- 
dividual depends upon society ; so that whatever would 
destroy society, — or, what is, in fact, the same thing, de- 
stroy the happiness of man as a society, — would destroy 
the happiness of man as an individual. And such is the 
constitution under which we are placed, that no benefit 
or injury can be, in its nature, individual. Whoever truly 
promotes his own happiness, promotes the happiness of 
society ; and whoever promotes the happiness of society, 
promotes his own happiness. In this view of the sub- 
ject, it will then be proper to consider man as a society, 
as an instrument for producing the happiness of man as a 
society; as well as man as an individual, as an instru- 
ment for producing the happiness of man as an individual. 

Let us now consider man as an instrument for the 
production of human happiness, in the sense here ex- 
plained. 

If we examine the impulsive and restraining faculties 
of man, we shall find, that they may, generally, be com- 
prehended under three classes. 

1. Passion or appetite. The object of this class of 
our faculties is, to impel us towards certain acts, which 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



63 



produce immediate pleasure. Thus, the appetite for 
food, impels us to seek gratification by eating. The love 
of power impels us to seek the gratification resulting from 
superiority ; and so of all the rest. 

If we consider the nature of these faculties, we shall 
find, that they impel us to immediate gratification, without 
any respect to the consequences, either to ourselves or to 
others ; and that they know of no limit to indulgence, un- 
til, by their own action, they paralyze the power of en- 
joyment. Thus, the love of food would impel us to eat, 
until eating ceased to be a source of pleasure. And 
where, from the nature of the case, no such limit exists, 
our passions are insatiable. Such is the case with the 
love of wealth, and the love of power. In these in- 
stances, there being, in the constitution of man, no limit 
to the power of gratification, the appetite grows by what 
it feeds on. 

2. Interest or self-love. This faculty impels us to 
seek our own happiness, considered in reference to a long- 
er or shorter period ; but always beyond the present mo- 
ment. Thus, if appetite impelled me to eat, self-love 
would prompt me to eat such food, and in such quantity, 
as would produce for me the greatest amount of happiness, 
upon the whole. If passion prompted me to revenge, 
self-love would prompt me to seek revenge in such a man- 
ner as would not involve me in greater distress than that 
which I now suffer ; or, to control the passion entirely, 
unless I could so gratify it, as to promote my own happi- 
ness for the future, as well as for the present. In all 
cases, however, the promptings of self-love have respect 
solely to the production of our own happiness : they 
have nothing to do with the happiness of any other being. 

3. Conscience. The office of conscience, considered 
in relation to these other impulsive faculties, is, to restrain 
our appetites within such limits, that the gratification of 
them will injure neither ourselves nor others ; and so to 
govern our self-love, that we shall act, not solely in obe- 
dience to the law of our own happiness, but in obedience 
to that law, which restricts the pursuit of happiness with- 



64 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



in such limits, as shall not interfere with the happiness of 
others. It is not here asserted, that conscience always 
admonishes us to this effect ; or, that, when it admonishes 
us, it is always successful. We may, if we please, diso- 
bey its monitions ; or, from reasons hereafter to be men- 
tioned, its monitions may have ceased. What we would 
speak of here, is the tendency and object of this faculty ; 
and the result to which, if it were perfectly obeyed, it 
would manifestly lead. And, that such is its tendency, I 
think that no one, who reflects upon the operations of his 
own mind, can, for a moment, doubt. 

Suppose, now, man to be a system, for the promotion 
of happiness, individual and social ; and that these vari- 
ous impelling powers are parts of it. These powers be- 
ing frequently, in their nature, contradictory ; that is, be- 
ing such, that one frequently impels to, and another repels 
from, the same action ; the question is, in what relation 
of these powers to each other, can the happiness of man 
be most successfully promoted. 

1. It cannot be asserted, that, when these impulsions 
are at variance, it is a matter of indifference to which of 
them we yield ; that is, that a man is just as happy, and 
renders society just as happy, by obeying the one as the 
other. For, as men always obey one or the other, this 
would be to assert that all men are equally happy ; and 
that every man promoted his own happiness just as much 
by one course of conduct, as by another ; than which, 
nothing can be more directly at variance with the whole 
experience of all men, in all ages. It would be to assert, 
that the glutton, who is racked with pain, is as happy as 
the temperate and healthy man ; and that Nero and Ca- 
ligula were as great benefactors to mankind, as Howard or 
Wilberforce. 

2. If, then, it be not indifferent to our happiness, to 
which of them we yield the supremacy, the question re- 
turns, under what relation of each to the other, can the 
happiness of man be most successfully promoted ? 

1. Can the happiness of man be promoted, by subject- 
ing his other impulses to his appetites and passions ? 
By referring to the nature of appetite and passion, as 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 65 

previously explained, it will be seen that the result to the 
individual, of such a course, would be sickness and death. 
It would be a life of unrestrained gratification of every 
desire, until the power of enjoyment was exhausted, with- 
out the least regard to the future ; and of refusal to endure 
any present pain, no matter how great might be the sub- 
sequent advantage. Every one must see, that under the 
present constitution, such a course of life must produce 
nothing but individual misery. 

The result upon society would be its utter destruction. 
It would render every man a ferocious beast, bent upon 
nothing but present gratification, utterly reckless of the 
consequences which gratification produced upon himself, 
either directly, or through the instrumentality of others ; 
and reckless of the havoc which he made of the happi- 
ness of his neighbor. Now, it is manifest, that the result 
of subjecting man to such a principle, would be, not only 
the destruction of society, but, also, in a few years, the 
entire destruction of the human race. 

2. Can the happiness of man be best promoted by 
subjecting all his impulses to self-love ? 

It may be observed, that our knowledge of the future, 
and of the results of the things around us, is manifestly 
insufficient to secure our own happiness, even by the most 
sagacious self-Jove. When we give up the present pleas- 
ure, or suffer the present pain, we must, from necessity, 
be wholly ignorant whether we shall ever reap the advan- 
tage which w T e anticipate. The system, of which every 
individual forms a part, was not constructed to secure the 
happiness of any individual ; and he who devises his plans 
with sole reference to himself, must find them continually 
thwarted by that Omnipotent and Invisible Agency, which 
is overruling all things upon principles directly at variance 
with those which he has adopted. Inasmuch, then, as 
we can never certainly secure to ourselves those results 
which self-love anticipates, it seems necessary, that, in 
order to derive from our actions the happiness which they 
are capable of producing, they involve in themselves some 
element, irrespective of future result, which shall give us 
pleasure, let the result be what it may. 



66 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



The imperfection of self-love, as a director of conduct, 
is nobly set forth in Cardinal Wolsey's advice to Crom- 
well : 

" Mark but my fall, and that which ruin'd me. 
Cromwell, I charge thee fling away ambition. 
Love thyself last. Cherish the hearts that hate thee. 

Be just, and fear not; 
Let all the ends thou aimest at, be thy country's. 
Thy God's, and truth's; then, if thou fall'st, O Cromwell! 
Thou fall'st a blessed martyr." 

Henry VIII, Act iii, Sc. 2. 

" May he do justice, 
For truth's sake, and his conscience; that his bones, 
When he has run his course, and sleeps in blessings, 
May have a tomb of orphan's tears wept on them." 

Ibid. 

" For care and trouble set your thought, 
Ev'n when your end 's attained; 
And all your plans may come to nought, 
When every nerve is strained." 

Burns' Epistle to a Young Friend. 

" But, mousie ! thou art not alone, 
In proving foresight may be vain: 
The best laid schemes of mice and men 
Gang oft agley, 
And leave us nought but grief and pain 
For promised joy." 
Burns, on turning up a Mouse's nest. 

Besides, a man, acting from uncontrolled self-love, 
knows of no other object than his own happiness. He 
would sacrifice the happiness of others, to any amount, 
how great soever, to secure his own, in any amount, how 
small soever. Now, suppose every individual to act in 
obedience to this principle ; it must produce universal 
war, and terminate in the subjection of all to the dominion 
of the strongest ; and in sacrificing the happiness of all 
to that of one : that is, produce the least amount of hap- 
piness of which the system is susceptible. And, still more, 
since men, who have acted upon this principle, have been 
proverbially unhappy ; the result of such a course of con- 
duct is, to render ourselves miserable by the misery of 
every one else ; that is, its tendency is to the entire de- 



THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIENCE. 



struction of happiness. It is manifest, then, that the 
highest happiness of man cannot be promoted by subject- 
ing all his impulses to the government of self-love. 

Lastly. Suppose, now, all the impulses of man to be 
subjected to conscience. 

The tendency of this impulse, so far as this subject is 
concerned, is, to restrain the appetites and passions of 
man within those limits, that shall conduce to his happi- 
ness, on the whole ; and so to control the impulse of self- 
love, that the individual, in the pursuit of his own happi- 
ness, shah never interfere with the rightful happiness of 
his neighbor. Each one, under such a system, and gov- 
erned by such an impulse, would enjoy all the happiness 
which he could create by the use of the powers which 
God had given him. Every one doing thus, the whole 
would enjoy all the happiness of which their constitution 
was susceptible. The happiness of man, as an individual, 
and as a society, would thus be, in the best conceivable 
manner, provided for. And thus, under the relation which 
we have suggested ; that is, conscience being supreme, 
and governing both self-love and passion ; and self-love, 
where no higher principle intervened, governing passion ; 
man individual, and man universal,, considered as an in- 
strument for the production of happiness, would best ac- 
complish the purpose for which he was created. This, 
then, is the relation between his powers, which was de- 
signed to be established by his Creator. 

It can, in the same manner, be shown, that, if man, in- 
dividual and universal, be considered as an instrument for 
the production of power, this end of his creation can 
be accomplished most successfully by obedience to the 
relation here suggested ; that is, on the principle, that the 
authority of conscience is supreme.* This is conclusive- 
ly shown in Butler's Analogy, Part i, Chapter 3. And 

* Vis consili expers, mole ruit sua. 

Vim temper atam, di quoque provehunt 
In majus ; idem odere vires 
Omne nefas animo moventes. 

Hor. Lib. 3, Car. 4. 

7 



THE LAW BY WHICH 



thus, let any reasonable end be suggested, for which it 
may be supposed that man has been created ; and it will be 
found, that this end can be best attained, by the subjection 
of every other impulse to that of conscience ; nay, that 
it can be attained in no other way. And hence, the ar- 
gument seems conclusive, that this is the relation intended 
by his Creator to be established between his faculties. 
If the preceding views be correct, it will follow : 

1. If God has given man an impulse for virtue, it is as 
true, that he has designed him for virtue, as for any thing 
else ; as, for instance, for seeing or for hearing. 

2. If this impulse be the most authoritative in his na- 
ture, it is equally manifest, that man is made for virtue 
more than for any thing else. 

3. And hence, he who is vicious, not only acts contra- 
ry to his nature, but contrary to the highest impulse of 
his nature ; that is, he acts as much in opposition to his 
nature as it is possible for us to conceive. 



SECTION IV. 

THE LAW BY WHICH CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 

Conscience follows the general law, by which the im- 
provement of all our other faculties is regulated. It is 
strengthened by use, it is impaired by disuse. 

Here it is necessary to remark, that, by use, we mean 
the use of the faculty itself , and not of some other facul- 
ty. This is so plain a case, that it seems wonderful that 
there should have been any mistake concerning it. Eve- 
ry one knows, that the arms are not strengthened by using 
the legs, nor the eyes by using the ears, nor the taste by 
using the understanding. So, the conscience can be 
strengthened, not by using the memory, or the taste, or 
the understanding ; but by using the conscience, and by 
using it precisely according to the laws, and under the 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 



69 



conditions, designed by our Creator. The conscience is 
not improved by the reading of moral essays, nor by com- 
mitting to memory moral precepts, nor by imagining mor- 
al vicissitudes ; but by hearkening to its monitions, and 
obeying its impulses. 

If we reflect upon the nature of the monition of con- 
science, we shall find that its office is of a threefold char- 
acter. 

1. It enables us to discover the moral quality of ac- 
tions. 

2. It impels us to do right, and to avoid wrong. 

3. It is a source of pleasure, when we have done right, 
and of pain, when we have done wrong. 

Let us illustrate the manner in which it may be im- 
proved, and injured, in each of these respects. 

I. Of the improvement of the discriminating power of 
conscience. 

1. The discriminating power of conscience is improved 
by reflecting upon the moral character of our actions, 
both before and after we have performed them. If, be- 
fore we resolve upon a course of conduct, or before we 
suffer ourselves to be committed to it, we deliberately ask, 
is this right 1 am I now actuated by appetite, by self- 
love, or by conscience ? we shall seldom mistake the path 
of duty. After an action has been performed, if we de- 
liberately and impassionately examine it, we may, without 
difficulty, decide whether it was right or wrong. Now, 
with every such effort as this, the discriminating power of 
conscience is strengthened. We discern moral differences 
more distinctly ; and we distinguish between actions, that 
before seemed blended and similar. 

2. The discriminating power of conscience is improved, 
by meditating upon characters of pre-eminent excellence, 
and specially upon the character of God our Creator, and 
Christ our Redeemer, the Fountain of all moral excel- 
lence. As we cultivate taste, or our susceptibility to 
beauty, by meditating upon the most finished specimens 
of art, or the most lovely scenery in nature, so conscience, 
or our moral susceptibility, is improved, by meditating 



70 



THE LAW BY WHICH 



upon any thing eminent for moral goodness. It is hence, 
that example produces so powerful a moral effect ; and 
hence that one single act of heroic virtue, as that of How- 
ard, or of illustrious self-denial, gives a new impulse to 
the moral character of an age. Men cannot reflect upon 
such actions, without the production of a change in their 
moral susceptibility. Hence, the effect of the Scripture 
representations of the character of God, and of the moral 
glory of the heavenly -state. The Apostle Paul refers to 
this principle, when he says, "We all, with open face, 
beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are 
changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even 
as by the Spirit of the Lord." 

On the contrary, the discriminating power of conscience 
may be injured. 

1. By neglecting to reflect upon the moral character 
of our actions, both before and after we have performed 
them. As taste is rendered obtuse by neglect, so that 
we fail to distinguish between elegance and vulgarity, and 
between beauty and deformity ; so, if we yield to the 
impulses of passion, and turn a deaf ear to the monitions 
of conscience, the dividing line between right and wrong 
seems gradually to become obliterated. We pass from 
the confines of the one into those of the other, with less 
and less sensation, and at last neglect the distinction al- 
together. 

Horace remarks this fact : 

Fas atque nefas, exiguo fine, libidinum 
Disceruunt avidi. 

This is one of the most common causes of the grievous 
moral imperfection which we every where behold. Men 
act without moral reflection. They will ask, respecting 
an action, every question before that most important one, 
Is it right ? and, in the great majority of cases, act with- 
out putting to themselves this question at all. " The ox 
knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib ; but 
Israel doth not know, my people do not consider. , ' > If 
any man doubt whether this be true, let him ask himself, 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 



71 



How large is the portion of the actions which I perform, 
upon which I deliberately decide whether they be right 
or wrong ? And on how large a portion of my actions 
do I form such a decision, after they have been perform- 
ed ? For the want of this reflection, the most pernicious 
habits are daily formed or strengthened ; and, when to 
the power of habit is added the seductive influence of 
passion, it is not wonderful that the virtue of man should 
be the victim. 

2. The discriminating power of conscience is impaired 
by frequent meditation upon vicious character and action. 
By frequently contemplating vice, our passions become 
excited, and our moral disgust diminishes. Thus, also, 
by becoming familiar with wicked men, we learn to asso- 
ciate whatever they may possess of intellectual or social 
interest, with their moral character ; and hence our ab- 
horrence of vice is lessened. Thus, men who are accus- 
tomed to view, habitually, any vicious custom, cease to 
have their moral feelings excited in respect to it. All this 
is manifest, from the facts made known in the progress of 
every moral reformation. Of so delicate a texture has 
God made our moral nature, and so easily is it either im- 
proved or impaired. Pope says, truly, 

Vice is a monster of so frightful mein, 
As, to be dreaded, needs but to be seen; 
But, seen too oft, familiar with her face, 
We first endure, then pity, then embrace. 

It is almost unnecessary to remark, that this fact will ena- 
ble us to estimate the value of much of our reading, and 
of much of our society. Whatever fills the memory with 
scenes of vice, or stimulates the imagination to conceptions 
of impurity, vulgarity, profanity, or thoughtlessness, must, 
by the whole of this effect, render us vicious. As a man 
of literary sensibility will avoid a badly written book, for 
fear of injuring his taste, by how much more should we 
dread the communion with any thing wrong, lest it should 
contaminate our imagination, and thus injure our moral 
sense ! 

7# 



72 



THE LAW BY WHICH 



II. The impulsive power of conscience is improved by 
use, and weakened by disuse. 

To illustrate this law, we need only refer to the elements 
of man's active nature. We are endowed with appetites, 
passions, and self-love, in all their various forms ; and any 
one of them, or all of them, may, at times, be found im- 
pelling us towards actions in opposition to the impulsion 
of conscience ; and, of course, one or the other impulse 
must be resisted. Now, as the law of our faculties is uni- 
versal, that they are strengthened by use, and weakened 
by disuse, it is manifest, that, when we obey the impulse 
of conscience, and resist the impulse of passion, the power 
of conscience is strengthened ; and, on the contrary, when 
we obey the impulse of passion, and resist that of con- 
science, the power of passion is strengthened. And, yet 
more, as either of these is strengthened, its antagonist 
impulse is weakened. Thus, every time a man does right, 
he gains a victory over his lower propensities, acquires 
self-control, and becomes more emphatically a freeman. 
Every time a man does wrong, that is, yields to his lower 
propensities, he loses self-control, he gives to his passions 
power over him, he weakens the practical supremacy of 
conscience, and becomes more perfectly a slave. The 
design of the Christian religion, in this respect, is to bring 
us under the dominion of conscience enlightened by reve- 
lation, and to deliver us from the slavery of evil propen- 
sity. Thus, our Lord declares, " If the Son shall make 
you free, ye shall be free indeed." And, on the contra- 
ry, " Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant (the slave) 
of sin." 

Again. It is to be remarked, that there exists a recip- 
rocal connection between the use of the discriminating 
and of the impulsive power of conscience. The more a 
man reflects upon moral distinctions, the greater will be 
the practical influence which he will find them to exert over 
him. And it is still more decidedly true, that the more 
implicitly we obey the impulsions of conscience, the more 
acute will be its power of discrimination, and the more 
prompt and definite its decisions. This connection be- 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 



73 



tween theoretical knowledge and practical application, is 
frequently illustrated in the other faculties. He who de- 
lineates objects of loveliness, finds the discriminating 
power of taste to improve. And thus, also, this effect, 
in morals, is frequently alluded to in the Scriptures. 

Our Savior declares, " If any man will do his will, he 
shall hnoiv of the doctrine." 

Thus, also, "Unto him that hath shall be given, and 
he shall have abundance ; but from him that hath not 
(that is, does not improve what he has), shall be taken 
away even that which he hath." 

Thus, also, the Apostle Paul : " I beseech you, there- 
fore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present 
your bodies a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto 
God, which is your rational service ; and be ye not con- 
formed to this world, but be ye transformed, unto the re- 
newing of your mind, that (so that, to the end that) ye 
may know what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect 
will of the Lord." 

III. The sensibility of conscience, as a source of pleas- 
ure or of pain, is strengthened by use, and weakened by 
disuse. 

The more frequently a man does right, the stronger is 
his impulse to do right, and the greater is the pleasure 
that results from the doing of it. A liberal man derives 
a pleasure from the practice of charity, of which the cov- 
etous man can form no conception. A beneficent man is 
made happy by acts of self-denial and philanthropy, 
while a selfish man performs an act of goodness by painful 
and strenuous effort, and merely to escape the reproaches 
of conscience. By the habitual exercise of the benevolent 
affections^ a man becomes more and more capacious of vir- 
tue, capable of higher and more disinterested and more self- 
denying acts of mercy, until he becomes an enthusiast in 
goodness, loving to do good better than any thing else. 
And, in the same manner, the more our affections to God 
are exercised, the more constant and profound is the hap- 
piness which they create, and the more absolutely is eve- 
ry other wish absorbed by the single desire to do the will 
of God. Illustrations of these remarks may be found in 



74 



THE LAW BY WHICH 



the lives of the Apostle Paul, John Howard, and other 
philanthropists. Thus, it is said of our Savior, " He 
went about doing good." And he says of himself, " My 
meat and my drink is to do the will of Him that sent me, 
and to finish his work." 

And it deserves to be remarked, that, in our present 
state, opportunities for moral improvement and moral 
pleasure are incessantly occurring. Under the present 
conditions of our being, there are every where, and at all 
times, sick to be relieved, mourners to be comforted, ig- 
norant to be taught, vicious to be reclaimed, and men, 
by nature enemies to God, to be won back to reconcilia- 
tion to Him. The season for moral labor depends not, 
like that for physical labor, upon vicissitudes beyond our 
control: it depends solely upon our own will. This I 
suppose to be the general principle involved in our Sa- 
vior's remark to his Apostles : " Say ye not there are four 
months, and then cometh the harvest ? lift up your eyes, 
and look upon the fields, for they are white already to 
the harvest.'''' That is, the fields are always waiting for 
the laborer in the moral harvest. 

And, on the contrary, the man who habitually violates 
his conscience, not only is more feebly impelled to do 
right, but he becomes less sensible to the pain of doing 
wrong. A child feels poignant remorse after the first act 
of pilfering. Let the habit of dishonesty be formed, and 
he will become so hackneyed in sin, that he will perpe- 
trate robbery with no other feeling than that of mere fear 
of detection. The first oath almost palsies the tongue of 
the stripling. It requires but a few months, however, to 
transform him into the bold and thoughtless blasphemer. 
The murderer, after the death of his first victim, is agi- 
tated with all the horrors of guilt. He may, however, 
pursue his trade of blood, until he have no more feeling 
for man, than the butcher for the animal which he slaugh- 
ters. Burk, who was in the habit of murdering men, for 
the purpose of selling their bodies to the surgeons for dis- 
section, confessed this of himself. Nor is this true of indi- 
viduals alone. Whole communities may become so ac- 
customed to deeds of violence, as not merely to lose all 



CONSCIENCE IS GOVERNED. 



75 



the milder sympathies of their nature, but also to take 
pleasure in exhibitions of the most revolting ferocity. 
Such was the case in Rome at the period of the gladiato- 
rial contests ; and such was the fact in Paris at the time 
of the French revolution. 

This also serves to illustrate a frequently repeated aph- 
orism, Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat. Asa 
man becomes more wicked, he becomes bolder in crime. 
Unchecked by conscience, he ventures upon more and 
more atrocious villany, and he does it with less and less 
precaution. As in the earliest stages of guilt he is be- 
trayed by timidity, in the later stages of it, he is exposed 
by his recklessness. He is thus discovered by the very 
effect which his conduct is producing upon his oWn mind. 
Thus, oppressors and despots seem to rush upon their 
own ruin, as though bereft of reason. Such limits has 
our Creator, by the conditions of our being, set to the 
range of human atrocity. 

Thus we see, that, by every step in our progress in vir- 
tue, the succeeding step becomes less difficult. In pro- 
portion as we deny our passions, they become less imper- 
ative. The oftener we conquer them, the less is the 
moral effort necessary to secure the victory, and the less 
frequently and the less powerfully do they assail us. By 
every act of successful resistance, we diminish the tre- 
mendous power of habit over us, and thus become more 
perfectly under the government of our own will. Thus, 
with every act of obedience to conscience, our character 
is fixed upon a more immovable foundation. 

And, on the contrary, by every act of vicious indul- 
gence, we give our passions more uncontrolled power over 
us, and diminish the power of reason and of conscience. 
Thus, by every act of sin, we not only incur new guilt, 
but we strengthen the bias towards sin, during the whole 
of our subsequent being. Hence, every vicious act ren- 
ders our return to virtue more difficult and more hopeless. 
The tendency of such a course is, to give to habit the 
power which ought to be exerted by our will. And, 
hence, it is not improbable, that the conditions of our be- 
ing may be such, as to allow of our arriving at such a 



76 



THE LAW BY WHICH, ETC. 



state, that reformation may be actually impossible. That 
the Holy Scriptures allude to such a condition during the 
present life, is evident. Such, also, is probably the ne- 
cessary condition of the wicked in another world. 

In stating the change thus produced upon our moral 
nature, it deserves to be remarked, that this loss of sensi- 
bility is, probably, only temporary. There is reason to 
believe, that no impressions made upon the human soul, 
during its present probationary state, are ever permanent- 
ly erased. Causes operating merely upon man's physical 
nature, frequently revive whole trains of thought, and 
even the knowledge of languages, which had been totally 
forgotten during the greater portion of a long life. This 
seems to show, that the liability to lose impressions, once 
made upon us, depends upon some condition arising from 
our material nature only, and that this liability will cease 
as soon as our present mode of existence terminates. 
That is to say, if the power of retaining knowledge is 
always the same, but if our consciousness of knowledge 
is veiled by our material organs, when these have been 
laid aside, our entire consciousness will return. Now, 
indications of the same nature are to be found in abun- 
dance, with respect to conscience. Wicked men, after 
having spent a life in prosperous guilt, and without being 
in trouble like other men, are frequently, without any 
assignable cause, tormented with all the agonies of remorse ; 
so that the mere consciousness of guilt has become abso- 
lutely intolerable, and they have perished by derangement, 
or by suicide. The horrors of a licentious sinner's death 
bed, present a striking illustration of the same solemn 
fact. A scene of this sort has been, no less vividly than 
accurately, described by Dr. Young, in the death of Alta- 
mont. All these things should be marked by us as solemn 
warnings. They show us of what the constitution, under 
which we exist, is capable ; and it is in forms like these, 
that the " coming events " of eternity " cast their shadows 
before." 

In such indexes, 

There is seen. 
The baby figures of the giant mass 
Of things to come at large. Shaks. 



RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 



77 



SECTION V. 

RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT, DERIVED FROM THE PRECEDING 
REMARKS. 

Several plain rules of conduct are suggested by the 
above remarks, which may more properly be introduced 
here, than in any other place. 

I. Before you resolve upon an action, or a course of 
action, 

1. Cultivate the habit of deciding upon its moral char- 
acter. Let the first question always be, Is this action 
right ? For this purpose, God gave you this faculty. If 
you do not use it, you are false to yourself, and inexcus- 
able before God. We despise a man who never uses his 
reason, and scorn him as a fool. Is he not much more to 
be despised, who neglects to use a faculty of so much 
higher authority than reason ? And let the question, Is 
this right? be asked first, before imagination has set 
before us the seductions of pleasure, or any step has been 
taken, which should pledge our consistency of character. 
If we ask this question first, it can generally be decided 
with ease. If we wait until the mind is agitated and 
harassed by contending emotions, it will not be easy to 
decide. 

2. Remember that your conscience has become imper- 
fect, from your frequent abuse of it. Hence, in many 
cases, its discrimination will be indistinct. Instead of de- 
ciding, it will, frequently, only doubt. That doubt 
should be, generally, as imperative as a decision. When 
you, therefore, doubt, respecting the virtue of an action, 
do not perform it, unless you as much doubt whether you 
are at liberty to refrain from it. Thus, says President 
Edwards, in one of his resolutions : " Resolved, never to 
do any thing, of which I so much question the lawfulness, 
as that I intend, at the same time, to consider and exam- 



78 



RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 



ine afterwards, whether it be lawful or not ; except I as 
much question the lawfulness of the omission." 

3. Cultivate, on all occasions, in private or in public, in 
small or great, in action or in thought, the habit of obey- 
ing the monitions of conscience ; all other things to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 

Its slightest touches, instant pause, 

Debar aside pretences ; 
And, resolutely, keep its laws, 

Uncaring consequences. 

Burns. 

The supremacy of conscience imposes upon you the ob- 
ligation to act thus. You cannot remember, in the course 
of your whole life, an instance in which you regret having 
obeyed it ; and you cannot remember a single instance in 
which you do not regret having disobeyed it. There can 
nothing happen to you so bad as to have done wrong: 
there can nothing be gained so valuable as to have done 
right. And remember, that it is only by cultivating the 
practical supremacy of conscience over every other im- 
pulse, that you can attain to that bold, simple, manly, 
elevated character, which is essential to true greatness. 

This has been frequently taught us, even by the hea- 
then poets : 

Virtus, repulsse nescia sordidse^ 
Intaminatis fulget honoribus: 
Nec sumit aut ponit secures 
Arbitrio popular is aurge: 

Virtus, recludens immeritis raori 
Ccelum, negata tentat iter via; 
Ccetusque vulgares et udam 
Spernit humum fugiente penna. 

Hor. Lib. 3, Car. 2. 

A greater than a heathen has said, " If thine eye be single, 
thy whole body shall be full of light ;" and has enforced 
the precept by the momentous question, " What shall it 
profit a man, though he should gain the whole world, and 
lose his own soul ; or what shall a man give in exchange 
for his soul ? " 



RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 



79 



II. After an action has been performed, 
1. Cultivate the habit of reflecting upon your actions, 
and upon the intention with which they have been per- 
formed, and of thus deciding upon their moral character. 
This is called self-examination. It is one of the most 
important duties in the life of a moral, and specially of a 
probationary existence. 

'T is greatly wise, to talk with our past hours, 
And ask them what report they bore to Heaven, 
And how they might have borne more welcome news. 

1. Perform this duty deliberately. It is not the busi- 
ness of hurry or of negligence. Devote time exclusively 
to it. Go alone. Retire within yourself, and weigh your 
actions coolly and carefully, forgetting all other things, in 
the conviction that you are a moral and an accountable 
being. 

2. Do it impartially. Remember that you are liable 
to be misled by the seduction of passion, and the allure- 
ments of self-interest. Put yourself in the place of those 
around you, and put others in your own place, and re- 
mark how you would then consider your actions. Pay 
great attention to the opinions of your enemies : there is 
generally foundation, or, at least, the appearance of it, in 
what they say of you. But, above all, take the true and 
perfect standard of moral character, exhibited in the pre- 
cepts of the gospel, and exemplified in the life of Jesus 
Christ ; and thus examine your conduct by the light that 
emanates from the holiness of heaven. 

2. Suppose you have examined yourself, and arrived 
at a decision respecting the moral character of your ac- 
tions. 

1. If you are conscious of having done right, be thank- 
ful to that God who has mercifully enabled you to do so. 
Observe the peace and serenity which fills your bosom, 
and remark how greatly it overbalances the self-denials 
which it has cost. Be humbly thankful that you have 
made some progress in virtue. 

2. If the character of your actions have been mixed, 

8 



80 



RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 



that is, if they have proceeded from motives partly good 
and partly bad, labor to obtain a clear view of each, and 
of the circumstances which led you to confound them. 
Avoid the sources of this confusion ; and, when you per- 
form the same actions again, be specially on your guard 
against, the influence of any motive of which you now 
disapprove. 

3. If conscience convicts you of having acted wrongly, 

1. Reflect upon the wrong, survey the obligations 
which you have violated, until you are sensible of your 

§ uilt * 

2. Be willing to suffer the pains of conscience. They 
are the rebukes of a friend, and are designed to withhold 
you from the commission of wrong in future. Neither 
turn a neglectful ear to its monitions, nor drown its voice 
amid the bustle of business, or the gayety of pleasure. 

3. Do not let the subject pass away from your thoughts, 
until you have come to a settled resolution, a resolution 
founded on moral disapprobation of the action, never to 
do so any more. 

4. If restitution be in your power, make it, without 
hesitation, and do it immediately. The least that a man 
ought to be satisfied with, who has done wrong, is to repair 
the wrong as soon as it is possible. 

5. As every act of wrong is a sin against God, seek, 
in humble penitence, his pardon, through the merits and 
intercession of his Son, Jesus Christ. 

6. Remark the actions, or the courses of thinking, which 
were the occasions of leading you to do wrong. Be 
specially careful to avoid them in future. To this effect, 
says President Edwards, " Resolved, that when I do any 
conspicuously evil action, to trace it back, till I come to 
the original cause : and then both carefully endeavor to 
do so no more, and to fight and pray, with all my might, 
against the original of it." 

7. Do all this, in humble dependence upon that merci- 
ful and every where present Being, who is always ready 
to grant us all assistance necessary to keep his command- 
ments ; and who will never leave us, nor forsake us, if 
we put our trust in him. 



RULES FOR MORAL CONDUCT. 



81 



It seems, then, from what has been remarked, that we 
are all endowed with conscience, or a faculty for discern- 
ing a moral quality in human actions, impelling us to- 
wards right, and dissuading us from wrong ; and that the 
dictates of this faculty are felt and known to be of supreme 
authority. 

The possession of this faculty renders us accountable 
creatures. Without it, we should not be specially distin- 
guished from the brutes. With it, we are brought into 
moral relations with God, and all the moral intelligences 
in the universe. 

It is an ever-present faculty. It always admonishes 
us, if we will listen to its voice, and frequently does so, 
even when we wish to silence its warnings. Hence, we 
may always know our duty, if we will but inquire for it. 
We can, therefore, never have any excuse for doing 
wrong, since no man need do wrong, unless he chooses ; 
and no man will do it ignorantly, unless from criminal 
neglect of the faculty which God has given him. 

How solemn is the thought, that we are endowed with 
such a faculty, and that we can never be disunited from 
it ! It goes with us through all the scenes of life, in 
company and alone, admonishing, warning, reproving, 
and recording ; and, as a source of happiness or of misery, 
it must abide with us for ever. Well doth it become 
man, then, to reverence himself. 

And thus we see, that, from his moral constitution, were 
there no other means of knowledge of duty, man is an 
accountable creature. Man is under obligation to obey 
the will of God, in what manner soever signified. That 
it is signified in this manner, I think there cannot be a 
question ; and for this knowledge he is justly held respon- 
sible. Thus, the Apostle Paul declares, that " the Gen- 
tiles, who have not the law, are a law unto themselves, 
which show the work of the law, written on their hearts, 
their consciences being continually excusing or accusing- 
one another." How much greater must be the responsi- 
bility of those to whom God has given the additional 
light of natural and revealed religion ! 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 



SECTION I. 

OF VIRTUE IN GENERAL. 

It has been already remarked, that we find ourselves 
so constituted, as to stand in various relations to all the 
beings around us, especially to our fellow-men, and to 
God. There may be, and there probably are, other be- 
ings, to whom, by our creation, we are related : but we, 
as yet, have no information on the subject ; and we must 
wait until we enter upon another state, before the fact, 
and the manner of the fact, be revealed. 

In consequence of these relations, and either by the 
appointment of God, or from the necessity of the case, 
if, indeed, these terms mean any thing different from each 
other, there arise moral obligations to exercise certain af- 
fections towards other beings, and to act towards them in 
a manner corresponding to those affections. Thus, we 
are taught in the Scriptures, that the relation in which 
we stand to Deity, involves the obligation to universal 
and unlimited obedience and love ; and that the relation 
in which we stand to each other, involves the obligation 
to love, limited and restricted ; and, of course, to a mode 
of conduct, in all respects, corresponding to these affec- 
tions. 

An action is right, when it corresponds to these obliga- 
tions, or, which is the same thing, is the carrying into 
effect of these affections. It is wrong, when it is in vio- 



OF VIRTUE IN GENERAL. 



83 



lation of these obligations, or is the carrying into effect of 
any other affections. 

By means of our intellect, we become conscious of the 
relations in which we stand to the beings with whom we 
are connected. Thus, by the exertion of our intellectual 
faculties, we become acquainted with the existence and 
attributes of God, his power, his wisdom, his goodness : 
and it is by these same faculties, that we understand and 
verify those declarations of the Scriptures, which give us 
additional knowledge of his attributes ; and by which we 
arrive at a knowledge of the conditions of our being as 
creatures, and also of the various relations in which we 
stand to each other. 

Conscience, as has been remarked, is that faculty by 
which we become conscious of the obligations arising from 
these relations ; by which we perceive the quality of right 
in those actions which correspond to these obligations, and 
of wrong in those actions which violate them ; and by 
which we are impelled towards the one, and repelled from 
the other. It is, manifestly, the design of this faculty to 
suggest to us this feeling of obligation, as soon as the rela- 
tions on which it is founded, are understood ; and thus 
to excite in us the corresponding affections. 

Now, in a perfectly constituted moral and intellectual 
being, it is evident, that there would be a perfect adjust- 
ment between these external qualities and the internal 
faculties. A perfect eye is an eye that, under the proper 
conditions, would discern every variety and shade of color, 
in every object which it was adapted to perceive. The 
same remark would apply to our hearing, or to any other 
sense. So, a perfectly constituted intellect would, under 
the proper conditions, discern the relations in which the 
being stood to other beings ; and a perfectly constituted 
conscience would, at the same time, become conscious of 
all the obligations which arose from such relations, and 
would impel us to the corresponding courses of conduct. 
That is, there would exist a perfect adaptation between 
the external qualities which were addressed to these fac- 
ulties, and the faculties themselves, to which these quali- 
ties were addressed. 8* 



84 



OF VIRTUE IN GENERAL. 



Hence, in a being thus perfectly constituted, it is mani- 
fest, that virtue, the doing of right, or obedience to con- 
science, would mean the same thing. 

When, however, we speak of the perfection of a moral 
organization, we speak of the perfection of adjustment be- 
tween the faculty of conscience, and the relations and 
obligations under which the particular being is created. 
Hence, this very perfection admits of various gradations 
and modifications. For example : 

1. The relations of the same being change, during the 
progress of its existence, from infancy, through childhood 
•and manhood, until old age. This change of relations 
involves changes of obligations ; and the perfection of its 
moral organization would consist in the perfect adjust- 
ment of its moral faculty to its moral relations, throughout 
the whole course of its history. Now, the tendency of 
this change is, manifestly, from less to greater ; that is, 
from less imperative to more imperative, and from less 
numerous to more numerous obligations. That is, the ten- 
dency of the present system is to render beings more and 
more capacious of virtue and of vice, as far as we are per- 
mitted to have any knowledge of them. 

2. As it is manifestly impossible for us to conceive either 
how numerous, or how important, may be our relations 
to other creatures, in another state, or how much more 
intimate may be the relations in which we shall stand to 
our Creator ; and, as there can be no limit conceived to 
our power of comprehending these relations, nor to our 
power of becoming conscious of the obligations which they 
involve ; so, it is manifest, that no limit can be conceived 
to the progress of man's capacity for virtue. It evident- 
ly contains within itself elements adapted to infinite im- 
provement, in any state in which we may exist. 

3. And the same may be said of vice. As our obliga- 
tions must, from what we already know, continue to in- 
crease, and our power for recognising them must also 
continue to increase ; if we perpetually violate them, we 
become more and more capable of wrong ; and thus, also, 
become more and more intensely vicious. And thus, the 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



85 



very elements of a moral constitution, seem to involve 
the necessity of illimitable progress, either in virtue or in 
vice, so long as we exist. 

4. And as, on the one hand, we can have no concep- 
tion of the amount of attainment, both in virtue and vice, 
of which man is capable, so, on the other hand, we can 
have no conception of the delicacy of that moral tinge by 
which his character is first designated. We detect moral 
character at a very early age ; but this by no means 
proves, that it did not exist long before we detected it. 
Hence, as it may thus have existed before we were able 
to detect it, it is manifest that we have no elements by 
which to determine the time of its commencement. That 
is to say, in general, we are capable of observing moral 
qualities within certain limits, as from childhood to old 
age ; but this is no manner of indication that these 
qualities may not exist in the being before, and afterwards, 
in degrees greatly below and infinitely above any thing 
which we are capable of observing. 



SECTION II. 

OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 

Let us now consider this subject in relation to a being 
whose moral constitution has become disordered. 
Now, this disorder might be of two kinds : 

1. He might not perceive all the relations in which he 
stood, and which gave rise to moral obligations, and, of 
course, would be unconscious of the corresponding obliga- 
tions. 

2. He might perceive the relation, but his conscience 
might be so disordered, as not to feel all the obligation 
which corresponded to it. 

What shall we say concerning the actions of such a 
being ? 



86 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



1. The relations under which he is constituted are the 
same, and the obligations arising out of these relations are 
the same, as though his moral constitution had not be- 
come disordered. 

2. His actions would all be comprehended under two 
classes : 

1. Those which came, if I may so express it, within 
the limit of his conscience ; that is, those in which his 
conscience did correctly intimate to him his obligation ; 
and, 

2. Those in which it did not so intimate it. 

Now, of the first class of actions, it is manifest that, 
where conscience did correctly intimate to him his obliga- 
tions, the doing of right, and obedience to conscience, 
would, as in the last section, be equivalent terms. 

But, what shall we say of those without this limit ; 
that is, of those which he, from the conditions of his 
being, is under obligation to perform ; but, of which, 
from the derangement of his moral nature, he does not 
perceive the obligation ? 

1. Suppose him to perform these very actions, there 
could be in them no virtue ; for the man perceiving in 
them no moral quality, and, having towards them no 
moral impulsion, moral obligation could be no motive for 
performing them. He might act from passion, or from 
self-love ; but under such circumstances, as there is no 
moral motive, there could be no praiseworthiness. 
Thus, for a judge to do justice to a poor widow, is man- 
ifestly right ; but, a man may do this without any moral 
desert ; for, hear what the unjust judge saith : " Though 
I fear not God, nor regard man, yet, because this wid- 
ow troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest, by her continual 
coming, she weary me." 

It does not, however, follow, that the performing of an 
action, in this manner, is innocent. The relation in 
which a being stands to other beings, involves the obliga- 
tion to certain feelings, and to the acts corresponding to 
those feelings. If the act be performed, and the feeling 
be wanting, the obligation is not fulfilled, and the man 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



87 



may be guilty. How far he is guilty will be seen 
below. 

2. But, second, suppose him not to perform those ac- 
tions, which are, as we have said, without the limit of his 
conscience. In how far is the omission of these actions, 
or the doing of the contrary, innocent ? That is to say, 
is the impulse of conscience, in an imperfectly constituted 
moral being, the limit of moral obligation ? 

This will, I suppose, depend upon the following con- 
siderations : 

1. His knowledge of the relations in which he stands. 
If he know not the relations in which he stands to 

others, and have not the means of knowing them, he is 
guiltless. If he Jcnow them, or have the means of know- 
ing them and have not improved these means, he is 
guilty. This is, I think, the principle asserted by the 
Apostle Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans. He asserts, 
that the heathen are guilty in sinning against God, be- 
cause His attributes may be known by the light of nature. 
He also asserts that there will be a difference between 
the condemnation of the Jews and that of the heathen, 
on the ground that the Jews were informed of many 
points of moral obligation, which the heathen could not 
have ascertained, without a revelation : " Those that sin 
without law, shall perish without law ; and those that 
have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law." 

2. His guilt will depend, secondly, on the cause of 
this imperfection of his conscience. 

Were this imperfection of conscience not the result of 
his own act, he would be guiltless. But, in just so far as 
it is the result of his own conduct, he is responsible. 
We have already seen, that conscience may be improved 
by use, and injured by disuse, or by abuse. Now, as a 
man is entitled to all the benefits which accrue from the 
faithful improvement of his conscience, so he is responsi- 
ble for all the injury that results from the abuse of it. 

That this is the fact, is, I think, evident, from obvious 
considerations. 

1 . It is well known, that the repetition of wickedness 



88 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



produces great stupidity of conscience, or, as it is fre- 
quently termed, hardness of heard. But no one ever 
considers this stupidity as in any manner an excuse. It 
is, on the contrary, always held to be an aggravation of 
crime. Thus, we term a man, who has become so accus- 
tomed to crime, that he will murder without feeling and 
without regret, a remorseless murderer, a cold-blooded as- 
sassin ; and every one knows that, by these epithets, we 
mean to designate a special and additional element of 
guiltiness. This I take to be the universal feeling of man. 

2. The assertion of the contrary would lead to results 
manifestly erroneous. 

Suppose two men, of precisely the some moral attain- 
ments, to-day, to commence, at the same time, two 
courses of conduct, diametrically opposed to each other. 
The first, by the scrupulous doing of right, cultivates, to 
the utmost, his moral nature, and increases, with every 
day, his capacity for virtue. The sphere of his benevo- 
lent affections enlarges, and the play of his moral feel- 
ings becomes more and more intense, until he is filled 
with the most ardent desire to promote the welfare of 
every fellow -creature, and to do the will of God with his 
whole heart. The other, by a continued course of crime, 
gradually destroys the susceptibility of his conscience, and 
lessens his capacity for virtue, until his soul is filled with 
hatred to God, and no other feeling of obligation remains, 
except that of fidelity to his co-partners in guilt. 

Now, at the expiration of this period, if both of these 
men should act according to what each felt to be the dic- 
tate of conscience, they would act very differently. But, 
if a man can be under obligation to do, and to leave un- 
done, nothing but what his conscience, at a particular 
moment, indicates, I do not see but that these men would 
be, in the actions of that moment, equally innocent. 
The only difference between them, so far as the actions 
of a particular moment were concerned, would be the 
difference between a virtuous man and a virtuous child. 

From these facts, we are easily led to the distinction 
between right and wrong, and innocence and guilt. 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



89 



Right and wrong depend upon the relations under which 
beings are created ; and, hence, the obligations resulting 
from these relations are, in their nature, fixed and un- 
changeable. Guilt and innocence depend upon the 
knowledge of these relations ; and are, moreover, affected 
by the degree in which the imperfection of conscience is 
the result of the voluntary agency of the individual him- 
self. As these are manifestly susceptible of variation, 
while right and wrong are invariable, the two notions 
may manifestly not always correspond to each other. 

Thus, for example, an action may be wrong ; but, if 
the actor have no means of knowing it to be wrong, he 
is held morally guiltless, in the doing of it. Or, again, a 
man may have a consciousness of obligation, and a sin- 
cere desire to act in conformity to it ; and may, from 
ignorance of the way in which that obligation is to be 
discharged, perform an act in its nature wrong ; yet, if 
he have acted according to the best of his possible knowl- 
edge, he may not only be held guiltless, but even virtu- 
ous. And. on the contrary, if a man do what is actually 
right, but without a desire to fulfil the obligation of which 
he is conscious, he is held to be guilty ; for he has not 
manifested a desire to act in obedience to the obligations 
under which he knew himself to be created. Illustra- 
tions of these remarks may be easily drawn from the 
ordinary affairs of life, or from the Scriptures. 

And, hence, we also arrive at another principle of 
importance in our moral judgments, namely, that our 
own consciousness of innocence, or our not being con- 
scious of guilt, is by no means a sufficient proof of our 
innocence. A man may never have reflected on the re- 
lations in which he stands to other men, or to God ; and, 
hence, may be conscious of no feeling of obligation to- 
ward either, in any or in particular respects. This may 
be the fact ; but his innocence would not be established, 
unless he can also show that he has faithfully and impar- 
tially used all the powers which God has given him, to 
obtain a knowledge of these relations. Or, again, he 
may understand the relation, and have no corresponding 



90 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



sensibility. This may be the fact; but his innocency 
would not be established, unless he can also show that he 
has always faithfully and honestly obeyed his conscience, 
so that his moral insensibility is, in no manner, attributa- 
ble to his own acts. Until these things can be shown, 
the want of moral consciousness will be no proof of inno- 
cence. To this principle, if I mistake not, the Apostle 
Paul alludes, in 1 Cor. iv, 3, 4 : (c But with me, it is a 
very small thing to be judged of you, or of man's judg- 
ment : yea, I judge not my ownself, for I know nothing 
of my ownself (or, rather, I am conscious of nothing 
wrong in myself ; that is, of no unfaithfulness in office) ; 
yet, am I not hereby justified : but he that judgeth me is 
the Lord." And, thus, a man may do great wrong, and 
be deeply guilty, in respect to a whole class of obliga- 
tions, without being, in any painful degree, sensible of it. 
Such I think to be the moral state in which men, in gen- 
eral, are, in respect to their obligations to God. Thus, 
saith our Savior to the Jews : " I know you, that ye have 
not the love of God in you;" while they were suppos- 
ing themselves to be the special favorites of Heaven. 

From these remarks, we may also learn the relation in 
which beings, created as we are, stand to moral law. 

Man is created with moral and intellectual powers, ca- 
pable of progressive improvement. Hence, if he use his 
faculties as he ought, he will progressively improve ; that 
is, become more and more capable of virtue. He is as- 
sured of enjoying all the benefits which can result from 
such improvement. If he use these faculties as he ought 
not, and become less and less capable of virtue, he is 
hence held responsible for all the consequences of his mis- 
improvement. 

Now, as this misimprovement is his own act, for which 
he is responsible, it manifestly does not affect the relations 
under which he is created, nor the obligations resulting 
from these relations ; that is, he stands, in respect to the 
moral acquirements under which he is created, precisely 
in the same condition as if he had always used his moral 
powers correctly. That is to say, under the present moral 



OF VIRTUE 11ST IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



91 



constitution, every man is justly held responsible, at every 
period of his existence, for that degree of virtue of which 
he would have been capable, had he, from the first mo- 
ment of his existence, improved his moral nature, in eve- 
ry respect, just as he ought to have done. In other 
words, suppose some human being to have always lived 
thus (Jesus Christ, for instance), every man is, at every 
successive period of his existence, held responsible for 
the same degree of virtue as such a perfect being attained 
to, at the corresponding periods of his existence. Such 
I think evidently to be the nature of the obligation which 
must rest upon such beings, throughout the whole extent 
of their duration. 

In order to meet this increasing responsibility, in such 
a manner as to fulfil the requirements of moral law, a 
being, under such a constitution, must, at every moment 
of his existence, possess a moral faculty, which, by per- 
fect previous cultivation, is adapted to the responsibilities 
of that particular moment. But, suppose this not to have 
been the case ; and that, on the contrary, his moral facul- 
ty, by once doing wrong, has become impaired, so that, 
it either does not admonish him correctly of his obliga- 
tions, or that he has become indisposed to obey its moni- 
tions. This must, at the next moment, terminate in ac- 
tion more at variance with rectitude than before. The 
adjustment between conscience and the passions, must 
become deranged ; and thus, the tendency, at every suc- 
cessive moment, must be, to involve him deeper and deep- 
er in guilt. And, unless some other moral force be exert- 
ed in the case, such must be the tendency for ever. 

And suppose some such force to be exerted, and, at 
any period of his existence, the being to begin to obey 
his conscience in every one of its present monitions. It 
is manifest, that he would now need some other and 
more perfect guide, in order to inform hirn perfectly of 
his obligations, and of the mode in which they are to be 
fulfilled. And supposing this to be done : as he is at this 
moment responsible for such a capacity for virtue, as 
would have been attained by a previously perfect recti- 
9 



92 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



tude ; and as his capacity is inferior to this ; and as no 
reason can be suggested, why his progress in virtue should, 
under these circumstances, be more rapid than that of a 
perfect being, but the contrary ; it is manifest, that he 
must ever fall short of what is justly required of him, — 
nay, that he must be continually falling farther and far- 
ther behind it. 

And hence, the present constitution tends to show us 
the remediless nature of moral evil, under the government 
of God, unless some other principle, than that of law, be 
admitted into the case. These conditions of being hav- 
ing been violated, unless man be placed under some other 
conditions, natural religion would lead us to believe, that 
he must suffer the penalty, whatever it be, of wrong. 
Penitence could in no manner alter his situation ; for it is 
merely a temper justly demanded, in consequence of his 
sin. But this could not replace him in his original rela- 
tion to the law which had been violated. Such seems to 
be the teachings of the Holy Scriptures ; and they seem 
to me to declare, moreover, that this change in the condi- 
tions of our being, has been accomplished by the mediation 
of a Redeemer, by which we may, through the obedience 
of another, be justified (that is, treated as though just), 
although we are, by confession, guilty. 

And hence, although it were shown that a man was, 
at any particular period of his being, incapable of that 
degree of virtue which the law of God required, it would 
neither follow that he was not under obligation to exer- 
cise it, nor that he was not responsible for the whole 
amount of that exercise of it ; since, if he have dwarfed 
his own powers, he is responsible for the result. And, 
conversely, if God requires this whole amount of virtue, 
it will not prove that man is now capable of exercising it ; 
but only, that he is either thus capable, or, that he would 
have been so, if he had used correctly the powers which 
God gave him. 

A few suggestions respecting the moral relations of 
habit, will close this discussion. 

Some of the most important facts respecting habit, are 
the following : 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



93 



It is found to be the fact, that the repetition of any 
physical act, at stated periods, and especially after brief 
intervals, renders the performance of the act easier ; it is 
accomplished in less time, with less effort, with less ex- 
pense of nervous power, and of mental energy. This is 
exemplified, every day, in the acquisition of the mechan- 
ical arts, and in learning the rudiments of music. And 
whoever will remark, may easily be convinced, that a 
great part of our education, physical and intellectual, 
in so far as it is valuable, consists in the formation of 
habits. 

The same remarks apply, to a very considerable extent, 
to moral habits. 

The repetition of a virtuous act produces a tendency to 
continued repetition ; the force of opposing motives is les- 
sened ; the power of the will over passion is more de- 
cided ; and the act is accomplished with less moral effort. 
Perhaps we should express the fact truly, by saying, that, 
by the repetition of virtuous acts, moral power is gained ; 
while, for the performance of the same acts, less moral 
power is required. 

On the contrary, by the repetition of vicious acts, q. 
tendency is created towards such repetition ; the power 
of the passions is increased ; the power of opposing 
forces is diminished ; and the resistance to passion re- 
quires a greater moral effort ; or, as in the contrary of the 
preceding case, a greater moral effort is required to resist 
our passions, while the moral power to resist them is di- 
minished. 

Now, the obvious nature of such a tendency is, to ar- 
rive at a fixed and unalterable moral state. Be the fact 
accounted for as it may, I think that habit has an effect 
upon the will, such as to establish a tendency towards the 
impossibility to resist it. Thus, the practice of virtue 
seems to tend towards rendering a man incapable of 
vice, and the practice of vice towards rendering a man 
incapable of virtue. It is common to speak of a man as 
incapable of meanness ; and I think we see men as often, 
in the same sense, incapable of virtue. And, if I mistake 



94 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



not, we always speak of the one incapacity as an object 
of praise, and of the other, as an object of blame. 

If we inquire, what are the moral effects of such a con- 
dition of our being, I think we shall find them to be as 
follows : 

1. Habit cannot alter the nature of an action, as right 
or wrong. It can alter neither our relations to our fellow- 
creatures, nor to God, nor the obligations consequent up- 
on those relations. Hence, the character of the action 
must remain unaffected. 

2. Nor can it alter the guilt or innocence of the action. 
As he who acts virtuously, is entitled to the benefit of 
virtuous action, among which the tendency to virtuous 
action is included ; so, he who acts viciously, is responsi- 
ble for all the consequences of vicious action, the corres- 
ponding tendency to vicious action also included. The 
conditions being equal, and he being left to his own free 
choice, the consequences of either course rest justly upon 
himself. 

The final causes of such a constitution are apparent. 

1. It is manifestly and precisely adapted to our present 
state, when considered as probationary, and capable of 
moral changes, and terminating in one where moral 
change is impossible. The constitution under which we 
are placed, presents us with the apparent paradox of a 
state of incessant moral change, in which every individu- 
al change has a tendency to produce a state that is un- 
changeable. 

2. The fact of such a constitution is, manifestly, in- 
tended to present the strongest possible incentives to vir- 
tue, and monitions against vice. It teaches us that con- 
sequences are attached to every act of both, not only 
present but future, and, so far as we can see, interminable. 
As every one can easily estimate the pleasures of vice 
and the pains of virtue, both in extent and duration ; but, 
as no one, taking into consideration the results of the 
tendency which each will produce, can estimate the in- 
terminable consequences which must arise from either,—*- 
there is, therefore, hence derived the strongest possible 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



95 



reason, why we should always do right, and never do 
wrong. 

And again. It is evident, that our capacity for increase 
in virtue, depends greatly upon the present constitution, 
in respect to habit. I have remarked, that the effect of 
the repetition of virtuous action, was to give us greater 
moral power, while the given action itself required less 
moral effort. There, hence, arises, if I may so say, a 
surplus of moral power, which may be applied to accom- 
plishing greater moral achievements. He who has over- 
come one evil temper, has acquired moral power to over- 
come another ; and that which was first subdued, is kept 
in subjection without a struggle. He who has formed 
one habit of virtue practises it, without effort, as a matter 
of course, or of original impulse ; and the power thus ac- 
quired, may be applied to the attainment of other and 
more difficult habits, and the accomplishment of higher 
and more arduous moral enterprises. He who desires to 
see the influence of habit illustrated, with great beauty 
and accuracy, will be gratified by the perusal of " The 
Hermit of Teneriffe," one of the most delightful allego- 
ries to be found in the English language. 

The relation between the moral and the intellectual 
powers, in the moral conditions of our being, may be thus 
briefly stated : 

1. We are created under certain relations to our Crea- 
tor, and to our fellow-creatures. 

2. We are created under certain obligations to our 
Creator, and our fellow-creatures, in consequence of these 
relations, — obligations to exercise certain affections, and 
to maintain courses of action corresponding to those af- 
fections. 

3. By means of our intellectual powers, we perceive 
these relations. 

4. By means of our moral powers, we become con- 
scious of these obligations. 

5. The consciousness of these obligations alone, would 
not always teach us how they were to be discharged ; as, 
for example, the consciousness of our obligations to God, 

9* 



96 



OF VIRTUE IN IMPERFECT BEINGS. 



would not teach us how God should be worshipped, and 
so in various other cases. It is by the use of the powers 
of our intellect, that we learn how these moral affections 
are to be carried into action. The use of the intellect is, 
therefore, twofold. First, to discover to us our relations. 
Secondly, to discover in what manner our obligations are 
to be discharged. 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



HUMAN HAPPINESS. 

We have already, on several occasions, alluded to the 
fact, that God has created every thing double ; a world 
without us, and a corresponding world within us. He 
has made light without, and the eye within ; beauty with- 
out, and taste within ; moral qualities in actions, and con- 
science to judge of them ; and so of every other case. 
By means of this correspondence, our communication 
with the external world exists. 

These internal powers are called into exercise by the 
presence of their corresponding external objects. Thus, 
the organ of vision is excited by the presence of light, 
the sense of smell by odors, the faculty of taste by beauty 
or deformity, and so of the rest. 

The first effect of this exercise of these faculties is, 
that we are conscious of the existence and qualities of 
surrounding objects. Thus, by sight, we become con- 
scious of the existence and colors of visible objects ; by 
hearing, of the existence and sound of audible objects, 
&c. 

But, it is manifest, that this knowledge of the existence 
and qualities of external objects is far from being all the 
intercourse which we are capable of holding with them. 
This knowledge of their existence and qualities is, most 
frequently, attended with pleasure or pain, desire or aver- 
sion. Sometimes the mere perception itself is immediate- 
ly pleasing ; in other cases, it is merely the sign of some 
other quality which has the power of pleasing us. In 
the first case, the perception produces gratification ; in 
the other, it awakens desire. 

That is, we stand in such relations to the external 



98 



HUMAN HAPPINESS. 



world, that certain objects, besides being capable of being 
perceived, are also capable of giving us pleasure ; and 
certain other objects, besides being perceived, are capa- 
ble of giving us pain. Or, to state the same truth in the 
other form, we are so made as to be capable, not only of 
perceiving, but also of being pleased with, or pained by, 
the various objects by which we are surrounded. 

This general power of being pleased or pained, may 
be, and I think frequently is, termed sensitiveness. 

This sensitiveness, or the power of being made happy 
by surrounding objects, is intimately connected with the 
exercise of our various faculties. Thus, the pleasure of 
vision cannot be enjoyed in any other manner, than by 
the exercise of the faculty of sight. The pleasure of 
knowledge can be enjoyed in no other way, than by the 
exercise of the intellectual powers. The pleasure of 
beauty can be enjoyed in no other manner, than by the 
exercise of the faculty of taste, and of the other subor- 
dinate faculties on which this faculty depends. And 
thus, in general, our sensitiveness derives pleasure from 
the exercise of those powers which are made necessary 
for our existence and well-being in our present state. 

Now, I think that we can have no other idea of happi- 
ness than the exercise of this sensitiveness upon its cor- 
responding objects and qualities. It is the gratification 
of desire, the enjoyment of what we love ; or, as Dr. 
Johnson remarks, " Happiness consists in the multiplica- 
tion of agreeable consciousness." 

It seems, moreover, evident, that this very constitution 
is to us an indication of the will of our Creator ; that is, 
inasmuch as he has created us with these capacities for 
happiness, and has also created objects around us precise- 
ly adapted to these capacities, he meant that the one 
should be exercised upon the other ; that is, that we should 
be made happy in this manner. 

And this is more evident, from considering that this 
happiness is intimately connected with the exercise of 
those faculties, the employment of which is necessary to 
our existence and our well-being. It thus becomes the 



HUMAN HAPPINESS. 



99 



incitement to or the reward of certain courses of conduct, 
which it is necessary, to our own welfare, or to that of 
society, that we should pursue. 

And thus we arrive at the general principle, that our 
desire for a particular object, and the existence of the ob- 
ject adapted to this desire, is, in itself, a reason why we 
should enjoy that object, in the same manner as our aver- 
sion to another object, is a reason why we should avoid 
it. There may sometimes be, it is true, other reasons to 
the contrary, more authoritative than that emanating from 
this desire or aversion, and these may and ought to con- 
trol it ; but this does not show that this desire is not a 
reason, and a sufficient one, if no better reason can be 
shown to the contrary. 

But, if we consider the subject a little more minutely, 
we shall find that the simple gratification of desire, in the 
manner above stated, is not the only condition on which 
our happiness depends. 

We find, by experience, that a desire or appetite may 
be so gratified as for ever afterwards to destroy its power 
of producing happiness. Thus, a certain kind of food is 
pleasant to me ; this is a reason why I should partake of 
it. But I may eat of it to excess, so as to loathe it for 
ever afterwards, and thus annihilate, in my constitution, 
this mode of gratification. Now, the same reasoning 
which proves that God intended me to partake of this 
food, namely, because it will promote my happiness, also 
proves that he did not intend me to partake of it after 
this manner ; for, by so doing, I have diminished, by this 
whole amount, my capacity for happiness, and thus de- 
feated, in so far, the very end of my constitution. Or, 
again, though I may not destroy my desire for a particu- 
lar kind of food, by a particular manner of gratification, 
yet I may so derange my system, that the eating of it 
shall produce pain and distress, so that it ceases to be to 
me a source of happiness, upon the whole. In this case, 
I equally defeat the design of my constitution. The re- 
sult equally shows that, although he means that 1 should 
eat it, he does not mean that I should eat it in this manner. 



100 



HUMAN HAPPINESS. 



Again, every man is created with various and dissimi- 
lar forms of desire, corresponding to the different exter- 
nal objects designed to promote his happiness. Now, it 
is found that one form of desire may be gratified in such 
a manner, as to destroy the power of receiving happiness 
from another ; or, on the contrary, the first may be so 
gratified as to leave the other powers of receiving happi- 
ness unimpaired. Since, then, it is granted that these 
were all given us for the same end, namely, to promote 
our happiness, if, by the first manner of gratification, we 
destroy another power of gratification, while, by the sec- 
ond manner of gratification, we leave the other power of 
gratification uninjured, it is evidently the design of our 
Creator that we should limit ourselves to this second 
mode of gratification. 

Thus, I am so formed that food is pleasant to me. 
This, even if there were no necessity for eating, is a reason 
why I should eat it. But I am also formed with a 
desire for knowledge. This is a reason why I should 
study in order to obtain it. That is, God intended me to 
derive happiness from both of these sources of gratifica- 
tion. If, then, I eat in such a manner that I cannot 
study, or study in such a manner that I cannot eat, in 
either case, I defeat his design concerning me, by des- 
troying those sources of happiness with which he created 
me. The same principle might be illustrated in various 
instances. 

Again, we find that the indulgence of any one form of 
gratification, in such manner as to destroy the power of 
another form of gratification, also in the end diminishes, 
and frequently destroys, the power of deriving happiness, 
even from that which is indulged. Thus, he who eats so 
as to injure his power of intellectual gratification, injures 
his digestive organs, and produces disease, so that his 
pleasure from eating is diminished. Or, he who studies so 
as to destroy his appetite, in the end destroys his power of 
study. This is another and distinct reason, to show, 
that, while I am designed to be happy by the gratifica- 
tion of my desires, I am also designed to be happy by 



HUMAN HAPPINESS. 



101 



gratifying them within a limit. The limit to gratifica- 
tion enters into my constitution, as a being designed for 
happiness, just as much as the power of gratification 
itself. 

And again, our Creator has endowed us with an addi- 
tional and superior power, by which we can contemplate 
these two courses of conduct ; by which we can approve 
of the one, and disapprove of the other ; and by which 
the one becomes a source of pleasure and the other a 
source of pain ; both separate and distinct from the 
sources of pain and pleasure mentioned above. And, 
moreover, he has so constituted us, that this very habit of 
regulating and limiting our desires, is absolutely essential 
to our success in every undertaking. Both of these are, 
therefore, additional and distinct reasons for believing, 
that the restriction of our desires within certain limits, is 
made, by our Creator, as clearly necessary to .our happi- 
ness, as the indulgence of them. 

All this is true, if we consider the happiness of man 
merely as an individual. But the case is rendered still 
stronger, if we look upon man as a society. It is mani- 
fest that the universal gratification of any single appetite 
or passion, without limit, not to say the gratification of all, 
would, in a very few years, not only destroy society, but 
absolutely put an end to the whole human race. And, 
hence, we see that the limitation of our desires is not only 
necessary to our happiness, but also to our existence. 

Hence, while it is the truth, that human happiness 
consists in the gratification of our desires, it is not the 
whole truth. It consists in the gratification of our de- 
sires within the limits assigned to them by our Creator. 
And, the happiness of that man will be the most perfect, 
who regulates his desires most perfectly in accordance 
with the laws under which he has been created. And, 
hence,the greatest happiness of which man is, in his present 
state, capable, is to be attained by conforming his whole 
conduct to the laws of virtue, that is, to the will of God. 



CHAPTER FIFTH. 



OF SELF-LOVE. 

By the term sensitiveness, I have designated the capac- 
ity of our nature to derive happiness from the various ob- 
jects and qualities of the world around us. Though in- 
timately associated with those powers by which we ob- 
tain a knowledge of external objects, it differs from them. 
When a desire for gratification is excited by its appropri- 
ate objects, it is termed appetite, passion, he. 

As our means of gratification are various, and are also 
attended by different effects, there is evidently an oppor- 
tunity for choice between them. By declining a gratifi- 
cation at present, we may secure one of greater value at 
some future time. That which is, at present, agreeable, 
may be of necessity followed by pain ; and that which is, 
at present, painful, may be rewarded by pleasure which 
shall far overbalance it. 

Now, it must be evident, to every one who will reflect, 
that my happiness, at any one period of my existence, is 
just as valuable as my happiness at the present period. 
No one can conceive of any reason, why the present mo- 
ment should take the precedence, in any respect, over 
any other moment of my being. Every moment of my 
past life was once present, and seemed of special value ; 
but, in the retrospect, all seem, so far as the happiness of 
each is concerned, of equal value. Each of those to 
come may, in its turn, claim some pre-eminence ; though, 
now, we plainly discover in anticipation, that no one is 
more than another entitled to it. Nay, if there be any 
difference, it is manifestly in favor of the most distant fu- 
ture, in comparison with the present. The longer we 
exist, the greater is our capacity for virtue and happiness, 



OF SELF-LOVE. 



103 



and the wider is our sphere of existence. To postpone 
the present for the future, seems, therefore, to be the dic- 
tate of wisdom, if we calmly consider the condition of our 
being. 

But, it is of the nature of passion, to seize upon the 
present gratification, utterly irrespective of consequences, 
and utterly regardless of other or more excellent gratifica- 
tions, which may be obtained by self-denial. He whose 
passions are inflamed, looks at nothing beyond the pres- 
ent gratification. Hence, he is liable to seize upon a 
present enjoyment, to the exclusion of a much more valu- 
able one in future, and even in such a manner as to en- 
tail upon himself poignant and remediless misery. And, 
hence, in order to be enabled to enjoy all the happi- 
ness of which his present state is capable, the sensitive 
part of man needs to be combined with another, which, 
upon a comparison of the present with the future, shall 
impel him towards that mode either of gratification or of 
self-denial, which shall most promote his happiness upon 
the whole. 

Such is self-love. We give this name to that part of 
our constitution, by which we are incited to do or to for- 
bear, to gratify or to deny our desires, simply on the 
ground of obtaining the greatest amount of happiness for 
ourselves, taking into view a limited future, or else our 
entire future existence. When we act from simple re- 
spect to present gratification, we act from passion. 
When we act from a respect to our whole individual hap- 
piness, without regard to the present, only as it is a part 
of the whole, and without any regard to the happiness of 
others, only as it will contribute to our own, we are then 
said to act from self-love. 

The difference between these two modes of impulsion 
may be easily illustrated. 

Suppose a man destitute of self-love, and actuated only 
by passion. He would seize without reflection, and en- 
joy without limit, every object of gratification which the 
present moment might offer, without regard to its value 
in comparison with others,, wdiicfi might be secured by 
10 



104 



OF SELF-LOVE. 



self-denial, and without any regard to the consequences 
which might follow present pleasure, be they ever so dis- 
astrous. 

On the contrary, we may imagine a being destitute of 
passions, and impelled only by self-love ; that is, by a 
desire for his own happiness, on the whole. In this 
case, so far as I see, he would never act at all. Having 
no desires to gratify, there could be no gratification ; and, 
hence, there could be no happiness. Happiness is the 
result of the exercise of our sensitiveness upon its corre- 
sponding objects. But we have no sensitiveness which 
corresponds to any object in ourselves ; nor do ourselves 
present any object to correspond to such sensitiveness. 
Hence, the condition of a being, destitute of passions, and 
actuated only by self-love, would be an indefinite and 
most painful longing after happiness, without the con- 
sciousness of any relation to external objects which could 
gratify it. Nor is this an entire imaginary condition. In 
cases of deep melancholy, and of fixed hypochondria, 
tending to derangement, I think every one must have 
observed in others, and he is happy if he have not expe- 
rienced in himself, the tendencies to precisely such a 
state. The very power of affection, or sensitiveness, 
seems paralyzed. This state of mind has, I think, been 
ascribed to Hamlet by Shakspeare, in the following 
passage : 

" I have, of late (but wherefore I know not), lost all 
my mirth, foregone all custom of exercises ; and, indeed, 
it goes so heavily with my dispositions, that this goodly 
frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory ; this 
most excellent canopy, the air — look you — this brave 
overhanging firmament ; this majestical roof, fretted with 
golden fire ; why, it appears no other thing to me, than a 
foul and pestilent congregation of vapors. Man delights 
me not, nor woman neither, though by your smiling you 
seem to say so." — Hamlet, Act ii, Sc. 2. 

It would seem, therefore, that self-love is not, in itself, 
a faculty, or part of our constitution, in itself, productive 
of happiness ; but rather an impulse, which, out of sever- 



OF SELF-LOVE. 



105 



al forms of gratification that may be presented, inclines us 
to select that which will be the most for our happiness, 
considered as a whole. This seems the more evident, 
from the obvious fact, that a man, actuated by the most 
zealous self-love, derives no more happiness from a given 
gratification, than any other man. His pleasure, in any 
one act of enjoyment, is not in the ratio of his self-love, 
but of his sensitiveness. 

From these remarks, we can easily determine the rank 
to which self-love is entitled. 

1. Its rank is superior to that of passion. As our 
happiness, as a whole, is of more consequence than the 
happiness of every separate moment, so the faculty which 
impels us towards our happiness upon the whole, was 
manifestly intended to control that which impels toward 
our happiness for a moment. If happiness be desirable, 
the greatest amount of it is most desirable ; and, as we 
are provided with a constitution, by which we are fore- 
warned of the difference, and impelled to a correct choice, 
it is the design of our Creator that we should obey it. 

2. Its rank is inferior to that of conscience. We are 
made not only sensitive beings, that is, beings capable of 
happiness, but also moral beings, that is, beings capable 
of virtue. The latter is manifestly the most important ob- 
ject of our being, even in so far as our own happiness is 
concerned ; for, by the practice of virtue, without respect 
to our own temporal happiness, we secure our moral hap- 
piness, the most valuable of any of which we are capa- 
ble ; while, by acting for our own happiness, when these 
seem to come into competition, we lose that which is 
most valuable, and can be by no means certain of obtain- 
ing the other. That is to say, when Our own happiness 
and our duty seem to come into collision, we are bound 
to discard the consideration of our own happiness, and to 
do what we believe to be right. 

This may be illustrated by an example. 

Suppose that two courses of action are presented to our 
choice. The one, so far as we can see, will promote our 
individual happiness ; the other will fulfil a moral obliga- 



106 



OF SELF-LOVE. 



tion. Now, in this case we may act in either of these 
ways : 

1. We may seek our own happiness, and violate our 
obligations. In this case, we certainly lose the pleasure 
of virtue, and suffer the pain of remorse, while we must 
be uncertain whether we shall obtain the object of our 
desires. 

2. We may perform the act which conscience indi- 
cates, but from our self-love as a motive. Here, we 
shall gain whatever reward, by the constitution under 
which we are placed, belongs to the action ; but we lose 
the pleasure of virtue. 

3. We may perform the act indicated by conscience, 
and from the simple impulse of duty. In this case, we 
obtain every reward which could be obtained in the pre- 
ceding case, and, in addition, are blessed with the appro- 
bation of conscience. Thus, suppose I deliberate wheth- 
er I shall spend a sum of money in self-gratification, or 
else in an act of benevolence, which is plainly my duty. 
If I pursue the former course, it is very uncertain wheth- 
er I actually secure the gratification which I seek, while 
I lose the pleasure of rectitude, and am saddened by the 
pains of remorse. The pleasure of gratification is soon 
over, but the pain of guilt is enduring. Or, again, I 
may perform the act of benevolence from love of ap- 
plause, or some modification of self-love. 1 here obtain 
with more certainty the reputation which I seek, but lose 
the reward of conscious virtue. Or, thirdly, if I do the 
act without any regard to my own happiness, and simply 
from love to God and man, I obtain all the rewards which 
attach to the action by the constitution under which I am 
placed, and also enjoy the higher rewards of conscious 
rectitude. 

This subordination of motives seems clearly to be re- 
ferred to by our Savior : " There is no man, that hath 
left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or 
wife, or children, or lands, for my sake and the gos- 
pel's, but he shall receive an hundred fold now, in this 
time, and, in the world to come, life everlasting." That 



OP SELF-LOVE. 



107 



is to say, a man does not obtain the reward of virtue, 
even in self-denial, unless he disregard the considera- 
tion of himself, and act from simple love to God. To 
the same purport is the often repeated observation of our 
Savior : " whosoever will save his life shall lose it ; and 
whosoever will lose his life, for my sake, shall find it." 
There are many passages of Scripture which seem to as- 
sert, that the very turning-point of moral character, so far 
as our relations to God are concerned, consists in yield- 
ing up the consideration of our own happiness, as a con- 
trolling motive, and subjecting it, without reserve, to the 
higher motive, the simple will of God. 
If these remarks be true, we see, 

1. That, when conscience speaks, the voice of self- 
love must be silent. That is to say, we have no right to 
seek our own happiness in any manner at variance with 
moral obligation. Nevertheless, from several courses of 
action, either of which is innocent, we are at liberty to 
choose that which will most conduce to our own happi- 
ness. In such a case the consideration of our happiness 
is justly ultimate. 

2. The preceding chapter has shown us that man was 
designed to be made happy by the gratification of his de- 
sires. The present chapter teaches us, that, when the 
gratification of desire is at variance with virtue, a greater 
happiness is to be obtained by self-denial. Or, in other 
words, our greatest happiness is to be obtained not by the 
various modes of self-gratification, but by simply seeking 
the good of others, and in doing the will of God, from the 
heart. 

3. And, hence, we may arrive at the general principle, 
that every impulse or desire is supreme within its own 
assigned limits ; but that, when a lower comes into com- 
petition with a higher impulsion, the inferior accomplishes 
its own object, by being wholly subject to the superior. 
Thus, desire, or the love of present gratification, may, 
within its own limits, be indulged. But, when this pres- 
ent gratification comes into competition with self-love, 
even passion accomplishes its own object best ; that is, a 

10* 



108 



OF SELF-LOVE. 



man actually attains to more enjoyment, by submitting 
present desire implicity to self-love. And so self-love is 
ultimate within its proper limits ; but when it comes into 
competition with conscience, it actually accomplishes its 
own object best, by being entirely subject to that which 
the Creator has constituted its superior. 

4. The difference between self-love, as an innocent 
part of our constitution, and selfishness, a vicious disposi- 
tion, may be easily seen. Self-love properly directs our 
choice of objects, where both are equally innocent. Self- 
ishness is a similar disposition to promote our own hap- 
piness, upon the whole : but it disposes us to seek it in 
objects over which we have no just control ; that is, 
which are not innocent, and which we could not enjoy, 
without violating the rights of our neighbor. 



CHAPTER SIXTH. 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE; NECESSITY OF SOME ADDITION- 
AL MORAL LIGHT. 

It has been already remarked, that a distinction may 
be very clearly observed between right and wrong, and 
guilt and innocence. Right and wrong depend upon the 
obligations under which we are created, and are in their 
nature immutable. Guilt and innocence have respect to 
the individual, and are modified, moreover, by the amount 
of his knowledge of his duty, and are not decided solely 
by the fact that the action was or was not performed. 

It is, moreover, to be observed, that the results of these 
two attributes of actions may be seen to differ. Thus 
every right action is followed, in some way, with pleasure 
or benefit to the individual ; and every wrong one, by 
pain or discomfort, irrespective of the guilt or innocence 
of the author of the act. Thus, in the present constitu- 
tion of things, it is evident that a nation which had no 
knowledge of the wickedness of murder, revenge, un- 
cleanness, or theft, would, if it violated the moral law in 
these respects, suffer the consequences which are attach- 
ed to these actions by our Creator. And, on the con- 
trary, a nation which practised forgiveness, mercy, hon- 
esty, and purity, without knowing them to be right, 
would enjoy the benefits which are connected with such 
actions. 

Now, whatever be the object of this constitution, by 
which rewards or punishments are affixed to actions as 
right and wrong, whether it be as a monition, or to in- 
form us of the will of God concerning us, one thing 
seems evident, — it is not to punish actions as innocent or 
guilty : for the rewards and punishments of which we 



110 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 



speak, affect men simply in consequence of the action, 
and without any regard to the innocence or guilt of the 
actor. 

Let us now add another element. Suppose a man to 
know the obligations which bind him to his Creator ; and, 
also, what is his Creator's will respecting a certain action ; 
and that he then deliberately violates this obligation. 
Every man feels that this violation of obligation deserves 
punishment on its own account ; and, also, punishment 
in proportion to the greatness of the obligation violated. 
Hence, the consequences of any action are to be consid- 
ered in a two-fold light ; first, the consequences depend- 
ing upon the present constitution of things ; and, secondly, 
those which follow the action, as innocent or guilty ; 
that is, as violating or not violating our obligations to our 
Creator. 

These two things are plainly to be considered distinct 
from each other. Of the one, we can form some esti- 
mate ; of the other, none whatever. Thus, whatever be 
the design of the constitution, by which pain should be 
consequent upon wrong actions, irrespective of guilt ; 
whether it be to admonish us of dangers, or to intimate to 
us the will of our Creator ; we can have some conception 
how great it would probably be. But, if we consider the 
action as guilty ; that is, as violating the known will of our 
Creator ; no one can conceive how great the punishment 
of such an act ought to be, for no one can conceive how 
vast is the obligation which binds a creature to his God : 
nor, on the other hand, can any one conceive how vast 
would be the reward, if this obligation were perfectly ful- 
filled. 

As, then, every moral act is attended with pleasure or 
pain, and as every one also exposes us to the punishments 
or rewards of guilt or innocence, both of which manifestly 
transcend our power of conception ; and, if such be our 
constitution, that every moment is rendering our moral 
condition better or worse ; specially, if this world be a 
state of probation, tending to a state where change is im- 
possible ; it is manifestly of the greatest possible impor- 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 



Ill 



tance that we should both know our duty, and be furnish- 
ed with all suitable impulsions to perform it. The con- 
stitution under which man is formed, in this respect, has 
been explained at the close of the chapter on virtue. 
And were the intellect and conscience of man to be in a 
perfect state, and were he in entire harmony with the 
universe around him, there can be no doubt that his hap- 
piness, in the present state, would be perfectly secured. 

It would not, however, be certain that, with intellect- 
ual and moral powers suited to his station, man would 
be in no need of farther communication from his Maker. 
Although his feeling of obligation; and his desire to dis- 
charge it, might be perfect, yet he might not be fully 
aware of the manner in which this obligation should be 
discharged. Thus, though our first parents were endow- 
ed with a perfect moral constitution, yet it was necessary 
that God should make to them a special revelation res- 
pecting some portion of his will. Such might also be 
the case in any other instance of a perfect moral consti- 
tution, in a being of limited capacity. 

How much more is additional light necessary, when it 
is remembered that the moral constitution of man seems 
evidently to be imperfect? This may be observed in sev- 
eral respects: 

1. There are many obligations under which man is cre- 
ated, both to his fellow-creatures and to God, which his 
unassisted conscience does not discover. Such are the ob- 
ligations to universal forgiveness, to repentance, and many 
others. 

2. When the obligations are acknowledged, man fre- 
quently errs in respect to the mode in which they are to 
be discharged. Thus, a man may acknowledge his obli- 
gations to God, but may suppose that God will be pleased 
with a human sacrifice. A man may acknowledge his ob- 
ligation to love his children, but may believe that this ob- 
ligation may be discharged by putting them to death. 
Now, it is manifest, that, in both these cases, a man must 
suffer all the present evils resulting from such a course, 
just as much as though he knowingly violated these ob- 
ligations. 



112 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 



3. When men both know the obligations under which 
they are created, and the mode in which they are to be 
discharged, they wilfully disobey the monitions of con- 
science. We act according to the impulsions of blind, 
headlong passion, regardless of our own best good, and 
of the welfare of others, in despite of what we know to be 
the will of our Maker. It is the melancholy fact, that 
men do deliberately violate the commands of God, for the 
sake of the most transient and trifling gratification. Hence 
the confession : vide0j proboque meliora . 

Deteriora sequor 

has become a hackneyed proverb. 

And hence it is evident that not only are men exposing 
themselves to the pains attendant upon wrong actions dur- 
ing the present life ; but they are also exposing themselves 
to the punishments, how great and awful soever these may 
be, which are incurred by violating our obligations to our 
Creator and our Judge. The state of human nature in 
these respects I suppose to be vividly set forth by St. 
Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, ch. vii, v. 7 — 25. 

If such be our state, it is manifest that under such a 
moral constitution as we have above described, our condi- 
tion must be sufficiently hopeless. Unless something be 
done, it would seem that we must all fail of a large portion 
of the happiness, to which we might otherwise in the pres- 
ent lile attain ; and, still more, must be exposed to a con- 
demnation greater than we are capable of conceiving. 

Under such circumstances, it surely is not improbable, 
that a benevolent Deity should make use of some addi- 
tional means, to inform us of our duty, and thus warn us 
of the evils which we were bringing upon ourselves. Still 
less is it improbable, that a God, delighting in right, should 
take some means to deliver us from the guilty habits which 
we have formed, and restore us to that love and practice 
of virtue, which can alone render us pleasing to him. That 
God was under any obligation to do this, is not asserted; but 
that a being of infinite compassion and benevolence should 
do it, though not under any obligation, is surely not improb- 
able. 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 



113 



Should a revelation be made to remedy the defects of 
man's moral state, we can form some conceptions of what 
might be expected in order to accomplish such a result. 

1. Our defective knowledge of moral obligation might 
be remedied, by a clear view of the attributes of God, and 
of the various relations which we sustain to him. 

2. Our ignorance of the mode in which our obligations 
should be discharged, might be dispelled, either by a 
more expanded view of the consequences of actions, or 
by direct precept. 

3. In order to overcome our temper of disobedience, I 
know not what means might be employed. A reasona- 
ble one would seem to be, a manifestation of the charac- 
ter of the Deity to us, in some new relation, creating 
some new obligations, and thus opening a new source of 
moral motives within the soul of man. 

The first and second of these objects are accomplished, 
as I suppose, by the discoveries of natural religion, and 
by the promulgation of the moral law, under the Old 
Testament dispensation. The third is accomplished, by 
the revelation of the facts of the New Testament, and 
specially, by the revelation of God, as the author of a 
new and a remedial dispensation. 

Hence, we see that the sources of moral light, irrespect- 
ive of conscience, are, 

1. The precepts of natural religion. 

2. The precepts and motives of the sacred Scriptures. 
From what has been remarked, in the present chapter, a 

few inferences naturally arise, which I will insert in this 
place. 

It is mentioned above, that the evil consequences of 
doing wrong, are manifestly of two kinds. First, those 
connected with an action as right or wrong, and arising 
from the present constitution of things; and, secondly, those 
resulting from the action as innocent or guilty ; that is, as 
wilfully violating, or not, the obligations due to our Maker. 

Now from this plain distinction, we see, 

1. That no sin can be of trifling consequence. The least 
as well as the greatest, being a violation of an obligation 



114 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 



more sacred and awful than we can conceive, must expose 
us to punishment more dreadful than we can comprehend. 
If it be said, the thing in itself is a trifle, the answer is 
obvious : How wicked must it be, for the sake of a trifle, 
to violate so sacred and solemn an obligation as that which 
binds us to our Creator ! 

2. Hence we see how unfounded is the assertion 
sometimes made, that God could not, for the momentary 
actions of this short life, justly inflict upon us any severe 
or long enduring punishment. If an act, whether long or 
short, be a violation of our obligations to God ; if ill-desert 
be according to the greatness of the obligation violated ; 
and if no one can pretend to comprehend the vastness of the 
obligations which binds the creature to the Creator ; then, 
no one can, a priori, pretend to decide what is the pun- 
ishment justly due to every act of wilful wickedness. It 
is evident that no one can decide this question but he 
who fully knows the relation between the parties ; that is, 
the Creator himself. 

3. Since every impure, revengeful, deceitful or envious 
thought is a violation of our obligations to our Maker, 
and, much more, the words and actions to which these 
thoughts give rise ; and since even the imperfect con- 
science of every individual accuses him of countless 
instances, if not of habits, of such violation : if the pre- 
ceding observations be just, it is manifest that our present 
moral condition involves the elements of much that is 
alarming. It surely must be the duty of every reasonable 
man, to inquire, with the deepest solicitude, whether any 
way of escape from punishment, and of moral renovation, 
has been revealed by the Being against whom we have 
sinned ; and, if any such revelation have been made, it 
must be our most solemn duty to conform our lives to 
such principles as shall enable us to avail ourselves of its 
provisions. 

4. The importance of this duty will be still more 
clearly evident, if we consider, that the present is a state 
of probation, in which alone moral change is possible ; 
and which must speedily terminate in a state, by neces- 



IMPERFECTION OF CONSCIENCE. 



115 



sity, unchangeable ; for which, also, the present state 
therefore offers us the only opportunity of preparation. 
To neglect either to possess ourselves of all the knowledge 
in our power on this subject, or to neglect to obey any 
reasonable precepts which afford the least probability of 
improving our condition for the future, seems a degree of 
folly for which it is really impossible to find an adequate 
epithet. 

5. Nor does it render this folly the less reprehensible, 
for a man gravely to assert, that we do not know any thing 
about the future world, and, therefore, it is needless to in- 
quire respecting it. This is to assert, without inquiry, 
what could only be reasonably asserted after the most full 
and persevering inquiry. No man can reasonably assert 
that we know nothing respecting the other world, until he 
has examined every system of religion within his knowl- 
edge, and, by the fair and legitimate use of his understand- 
ing, shown conclusively that none of them throw any light 
upon the subject. By what right, therefore, can a man 
utter such an assertion, who, at the outset, declares that 
he will examine none of them ? What should we think 
of the man who declared that he w r ould not study astron- 
omy, for that no one knew more about the heavens than 
he did himself ? Yet many men neglect to inform them- 
selves on the subject of religion for no better reason. It 
is very remarkable, that men do not perceive the absurd^ 
ity of an assertion respecting religion, which they would 
immediately perceive, if uttered respecting any thing else, 
11 



CHAPTER SEVENTH. 



OF NATURAL RELIGION. 

In the preceding chapter, I have endeavored 1o illus- 
trate the nature of our moral constitution, and to show 
that, in our present state, conscience, unassisted, manifest- 
ly fails to produce the results which seem to have been 
intended ; and which are necessary to our attaining the 
happiness which is put within our power ; and to our 
avoiding the misery to which we are exposed. That 
some additional light will be granted to us, and that some 
additional moral power will be imparted, seems clearly not 
improbable. This I suppose to have been done by the 
truths of natural and revealed religion. In the present 
chapter, I shall treat of natural religion under the follow- 
ing heads : 

1. The manner in which we may learn our duty, by 
the light of nature. 

2. The extent to which our knowledge of duty can be 
carried by this mode of teaching. 

3. The defects of the system of natural religion. 



SECTION L 

OF THE Mx\NNER IN WHICH WE MAY LEARN OUR DUTY BY THE 
LIGHT OF NATURE. 

In treating upon this subject, it is taken for granted, 
1. That there is an intelligent and universal First 
Cause, who made us as we are, and made all things 
around us capable of affecting us, both as individuals and 
as societies, as they do. 



HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR DUTY, ETC. 



117 



2. That He had a design in so making us, and in con- 
stituting the relations around us as they are constituted ; 
and that a part of that design was to intimate to us his 
will concerning us. 

3. That we are capable of observing these relations, 
and of knowing how various actions affect us and affect 
others. 

4. And that we are capable of learning the design 
with which these various relations were constituted ; and, 
specially, that part of the design which was to intimate 
to us the will of our Creator. 

The application of these self-evident principles to the 
subject of duty is easy. We know that we are so made 
as to derive happiness from some courses of conduct, and 
to suffer unhappiness from others. Now, no one can 
doubt that the intention of our Creator in these cases was 
that we should pursue the one course, and avoid the oth- 
er. Or, again, we are so made, that we are rendered 
unhappy, on the whole, by pursuing a course of conduct 
in some particular manner, or beyond a certain degree. 
This is an intimation of our Creator, respecting the man- 
ner and the degree in which he designs us to pursue that 
course of conduct. 

Again, as has been said before, society is necessary, 
not merely to the happiness, but to the actual existence, 
of the race of man. Hence, it is necessary, in estima- 
ting the tendency of actions upon our own happiness, to 
extend our view beyond the direct effect of an action up- 
on ourselves. Thus, if we cannot perceive that any evil 
would result to ourselves from a particular course of ac- 
tion, yet, if it would tend to injure society, specially if it 
would tend to destroy society altogether, we may hence 
arrive at a clear indication of the will of our Creator con- 
cerning it. As the destruction of society would be the 
destruction of the individual, it is as evident that God 
does not intend us to do what would injure society, as 
that He does not intend us to do what would injure our 
own bodies, or diminish our individual happiness. And 
the principle of limitation suggested above, applies in the 



118 



HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR 



same manner here : that is, if a course of conduct, pur- 
sued in a certain manner, or to a certain extent, is bene- 
ficial to society ; and if pursued in another manner, or 
beyond a certain extent, is injurious to it; the indication 
is, in this respect, clear, as to the will of our Maker re- 
specting us. 

To apply this to particular cases. Suppose a man 
were in doubt, whether or not drunkenness were agreea- 
ble to the will of his Maker. Let us suppose that intem- 
perate drinking produces present pleasure, but that it al- 
so produces subsequent pain ; and that, by continuance 
in the habit, the pleasure becomes less, and the pain 
greater ; and that the pain affects various powers of the 
mind, and different organs of the body. Let a man look 
around him, and survey the crime, the vice, the disease, 
and the poverty, which God has set over against the mo- 
mentary gratification of the palate, and the subsequent ex- 
citement which it produces. Now, whoever will look at 
these results, and will consider that God had a design in 
creating things to affect us as they do, must be as fully 
convinced that, by these results, He intended to forbid in- 
temperance, as though He had said so by a voice from 
heaven. The same principle may be applied to glut- 
tony, libertinism, or any other vice. 

Another example may be taken from the case of re- 
venge. Revenge is that disposition which prompts us to 
inflict pain upon another, for the sake of alleviating the 
feeling of personal degradation consequent upon an in- 
jury. Now, suppose a man, inflamed and excited by 
this feeling of injury, should inflict, upon the other party, 
pain, until his excited feeling was gratified : the injured 
party would then manifestly become the injurer ; and, 
thus, the original injurer would be, by the same rule, 
entitled to retaliate. Thus, revenge and retaliation would 
go on increasing until the death of one of the parties. 
The duty of vengeance would then devolve upon the 
surviving friends and relatives of the deceased, and the 
circle would widen until it involved whole tribes or na- 
tions. Thus, the indulgence of this one evil passion 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 



119 



would, in a few generations, render the thronged city an 
unpeopled solitude. Nor is this a mere imaginary case. 
The Indians of North America are known to have con- 
sidered the indulgence of revenge not merely innocent, 
but also glorious, and in some sense obligatory. The re- 
sult was, that, at the time of the discovery of this conti- 
nent, they were universally engaged in wars ; and, accor- 
ding to the testimony of their oldest and wisest chiefs, 
their numbers were rapidly diminishing. And, hence, he 
who observes the effects of revenge upon society, must 
be convinced, that he who formed the constitution under 
which we live, must have intended, by these effects, to 
have forbidden it, as clearly as though he had made it 
known by language. He has given us an understandings 
by the simplest exercise of which, we arrive at this con- 
clusion. 

It is still further to be observed, that, whenever a 
course of conduct produces individual, it also produces so- 
cial misery ; and whenever a course of conduct violates 
the social laws of our being, it of necessity produces indi- 
vidual misery. And, hence, we see that both of these 
indications are combined, to teach us the same lesson ; 
that is, to intimate to us what is, and what is not, the will 
of God respecting our conduct. 

Hence, we see that two views may be taken of an ac- 
tion, when it is contemplated in the light of nature : first, 
as affecting ourselves ; and, secondly, as affecting both 
ourselves and society, but specially the latter. It is in 
this latter view that we introduce the doctrine of general 
consequences. We ask, in order to determine what is 
our duty, what would be the result, if this or that ac- 
tion were universally practised among men ? Or, how 
would it affect the happiness of individuals, and of the 
whole ? By the answer to these questions, we ascertain 
what is the will of God in respect to that action, or that 
course of action. When once the will of God is ascer- 
tained, conscience, as we have shown, teaches us that we 
are under the highest obligation to obey it. Thus, from 
the consideration of the greatest amount of happiness, we 
11* 



120 



HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR 



arrive at the knowledge of our duty, not directly, but in- 
directly. The feeling of moral obligation does not arise 
from the simple fact that, such a course of conduct will, 
or will not, produce the greatest amount of happiness ; 
but, from the fact that this tendency shows us what is 
the will of our Creator ; and we are, by the principles 
of our nature, under the highest possible obligation to 
obey that will. 

It must be evident that a careful observation of the re- 
sults and tendencies of actions, and of different courses of 
conduct, will teach us, in very many respects, the laws of 
our moral nature ; that is, what, in these respects, is the 
will of our Creator. Now, these laws, thus arrived at, 
and reduced to order and arrangement, form the system 
of natural religion. So far as it goes, every one must 
confess such a system to be valuable : and it, moreover, 
rests upon as sure and certain a basis as any system of 
laws whatever. 

To all this, however, I know but of one objection that 
can be urged. It is, that pain is not, of necessity, puni- 
tive, or prohibitory ; and that it may be merely monitory 
or advisory. Thus, if I put my hand incautiously too 
near the fire, I am admonished by the pain to withdraw 
it. Now, this pain is, manifestly, only monitory, and in- 
tended merely to warn me of danger. It is not, of ne- 
cessity, prohibitory ; for, I may hold my hand so near to 
the fire as to produce great pain, for some necessary pur- 
pose, — as, for instance, for the sake of curing disease, — 
and yet not violate my obligations to my Creator, nor in 
any measure incur his displeasure. 

Now, the fact thus stated may be fully admitted, with- 
out in the least affecting the argument. It is evident, 
that many of the pains to which we are at present ex- 
posed, are, in their nature, intended to warn us of ap- 
proaching harm, as in the instance just mentioned ; or, 
they may be intimations of mischief actually commenced, 
of which we could not be otherwise aware, — as in the 
cases of internal diseases. And, it is manifest, that, such 
being their nature and design, they must be intimately 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 



121 



connected with, and either accompany or precede, that 
injury of which they are intended to forewarn or to in- 
form us ; and it is natural to expect that they would 
cease or tend to cessation, as soon as they have accom- 
plished the object for which they were intended. And 
such, I think, will in general be found to be the fact, 
with respect to those pains which are in their nature 
monitory. 

But I think it will be evident, to every one who will 
observe, that many of the pains endured under the pres- 
ent constitution, are not of this kind. 

Thus for example : 

1. There are many pains which are inflicted in con- 
sequence of actions of which we were forewarned by con- 
science. It would seem that the design of these pains 
could not be monitory, inasmuch as monition is performed 
by another faculty. 

2. There are many pains which, from the nature of 
our constitution, are not inflicted until after the act has 
been performed, and the evil accomplished. This is the 
case with drunkenness, and many other vices. Here, the 
pain cannot be intended as a premonition ; for it is not 
inflicted in its severity until after the injury has actually 
been done. 

3. Not only does the pain, in many cases, occur after- 
wards ; it frequently does not occur until a long time af- 
ter the offence. Months, and even years, may elapse, 
before the punishment overtakes the criminal. This is 
very frequently the case with youthful crimes, which, or- 
dinarily, exhibit their result not until manhood, or even 
old age. Now, pain must here be intended to signify 
something else besides warning. 

4. We find that the punishment, in many cases, bears 
no sort of proportion either to the benefit obtained by the 
individual, or even to the injury, in the particular instance, 
inflicted upon society. This is manifest in very many in- 
stances of lying, forgery, small theft, or other cases, in 
which, by a single act of wrong, a person ruins a reputa- 
tion which it had taken a whole life to establish. Now, 



122 



HOW WE MAY LEARN OUR 



in such a case as this, it is evident that the purpose of 
warning could not be intended ; for this end could be ac- 
complished, at vastly less expense of happiness, in some 
other way. 

5. We find that the tendency of many instances of 
punishment, is not to leave the offender in the same state 
as before, but rather in a worse state. His propensities 
to do wrong are rendered stronger, and his inducement to 
do well weaker ; and thus he is exposing himself to great- 
er and greater punishments. The tendency, therefore, is 
not to recovery, but to more fatal moral disease. 

6. Although a man, by reformation, may frequently re- 
gain the standing which he has lost, yet there are mani- 
fest indications, in the present constitution, that, after a 
given amount of trial has been granted, a decisive punish- 
ment is inflicted which extinguishes for ever all hope, if 
not all possibility, of recovery. A man may waste part 
of his youth, and may by diligence regain the time which 
he had lost. But he soon arrives at a point, beyond 
which such opportunity is impossible. Thus also in mor- 
als, a man may sometimes do wrong, and return to virtue, 
and escape present punishment; but every instance of 
crime renders the probability of escape less ; and he at 
last arrives at a point, beyond which nothing can avert 
the infliction of the merited and decisive calamity. 

7. We find that some actions produce misery which 
extends to other beings besides those who are actually 
concerned in committing them. 

This takes place sometimes by example, and at other 
times the pain is inflicted upon those who could not be 
infected by the example. Illustrations of this are seen in 
cases of disease propagated by hereditary descent, in mis- 
ery arising from the misconduct of rulers, in the suffering 
of men from flagitious crimes of relatives and acquaint- 
ances. And in consequence of the constitution under 
which we exist, these miseries are frequently transmitted 
down beyond any assignable limit. Thus, the condition 
of the Jews is by themselves and others believed to be 
the result of some crime committed by their forefathers, 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 



123 



either at or before the time of Christ. The effects of the 
persecution of Protestantism in Spain and Portugal, at the 
time of the Reformation, can be clearly traced in all the 
subsequent history of these countries. 

Now, all these considerations seem clearly to indicate, 
that there are pains inflicted upon man for other purposes 
except warning ; and that they are of the nature of pun- 
ishment ; that is, of pain inflicted after crime has been 
voluntarily committed, in spite of sufficient warning, and 
inflicted by way of desert, as what the offence really 
merits, and what it behooves a righteous governor to 
award to transgression. 

Nor will it avail, to object that these inflictions are in- 
tended to be warnings to others. This is granted ; but 
this by no means prevents their being also punishments in 
the sense in which we have considered them. Such is 
the case in all punishments inflicted by society. They 
are intended to be a warning to others ; but this hinders 
not their being also in the strictest sense punishments ; 
that is, inflictions of pain as the just desert of crime, and 
as clear indications of the will of society respecting the 
action of which they are the result. 

From what has been said, I think we may safely con- 
clude : 

1. That God has given man a moral and an intellect- 
ual constitution, by which he may be admonished of his 
duty. 

2. That He allows man to act freely, and either to do 
right or wrong, as he chooses. 

3. That He, in the present life, has connected rewards 
with the doing of right, and punishments with the doing 
of wrong ; and that these rewards and punishments affect 
both the individual and society. 

4. And hence, from an attentive observation of the re- 
sults of actions upon individuals, and upon society, we 
may ascertain what is the will of God concerning us. 

5. And for all the opportunities of thus ascertaining 
his will by his dealings with men — that is, by the light of 
nature- — God holds all his creatures responsible. 



124 



HOW FAR WE MAY LEARN OUR 



SECTION II. 

HOW FAR WE MAY DISCOVER OUR DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF 
NATURE. 

It has been shown that we may, by observing the re- 
sults of our actions upon individuals and upon society, as- 
certain what is the will of our Creator concerning us. In 
this manner we may discover much moral truth, which 
would be unknown, were we left to the guidance of con- 
science unassisted ; and we may derive many motives to 
virtue which would otherwise be inoperative. 

I. By the light of nature we discover much moral 
truth which could never be discovered by conscience un- 
assisted. 

1. Conscience indicates to us our obligations to others 
when our relations to them are discovered ; and impels us 
toward that course of conduct which the understanding 
points out as corresponding with these obligations. But 
there are many obligations which conscience seems not to 
point out to men, and many ways of fulfilling these obli- 
gations which the understanding does not clearly indicate. 
In these respects, we may be greatly assisted by natural 
religion. 

Thus, I doubt whether the unassisted conscience would 
teach the wrong of polygamy or of divorce. The Jews, 
even at the time of our Savior, had no conception that a 
marriage contract was between individuals for life. But 
any one who will observe the effects of polygamy upon 
families and societies, can have no doubt that the precept 
of the gospel on this subject is the moral law of the sys- 
tem under which we are. So, I do not know that un- 
assisted conscience would remonstrate against what might 
be called reasonable revenge, or the operation of the Lex 
Talionis. But he who will observe the consequences of 
revenge, and those of forgiveness of injuries, will have no 
difficulty in deciding which course of conduct has been in- 
dicated as his duty by his Maker. 



DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE. 



125 



2. The extent of obligations, previously known to exist, 
is made known more clearly by the light of nature. Con- 
science might teach us the obligations to love our friends, 
or our countrymen, but it might not go farther. The re- 
sults of different courses of conduct would clearly show 
that our Creator intended us to love all men, of every na- 
tion, and even our enemies. 

3. It is by observing the results of our actions that we 
learn the limitations which our Creator has affixed to our 
desires, as we have shown in the chapter on happiness. 
The simple fact that gratification of our desires, beyond a 
certain limit, will produce more misery than happiness, ad- 
dresses itself to our self-love, and forms a reason why that 
limit should not be transgressed. The fact that this limit 
was fixed by our Creator, and that he has thus intimated 
to us his will, addresses itself to our conscience, and places 
us under obligation to act as he has commanded, on pain 
of his displeasure. 

4. In many cases where the obligation is acknowledged, 
we might not be able, without the light of natural religion, 
to decide in what manner it could best be discharged. 
Thus, a man who felt conscious of his obligations as a 
parent, and wished to discharge them, would derive much 
valuable information by observing what mode of exhibit- 
ing paternal love had produced the happiest results. He 
would hence be able the better to decide what was re- 
quired of him. 

In this manner it cannot be doubted that much valua- 
ble knowledge of moral truth might be acquired, beyond 
what is attainable by unassisted conscience. But this is 
not all. 

II. Natural religion presents additional motives to the 
practice of virtue. 

1. It does this, in the first place, by more clearly setting 
before us the rewards of virtue, and the punishments of 
vice. Conscience forewarns us against crime, and inflicts 
its own peculiar punishment upon guilt ; but, natural re- 
ligion informs us of the additional consequences, indepen- 
dent of ourselves, which attach to moral action, according 



1 26 HOW FAR WE MAY LEARN OUR DUTY, ETC. 

to the constitution under which we are created. Thus, 
conscience might forewarn a man against dishonesty, and 
might inflict upon him the pains of remorse, if he had 
stolen ; but her monition would surely derive additional 
power from an observation of the effect which must be 
produced upon individuals and societies by the practice of 
this immorality ; and, also, by the contrary effects which 
must arise from the opposite virtue. 

2. Still lurther. Natural religion presents us with more 
distinct and affecting views of the character of God than 
could be obtained without it. One of the first aspirations 
of a human soul is after an Intelligent First Cause ; and 
the most universal dictate of conscience is, that this First 
Cause ought to be obeyed. Hence, every nation, how 
rude soever it be, has its gods, and its religious services. 
But such a notion of the Deity is cold and inoperative, 
when compared with that which may be derived from an 
intelligent observation of the laws of nature, physical and 
moral, which we see pervading the universe around us. 
In every moral law which has been written on the page 
of this world's history, we discover a new lineament of 
the character of the Deity. Every moral attribute of God 
which we discover, imposes upon us a new obligation, and 
presents an additional motive why we should love and 
serve Him. Hence we see that the knowledge of God, 
derived from the study of nature, is adapted to add greatly 
to the impulsive power of conscience. 

We see, then, how large a field of moral knowledge is 
spread open before us, if we only, in a suitable manner, 
apply our understandings to the works of God around us. 
He has arranged all things, for the purpose of teaching us 
these lessons, and He has created our intellectual and moral 
nature expressly for the purpose of learning them. If, 
then, we do not use the powers which He has given us, 
for the purpose for which He has given them, He holds 
us responsible for the result, Thus said the prophet: 
" Because they regard not the works of the Lord, neither 
consider the operation of His hands, therefore., He shall 
destroy them, and not build them up." Thus, the Scrip- 



DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM, ETC. 127 

tures, elsewhere, declare all men to be responsible for the 
correct use of all the knowledge of duty which God had 
set before them. St. Paul, Rom. i, 19, 20, asserts, 
" That which may be known of God, is manifest in (or 
to) them, for God hath showed it to them ; so that, or 
therefore, they are without excuse." Thus, he also de- 
clares, " They that sin without law, (that is, without a 
written revelation,) shall perish without law." And 
thus we come to the general conclusion, that natural re- 
ligion presents to all men a distinct and important means 
of knowing the character and will of God, and the obliga- 
tions and duties of man ; and that, for this knowledge, all 
men are justly held responsible. 



SECTION III. 

DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF NATURAL RELIGION. 

I. Without any argument on the subject, the insuf- 
ficiency of natural religion, as a means of human reforma- 
tion, might be readily made manifest by facts. 

1. The facts on whieh natural religion rests, and the 
intellectual power to derive the moral laws from the 
facts, have been in the possession of man from the begin- 
ning. Yet, the whole history of man has exhibited a con- 
stant tendency to moral deterioration. This is acknowl- 
edged in the fact, that every people, not enlightened by 
revelation, consider the earliest period of their history as 
the period of their greatest moral purity. Then, the gods 
and men held frequent intercourse ; this intercourse, in con- 
sequence of the sins of men, has since been discontinued. 
That was the golden age ; the subsequent ages have been 
of brass, or of iron. The political history of men seems 
to teach the same lesson. In the early ages of nation- 
al existence, sparseness of population, mutual fear, and 
universal poverty, have obliged men to lay the founda- 
tions of society in principles of justice, in order to secure 
12 



128 



DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM 



national existence. But, as soon as, under such a con- 
stitution, wealth was increased, population become dense, 
and progress in arts and arms have rendered a nation 
fearless, the anti-social tendencies of vice have shown 
themselves too powerful for the moral forces by which 
they have been opposed. The bonds of society have 
,been gradually dissolved, and a nation, rich in the spoils 
of an hundred triumphs, becomes the prey of some war- 
like and more virtuous horde, which takes possession of 
the spoil, merely to pursue the same career to a more 
speedy termination. 

2. The systems of religion of the heathen may be fairly 
considered as the legitimate result of all the moral forces 
which are in operation upon man, irrespective of revela- 
tion. They show us. not what man might have learned 
by the proper use of his faculties in the study of duty, but 
what he has always actually learned. Now, these sys- 
tems, so far from having any tendency to make man bet- 
ter, have a manifest tendency to make him worse. Their 
gods were of the most profligate and demoralizing char- 
acter. Had natural religion succeeded in instilling into 
the minds of men true ideas of virtue and duty, their im- 
aginations, in forming conceptions of deities, would have 
invested them with far different attributes. 

3. The ethical systems of philosophers, it is true, not 
unfrequently presented sublime and pure conceptions of 
Deity. But, as instruments of moral reformation, they 
were clearly inoperative. They were extremely imper- 
fect in every thing which relates to our duties to man, 
and, specially, in every thing which relates to our duty to 
God ; they offered no sufficient motives to obedience ; 
they were established on subtle reasonings, which could 
not be comprehended by the common people ; and they 
imposed no obligation upon their disciples to disseminate 
them among others. Hence, they were never extensively 
known, beyond the small circle of meditative students ; 
and, by these, they were considered rather as matters of 
doubtful speculation, than of practical benefit; adapted 
rather to the cultivation of intellectual acuteness, than to 



OF NATURAL RELIGION. 



129 



the reformation of moral conduct. I think that any one, 
on reading the ethical disquisitions of the ancients, must 
be struck with the fact, that honest, and simple, and ar- 
dent love of truth seems to have furnished no motive 
whatever to their investigations ; and that its place was 
supplied by mere curiosity, or love of the new, the refined, 
and even the paradoxical. 

And, hence, as might be expected, these ethical systems 
made no converts from vice to virtue. From the era of 
which of the systems of ancient ethics, can any reforma- 
tion be dated ? Where are their effects recorded in the 
moral history of man ? Facts have abundantly proved 
them to be utterly destitute of any power over the con 
science, or of any practical influence over the conduct. 

4. Nor can this failure be attributed to any want of in- 
tellectual cultivation. During a large portion of the pe- 
riod of which we have spoken, the human mind had, in 
many respects, attained to as high a state of perfection as 
it has attained at any subsequent age. Eloquence, poetry, 
rhetoric, nay, some of the severer sciences, were studied 
with a success which has never since been surpassed. 
This is universally confessed. Yet what progress did the 
classic ages make in morals ? And hence, we think, it 
must be admitted that the human mind, even under the most 
favorable circumstances, has never, when unassisted by 
revelation, deduced from the course of things around us 
any such principles of duty, or motives to the performance 
of it, as were sufficient to produce any decided effect 
upon the moral character of man. 

And hence were we unable to assign the cause of this 
failure ; yet the fact of the failure alone is sufficient to 
prove the necessity of some other means for arriving at a 
knowledge of duty, than is afforded by the light of nature. 

II. But, secondly, the causes of this insufficiency may 
be, in many respects, pointed out. Among them are ob- 
viously the following: 

1. The mode of teaching natural religion is by expe- 
rience. We can form no opinion respecting the results 
of two opposite courses of action, until they be both before 



130 



DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM 



us. Hence, we cannot certainly know what the law is, 
except by breaking it. Hence, the habit of violation must, 
in some sense, be formed, before we know what the law 
is which we violate. Consequently, from the nature of 
the case, natural religion must always be much behind 
the age, and must always titter its precepts to men who 
are, in some manner, fixed in the habit of violating them. 

2. There are many moral laws in which the connection 
between the transgression and the punishment cannot be 
shown, except in the more advanced periods of society. 
Such is the fact, in respect to those laws which can be 
ascertained only by extended and minute observation ; 
and, of course, a state of society in which knowledge is 
widely disseminated, and the experience of a large surface, 
and for a long period, may be necessary to establish the 
fact of the connection between this particular violation 
and this particular result. In the mean time, mankind 
will be suffering all the consequences of vice ; and the 
courses of conduct which are the causes of misery, will 
be interweaving themselves with the whole customs, and 
habits, and interests, of every class of society. Thus, it 
too often happens, that the knowledge is with great diffi- 
culty acquired ; and, when acquired, unfortunately comes 
too late to effect a remedy, 

3. A still more radical deficiency, however, in natural 
religion, is, that it is, from its nature, incapable of teaching 
facts. It can teach only laws and tendencies. From ob- 
serving what has been done, and how it has been done, it 
can infer that, if the same thing were done again, it would 
be done in the same manner, and would be attended, in 
all places, and at all times, if under the same conditions, 
with the same results. But, as to a fact, that is, whether 
an action were actually performed at some other place or 
time, or whether it ever would be, natural religion can 
give us no information. Thus, we know by experience, 
that, if a man fall from a precipice, he will be destroyed ; 
but, whether a man ever did so fall, much less whether A 
or B did fall from it, we can never be informed by general 
principles, Thus, from the fact that we see guilt punish* 



OF NATURAL RELIGION. 



131 



ed in this world, we infer, from natural religion, that it will 
always be punished in this world ; we infer, though not so 
certainly, that it will also be punished in another world, if 
there be another world ; but of the fact whether there be 
another world, natural religion can give us no certain in- 
formation ; much less, can it give us any information re- 
specting the question whether God has actually done any 
thing to remedy the evils of sin, and vary those sequences 
which experience shows us to be inevitable. 

4. Hence, natural religion must derive all its certain 
motives from the present world. Those from the other 
world are, so far as it is concerned, in their nature con- 
tingent and uncertain. And, hence, it loses all that power 
overman, which would be derived from the certain knowl- 
edge of our existence after death, of the nature of that ex- 
istence, and of what God has done for our restoration to 
virtue and happiness. All these being facts, can never 
be known, except by language, that is, by revelation. 
They must always remain in utter incertitude, so long as 
we are left to the teachings of natural religion. 

We see, then, that natural religion is obliged to meet 
the impulsions lrom this world, solely by impulsions from 
this world. Nay, more, she is obliged to resist the power 
of the present, of passion, strengthened and confirmed by 
habit, by considerations drawn from the distant, ihe future, 
and what may seem to be the uncertain. Hence, its suc- 
cess must be at best but dubious, even when its power is 
exerted upon those least exposed to the allurements of 
vice. Who does not see that it is utterly vain, to hope 
for success from such a source, in our attempts to reform 
men in general ? Every one, who is at all acquainted 
with the history of man, must be convinced, that nothing 
less powerful than the whole amount of motive derived 
from the knowledge of an endless existence, has ever been 
found a sufficient antagonist force, to the downward and 
headlong tendencies of appetite and passion. 

And hence, from the fact of the recorded failure of natu- 
ral religion, as a means of reformation, and from the de- 
fects inherent in its very nature, as a means of moral im- 
12* 



132 



DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM, ETC. 



provement, there seems clearly to exist a great need of 
some additional moral force, to correct the moral evils of 
our nature. It is surely not improbable that some ad- 
ditional means of instruction and improvement may have 
been granted to our race by a merciful Creator. 



CHAPTER EIGHTH. 

RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION. 

If what we have said be true, the defects of natural 
religion would lead us to expect, that some other means 
of moral instruction would be afforded us. And, indeed, 
this is the conclusion at which some of the wisest of the 
heathen philosophers arrived, from a consideration of that 
utter ignorance of futurity in which they were of neces- 
sity plunged, by the most attentive study of natural re- 
ligion. They felt convinced, that the Deity would not 
have constructed a system of moral teaching, which led 
to impervious darkness, unless He intended, out of that 
very darkness, at some period or other, to manifest light. 

But still more, 1 think that an attentive observation of 
what natural religion teaches, and of its necessary and 
inherent defects, would afford us some grounds of expec- 
tation, respecting the nature of that revelation which 
should be made. If we can discover the moral necessities 
of our race, and can also discover in what respects, and 
for what reason, the means thus far employed have failed 
to relieve them, we may with certainty predict some of 
the characteristics which must mark any system, which 
should be devised to accomplish a decided remedy. 

For example : 

1. It is granted that natural religion does teach us some 
unquestionable truths. Now, no truth can be inconsistent 
with itself. And hence it might be expected, that when- 
ever natural and revealed religion treated upon the same 
subjects, they would leach in perfect harmony. The 
second instructer may teach more than the first ; but so 
far as they give instruction on the same subjects, if both 
teach the truth, they must both teach the same lesson. 



134 



RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL 



2. It is natural to expect that a revelation would give 
us much information upon the subject of duty, which 
could not be learned by the light of nature. Thus, it 
might be expected to make known more clearly to us, 
than we could otherwise learn them, the obligations by 
which we are bound to our fellow-men, and to God ; and 
also the manner in which those obligations are to be dis- 
charged. 

3. That it would present us with motives to virtue, in 
addition to those made known by the light of nature. We 
have seen that the motives of natural religion are derived 
from this world, and are in their nature insufficient. We 
should expect that those in a revelation would be drawn 
from some other source. And still more, as natural re- 
ligion may be considered to have exhausted the motives 
of this world, it is surely not unreasonable to expect, that 
a revelation, leaving this world, would draw its motives 
principally, if not entirely, from another, if it revealed to 
us the fact that another world existed. 

4. We should not expect that the Deity would employ 
a second and additional means, to accomplish what could 
be done by any modification of the means first employed. 
Hence, if a revelation were made to men, we might rea- 
sonably expect, that it would make known to us such 
truths as could not, in the nature of the case, be com- 
municated by natural religion. 

These are, I think, just anticipations. At any rate, I 
think it must be admitted, that if a system of religion, pur- 
porting to be a revelation from heaven, met all these ex- 
pectations, its relations to natural religion not only would 
present no argument against its truth, but would create a 
strong a priori presumption in its favor. 

Now these expectations are all fully realized in the sys- 
tem of religion contained in the Scriptures of the Old and 
New Testaments. 

1. The truths of revealed religion harmonize perfectly 
with those of natural religion. The difference between 
them consists in this, — that the one teaches plainly, what 
the other teaches by inference ; the one takes up the les- 



AND REVEALED RELIGION. 



135 



son where the other leaves it, and adds to it other and 
vitally important precepts. Nay, so perfect is the har- 
mony between them, that it may safely be asserted that 
not a single precept of natural religion exists, which is not 
also found in the Bible ; and still more, the Bible is every 
day directing us to new lessons, taught us by nature, 
which, but for its information, would never have been dis- 
covered. So complete is this coincidence, as to afford ir- 
refragable proof that the Bible contains the moral laws of 
the universe ; and, hence, that the Author of the universe 
— that is, of natural religion^-is also the Author of the 
Scriptures. 

2. The Holy Scriptures, as has just been intimated, 
give us much information on questions of duty, which 
could not be obtained by the light of nature. Under this 
remark may be classed the scriptural precepts respecting 
the domestic relations ; respecting our duties to enemies, 
and to men in general ; and especially respecting our ob- 
ligations to God, and the manner in which He may most 
acceptably be worshipped. 

3. The Scriptures present motives to the practice of 
virtue, additional, generically different from those of natu- 
ral religion, and of infinitely greater power. 

1. The motives to virtue, from consequences in this 
world, are strengthened by a clearer development of the 
indissoluble connection between moral cause and effect, 
than is made known by natural religion. 

2. In addition to these motives, we are assured of our 
existence after death ; and eternal happiness and eternal 
misery are set forth as the desert of virtue and vice. 

3. The Scriptures reveal to us the Deity as assuming 
new relations to us, and devising a most merciful way for 
our redemption ; by virtue of this new relation, establish- 
ing a new ground of moral obligation between the race of 
man and himself, and thus adding a power to the impul- 
sion of conscience, of which natural religion must, in the 
nature of the case, be destitute. 

4. It is manifest, that much of the above knowledge, 
which the Scriptures reveal, is of the nature of fact ; and ? 



136 



RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL 



therefore, could not be communicated to us by expe- 
rience, or in the way of general laws, but must be made 
known by language, that is, by revelation. 

Thus, the existence of a state of being after death, the 
doctrine of the resurrection, of a universal and impartial 
judgment, of an endless state of rewards and punishments, 
of a remedial dispensation, by which the connection be- 
tween guilt and punishment may be conditionally severed ; 
the doctrine of the atonement, and the way in which a 
man may avail himself of the benefits of this remedial dis- 
pensation ; — all these are manifestly of great practical im- 
portance in a scheme of moral reformation ; and yet, all of 
them being of the nature of facts, they could be made 
known to man in no other way than by language. 

Now, as these seem clearly to be just anticipations re- 
specting any system which should be designed to supply 
the evident defects of natural religion, and as all these an- 
ticipations are realized in the system of religion contained 
in the Scriptures, each one of these anticipations thus real- 
ized, furnishes a distinct a priori presumption in favor of 
the truth of revealed religion. We do not pretend that 
any, or that all of these considerations, prove the Scrip- 
tures to be a revelation from God. This proof is derived 
from other sources. What we would say, is this : that, 
from what we know of God's moral government by the 
light of nature, it is manifestly probable that he would 
give us some additional instruction, and that that instruc- 
tion would be, in various important respects, analogous to 
that contained in the Holy Scriptures. And we hence 
conclude, that although it were granted — which, however, 
need not be granted- — that, were there no antecedent facts 
in the case, it might seem unlikely that God would con- 
descend to make a special revelation of his will to men ; 
yet, when the antecedent facts are properly considered, 
this presumption, if it ever could be maintained, is now 
precisely reversed, and that there now exists a fair pre- 
sumption that such a revelation would actually be made. 
And hence we conclude, that a revelation of the will of 
God by language is not, as many persons suppose, an 



AND REVEALED RELIGION. 



137 



event so unlikely, that no evidence can be conceived 
sufficiently strong to render it credible ; but, that it is, on 
the contrary, an event, from all that we know of God 
already, essentially probable ; and that it is, to say the 
least of it, as fairly within the limits of evidence as any 
other event, and when proved, on the ordinary principles 
of evidence, is as much entitled to belief as any other 
event. And hence we conceive that when men demand, 
in support of the truth of revealed religion, evidence unlike 
to that which is demanded in support of any other event, 
— -that is, evidence of which they themselves cannot de- 
fine the nature, — they demand what is manifestly unrea- 
sonable, and proceed upon a presumption wholly at va- 
riance with all the known facts in the case. 



CHAPTER NINTH. 



THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. 

This would seem to be the place in which to present 
the proof of the authenticity of the Holy Scriptures, as a 
revelation from God. This, however, being only a par- 
ticular exemplification of the general laws of evidence, it 
belongs to the course of instruction in Intellectual Phil- 
osophy. It must therefore be here omitted. We shall, 
in the remainder of these remarks, take it for granted, 
that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament con- 
tain a revelation from God to man, and that these books 
contain all that God has been pleased to reveal unto us 
by language ; and, therefore, all which is recorded in 
language that is ultimate in morals, and that is, by its 
own authority, binding upon the conscience. Taking 
this for granted, we shall in the present chapter consider, 
1st, what the Scriptures contain ; and, 2d, how we may 
ascertain our duty from the Scriptures. 



SECTION I. 



A VIEW OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. 

The Holy Scriptures are contained in two separate 
volumes, entitled the Old and the New Testament. 
These volumes have each a distinct object, and yet their 
objects are in perfect harmony ; and, together, they con- 
tain all that could be desired in a revelation to the human 
race. 



A VIEW OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. 



139 



The design of the Old Testament mainly is, to reveal 
a system of simple law ; to exhibit the results of such a 
system upon the human race, and to direct the minds of 
men to the remedial dispensation which was to follow. 
In accomplishing this design, it contains several distinct 
parts. 

1. An account of the creation of the world, of the 
creation and fall of man, and a brief history of the race of 
man until the delude. The cause of this deluge is stated 
to be, the universal and intense wickedness of man. 

2. The account of the separation of a particular family, 
the germ of a nation, designed to be the depositories of 
the revealed will of God ; and the history of this nation, 
from the call of Abraham until the return from the cap- 
tivity in Babylon, a period of about fifteen hundred years. 

3. The system of laws which God gave to this nation. 
These laws may be comprehended under three classes : 

Moral laws, or those which arise from the immutable 
relations existing between God and man. 

Civil laws, or those enacted for the government of civil 
society ; adapted specially to the Jewish Theocracy, or 
that form of government in which God was specially 
recognised as King. 

Ceremonial laws. These were of two kinds : First, 
those which were intended to keep this nation separate 
from other nations ; and, second, those intended to prefig- 
ure events which were to occur under the second or new 
dispensation. 

4. Various events in their history, discourses of pro- 
phets and inspired teachers, prayers, odes of pious men ; 
all tending to illustrate what are the effects of a system 
of moral law upon human nature, even when placed 
under the most favorable circumstances. 

The result of all this series of moral means seems to 
be this. God, in various modes, suited to their condition, 
made known his will to the whole human race. They 
all, with the exception of a single family, became so cor- 
rupt, that he destroyed them by a general deluge. He 
then selected a single family, and gave them his written 
13 



140 



A VIEW OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. 



law, and, by peculiar enactments, secluded them from all 
other nations, that the experiment might be made under 
the most favorable circumstances. At the same time, the 
effects of natural religion were tried among the heathen 
nations that surrounded them. The result was, a clear 
demonstration that, under the conditions of being in which 
man was created, any reformation was hopeless, and that, 
unless some other condition was revealed, the race would 
perish by its own vicious and anti-social tendencies, and 
enter the other world to reap the reward of its guilt for 
ever. 

The design of the New Testament is, to reveal to the 
race of man the new conditions of being, under which it 
is placed, by virtue of a remedial dispensation. 

In pursuance of this design, the New Testament con- 
tains, — 

1. A narrative of the life and death, resurrection and 
ascension, the acts and conversations, of Jesus of Naza- 
reth ; a Being in whom the divine and human natures 
were mysteriously united ; who appeared on earth to 
teach us whatever was necessary to be known of our re- 
lations to God ; and, by his obedience to the law, and 
voluntary sufferings and death, to remove the obstacles to 
our pardon, which, under the former dispensation, existed 
in consequence of the holiness of God. 

2. A brief narrative of the facts relating to the progress 
of the Christian religion, for several years after the ascen- 
sion of Jesus of Nazareth. 

3. The instructions which his immediate followers, or 
apostles, by divine inspiration, gave to the men of their 
own time, and which were rendered necessary in conse- 
quence of their ignorance of the principles of religion, or 
the weakness of their virtue, and the imperfection of their 
faith. 

The whole of this volume taken together, teaches us 
the precepts, the sanctions, and the rewards of the law of 
God, with as great distinctness as we could desire ; and 
also a way of salvation, on different grounds from that 
revealed both by natural religion and by the Old Testa- 



HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN, ETC. 



141 



ment ; a way depending for merit, upon the doings and 
sufferings of another, but yet available to us on no other 
conditions than those of supreme, strenuous, and universal 
moral effort after perfect purity of thought, and word and 
action. 

This, being a remedial dispensation, is, in its nature, 
fixed. We have no reason to expect any other ; nay, 
the idea of another would be at variance with the belief 
of the truth of this. And, hence, the Scriptures of the 
Old and New Testaments contain all that God has re- 
vealed to us by language respecting his will. What is 
contained here alone, is binding upon the conscience. 
Or, in the words of Chillingworth, "The Bible, the 
Bible, the religion of Protestants." 



SECTION II. 

IN WHAT MANNER ARE WE TO ASCERTAIN OUR DUTY FROM THE 
HOLY SCRIPTURES ? 

Taking it for granted that the Bible contains a revela- 
tion of the will of God, such as is stated in the preceding 
section, it will still be of importance for us to decide how 
we may ascertain, from the study of it, what God really 
requires of us. Much of it is mere history, containing an 
unvarnished narration of the actions of good and of bad 
men. Much of it has reference to a less enlightened age, 
and to a particular people, set apart from other people, 
for a special and peculiar purpose. Much of it consists 
of exhortations and reproofs, addressed to this people, in 
reference to the laws then existing, but which have been 
since abrogated. Now, amidst this variety of instructions, 
given to men at different times, and of different nations, it 
is desirable that the principles be settled, by which we 
may decide what portion of this mass of instruction is 
binding upon the conscience, at the present moment. 
My object, in the present section, is to ascertain, as far as 



142 



HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN 



possible, the principles by which we are to be guided in 
such a decision. 

When a revelation is made to us by language, it is 
taken for granted, that whatever is our duty, will be sig- 
nified to us by command ; and hence, what is not com- 
manded, is not to be considered by us as obligatory. Did 
we not establish this limitation, every thing recorded, as, 
for instance, ail the actions both of good and of bad men, 
might be regarded as authority ; and thus a revelation, 
given for the purpose of teaching us our duty, might be 
used as an instrument to confound all distinction between 
right and wrong. 

The ground of moral obligation, as derived from a reve- 
lation, must, therefore, be a command of God. 

Now, a command seems to involve three ideas : 

1. That an act be designated. This may be, by the 
designation of the act itself, as, for instance, giving bread 
to the hungry ; or else by the designation of a temper of 
mind, as that of universal love, under which the above 
act, and various other acts, are clearly comprehended. 

2. That it be somehow signified to be the will of God, 
that this act be performed. Without this intimation, 
every act that is described, or even held up for our repro- 
bation, might be quoted as obligatory. 

3. That it be signified, that v)e are included within the 
number to whom the command is addressed. Otherwise, 
all the commandments, to the patriarchs and prophets, 
whether ceremonial, symbolical, or individual, would be 
binding upon every one who might read them. And 
hence, in general, whosoever urges upon us any duty, as 
the command of God, revealed in the Bible, must show 
that God has, somewhere, commanded that action to be 
done, and that he has commanded us to do it.. 

This principle will exclude,— 

1. Every thing which is merely history. Much of the 
Bible contains a mere narrative of facts. For the truth 
of this narrative, the veracity of Deity is pledged. We 
may derive from the account of God's dealings, lessons of 
instruction to guide us in particular cases ; and, from the 



OUR DUTY FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 143 



evil conduct of men, matter of warning. But the mere 
fact, that any thing has been done, and recorded in the 
Scripture, by no means places us under obligation to 
do it. 

2. It excludes from being obligatory upon all, what 
has been commanded, but which can be shown to have 
been intended only for individuals, or for nations, and not 
for the whole human race. Thus many commands are 
recorded in the Scriptures, as having been given to indi- 
viduals. Such was the command to Abraham, to offer 
up his son ; to Moses, to stand before Pharaoh ; to Sam- 
uel, to anoint Saul and David ; and a thousand others. 
Here, evidently, the Divine direction was exclusively in- 
tended forlhe individual to whom it was given. No one 
can pretend that he is commanded to offer up his son, 
because Abraham was so commanded. 

Thus, also, many of the commands of God in the Old 
Testament were addressed to nations. Such were the 
directions to the Israelites to take possession of Canaan ; 
to make war upon the surrounding nations; to keep the 
ceremonial law ; and so of various other instances. Now 
of such precepts, it is to be observed, 1. They are to be 
obeyed only at the time and in the manner in which they 
were commanded. Thus, the Jews, at present, would 
have no right, in virtue of the original command, to expel 
the Mahometans from Palestine ; though the command to 
Joshua was a sufficient warrant for expelling the Canaan- 
ites, at the time in which it was given. 2. They are of 
force only to those to whom they were given. Thus, 
supposing the ceremonial law was not abolished ; as it 
was given specially to Jews, and to no one else, it would 
bind no one but Jews now. Supposing it to be abolish- 
ed, it of course now binds no one. For if, when in force, 
it was obligatory on no one but the Jews, and was nothing 
to any one else ; when it is abolished, as to them, it is 
nothing to any one. Such is the teaching of St. Paul on 
this subject. 3. It would exclude whatever was done by 
inspired men, if it was done without the addition of being 
somehow commanded. Thus, the New Testament was 
13* 



144 



HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN 



manifestly intended for the whole human race, and at all 
times ; and it was written by men who were inspired by 
God to teach us His will. But still, their example is not 
binding per se ; that is, we are not under obligation to 
perform an act, simply because they have done it. Thus, 
Paul and the other apostles kept the Feast of Pentecost ; 
but this imposes no such obligation upon us. Paul cir- 
cumcised Timothy ; but this imposes no obligation upon 
us to do likewise : for upon another occasion he did not 
circumcise Titus. The examples of inspired men in the 
New Testament would, unless exception be made, prove 
the lawfulness of an act ; but it could by no means es- 
tablish its obligatoriness. 

This principle will include as obligatory, — 
1. Whatever has been enjoined as the will of God 
upon man as man, in distinction from what has been en- 
joined upon men as individuals or as nations. The 
command may be given us, 1. By God himself, as when 
he proclaimed his law from Mount Sinai ; or, 2. By the 
Mediator Christ Jesus ; or, 3. By any persons divinely 
commissioned to instruct us in the will of God ; as pro- 
phets, apostles, or evangelists. This includes, as obliga- 
tory on the conscience, simply what is proved to be in- 
tended, according to the established principles of inter- 
pretation. But it by no means includes any thing which 
man may infer from what is thus intended. Any idea 
which man adds to the idea given in the Scriptures, is the 
idea of man, and has no more obligation on the conscience, 
than any other idea of man. 

But it may be asked, granting that nothing but a Di- 
vine command is obligatory on the conscience, yet, as 
general and particular commandments in the Scriptures 
are frequently, in a considerable degree, blended together, 
how may we learn to distinguish that part which is obli- 
gatory upon us, from that which is in its nature local and 
peculiar ? In attempting to answer this question, I would 
suggest,— 

That the distinction of nations or individuals is no- 
where adverted to in the New Testament. Its instruc- 



OUR DUTY FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 



145 



tions are clearly intended for men of all ages and nations ; 
and hence they never involve any thing either local or 
peculiar, but are universally binding upon all. The 
question must therefore refer to the Old Testament. 

If we confine ourselves then to the Old Testament, this 
question may be decided on the following principles : 

1. In by far the greater number of cases, we shall be 
able to decide, by reference to the nature of the Jewish 
commonwealth ; a temporary or preparatory dispensation, 
which was to cease when that to which it was prepara- 
tory had appeared. 

2. The New Testament, being thus intended for the 
whole human race, and being a final revelation of the will 
of God to man, may be supposed to contain all the moral 
precepts, both of natural religion and of the Old Testa- 
ment, together with whatever else it was important to our 
salvation that we should know. If, then, a revelation 
has been made in the Old Testament, which is repeated 
in the New Testament, we shall be safe in making the 
later revelation the criterion, by which we shall judge 
respecting the precepts of the earlier. That is to say, no 
precept of the Old Testament, which is not given to man 
as man, or which is not either repeated, or its obligations 
acknowledged, under the new dispensation, is binding 
upon us at the present day. This principle is, I think, 
avowed in substance by the Apostle Paul, in various 
places in his Epistles. While he repeatedly urges the 
moral precepts of the Old Testament, as of unchanging 
obligation, he speaks of every thing else, so far as moral 
obligation is concerned, as utterly annihilated. 

Such, then, are the means afforded to us by our Crea- 
tor, for acquiring a knowledge of our duty. They are, 
first, natural religion ; second, the Old Testament, or a 
dispensation of law ; third, the Gospel, a remedial dis- 
pensation, or a dispensation of grace. 

The relation existing between our moral power, and 
these means of moral cultivation, may, I suppose, be 
stated somewhat as follows : 

1. By conscience, we attain a feeling of moral obliga- 



146 



HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN 



tion towards the various beings to whom we are related. 
The elements of this feeling are developed as soon as we 
come to the knowledge of the existence and attributes of 
those beings, and the relation in which we stand to them. 
Such elements are, the feeling of obligation of reciprocity 
to man, and of universal love and obedience to our Cre- 
ator. 

2. In order to illustrate the relations in which we stand 
to other beings, created and uncreated, as well as to teach 
us His character and His will concerning us, God has 
given us other means of instruction. 

1. He has so arranged and governed all the events of 
this world, as to illustrate His character by His dealings 
with men ; and He has given us powers, by which we 
may, if we will, acquire the knowledge thus set before 
us. The fact that we may acquire this knowledge of the 
will of God, and that we are so constituted as to feel that 
we ought to do the will of God, renders us responsible 
for obedience to all the light which we may acquire. 

2. In the utter failure of this mode of instruction to 
reclaim men, God has seen fit to reveal His will to us by 
language. Here the truth is spread before us, without 
the necessity of induction from a long and previous train 
of reasoning. This knowledge of the will of God, thus 
obtained, renders man responsible for the additional light 
thus communicated. 

3. In the same manner, when this means failed to pro- 
duce any important moral result, a revelation has been 
made, instructing us still farther concerning our duties to 
God, His character and will ; and, above all, informing 
us of a new relation in which the Deity stands to us, and 
of those new conditions of being under which we are 
placed. And we are, in consequence of our moral con- 
stitution, rendered responsible for a conduct corresponding 
to all this additional moral light, and consequent moral 
obligation. 

Now, if it be remembered that we are under obliga- 
tions, greater than we can estimate, to obey the will of 
God, by what manner soever signified, and that we are 



OUR DUTY FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 147 



under obligation, therefore, to obey Him, if he had given 
us no other intimation of His will, than merely the moni- 
tion of conscience, unassisted by natural or revealed reli- 
gion, how greatly must that obligation be increased, when 
these additional means of information are taken into the 
account ! And, if the guilt of our disobedience be in 
proportion to the knowledge of our duty, and if that 
knowledge of our duty be so great that we cannot readily 
conceive how, consistently with the conditions of our 
being, it could have been greater, we may judge how 
utterly inexcusable must be every one of our transgres- 
sions. Such does the Bible represent to be the actual 
condition of man ; and hence it every where treats him 
as under a just and awful condemnation ; a condemnation 
from which there is no hope of escape, but by means of 
the special provisions of a remedial dispensation. 

It belongs to theology to treat of the nature of this 
remedial dispensation. We shall, therefore, attempt no 
exhibition, either of its character or its provisions, beyond 
a simple passing remark, to show its connections with our 
present subject. 

The Jaw of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, repre- 
sents our eternal happiness as attainable upon the simple 
ground of perfect obedience, and perfect obedience upon 
the principles already explained. But this, in our present 
state, is manifestly unattainable. A single sin, both on 
the ground of its violation of the conditions on which our 
future happiness was suspended, as well as by the effects 
which it produces upon our whole subsequent moral 
character, and our capacity for virtue, renders our loss of 
happiness inevitable. Even after reformation, our moral 
attainment must fall short of the requirements of the law 
of God, and thus present no claim to the Divine favor. 
For this reason, our salvation is made to depend upon the 
obedience and merits of another. But we are entitled to 
hope for salvation upon the ground of the merit of Christ, 
solely upon the condition of yielding ourselves up in en- 
tire obedience to the whole law of God. " He that saith, 
I know Him, and keepeth not His commandments, is a 



148 



HOW WE ARE TO ASCERTAIN, ETC. 



liar, and the truth is not in him." John ii, 4. And 
hence a knowledge of the law of God is of just as great 
importance to us, under a remedial dispensation, as under 
a dispensation of law ; not on the ground that we are to 
be saved by keeping it without sin ; but on the ground 
that, unless the will of God be the habitually controlling 
motive of all our conduct, we are destitute of the elements 
of that character to which the blessings of the remedial 
dispensation are promised. Hence, under the one dis- 
pensation, as well as under the other, though on different 
grounds, the knowledge of the law of God is necessary to 
our happiness both here and hereafter. 



BOOK SECOND. 

PRACTICAL ETHICS. 



PRACTICAL ETHICS. 



In the preceding pages, it has been my design to illus- 
trate the moral constitution of man, and to point out the 
sources from which that truth emanates, which is addres- 
sed to his moral constitution. My design, in the present 
book, is, to classify and explain some of the principal moral 
laws under which God has placed us, in our present state. 
We shall derive these laws from natural or from revealed 
religion, or from both, as may be most convenient for our 
purpose. 

The Scriptures declare that the whole moral law is con- 
tained in the single word, Love. 

The beings to whom man is related in his present state, 
are, so far as this subject is concerned, God his Creator, 
and man his fellow-creature. Hence, the moral obliga- 
tions of men are of two kinds : first, Love to God, or 
Piety ; second, Love to Man, or Morality. 

This book will, therefore, be divided into two parts, in 
which those two subjects will be treated of in their order. 
14 



PART I. 



LOVE TO GOD, OR PIETY. 



CHAPTER FIRST. 

THE GENERAL OBLIGATION TO SUPREME LOVE TO GOD. 

The scriptural precept on this subject, may be found 
recorded in various passages. It is in these words : " Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with 
all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy 
strength." See Matthew xxii, 37 ; Mark xii, 30 ; Luke 
x, 27. 

In order to illustrate this precept, I shall consider, first, 
the relation which exists between us and the Deity ; sec- 
ondly, the rights and obligations which that relation im- 
poses ; and, thirdly, the facts in our constitution which 
show that these are manifestly the law of our being, 

I. The relation which exists between us and God. 

1. He is our Creator and Preserver. A few years 
since, and we had no existence. Within a few more 
years, and this whole system, of which we form a part, 
had no existence. Over our own existence, neither we, 
nor any created thing, has any more than the semblance 
of power. We are upheld in being by the continued act 
of Omnipotence, Not only we, ourselves, but every fac- 
ulty which we and which all creatures enjoy, was created, 
and is continually upheld, by the same Creator. Nor this 
alone ; all the circumstances by which we are surrounded, 
and all the modifications of external nature, of what sort 
soever they may be, whether physical, intellectual, social, 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



153 



or moral, are equally created and sustained by God, and 
derive their powers to render us happy, or wise, or good, 
purely from his own provident care, and from the exer- 
tion of his omnipotent and omnipresent goodness. The 
relation, therefore, existing between the Deity and us, is 
that of dependence, more profound, universal, and absolute, 
than we are able adequately to comprehend, upon a Being, 
absolutely and essentially independent, omniscient, om- 
nipotent, and all-providing. 

2. The Deity has revealed himself to us, as a Being 
in whom are united, by the necessity of his existence, 
every perfection of which the human mind can conceive, 
and every perfection that can possibly exist, how much 
soever they may transcend the powers of our conception. 
To Him belong, from the necessity of His being, almighty 
power, omniscient wisdom, unchanging veracity, inflexible 
justice, transcendent purity, illimitable benevolence, and 
universal love. Not only does He treasure up within 
Himself all that can be conceived of every perfection, but 
He is the exhaustless fountain, from which emanates all 
of these attributes, that exists throughout this wide crea- 
tion. As every object in nature that we see, is seen only 
by its reflecting rays of the sun, so every exhibition of 
goodness which we behold in creatures, is nothing but the 
reflection of the perfections of Him who is the Father of 
Lights, with whom is neither variableness nor shadow of 
turning. The relation, therefore, in this respect, which 
exists between us and the Creator, is that between beings 
whom He has formed to admire and love all these perfec- 
tions, and the Uncreated Being, in whom they all exist, 
in a degree infinitely surpassing all that it is in our power 
to conceive. 

3. This creative power, and this incomprehensible wis- 
dom, have been exerted in obedience to all these tran- 
scendent moral perfections, for the production of our best 
good, our highest temporal and eternal happiness ; nay, 
they have been as fully exerted in behalf of our race, as 
though there were no other race in existence ; and in be- 
half of each one of us, as though each individual were the 



154 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



only being created, within this illimitable universe. And 
upon all this exertion of goodness towards us, we have 
not the semblance of a claim ; for God was under no 
manner of obligation to create us, much less, to create us 
capable of that happiness which we enjoy. The relation, 
therefore, in this respect, existing between us and the 
Deity, is that between beings who, without any claim 
whatever, are, at every moment, receiving the results of 
the exercise of every conceivable perfection, from a Being 
who is moved thus to conduct towards us, by nothing but 
His own independent goodness. 

II. From these relations, existing between creatures 
and the Creator, there arise various rights of the Crea- 
tor, and various obligations of the creature. 

Every one, who will reflect upon this subject, must be 
convinced, that, inasmuch as these relations are entirely 
beyond the range of human analogies, and also manifestly 
beyond the grasp of finite conception, they must involve 
obligations, in their very nature more profound and uni- 
versal, than we can adequately comprehend ; and that, 
therefore, no conception of ours can possibly transcend 
their solemnity and awfulness. As, in our present state, 
we are so little able to understand them, or even to in- 
quire after them, we see the need of instruction concern- 
ing them, from Him, who alone, of all beings that exist, 
can fathom their depth, or measure their immensity. Let 
us, therefore, inquire, what are the claims which, in his 
revealed word, God asserts over us, and what are the ob- 
ligations which in his sight bind us to Him. 

1. By virtue of his relation to us as Creator, he asserts 
over us the right of unlimited possession. Inasmuch as 
we are his creatures, we are his in the highest and most 
extensive sense, in which we can conceive of the idea of 
possession. Neither we ourselves, nor any thing which 
we seem to possess, are our own. Our wills are not our 
own, but he claims that we shall only will precisely what 
He wills. Our faculties, of what sort soever, are not our 
own. He claims that, from the commencement of our 
existence, they be used precisely in the manner, for the 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



155 



purposes, and within the limits, that He shall direct. Not 
only does God assert this right in his word, but we find 
that he actually exercises it. Without regard to what we 
will, He does his pleasure, in the armies of heaven and 
among the inhabitants of the earth. He takes from us 
health, possessions, friends, faculties, life, and He giveth 
not account of any of his matters. That is, he manifest- 
ly acts upon the principle, that He is the Sovereign and 
rightful Proprietor, both of ourselves, and of all that we 
seem to ourselves to possess. 

And, thus, on the other hand, God asserts that we are 
all under obligations, greater and more solemn than we 
can possibly conceive, to render to Him that entire obe- 
dience and submission, which his essential right over us 
renders manifestly his due. 

This right, and the correspondent obligation, have re- 
spect to two classes of duties. The first class, is that 
which respects simply our relations to him, and which 
would be obligatory upon us, although each one of us was 
the only created being in the universe. The second class 
of duties respects our fellow-creatures. If we could sup- 
pose moral creatures to exist without a Creator, there 
would yet be duties which, from their constitution as 
moral creatures, they would owe to each other. But, in- 
asmuch as every creature is the creature of God, He has 
made the duties which they owe to each other, a part of 
their duty to Him. That is to say, he requires us, who 
are his creatures and who are under universal obligations 
to him, to treat our fellow-creatures, who are also his 
creatures, and under his protection, in such manner as he 
shall direct. He is the Father of us all, and he requires 
that every one of his children conduct himself towards 
others, who are also his children, as he shall appoint. 
And, hence, the duties which are required of us to our 
fellow- creatures, are required of us under a twofold obli- 
gation. First, that arising from our relation to God, and 5 
secondly, that arising from our relation to our fellows. 
And, hence, there is not a single act which we are under 
obligation to perform, which we are not also under obli- 
14* 



156 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



gation to perform from the principle of obedience to our 
Creator. Thus the obligation to act religiously, or 
piously, extends to the minutest action of our lives, and 
no action of any sort whatever can be, in the full accep- 
tation of the term, virtuous, that is, be entitled to the 
praise of God, which does not involve in its motives the 
temper of filial obedience to the Deity. And still more, 
as this obligation is infinitely superior to any other that 
can be conceived, an action performed from the convic- 
tion of any other obligation, if this obligation be excluded, 
fails, in infinitely the most important respect ; and must, 
by the whole amount, of this deficiency, expose us to the 
condemnation of the law of God, whatever that condem- 
nation may be. 

And, once more, we are taught, in the Scriptures, that 
the relation in which we stand to the Deity, places us 
under such obligations, that, while our whole and uninter- 
rupted service is thus due to God, we can, after it is all 
performed, in no manner bring him under any obligation 
to us. This I suppose to be the meaning intended by 
our Savior, in the parable, Luke xvii, 7 — 10 : " But which 
of you, having a servant, (a slave,) ploughing or feeding 
cattle, will say unto him, by and by, when he is come 
from the field, Go and sit down to meat ; and will not 
rather say unto him, Make ready wherewith I may sup, 
and gird thyself and serve me, until I have eaten and 
drunken ; and afterwards thou shalt eat and drink ? Doth 
he thank that servant because he hath done the things 
that were commanded him? I suppose not. So, like- 
wise ye, when ye have done all the things which are 
commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we 
have done that which was our duty to do." That is, the 
obligation of the servant is not fulfilled by doing any one 
thing, but only by occupying his whole time, and exert- 
ing his whole power, to its full extent, in doing whatever 
is commanded him. And when all this is done, such is 
the relation between the parties, that he has placed the 
Master, God, under no obligation ; he has only discharged 
a duty ; he has merely paid a debt ; nor is it possible, 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



157 



from the nature of the relation, that he could ever do any 
thing more. Such, I think, every one will acknowledge, 
upon reflection, to be the relation existing between us and 
our Creator. 

And, hence, we see, that a failure in duty to God, on 
the part of the creature, must be remediless. At every 
moment, he is under obligation to the full amount of his 
ability ; and, when this whole amount of obligation is dis- 
charged, he has simply fulfilled his duty. Hence, no act 
can have any retrospective effect ; that is, it cannot sup- 
ply the deficiencies of any other act. This would be the 
case, even if the moral powers were not injured by sin. 
But, if we add this other element, and reflect, that, by 
sin, the moral powers are permanently injured ; that is, 
the capacity for virtue is diminished, according to the 
laws of our constitution ; by how much more is it evident, 
that, under a system of mere law, a single failure in our 
duty to God must be of necessity fatal. What shall we 
then say of a life, of which every act is, when strictly 
considered, by confession, a moral failure ? 

2. God has revealed himself to us as a Being endowed 
with every attribute of natural and moral excellence ; and, 
in virtue of the relation which, on this account, he sus- 
tains to us, a new form of obligation is imposed upon us. 

We are evidently formed to love whatever is beautiful, 
and to admire whatever is great in power, or excellent in 
wisdom. This is too evident to need illustration. But 
we are so made as to love and admire still more the cause 
from which all these emanate. We admire the tragedies 
of Shakspeare, and the epic of Milton, but how much 
more the minds in which these works were conceived, 
and by which they were executed. Now, all that we 
see in creation, whether of beauty, or loveliness, or gran- 
deur, is the work of the Creator. It all existed in His 
conceptions, before it existed in fact. Nor this alone. 
The powers by which we perceive, and are affected by, 
these exhibitions, all proceed from Him, and both the 
external qualities and the internal susceptibilities are up- 
held by his all-sustaining energy. Thus, every feeling 



158 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



of love or of admiration which we exercise, involves, from 
the constitution of our nature, the obligation to exercise 
these feelings, in a higher degree towards Him who is the 
author of ah. But, as He is the author, not only of what- 
ever is lovely or glorious that we see, but of all that we 
have ever seen ; not only of all that we have ever seen, 
but of all that has ever existed ; not only of all that has 
ever existed, but of all that ever can exist ; by how much 
are we under obligation to love Him better than all things 
else that we know ! and by how much more than any 
individual form of excellence, with which it is possible for 
us ever to become acquainted ! 

Again, God reveals himself to us as the possessor of 
every moral attribute, in infinite perfection. In him are 
united infinitely more than we or other created beings can 
conceive, of justice, holiness, mercy, compassion, goodness 
and truth. Now, we are manifestly formed to love and 
admire actions emanating from such attributes, as they 
are exhibited on earth, and specially the moral characters 
of those by whom such actions are performed. We are 
not only formed to do this, but we are specially formed 
to do it. We are created with an impulsion to exercise 
these affections, and we are conscious that it is the high- 
est impulsion of our nature. Now, whatever we see of 
moral excellence on earth, springs from Him, as its first 
and original cause. He created the circumstances under 
which it exists, and created, with all its powers, the be- 
ings by whom it is displayed. Nor this alone. He pos- 
sesses, essentially, and in an infinite degree, and without 
the possibility of imperfection, every moral attribute. If, 
then, the highest impulsion of our nature teaches us to 
love and venerate these attributes, even as they are dis- 
played in their imperfection on earth, by how much more 
are we under obligation to love these attributes, as they 
are possessed by our Father who is in heaven ! If a 
single act of justice deserves our veneration, how much 
more should we venerate that justice which has governed 
this universe without the shadow of a spot, from eternity ! 
If a single act of purity deserves our regard, with what 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



159 



awe should we adore the holiness of Him, in whose sight 
the heavens are unclean ! If a single act of benevolence 
deserves our love, with what affection should we bow 
before Him, who, from eternity, has been pouring abroad 
a ceaseless flood of blessedness, over the boundless uni- 
verse by which He is surrounded ! 

And yet more, I think it is manifest that we are so 
constituted as to be under obligations to love such attri- 
butes as I have mentioned, entirely aside from the con- 
sideration of their connection with ourselves. We admire 
justice and benevolence in men who existed ages ago, 
and in countries with which we have no interests in com- 
mon. And thus these obligations to love and adore these 
attributes in the Deity, would exist in full force, irrespec- 
tive of the fact of our receiving any benefit from them. 
And our Creator might, and would, justly require of us 
all these affections of which I have spoken, did these 
moral attributes exist in some other being beside himself. 
The obligation is sustained upon the simple considera- 
tion, that we are constituted such moral beings as we are, 
and that another Being exists, endowed with attributes, in 
this particular manner, corresponding to our moral consti- 
tution. By how much is this obligation increased, by the 
consideration that He, in whom these attributes exist, 
stands to us in the relation of Creator ! 

3. As, by the constitution of our moral nature, we are 
under obligation to love whatever is morally excellent, 
irrespective of any benefit which we may derive from it 
ourselves, so, when this moral excellence is intentionally 
the source of happiness to us, we are under the additional 
obligation to gratitude, or a desire to do something which 
shall please Him, from whom our happiness has proceed- 
ed. This obligation is so manifestly recognized as one 
of the instinctive impulses of our nature, that, whilst we 
merely esteem him who acts in obedience to it, the neg- 
lect of it, without the exhibition of the positively oppo- 
site temper, is always met by the feeling of intense moral 
reprobation. 

Now, since whatever of favor we receive from others, 



160 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



is derived from them merely as second causes, it all origi- 
nates, essentially, from the First and All-pervading Cause. 
Whatever gratitude we feel, therefore, towards creatures, 
is really, and in the highest possible sense, due to God, 
from whom it all really emanates. 

But how small is that portion of the happiness which 
we enjoy, which is conferred by the favor of our fellows ! 
Immeasurably the greater part is the direct gift of our 
Creator. The obligation to gratitude, is in proportion to 
the amount of benefits conferred, and the disinterestedness 
of the goodness from which they have proceeded. By 
these elements, let us estimate the amount of obligation 
of gratitude to God. 

As the Deity is essentially independent of all his crea- 
tures, and as He has created us from nothing, and as He 
has created, also, all the circumstances under which we 
exist, He can be under no sort of obligation to us, nor 
can our relation to Him ever be of any other sort, than 
that of the recipients of favor, which we can by no possi- 
bility merit. 

Under such circumstances, a sensation of happiness, for 
a single moment, even if it terminated with that single 
moment, would be a cause for gratitude so long as it could 
be remembered. How much more, if this form of happi- 
ness continued throughout our whole extent of being ! 
The enjoyment of one form of happiness, say of that de- 
rived from a single sense, would deserve our gratitude ; 
how much more that derived from all our senses, and 
specially that derived from the combination of them all ! 
The enjoyment of ever so transient a sensation of intel- 
lectual happiness, would deserve our gratitude ; how much 
more that of a permanent constitution, which was a source 
of perpetual intellectual happiness, and specially a consti- 
tution involving a great variety of forms of intellectual 
happiness ! Thus, also, a single emotion of moral happi- 
ness would deserve our gratitude ; how much more a 
constitution formed for perpetual moral happiness ! And 
yet. more, if these forms of happiness, taken singly, would 
be each a cause of perpetual and increasing gratitude, 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



161 



how much more a constitution, by which the very rela- 
tions which they sustain to each other, become a source 
of additional and increased happiness ! Add to this, that 
the external world is itself adjusted to all these powers 
and susceptibilities of man, and each adjustment is mani- 
festly intended for our best good. And add to this, that 
such are the conditions of being under which we are 
placed, that, if we only use these powers according to the 
will of God, and to the nature which He has given us, 
that is, in such a way as to promote our highest happiness 
here, we shall be advanced to a state of happiness more 
excellent and glorious than any of which we can conceive ; 
and we shall be fixed in it unchangeably and for ever. 
Now, if a single act of disinterested goodness, and unde- 
served favor, deserves our gratitude for ever, what limits 
can be set to the intensity of that grateful adoration, 
which should, throughout our whole being, pervade our 
bosoms, towards Him from whom every blessing is per- 
petually flowing, in so exhaustless a flood of unfathomable 
goodness ! 

Such, then, are the obligations to love and gratitude, 
which, in addition to that of obedience, we owe to our 
Creator. But it deserves to be remarked, that these 
forms of obligation reciprocally involve each other. For 
if we possess that temper of entire obedience, which 
springs from a recognition of the universal right of the 
Creator over us, we shall dedicate our affections to Him, 
as entirely as our will; that is, we shall love only what 
he commands, and just as he has commanded ; that is, 
we not only shall do his will, but we shall love to do it, 
not only on account of what he is in himself, but also on 
account of what he is and always has been to us. And, 
on the other hand, if we love his character and attributes 
as they deserve, we shall love to perform actions which 
are in harmony with those attributes ; that is, which 
spring from the same dispositions in ourselves. In other • 
words, we shall love to act in perfect accordance with the 
will of God. And still more, if we are penetrated with a 
proper conviction of the obligations of gratitude under 



162 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



which we are placed, we shall love to please our Supreme 
Benefactor ; and the only way in which we can do this, 
is, by implicitly obeying his commands. 

It was remarked, in a former part of this work, that 
happiness consists in the exercise of our sensitiveness 
upon its appropriate objects. Now, that man has moral 
sentiments, that is, that he is formed to derive happiness 
from the contemplation of moral qualities, and specially 
from the love of those beings in whom these moral quali- 
ties reside, is too evident to need argument. It is also 
evident, that this is the highest and most exalted form of 
happiness of which he is susceptible. But created beings, 
and the moral qualities of created beings, are not the 
objects adapted to his moral sensitiveness. This power 
of our being, finds its appropriate object in nothing less 
than in supreme, and unlimited, and infinite moral perfec- 
tion. And yet more, the moral susceptibility of happiness 
expands by exercise, and the uncreated object to which 
it is directed, is, by necessity, unchangeable, eternal and 
infinite. A provision is thus made for the happiness of 
man, eternal and illimitable ; that is to say, not only is it 
evident, from the constitution of man, that he is made to 
love God, but also that he is made to love Him infinitely 
more than any thing else ; to be happier from loving Him 
than from loving any thing else ; and, also, to be more 
and more intensely happy, from loving Him, throughout 
eternity. 

Thus, in general, from the relations which we sustain 
to God, we are under more imperative obligations than 
we are able to conceive, to exercise towards him that 
temper of heart, which is, perhaps, in the language of 
men, best expressed by the term, a filial disposition; 
that is, a disposition to universal obedience, pervaded by 
the spirit of supreme and grateful affection. This temper 
of heart is that generically denominated in the Scriptures, 
faith. In the New Testament, it is somewhat modified 
by the relations in which we stand to God, in consequence 
of the provisions of the remedial dispensation. 

Now, all these dispositions would be required of us, if 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 163 



we were sinless beings, and possibly no others would be 
required. The same are manifestly our duty, after we 
have sinned ; for our sin changes neither the character of 
God, nor His claim upon our obedience and affection. 
A child who has done wrong, is not under any the less 
imperative obligation to exercise a filial disposition towards 
a parent. But, suppose a creature to have sinned, it is 
manifest, that he would be under obligations to exercise 
another moral disposition. He ought to regret his fault, 
not on account of its consequences to himself, but on 
account of the violation of moral obligation, which is the 
essence of its guiltiness. Acknowledging its utter wrong- 
fulness, justifying God, and taking all the blame of his 
act upon himself, he ought to hate his own act, and from 
such feelings to the act, as well as from the temper of 
filial obedience to God, commence a life of moral purity. 
Such is repentance. This is the temper of heart, which 
the Scriptures teach us, that God requires of us as sin- 
ners. 

111. Such, then, is the obligation under which, by our 
creation, we stand to God. It would be easy to show 
that this is the only principle of action suited to our na^ 
ture, under the present constitution. 

For, 1. As we live under a constitution of law, that is, 
under which every action is amenable to law, and since 
to every action is affixed, by omnipotent power and un- 
searchable wisdom, rewards or punishments, both in this 
life and also in the other, and, as these consequences can, 
by no power of ours, be severed from the action, it is 
manifest, that we can attain to happiness, and escape 
from misery, only by perfectly obeying the will of our 
Creator. And yet more, since we are creatures, endow- 
ed with will, and the power of choice, we never can be 
completely happy, unless we act as we choose ; that is, 
unless we obey because we love to obey. Hence, from 
the elements of our constitution, it is evident, we can be 
happy on no other principles than those of perfect obe- 
15 



164 OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



dience to God, and obedience emanating from, and per- 
vaded by, love. 

2. The same truth is evident, from a consideration of the 
relations which every individual sustains to the whole race 
of man. It manifestly enters into the constitution under 
which we exist, that every individual shall have a power 
over society, both for good and for evil, so far as we can see, 
in its nature illimitable. That such is the fact will be evi- 
dent to every one who will reflect for a moment upon the re- 
sults emanating from the lives of St. Paul, Luther, Howard, 
Clarkson, or Wilberforce ; and of Alexander, Julius Caesar, 
Voltaire, Lord Byron, or Napoleon. Now, it is only 
necessary to recollect, that the being possessed of this 
power is by nature utterly ignorant of the future ; wholly 
incapable, even during life, and much more after death, of 
controlling and directing the consequences of his actions ; 
and still more, that he is fallible, — that is, liable not only 
to err from ignorance, but also from a wrong moral bias ; 
and we must be convinced that the exercise of this power 
could never be safe for his fellows, unless it were under 
the supreme direction of a Being who knew the end from 
the beginning, and who was by his very nature incapable 
cf wrong. 

From what has been said, it will follow, that our duty 
to God forbids, — 

1. Idolatry, — that is, rendering divine homage to any 
other being than the Deity. 

2. Rendering obedience to any creature, in opposition to 
the will of the Creator. 

3. Yielding obedience to our own will, or gratifying our 
own desires, in opposition to His will. 

4. Loving any thing which He has forbidden. 

5. Loving any thing which He has allowed us to love, 
in a manner and to a degree that He has forbidden. 

6. Loving any thing created in preference to Him. 

Each of these topics is susceptible of extended illustra- 
tion. As, however, they are discussed in full in works 
on theology, to which science they more particularly 



OBLIGATION TO THE LOVE OF GOD. 



165 



belong, we shall leave them with this simple enumera- 
tion. 

In treating of the remainder of this subject, we shall, 
therefore, consider only the means by which the love of 
God, or piety, may be cultivated. These are three : 1st. 
A spirit of devotion. 2d. Prayer. 3d. The observance 
of the Sabbath. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



THE CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 

From what has been already said, it will be seen that 
the relation which we sustain to God, imposes upon us 
the obligation of maintaining an habitual temper towards 
Him, which shall continually incite us to do whatever will 
please Him. It is natural to suppose that our Creator 
would have placed us under such circumstances as would, 
from their nature, cultivate in us such a temper. Such 
we find to be the fact. We are surrounded by objects of 
knowledge, which not merely by their existence, but also 
by their ceaseless changes, remind us of the attributes of 
God, and of the obligations under which we are placed to 
Him. A devotional spirit consists in making the moral 
use which is intended, of all the objects of intellection that 
come within our experience of observation. 

1. Our existence is dependent on a succession of 
changes, which are taking place at every moment in our- 
selves, over which we have no power whatever, but of 
which, each one involves the necessity of the existence and 
the superintending power of the Deity. The existence 
of the whole material universe is of the same nature. 
Now, each of these changes is, with infinite skill, adapted 
to the relative conditions of all the beings whom they 
affect ; and they are subjected to laws which are most 
evident expressions of almighty power, of unsearchable 
wisdom, and exhaustless goodness. Now, were we mere- 
ly intellectual beings, it would not be possible for us to 
consider any thing more than these laws themselves ; but, 
inasmuch as we are intellectual, and also moral beings, 
we are capable not only of considering the laws, but also 



THE CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 167 



the attributes of the Creator from whom such laws are the 
emanations. As every thing which we can know teaches 
a lesson concerning God, if we connect that lesson with 
every thing which we learn, every thing will be resplen- 
dent with the attributes of Deity. By using in this man- 
ner, the knowledge which is every where spread before us, 
we shall habitually cultivate a devout temper of mind. 
Thus, " the heavens will declare unto us the glory of God, 
and the firmament will show his handy-work ; thus day 
unto day will utter speech, and night unto night show 
forth knowledge of Him." 

2. Nor is this true of physical nature alone. The whole 
history of the human race teaches us the same lesson. 
The rewards of virtue, and the punishments of vice, as 
they are beheld in the events which befall both individuals 
and nations, all exhibit the attributes of the Deity. It is 
He that " stilleth the noise of the seas, the noise of their 
waves, and the tumult of the people." " The Lord reign- 
eth, let the earth rejoice ; let the multitude of isles be glad 
thereof. Clouds and darkness are round about him ; 
righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his 
throne." His forbearance and long-suffering, and at the 
same time His inflexible justice, His love of right, and 
His hatred of wrong, are legibly written in every page of 
individual and national history. And hence it is, that 
every fact which we witness in the government of moral 
beings, has a twofold chain of connections and relations. 
To the mere political economist or the statesman, it 
teaches the law by which cause and effect are connected. 
To the pious man it also teaches the attributes of that 
Being, who has so connected cause and effect ; and who, 
amidst all the intricate mazes of human motive and social 
organization, carries forward His laws with unchanging 
certainty and unerring righteousness. Now, it is by ob- 
serving not merely the law, but the moral lesson derived 
from the law ; it is by observing not merely the connec- 
tions of events with each other, but, also, their connection 
with the Great First Cause, that a devotional spirit is to 
be cultivated. 

15* 



168 



THE CULTIVATION OF 



And, hence, we see that knowledge of every sort, if suit- 
ably improved, has, in its very nature, a tendency to de- 
votion. If we do not thus use it, we sever it from its 
most important connections. We act simply as intellectual, 
and not as moral beings. We act contrary to the highest 
and most noble principles of our constitution. And, hence, 
we see how progress in knowledge really places us under 
progressive obligations to improvement in piety. This 
should be borne in mind by every man, and specially by 
every educated man. For this improvement of our 
knowledge, God holds us accountable. "Because they 
regard not the works of the Lord, nor consider the opera- 
tions of his hand, therefore will He destroy them." 

3. But if such are the obligations resting upon us, from 
our relation to the works of Nature and Providence, how 
much are these obligations increased by our knowledge of 
God, as it is presented to us by revelation ! 1 suppose 
that a person acquainted with the laws of optics, who had 
always stood with his back to the sun, might acquire 
much important knowledge of the nature of light, and of 
the path of the sun through the heavens, by reasoning 
from the reflection of that light, observed in the surround- 
ing creation. But how uncertain would be this knowl- 
edge, compared with that which he would acquire, by look- 
ing directly upon the sun, and tracing his path by his own 
immediate observation! So of revelation. Here, we are 
taught by language, that truth, which we otherwise could 
Tlearn only by long and careful induction. God has here 
made known to us His attributes and character ; here He 
has recorded His law ; here He has written a portion of 
the history of our race, as a specimen of His providential 
dealings with men ; and here He has, more than all, re- 
vealed to us a remedial dispensation, by which our sins 
may be forgiven, and we be raised to higher and more 
glorious happiness than that which we have lost. It 
surely becomes us, then, specially to study the Bible, not 
merely as a book of antiquities, nor as a choice collection 
of poetry, and an inexhaustible storehouse of wisdom ; but 
.for the sole purpose of ascertaining the character of God, 



A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 



169 



and our relations to Him, and of thus cultivating towards 
Him those feelings of filial and reverential homage, which 
are so manifestly our duty, and which such contemplations 
are in their nature so adapted to foster and improve. 

4. A devout temper is also cultivated by the exercise 
of devotion. The more we exercise the feeling of vene- 
ration, of love, of gratitude, and of submission towards God, 
the more profound, and pervading, and intense, and ha- 
bitual, will these feelings become. And, unless the feel- 
ings themselves be called into exercise, it will be in vain 
that we are persuaded that we ought to exercise them. 
It is one thing to be an admirer of devotion, and another 
thing to be really devout. It becomes us, therefore, to 
cultivate these feelings, by actually exercising towards 
God the very tempers of mind indicated by our circum- 
stances, and our progressive knowledge. Thus, submis- 
sion to His will, thankfulness for His mercies, trust in His 
providence, reliance on His power, and sorrow for our 
sins, should be, not the occasional exercise, but the habit 
of our souls. 

5. By the constitution of our nature, a most intimate 
connection exists between action and motive ; between 
the performance of an action and the principle from which 
it emanates. The one cannot long exist without the 
other. True charity cannot long exist in the temper, un- 
less we perform acts of charity. Meditation upon good- 
ness will soon become effete, unless it be strengthened by 
good works. So the temper of devotion will be useless ; 
nay, the profession of it must, of necessity, be hypocriti- 
cal, unless it produce obedience to God. By this alone 
is its existence known ; by this alone can it be successfully 
cultivated. The more perfectly our wills are subjected to 
the will of God, and our whole course of conduct regula- 
ted by His commands, the more ardent will be our devo- 
tion, and the more filial the temper from which our actions 
proceed. 

6. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that as penitence 
is a feeling resulting from a conviction of violated obliga- 
tion, it is to be cultivated, not merely by considering the 



170 THE CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 

character of God, but also our conduct towards Him. 
The contrast between His goodness and compassion, and 
our ingratitude and rebellion, is specially adapted to fill us 
with humility and self-abasement, and also with sorrow for 
all our past transgressions. Thus said the prophet : " Wo 
is me, for I am a man of unclean lips ; and I dwell in the 
midst of a people of unclean lips ; for mine eyes have 
seen the King, the Lord of Hosts /" 

Lastly. It is surely unnecessary to remark, that such 
a life as this is alone suited to the character of man. If 
God have made us capable of deriving our highest hap- 
piness from Him, and have so constituted the universe 
around us as perpetually to lead us to this source of hap- 
piness, the most unreasonable, ungrateful, and degrading, 
not to say most guilty, course of conduct which we can 
pursue, must be, to neglect and abuse this, the most no- 
ble part of our constitution, and to use the knowledge of 
the world around us for every other purpose than that 
for which it was created. Let every frivolous, thought- 
less human being reflect what must be his condition, when 
he, whose whole thoughts are limited by created things, 
shall stand in the presence of Him, " before whose face 
the heavens and the earth shall flee away, and there be 
no place left for them !" 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



OF PRAYER. 

In the present chapter, we shall treat of the nature, 
the obligation, and the utility of prayer. 
I. The nature of prayer. 

Prayer is the direct intercourse of the spirit of man 
with the spiritual and unseen Creator. " God is a spirit, 
and those that worship Him, must worship Him inspirit 
and in truth." 

It consists in the expression of our adoration, the ac- 
knowledgment of our obligations, the offering up of our 
thanksgivings, the confession of our sins, and in supplica- 
tion for the favors, as well temporal as spiritual, which 
we need ; being always accompanied with a suitable tem- 
per of mind. 

This temper of mind presupposes, — 

1. A solemn conviction of the character and attributes 
of God, and of the relations which He sustains to us. 

2. A conviction of the relations which we sustain to 
Him, and of our obligations to Him. 

3. An affecting view of our sinfulness, helplessness, 
and misery. 

4. Sincere gratitude for all the favors which we have 
received. 

5. A fixed and undissembled resolution to obey the 
commands of God in future. 

6. Unreserved submission to all His will. 

7. Unshaken confidence in the veracity of God. 

8. Importunate desires that our petitions, specially for 
spiritual blessings, should be granted. 

9. A soul at peace with all mankind. 

Illustrations of all these dispositions, from the prayers 



172 



OF PRAYER. 



recorded in the Holy Scriptures, as well as the precepts 
by which they are enforced, might be easily adduced. I 
presume, however, they are unnecessary. I will only 
remark, that it is not asserted that all these dispositions 
are always to be in exercise at the same time, but only 
such of them as specially belong to the nature of our sup- 
plications. 

Inasmuch as we are dependent on God, not only for 
all the blessings which we derive directly from His hands, 
but also for all those which arise from our relations to 
each other, it is manifestly proper that we confess our 
sins, and supplicate His favor, not only as individuals, but 
as societies. Hence, prayer may be divided into individ- 
ual, domestic and social. 

Individual Prayer. As the design of this institution 
is, to bring us, as individuals, into direct communion with 
God, to confess our personal infirmities, and to cultivate 
personal piety, it should be strictly in private. We are 
commanded to pray to our Father in secret. It should, 
moreover, be solemn, unreserved, and, in general, accom- 
panied with the reading of the Holy Scriptures. As, 
moreover, this direct communion with the unseen Creator, 
is intended to be the great antagonist force to the constant 
pressure of the things seen and temporal, it should be 
habitual and frequent. 

Domestic Prayer. As the relation sustained by pa- 
rents and children, is the source of many and peculiar 
blessings ; as the relation involves peculiar responsibilities, 
in the fulfilment of which we all need special guidance 
and direction, there is a peculiar propriety in the acknowl- 
edgment of God, in connection with this relation. The 
importance of this duty is specially urged upon us, by its 
effect upon the young. It associates with religion all the 
recollections of childhood, and all the sympathies of home. 
It gives to parental advice the sanction of religion, and, 
in after life, recalls the mind to a conviction of duty to 
God, with all the motives drawn from a father's care and 
a mother's tenderness. 

Social Prayer. Inasmuch as all our social and civil 



OF PRAYER. 



173 



blessings are the gift of God, it is meet that we should, 
as societies, meet to acknowledge them. This is one of 
the most important duties of the Sabbath day. It will, 
therefore, be more fully treated of, under that branch of 
the subject. 

Since prayer is the offering up of our desires, &c, with 
a suitable temper of heart, it is manifest that the question 
whether a form of prayer, or extemporary prayer, should 
be used, is merely one of expediency, and has no connec- 
tion with morals. The obligation is, to use that which is 
of the greatest spiritual benefit to the individual. Private 
prayer should, however, I think, be expressed in the 
words of the supplicant himself. 

II. The duty of prayer. 

The duty of prayer may be seen from the conditions 
of our being , and from the Holy Scriptures. 
L The conditions of our being. 

1. We are utterly powerless, ignorant of the future, 
essentially dependent at the present and for the future, 
and are miserably sinful. We need support, direction, 
happiness, pardon and purification. These can come 
from no other being than God, who is under no obligation 
to confer them upon us. What can be more manifestly 
proper, than that we should supplicate the Father of the 
universe for those blessings which are necessary, not only 
for our happiness, but for our existence, and that we 
should receive every favor with a devout acknowledgment 
of the terms on which it is bestowed ? 

2. Inasmuch as we are sinners, and have forfeited the 
blessings which we daily receive, what can be more suita- 
ble, than that we should humbly thank that Almighty 
power, from whom comes such an inexhaustible supply 
of goodness, to us so utterly undeserving ? and what more 
obligatory, than to ask the pardon of our Creator, for 
those sins of omission and of commission, with which we 
are every hour justly chargeable ? 

3. Specially is this our duty, when we reflect, that this 
very exercise of habitual reliance upon God, is necessary 
to our happiness in our present state, and that the temper 



174 



OF PRAYER. 



which it presupposes, is essential to our progress in 
virtue. 

That such is the dictate of our moral constitution, is 
evident from the fact, that all men who have any notion 
of a Supreme Being, under any circumstances, acknowl- 
edge it as a duty, and, in some form or other, profess to 
practise it. And besides this, all men, even the most 
abandoned and profligate, when in danger, pray most 
eagerly. This has been the case with men who, in 
health and safety, scoff at religion, and ridicule the idea 
of moral obligation. But it is evident, that it can be 
neither more proper nor more suitable to pray in danger, 
than at any other time ; for our relations to God are al- 
ways the same, and we are always essentially dependent 
upon him for every thing, both temporal and spiritual, 
that we enjoy at the present, or hope for in the future. 
It is surely as proper to thank God for those mercies 
which we receive every moment, as to deprecate those 
judgments by which we are occasionally alarmed. 

II. The duty of prayer, as taught in the Scriptures. 

The Scriptures treat of prayer, as a duty arising so im- 
mediately out of our relations to God, and our obligations 
to Him, as scarcely to need a positive precept. Every 
disposition of heart which we are commanded to exercise 
towards God, presupposes it. Hence, it is generally re- 
ferred to, incidentally, as one of which the obligation is 
already taken for granted. Precepts, however, are not 
wanting, in respect to it. I here only speak of the gen- 
eral tendency of the Scripture instructions. 

1. It is expressly commanded : " Pray without ceas- 
ing." " In every thing giving thanks, for this is the will 
of God, in Christ Jesus, concerning you." " In all 
things, by prayer and supplication, let your request be 
made known unto God." Phil, iv, 6. " I exhort that 
supplications and prayers, intercessions and giving of 
thanks, be made for all men ; for this is good and ac- 
ceptable in the sight of God, our Savior." 1 Tim. ii, 
1—3. 

2. God declares it to be a principal condition on which 



OF PRAYER. 



175 



He will bestow favors : " If any man lack wisdom, let 
him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally, and up- 
braideth not, and it shall be given him." James i, 5. 
" Ask, and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; 
knock, and it shall be opened unto you : for every one 
that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and to 
him that knocketh it shall be opened. Or, what man is 
there of you, whom, if his son ask bread, will he give him 
a stone ; or, if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent ? 
If ye, then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to 
your children, how much more shall your Father, that is 
in heaven, give good things to them that ask him !" Mat- 
thew vii, 7 — 11. Now, it is too obvious to need a re- 
mark, that God would not have connected so important 
consequences with prayer, unless He meant to inculcate 
it as a universal duty. 

3. The Scriptures make the habit of prayer the mark 
of distinction between the righteous and the wicked ; be- 
tween the enemies and the friends of God. Thus, the 
wicked say : " What is the Almighty, that we should 
serve Him ? or, what profit shall we have, if we call upon 
Him ? " Job xxi, 15. " The wicked, through the pride 
of his countenance, will not seek after God. God is not 
in all his thoughts." Psalms x, 4. On the contrary, 
righteous persons, those whom God approves, are spe- 
cially designated as those who call upon Him. 

4. Examples of the prayers of good men, are, in the 
Scriptures, very abundant. In fact, a large portion of 
the Bible is made up of the prayers and praises of those 
whom God has held up for our imitation. To transcribe 
these, would be to transcribe a large portion of the sacred 
books. 

5. The Bible abounds with examples recorded by God, 
of special answers to prayer of every kind that can be. 
conceived. There are examples of the successful prayer 
of individuals for temporal and for spiritual blessings, both 
for themselves and for others ; of individual prayers for 
nations, and of nations for themselves ; of individuals for 
societies, and of societies for individuals ; and, indeed, of 

16 



176 



OF PRAYER. 



men in all the circumstances in which they can be placed, 
for every blessing, and under every variety of relation. 
Now, what God has, at so great length, and in so great a 
variety of ways, encouraged us to do, must be not only a 
privilege, but a duty. 

In a word, the Bible teaches us, on this subject, that 
our relation to God is infinitely nearer, and more univer- 
sal, than that in which we can possibly stand to any other 
being. He allows us, with the simplicity and confidence 
of children, to unbosom all our cares, to make known all 
our wants, and express all our thanks, with unreserved 
freedom to Him. He assures us, that this exercise, and 
the temper from which it springs, and which it cultivates, 
is most acceptable to Him. And, having thus conde- 
scended to humble Himself to our situation, He holds us 
as most ungrateful, proud, insolent and sinful, if we ven- 
ture to undertake any business, or receive any favor, 
without holding direct and child-like communion with 
Him. 

Under the remedial dispensation, a special encourage- 
ment is given to prayer. We are there taught, that 
though we are unworthy of the blessings which we need, 
yet we may ask and receive, for the sake of the Mediator. 
" Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, He 
will give it you." The death of Christ is also held forth 
as our special ground of confidence in prayer : " He that 
spared not His own Son, but gave Him up for us all, how 
shall He not, with Him, freely give us all things ? " And, 
yet more, we are informed, that it is the special office of 
the exalted Mediator, to intercede for us before the throne 
of God. Greater encouragements than these, to prayer, 
could not possibly be conceived. 

III. The utility of prayer. 

This may be shown, — 

1. From the nature and attributes of God: He would 
not require any thing of us which was not for our good. 

2. The utility of prayer is seen from the tempers of 
mind which it presupposes. We have already shown 
what these tempers of mind are. Now, it must be evi- 



OF PRAYER. 



177 



dent to every one, that the habitual exercise of these dis- 
positions must be, in the nature of the case, in the highest 
degree, beneficial to such creatures as we. 

3. The utility of prayer is also evident from its con- 
nection with our reception of favors from God. 

1. In the government of this world, God establishes 
such connections between cause and effect, or antecedent 
and consequent, as he pleases. He has a perfect right to 
do so. The fact, that one event is the antecedent of 
another, involves not the supposition of any essential 
power in the antecedent, but merely the supposition that 
God has placed it in that relation to something that is to 
follow. 

2. The bestowment of favors is one event. God has 
a right to ordain whatever antecedent to this event he 
chooses. We are not competent to say, of any event, 
that it cannot be the antecedent to the bestowment of 
favors, any more than that rain cannot be the antecedent 
to the growth of vegetation. 

3. Since, then, any event whatever may be the ante- 
cedent to any other event whatever, we are, surely, not 
competent to say that prayer cannot be the antecedent 
to the bestowment of favors, any more than to say this 
of any thing else. It is, surely, to say the least of it, 
as good as any other antecedent, if God saw fit so to 
ordain. 

4. But, since God is a moral Governor, and must, 
therefore, delight in and reward virtuous tempers, there is 
a manifest moral propriety in his making these tempers 
the antecedent to his bestowment of blessings. Nay, we 
cannot conceive how he would be a righteous moral Gov- 
ernor, unless he did do so. And, hence, we see, that the 
supposition that God bestows blessings in answer to prayer, 
which he would not bestow on any other condition, is not 
only not at variance with any of his natural attributes, but 
that it is even demanded by his moral attributes. 

5. But, inasmuch as God has revealed to us the fact, 
that this is the condition on which he bestows the most 



178 



OF PRAYER. 



valuable of his gifts, and as he has bound himself, by his 
promise, to reward abundantly all who call upon him, the 
utility of prayer, to creatures situated as we are, is as 
manifest as our necessities are urgent, both for time and 
for eternity. 

And, finally, there can be no clearer evidence of the 
goodness of God, than just such a constitution as this. 
God promises favors in answer to prayer ; but prayer, as 
we have seen, is one of the most efficient means of pro- 
moting our moral perfection ; that is, our highest happi- 
ness ; that is to say, God promises us favors, on condi- 
tions, which, in themselves, involve the greatest blessings 
which we could possibly desire. Bishop Wilson beauti- 
fully remarks, " How good is God, who will not only give 
us what we pray for, but will reward us for going to 
him, and laying our wants before him ! " 

That a man .will, however, receive every thing he asks 
for, and just as he asks for it, is by no means asserted, in 
an unlimited sense ; but only that which he prays for, in 
a strict sense. True prayer is the offering up of our 
desires, in entire subjection to the will of God ; that is, 
desiring that he will do what we ask, if He, in His infinite 
wisdom and goodness, sees that it will be best. Now, if 
we ask thus, our prayer will be granted, for thus He has 
promised to do for us. Hence, our prayers respecting 
temporal blessings, are answered only contingently; that 
is, under this condition ; but our prayers respecting spirit- 
ual blessings, are answered absolutely ; for God has posi- 
tively promised to give His Holy Spirit to them that ask 
Him. 

If God has allowed us thus to hold the most intimate 
and unreserved communion with Him ; and if He has 
promised, on this condition, to support us by His power, 
to teach us by His wisdom, to purify us by His Spirit, and 
to work in us all those tempers which He sees will best 
prepare us for the highest state of future felicity, what 
can be more ennobling and more lovely than a prayerful 
life ? and what more ungrateful and sinful, than a life of 



OF PRAYER. 



179 



thoughtless irreverence and impiety ? Is not the single 
fact, of living without habitual prayer, a conclusive evi- 
dence that we have not the love of God in us ; that we 
are living in habitual violation of every obligation that 
binds us to our Maker ; and that we are, therefore, under 
the solemn condemnation of His most holy law ? 
16* 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 

This is the second special means appointed by our 
Creator, for the purpose of cultivating in us suitable moral 
dispositions. We shall treat, first, of the original insti- 
tution of the Sabbath ; secondly, of the Mosaic Sabbath ; 
thirdly, of the Christian Sabbath. 

Although the Sabbath is a positive institution, and, 
therefore, the proof of its obligation is to be sought for 
entirely from revelation, yet there are indications, in the 
present constitution, that periods of rest are necessary, 
both for man and for beast. The recurrence of night, 
and the necessity of repose, show that the principle of 
rest enters into the present system, as much as that of 
labor. And, besides, it is found that animals which enjoy 
one day in seven for rest, live longer, and enjoy better 
health, than those which are worked without intermission. 
The same may, to a considerable degree, be said of man. 
The late Mr. Wilberforce attributed his length of life, and 
the superiority of health which he enjoyed over his politi- 
cal contemporaries, mainly to his resolute and invariable 
observance of the Sabbath day ; a duty which, unfortu- 
nately, they too frequently neglected. 

1 shall not go into the argument on this subject in de- 
tail, as the limits of the present work will not admit of it, but 
shall merely give what seem to me the results. To those 
who wish to examine the question of the obligation of the 
Sabbath at large, I would recommend the valuable trea- 
tise of Mr. J. J. Gurney, on the history, authority, and 
use of the Sabbath ; from which much of the present 
article is merely an abridgment. 

I. Of the original institution of the Sabbath. 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 



181 



First. The Divine authority for the institution of the 
Sabbath, is found in Genesis ii, 1 — 3. " Thus, the 
heavens and the earth were finished, and all the hosts of 
them; and on the seventh day, God ended his work 
which He had made, and He rested on the seventh day 
from all his works which He had made. And God bless- 
ed the seventh day, and sanctified it ; because that in it 
He had rested from all his work which God had created 
and made." 

Now, concerning this passage, we remark, — 

1. It was given to our first parents; that is, to the 
whole human race. 

2. God blessed it ; that is, bestowed upon it a peculiar 
blessing, or made it a source of peculiar blessings to man. 
Such, surely, must be that day, which is given to culti- 
vate in ourselves moral excellence, and prepare us for the 
happiness of heaven. He sanctified it ; that is, set it 
apart from a common to a sacred and religious use. 

3. The reason is a general one : God rested. This 
has no reference to any peculiar people, but seems in the 
light of an example from God for all the human race. 

4. The nature of the ordinance is general. God sanc- 
tified it; that is, the day. The act refers not to any 
particular people, but to the day itself. 

5. The object to be accomplished is general, and can 
apply to no one people more than to another. If it be 
rest, all men equally need it. If it be moral cultivation, 
surely no people has ever existed who did not require 
such a means to render them better. 

Second. There are indications that the hebdomadal 
division of time was observed by the patriarchs before the 
time of Moses, and that the Sabbath was regarded as the 
day for religious worship. 

1. Genesis iv, 3. "And in process of time, it came 
to pass that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an 
offering to the Lord." The words rendered " in process 
of time," literally signify " at the end of days ; " or, " at 
the cutting off of days ; " that is, as I think probable, at 
the close, as we should say, of a section of days ; a very 



182 THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 

natural expression for the end of a week. If this be the 
meaning, it would seem to refer to the division of time 
just previously mentioned, and also to the use of this day 
for religious worship. 

2. Noah seems to have observed the same hebdomadal 
division of time. The command to enter into the ark, 
was given seven days before the flood came. Genesis 
vii, 4 — 10. So, he allowed seven days to elapse between 
the times of sending forth the dove. Genesis viii, 10 — 
12. Now, I think that these intimations show that this 
division of time was observed according to the original 
command ; and we may well suppose that with it was 
connected the special time for religious worship. Thus, 
also, Joseph devoted seven days, or a whole week, to the 
mourning for his father. 

3. The next mention of the Sabbath, is shortly after 
the Israelites had left Egypt, and were fed with manna in 
the wilderness. Exodus xvi, 22 — 30. As the passage 
is of considerable length, I need not quote it. I would, 
however, remark, — 

1. It occurs before the giving of the law ; and, there- 
fore, the obligatoriness of the Sabbath is hereby acknowl- 
edged, irrespective of the Mosaic law. 

2. When first alluded to, it is spoken of as a thing 
known. God, first, without referring to the Sabbath, in- 
forms Moses that on the sixth day, the Israelites should 
gather twice as much manna as on any other day. From 
this, it seems that the division of time by weeks was 
known ; and that it was taken for granted, that they 
would know the reason for the making of this distinction. 
In the whole of the narration, there is no precept given 
for the keeping of the day ; but they are reproved for not 
suitably keeping it, as an institution with which they 
ought to have been familiar. 

Besides these, there are many indications in the earliest 
classics, that the Greeks and Romans observed the heb- 
domadal division of time ; and, also, that the seventh day 
was considered peculiarly sacred. This seems to have 
been the case in the time of Hesiod. The same is sup- 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 



183 



posed to have been the fact in regard to the northern na- 
tions of Europe, from which we are immediately descend- 
ed. The inference which seems naturally to arise from 
these facts, is, that this institution was originally observed 
by the whole human race ; and that it was transmitted, 
with different degrees of care, by different nations, until 
the period of the commencement of our various historical 
records. 

From the above facts, I think we are warranted in the 
conclusion, that the seventh day, or perhaps, generally, 
the seventh part of time, was originally set apart for a 
religious purpose by our Creator, for the whole human 
race ; that it was so observed by the Hebrews, previously 
to the giving of the law ; and that, probably, the observ- 
ance was, in the infancy of our race, universal. 

II. The Mosaic Sabbath. 

The precept for the observance of the Sabbath, at the 
giving of the law, is in these words: "Remember the 
Sabbath day, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, 
and do all thy work ; but the seventh is the Sabbath of 
the Lord thy God ; in it, thou shalt not do any work, 
thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, 
nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that 
is within thy gates ; for in six days the Lord made heaven 
and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the 
seventh day. Wherefore the Lord blessed the seventh 
day, and hallowed it." Exodus xx, 11. 

Now, concerning this precept, there are several things 
worthy of remark : 

1. It is found in the law of the ten commandments, 
which is always referred to in the Scriptures, as containing 
the sum of the moral precepts of God to man. Our 
Savior and the Apostles, who made the most decided 
distinction between moral and ceremonial observances, 
never allude to the law of the ten commandments in any 
other manner than as of permanent and universal obliga- 
tion. Now, I know of no reason which can be assigned, 
why this precept should be detached from all the rest, 
and considered as ceremonial, when the whole of these, 



184 THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 

taken together, are allowed, by universal consent, to have 
been quoted as moral precepts by Christ and his Apostles. 

2. The reasons given for observing it, are the same as 
those given at the time of its first institution. Inasmuch 
as these reasons are, in their nature, general, we should 
naturally conclude that the obligation which it imposes, 
is universal. 

3. This commandment is frequently referred to by the 
prophets, as one of high moral obligation ; the most sol- 
emn threatenings are uttered against those who profane 
it ; and the greatest rewards promised to those who keep 
it. See Isaiah lvi, 2 — 6 ; Jeremiah xvii, 24, 25 ; Ne- 
hemiah xiii, 15 — 21. 

4. In addition to rest from labor, the meeting together 
for worship, and the reading of the Scriptures, was made 
a part of the duty of the Sabbath day. Six days shall 
work be done ; but the seventh is the Sabbath of rest ; a 
holy convocation. Leviticus xxiii, 3. Thus, also, Moses, 
of old time, hath, in every city, them that preach him, 
being read in the synagogues every Sabbath day. Acts 
xv, 21. 

Besides this reenaction of the Sabbath day, in the 
Mosaic law, there were special additions made to its ob- 
servance, which belong to the Jews alone, and which 
were a part of their civil or ceremonial law. With this 
view, other reasons were given for observing it, and other 
rites were added. Thus, for instance, — 

1. It was intended to distinguish them from the sur- 
rounding idolatrous nations. Exodus xxxi, 12 — 17. 

2. It was a memorial of their deliverance from Egypt. 
Deuteronomy v, 15. 

3. And, with these views, the principle of devoting the 
seventh part of time, was extended also to years, every 
seventh year being a year of rest. 

4. The violation of the Sabbath was punished with 
death by the civil magistrate. 

Now, whatever is in its nature local, and designed for 
a particular purpose, ceases, whenever that purpose is 
accomplished. Hence, these civil and ceremonial ob- 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 



185 



servances cease, with the termination of the Jewish polity ; 
while that which is moral and universal, remains as though 
the ceremonial observances had never existed. I think 
that this view of the subject is also confirmed by the ex- 
ample and precept of Christ, who gave directions con- 
cerning the manner in which the Sabbath was to be kept, 
and also was himself accustomed to observe the day for 
the purposes of religious worship. " As his custom was, 
he went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and 
stood up to ready LuJce iv, 16. See also Matthew 
xii, 2 — 13. When our Lord, also, in teaching the mode 
in which the Sabbath is to be kept, specifies what things 
it is lawful to do on the Sabbath day, he clearly proceeds 
upon the principle that it was lawful to do things on other 
days, which it would not be lawful to do on the Sabbath 
day. 

III. The Christian Sabbath. 

We shall consider here, 1st, The day on which the 
Christian Sabbath is to be kept ; 2d. The manner in 
which it is to be kept. 

First. The day on which the Christian Sabbath is 
to be kept. 

First. There are indications, from the facts which 
transpired on that day, that it was to be specially honored 
under the new dispensation. 

1 . Our Savior arose on that day from the dead, having 
accomplished the work of man's redemption. 

2. On this day he appeared to his Apostles, a week 
from his resurrection, at which time he had his conversa- 
tion with Thomas. 

3. On this day, also, occurred the feast of Pentecost, 
when the Spirit was in so remarkable a manner poured 
out, and when the new dispensation emphatically com- 
menced. 

Second. That the primitive Christians, in the days of 
the Apostles, were accustomed to observe this day, as 
their day of weekly worship, is evident from several pas- 
sages in the New Testament, and also from the earliest 
ecclesiastical records. 



186 THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 



1. That the early disciples, in all places, were accus- 
tomed to meet statedly, to worship and celebrate the 
Lord's Supper, is evident from 1 Corinthians xi, 1, 14, 
20, 23, 40. And that these meetings were on the first 
day of the week, may be gathered from 1 Corinthians 
xvi, 1, 2. 

2. That these meetings were held on the first day of 
the week, is also further evident from Acts xx, 6 — 11 ; 
where we are informed, that in Troas the Christians met 
on the first day of the week to break bread, (that is, to 
celebrate the Lord's Supper,) and to receive religious 
instruction. From these passages, we see that this cus- 
tom had already become universal, not merely in the 
neighborhood of Jerusalem, but throughout the regions in 
which the Christian religion was promulgated. 

3. Again, (Revelations i, 10,) it is observed by John, 
" I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day." From this 
remark, it is probable that John kept this day with pecu- 
liar solemnity. It is certain that the day had already 
obtained a particular name ; a name by which it has con- 
tinued to be distinguished in every subsequent age. 

Besides these allusions to the day from the New Tes- 
tament, there are various facts, bearing upon the subject, 
from uninspired historians. 

1. The early fathers frequently refer to this day, as 
the day set apart for religious worship ; and allude to the 
difference between keeping this day, and keeping the 
seventh, or Jewish Sabbath, specially on the ground of 
its being the day of our Savior's resurrection. 

2. Pliny, in his letter to Trajan, remarks that the 
Christians " were accustomed, on a stated day, to meet 
before day-light, and to repeat among themselves a hymn 
to Christ, as to a God, and to bind themselves, by a sa- 
cred obligation, not to commit any wickedness, but, on 
the contrary, to abstain from thefts, robberies and adulte- 
ries ; also, not to violate their promise, or deny a pledge ; 
after which, it was their custom to separate, and meet 
again at a promiscuous and harmless meal." It is need- 
less here to remark the exact coincidence between this 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 



187 



account from the pen of a heathen magistrate, with the 
account of the keeping of the day, in the places where it 
is mentioned in the New Testament. 

3. That this stated day was the first day of the week, 
or the Lord's day, is evident from another testimony. So 
well known was the custom of the early Christians on this 
subject, that the ordinary question, put by their persecutors 
to the Christian martyrs, was, " Hast thou kept the Lord's 
day ? " Dominicum servasti ? To which the usual an- 
swer was, " 1 am a Christian : I cannot omit it." Chris- 
tianus sum : inter mitt ere non possum. 

4. It is, however, manifest, that the Jews, who were 
strongly inclined to blend the rites of Moses with the 
Christian religion, at first kept the seventh day; or, what 
is very probable, at first kept both days. The Apostles 
declared that the disciples of Jesus were not under obli- 
gation to observe the seventh day. See Colossians ii, 
16, 17. Now, as the observance of the Sabbath is a 
precept given to the whole human race ; as it is repeated, 
in the Mosaic law, as a moral precept ; as the authority 
of this precept is recognized both by the teaching and 
example of Christ and his Apostles; as the Apostles 
teach that the keeping of the seventh day is not obliga- 
tory ; and as they did keep the first day as a day of re- 
ligious worship; it seems reasonable to conclude that 
they intended to teach, that the first day was that which 
we are, as Christians, to observe. 

5. From these considerations, we feel warranted to 
conclude that the first day of the week ivas actually kept 
by the inspired Apostles, as the Christian Sabbath. Their 
example is sufficient to teach us that the keeping of this 
day is acceptable to God ; and we are, on this ground, at 
liberty to keep it as the Sabbath. If, however, any other 
person be dissatisfied with these reasons, and feel under 
obligation to observe the seventh day, 1 see no precept 
in the word of God to forbid him. 

6. If, however, as seems to me to be the case, both 
days are allowable ; that is, if I have sufficient reason to 
believe that either is acceptable to God ; but if, by ob- 

17 



188 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 



serving the first day, I can enjoy more leisure, and suffer 
less interruption, and thus better accomplish the object of 
the day ; and if, besides, I have the example of inspired 
Apostles in favor of this observance ; I should decidedly 
prefer to observe the first day. Nay, I should consider 
the choice of that day as obligatory. For, if I am allow- 
ed to devote either day to the worship of God, it is surely 
obligatory on me to worship God on that day on which I 
can best accomplish the very object for which the day 
was set apart. 

If it be asked, when this day is to begin, I answer, that 
I presume we are at liberty to commence this day at the 
same time that we commence other days ; for the obvious 
reason, that thus we can generally enjoy the quiet of the 
Sabbath with less interruption. 

Secondly. Of the manner in which the Christian Sab- 
bath is to be observed. 

The design for which the Sabbath was. instituted, I sup- 
pose to be, to set apart a portion of our time for the un- 
interrupted worship of God, and the preparation of our 
souls for eternity ; and, also, to secure to man and beast 
one day in seven, as a season of rest from labor. 

Hence, the law of the Sabbath forbids, — 

1. All labor of body or mind, of which the immediate 
object is not the worship of God, or our own religious im- 
provement. The only exceptions to this rule, are works 
of necessity or of mercy. The necessity, however, must 
be one which is imposed by the providence of God, and 
not by our own will. Thus, a ship, when on a voyage, 
may sail on the Sabbath, as well as on any other day, 
without violating the rule. The rule, however, would be 
violated by commencing the voyage on the Sabbath, be- 
cause here a choice of days is in the power of the master. 

2. The labor of those committed to our charge. 

1. The labor of servants. Their souls are of as much 
value as our own, and they need the benefit of this law as 
much as ourselves. Besides, if this portion of their time 
is claimed by our Creator, we have no right to purchase 
it, nor have they a right to negociate it away. Works of 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 



189 



necessity must, of course, be performed ; but these should 
be restricted within the limits prescribed by a conscien- 
tious regard to the object and design of the day. 

2. Brutes are, by the fourth commandment, included 
in the law which ordains rest to all the animate creation. 
They need the repose which it grants, and they are en- 
titled to their portion of it. 

3. The pursuit of pleasure, or of any animal, or merely 
intellectual gratification. Hence, the indulgence of our 
appetites in such manner as to prevent us from free and 
buoyant spiritual contemplation, riding or journeying for 
amusement, the merely social pleasure of visiting, the 
reading of books designed for the gratification of the taste 
or the imagination, are all, by the principles of the com- 
mand, forbidden. 

On the contrary, the law of the Sabbath enjoins the 
employment of the day in the more solemn and immediate 
duties of religion. 

1. Reading the Scriptures, religious meditation, prayer 
in private, and also the special instruction in religion of 
those committed to our charge. And, hence, it enjoins 
such domestic arrangements as are consistent with these 
duties. 

2. Social worship. Under the Mosaic and Christian 
dispensation, this was an important part of the duties of 
the day. As the setting apart of a particular day to be 
universally observed, involves the idea of social as well as 
personal religion, one of the most obvious duties which it 
imposes, is that of social worship ; that is, of meeting to- 
gether in societies, to return thanks for our social mercies, 
to implore the pardon of God for our social sins, and be- 
seech His favor for those blessings which we need as so- 
cieties, no less than as individuals. 

The importance of the religious observance of the Sab- 
bath, is seldom sufficiently estimated. Every attentive 
observer has remarked, that the violation of this command, 
by the young, is one of the most decided marks of incipi- 
ent moral degeneracy. Religious restraint is fast losing 
its hold upon that young man, who, having been educated 



190 THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 

in the fear of God, begins to spend the Sabbath in idle- 
ness, or in amusement. And so, also, of communities. 
The desecration of the Sabbath is one of those evident 
indications of that criminal recklessness, that insane love 
of pleasure, and that subjection to the government of ap- 
petite and passion, which forebodes, that the "beginning of 
the end " of social happiness, and of true national pros- 
perity, has arrived. 

Hence, we see how imperative is the duty of parents, 
and of legislators, on this subject. The head of every 
family is obliged, by the command of God, not only to 
honor this day himself, but to use all the means in his 
power to secure the observance of it, by all those com- 
mitted to his charge. He is, thus, not only promoting his 
own, but his children's happiness; for nothing is a more 
sure antagonist force to all the allurements of vice, as 
nothing tends more strongly to fix in the minds of the 
young a conviction of the existence and attributes of God, 
than the solemn keeping of this day. And, hence, also, 
legislators are false to their trust, who, either by the 
enactment of laws, or by their example, diminish, in the 
least degree, in the minds of a people, the reverence due 
to that day which God has set apart for Himself. 

The only question which remains, is the following: 

Is it the duty of the civil magistrate to enforce the ob- 
servance of the Sabbath ? 

We are inclined to think not, and for the following 
reasons : 

1. The duty arises solely from our relations to God, 
and not from our relations to man. Now, our duties to 
God are never to be placed within the control of human 
legislation. 

2. If the civil magistrate has a right to take cognizance 
of this duty to God, he has a right to take cognizance of 
every other. And, if he have a right to take cognizance 
of the duty, he has a right to prescribe in what manner it 
shall be discharged ; or, if he see fit, to forbid the observ- 
ance of it altogether. The concession of this right would, 
therefore, lead to direct interference with liberty of con- 
science. 



THE OBSERVANCE OF THE SABBATH. 191 

3. The keeping of the Sabbath is a moral duty. 
Hence, if it be acceptably observed, it must be a volun- 
tary service. But the civil magistrate can never do any 
thing more than produce obedience to the external pre- 
cept ; which, in the sight of God, would not be the keeping 
of the Sabbath at all. Hence, to allow the civil magis- 
trate to enforce the observance of the Sabbath, would be 
to surrender to him the control over the conscience, with- 
out attaining even the object for which the surrender was 
made. 

4. It is, however, the duty of the civil magistrate, to 
protect every individual in the undisturbed right of wor- 
shipping God as he pleases. This protection, every in- 
dividual has a right to claim, and society is under obliga- 
tion to extend it. And, also, as this is a leisure day, and 
is liable to various abuses, the magistrate has a right to 
prevent any modes of gratification which would tend to 
disturb the peace of society. This right is acknowledged 
in regulations respecting other days of leisure or rejoicing ; 
and there can be no reason why it should not be exercised 
in respect to the Sabbath. 

5. And, lastly, the law of the Sabbath applies equally 
to societies, and to individuals. An individual is forbid- 
den to labor on the Sabbath, or to employ another person 
to labor for him. The rule is the same, when applied to 
any number of individuals ; that is, to a society. Hence, 
a society has no right to employ persons to labor for them. 
The contract is a violation of the Sabbatical law. It is 
on this ground that I consider the carrying of the marl on 
this day a social violation of the Christian Sabbath. 



17* 



PART II. 



DUTIES TO MAN. RECIPROCITY AND BENEVO- 
LENCE. 

DIVISION I. 

THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY.— GENERAL PRINCIPLE ILLUSTRATED, 
AND THE DUTIES OF RECIPROCITY CLASSIFIED. 

It has been already observed, that our duties, to both 
God and man, are all enforced by the obligation of love 
to God. By this we mean, that, in consequence of our 
moral constitution, we are under obligation to love our fel- 
low-men, because they are our fellow-men ; and we are also 
under obligation to love them, because we have been com- 
manded to love them by our Father who is in heaven. 
The nature of this obligation may be illustrated by a fa- 
miliar example. Every child in a family is under obliga- 
tion to love its parent. And every child is bound to love 
its brother, both because he is its brother, and, also, be- 
cause this love is a duty enforced by the relation in which 
they both stand to their common parent. 

The relation .in which men stand to each other, is es- 
sentially the relation of equality; not equality of condition, 
but equality of right. 

Every human being is a distinct and separately account- 
able individual. To each one, God has given just such 
means of happiness, and placed him under such circum- 
stances for improving those means of happiness, as it has 
pleased him. To one he has given wealth ; to another, 
intellect ; to another, physical strength ; to another, health ; 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



193 



and to all in different degrees. In all these respects, the 
human race presents a scene of the greatest possible di- 
versity. So far as natural advantages are concerned, we 
can scarcely find two individuals, who are not created un- 
der circumstances widely dissimilar. 

But, viewed in another light, all men are placed under 
circumstances of perfect equality. Each separate indi- 
vidual is created with precisely the same right to use the 
advantages with which God has endowed him, as every 
other individual. This proposition seems to me in its 
nature so self-evident, as almost to preclude the possibility 
of argument. The only reason that I can conceive, on 
which any one could found a plea for inequality of right, 
must be inequality of condition. But this can manifest- 
ly create no diversity of right. I may have been endow- 
ed with better eye-sight than my neighbor; but this evi- 
dently gives me no right to put out his eyes, or to inter- 
fere with his right to derive from them whatever of hap- 
piness the Creator has placed within his power. I may 
have greater muscular strength than my neighbor; but 
this gives me no right to break his arms, or to diminish, 
in any manner, his ability to use them for the production 
of his own happiness. Besides, this supposition involves 
direct and manifest contradiction. For the principle as- 
serted is, that superiority of condition confers superiority 
of right. But if this be true, then every kind of superi- 
ority of condition must confer corresponding superiority of 
right. Superiority in muscular strength must confer it, 
as much as superiority of intellect, or of wealth ; and 
must confer it in the ratio of that superiority. In that 
case, if A, on the ground of intellectual superiority, have 
a right to improve his own means of happiness, by dimin- 
ishing those which the Creator has given to B, B would 
have the same right over A, on the ground of superiority of 
muscular strength ; while C would have a corresponding 
right over them both, on the ground of superiority of wealth ; 
and so on indefinitely ; and these rights would change eve- 
ry day, according to the relative situation of the respective 
parties. That is to say, as right is, in its nature, exclu- 



194 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



sive, all the men in the universe have an exclusive right 
to the same thing ; while the right of every one absolutely 
annihilates that of every other. What is the meaning of 
such an assertion, I leave it for others to determine. 
But let us look at man in another point of light. 

1. We find all men possessed of the same appetites 
and passions, that is, of the same desire for external ob- 
jects, and the same capacity for receiving happiness from 
the gratification of these desires. We do not say that all 
men possess them all in an equal degree ; but only that 
all men actually possess them all, and that their happiness 
depends upon the gratification of them. 

2. These appetites and passions are created, so far as 
they themselves are exclusively concerned, without limit. 
Gratification generally renders them both more intense 
and more numerous. Such is the case with the love of 
wealth, the love of power, the love of sensual pleasure, 
or with any of the others. 

3. These desires may be gratified in such a manner, as 
not to interfere with the right which every other man 
has over his own means of happiness. Thus, I may 
gratify my love of wealth, by industry and frugality, while 
I conduct myself towards every other man with entire 
honesty. I may gratify my love of science, without di- 
minishing, in any respect, the means of knowledge pos- 
sessed by another. And, on the other hand, I am created 
with the physical power to gratify my desires, in such a 
manner as to interfere with the right which another has 
over the means of happiness which God has given him. 
Thus, I have a physical power to gratify my love of 
property, by stealing the property of another, as well as 
to gratify it by earning property for myself. 1 have, by, 
the gift of speech, the physical power to ruin the reputa- 
tion of another, for the sake of gratifying my own love of 
approbation. I have the physical power to murder a 
man, for the sake of using his body to gratify my love of 
anatomical knowledge. And so of a thousand cases. 

4. And, hence, we see that the relation in which hu- 
man beings stand to each other, is the following : Every 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



195 



individual is created with a desire to use the means of 
happiness which God has given him, in such a manner 
as he thinks will best promote that happiness ; and of this 
manner he is the sole judge. Every individual is endowed 
with the same desires, which he may gratify in such a 
manner as will not interfere with his neighbor's means of 
happiness ; but each individual has, also, the physical 
power of so gratifying his desires, as will interfere with 
the means of happiness which God has granted to his 
neighbor. 

5. From this relation, it is manifest that every man is 
under obligation to pursue his own happiness, in such 
manner only as will leave his neighbor in the undisturbed 
exercise of that common right which the Creator has 
equally conferred upon both ; because in no other manner 
can the evident design of the Creator, the common hap- 
piness of all, be promoted. 

That this is the law of our being, may be shown from 
several considerations : 

1. By violating it, the happiness of the aggressor is not 
increased, while that of the sufferer is diminished ; while, 
by obeying it, the greatest amount of happiness of which 
our condition is susceptible, is secured ; because, by obey- 
ing it, every one derives the greatest possible advantage 
from the gifts bestowed upon him by the Creator. 

2. Suppose any other rule of obligation ; that is, that 
a man is not under obligation to observe, with this exacti- 
tude, the rights of his neighbor. Where shall the limit 
be fixed ? If violation be allowed in a small degree, why 
not in a great degree ? and if he may interfere with one 
right, why not with all ? And, as all men come under 
the same law, this principle would lead to the same ab- 
surdity as that of which we have before spoken ; that is, 
it would abolish the very idea of right ; and, as every one 
has an equal liberty of violation, would surrender the 
whole race to the dominion of unrestrained desire. 

3. If it be said that one class of men is not under the 
obligation to observe this rule in its conduct towards an- 
other class of men, then it will be necessary to show that 



196 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



the second class are not men, that is, human beings ; for 
these principles apply to men, as men ; and the simple 
fact, that a being is a man, places him within the reach 
of these obligations, and of their protection. Nay, more, 
suppose the inferior class of beings were not truly men; 
if they were intelligent moral agents, I suppose that we 
should be under the same obligation to conduct ourselves 
towards them upon the principle of reciprocity. I see no 
reason why an angel would have a right, by virtue of his 
superior nature, to interfere with the means of happiness 
which God has conferred upon man. By parity of rea- 
soning, therefore, superiority of rank would give to man 
no such power over an inferior species of moral and intel- 
ligent beings. 

And, lastly, if it be true that the Creator has given to 
every separate individual, control over those means of 
happiness which He has bestowed upon him, then the 
simple question is, which is of the highest authority, this 
grant of the Creator, or the desires and passions of the 
creature ? for these are really the notions which are brought 
into collision. That is to say, ought the grant of God, 
and the will of God, to limit my desires ; or ought my 
desires to vitiate the grant, and set at defiance the v/ill of 
God ? On this question, a moral and intelligent creature 
can entertain but one opinion. 

Secondly. Let us examine the teaching of the Holy 
Scriptures on this subject. 

The precept in the Bible is in these words : " Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." 

Two questions are here to be considered. First, to 
whom does this command apply ; or, in other words, who 
is my neighbor? and, secondly, what is implied in the 
precept ? 

1. The first of these questions is answered by our 
Savior himself, in the parable of the good Samaritan. 
Luke x, 25 — 37. He there teaches us, that we are to 
consider as our neighbor, not our relation, or our fellow- 
citizen, or those to whom we are bound by the reception 
of previous kindness, but the stranger, the alien, the he- 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



197 



reditary national enemy ; that is, man, as man ; any human 
being to whom we may in any manner do good. Every 
man is our neighbor, and, therefore, we are under obliga- 
tion to love every man as ourselves. 

2. What is the import of the command to love such a 
one as ourselves ? 

The very lowest meaning that we can assign to this 
precept, is as follows. I have already stated that God 
has bestowed upon every man such means of happiness, 
as, in his own sovereign pleasure, he saw fit ; and that he 
has given to every man an equal right to use those means 
of happiness as each one supposes will best promote his 
own well-being. Besides this, every one has an instinct- 
ive desire thus to use them. He cannot be happy unless 
this desire be gratified, and he is painfully conscious of 
injury, if this right be interfered with. In this manner, 
he loves himself. Now, in the same manner he is com- 
manded to love his neighbor. That is, he is, by this 
precept, obliged to have the same desire that his neighbor 
should enjoy, unmolested, the control over whatever God 
has bestowed upon him, as he has to enjoy, unmolested, 
the same control himself ; and to feel the same conscious- 
ness of injury when another man's rights are invaded, as 
when his own rights are invaded. With these sentiments, 
he would be just as unwilling to violate the rights of an- 
other, as he would be to suffer a violation of his own. 
That this view of the subject exhausts the command, we 
by no means assert ; but we think it evident that the 
language is capable of a no less comprehensive meaning. 

The same precept is expressed in other places, under 
another form of language : " All things whatsoever ye 
would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto 
them ; for this is the law and the prophets." Matthew 
vii, 12. 

The words here, as in the former case, are used to 
denote a principle of universal obligation : " All things 
whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye 
even so unto them." 

The precept itself teaches us to estimate the rights of 



198 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



others by the consciousness of individual right in our own 
bosoms. Would we wish to know how delicate a regard 
we are bound to entertain towards the control which God 
has given to others over the means of happiness which 
He has granted to them, let us decide the question by 
asking how tender and delicate is the regard which we 
would wish them to entertain towards us under similar 
circumstances. The decision of the one question, will 
always be the decision of the other. And this precept 
goes a step farther. It renders it obligatory on every 
man to commence such a course of conduct, irrespectively 
of whatever may be the conduct of others to himself. It 
forbids us to demand more than the law of reciprocity 
allows ; it commands us always to render it ; and, still 
more, if we complain to another of his violation of the 
law, it renders it imperative on us, while we urge upon 
him a change of conduct, to commence by setting him 
the example. And it really, if carried out to the utmost, 
would preclude our claim upon him, until we had our- 
selves first manifested towards him the very disposition 
which we demand towards ourselves. The moral beauty 
of this precept v/ill be at once seen by any one who will 
take the trouble, honestly, to generalize it. He will im- 
mediately perceive that it would always avert injury at 
the very outset ; and, by rendering both parties more 
virtuous, would tend directly to banish injury, and vio- 
lence, and wrong, from the earth. 

Thirdly. This law of universal reciprocity applies with 
the same force to communities as to individuals. 

Communities are composed of individuals, and can 
have, in respect to each other, no other rights than those 
of the individuals who constitute them. If it be wrong 
for one man to injure another man, it must be equally 
wrong for two men to injure two other men ; and so of 
any other number. And, moreover, the grant of the 
Creator is in both cases under the same circumstances. 
God has bestowed upon nations physical and intellectual 
advantages, in every possible degree of diversity. But 
He has granted to them all an equal right to use those 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



199 



advantages in such manner as each one may suppose will 
best conduce to the promotion of his own happiness. 
Hence it will follow, — 

1. That the precept applies as universally to nations 
as to individuals. Whenever societies of men treat with 
each other ; whether powerful with weak, or polite with 
rude, civilized with savage, or intelligent with ignorant : 
whether friends with friends, or enemies with enemies ; 
all are bound, b) r the law of reciprocity, to love each 
other as themselves, and to do unto others, in all things., 
whatsoever they would desire others to do unto them. 

2. And hence, also, the precept itself is equally obli- 
gatory upon nations as upon individuals. Every nation 
is bound to exhibit as sensitive a regard for the preserva- 
tion inviolate of the rights of another nation, as it exhibits 
for the preservation inviolate of its own rights. And still 
more, every nation is under the same obligation as every 
individual, to measure the respect and moderation which 
it displays to others, by the respect and moderation which 
it demands for itself; and is also, if it complain of viola- 
tion of right, to set the first example of entire and perfect 
reciprocity and fidelity. Were this course pursued by 
individuals and nations, the causes of collision would 
manifestly cease, and the appeal to arms would soon be 
remembered only as one of the strange infatuations of by- 
gone, barbarous and blood-thirsty ages. Chicanery, and 
intrigue, and overreaching, are as wicked and as disgrace- 
ful in the intercourse of nations and societies, as in that 
of individuals ; and the tool of a nation or of a party, is 
as truly contemptible as the tool of an individual. The 
only distinction which I perceive, is, that, in the one case, 
the instrument of dishonesty is ashamed of his act, and 
dare not wear the badge of his infamy ; while, in the 
other case, even the ambiguous virtue of shame has been 
lost, and the man glories in the brand which marks him 
for a villain. 

18 



200 



THE DUTY OF RECIPROCITY. 



CLASSIFICATION OF THE DUTIES ARISING FROM THE LAW OF 
RECIPROCITY. 

The duties of reciprocity may be divided into three 
classes : 

Class 1. Duties to men, as men. 
Class 2. Duties arising from the constitution of 
the sexes. 

Class 3. Duties arising from the constitution of 
civil society. 

Class 1. Duties to men, as men. 
This includes justice and veracity. 

I. Justice, as it regards, 1. Liberty. 

2. Property. 

3. Character. 

4. Reputation. 

II. Veracity. 1. Of the past and present. 

2. Of the future. 
Class 2. Duties arising from the constitution of 
the sexes. 

Including, 1. General duty of chastity. 

2. The law of marriage. 

3. The duties and rights of parents. 

4. The duties and rights of children. 
Class 3. Duties arising from the constitution of 

CIVIL SOCIETY. 

1. The nature of civil society. 

2. The mode in which the authority of civil society is 
maintained. 

3. Of forms of government. 

4. Duties of magistrates. 

5. Duties of citizens. 



CLASS FIRST. 



JUSTICE AND VERACITY. 

JUSTICE. 

Justice, when used in a judicial sense, signifies that 
temper of mind which disposes a man to administer re- 
wards and punishments according to the character and 
actions of the object. 

It is also used to designate the act by which this ad- 
ministration is effected. Thus, we speak of a judge, who 
administers justice. 

In the present case, however, it is used in a more ex- 
tensive signification. It is here intended to designate that 
temper of mind which disposes us to leave every other 
being in the unmolested enjoyment of those means of 
happiness bestowed upon him by his Creator. It is, also, 
frequently used for the exhibition of this conduct in out- 
ward act. Thus, when a man manifests a proper respect 
for the rights of others, we say, he acts justly ; when he, 
in any manner, violates these rights, we say, he acts un- 
justly. 

The most important means of happiness which God 
has placed in the power of the individual, are, first, his 
own person ; second, property ; third ? character ; 
fourth, reputation. 



CHAPTER FIRST. 



PERSONAL LIBERTY. 
SECTION I. 

NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 

Every human being is, by his constitution, a separate, 
and distinct, and complete system, adapted to all the pur- 
poses of self-government, and responsible, separately, to 
God, for the manner in which his powers are employed. 
Thus, every individual possesses a body, by which he is 
connected with the physical universe, and by which that 
universe is modified for the supply of his wants ; an un- 
derstanding, by which truth is discovered, and by which 
means are adapted to their appropriate ends ; passions 
and desires, by which he is excited to action, and in the 
gratification of which his happiness consists; conscience, 
to point out the limit within which these desires may be 
rightfully gratified ; and a will, which determines him to 
action. The possession of these is necessary to a human 
nature, and it also renders every being so constituted, a 
distinct and independent individual. He may need soci- 
ety, but every one needs it equally with every other one; 
and, hence, all enter into it upon terms of strict and evi- 
dent reciprocity. / If the individual uses these powers 
according to the laws imposed by his Creator, his Creator 
holds him guiltless. If he use them in such manner as 
not to interfere with the use of the same powers which 
God has bestowed upon his neighbor, he is. as it respects 
his neighbor, whether that neighbor be an individual or 
the community, to be held guiltless. So long as he uses 
them within this limit, he has a right, so far as his fellow- 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 



203 



men are concerned, to use them, in the most unlimited 
sense, suo arbitrio, at his own discretion. His will is a 
sufficient and ultimate reason. He need assign no other 
reason for his conduct, than his own free choice. Within 
this limit, he is still responsible to God ; but, within this 
limit, he is not responsible to man, nor is man responsible 
for him. 

1. Thus, a man has an entire right to use his own body 
as he will, provided he do not so use it as to interfere 
with the rights of his neighbor. He may go where he 
will, and stay where he please ; he may work, or be idle ; 
he may pursue one occupation, or another, or no occupa- 
tion at all ; and it is the concern of no one else, if he 
leave inviolate the rights of every one else ; that is, if he 
leave every one else in the undisturbed enjoyment of 
those means of happiness bestowed upon him by the 
Creator. 

But it may be said, in this case, the individual may 
become chargeable to the community. To this I answer, 
not unless the community assume the charge. If every 
man is left to himself, but is obliged to respect the rights 
of others ; if he do not labor, a remedy is provided in the 
laws of the system, — he will very soon starve ; and, if he 
prefer starvation to labor, he has no one to blame but 
himself. While the law of reciprocity frees him from the 
control of society, it discharges society from any respon- 
sibility for the result of his actions upon himself. I know 
that society undertakes to support the indigent and help- 
less, and to relieve men in extreme necessity. This, 
however, is a conventional arrangement, into which men, 
who choose, have a right to enter ; and, having entered 
into it, they are bound by its provision. If they become 
responsible for the support of the individual's life, they 
have a right over his power of labor sufficient to cover 
that responsibility. And he who has become a member 
of such a society, has surrendered voluntarily his control 
over his body, to this amount. But as he has done it 
voluntarily, such a convention proceeds upon the conces- 
sion, that the original right vests in the individual. 
18* 



204 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 



It seems almost trifling to argue a point, which is, in 
its nature, so evident upon inspection. If, however, any 
additional proof be required, the following considerations 
will readily suggest themselves. It is asserted that every 
individual has an equal and ultimate right with every 
other individual, to the use of his body, his mind, and all 
the other means of happiness with which God has en- 
dowed him. But suppose it otherwise. Suppose that 
one individual has a right to the body, or mind, or means 
of happiness, of another. That is, suppose that A has a 
right to use the body of B according to his, that is, A's, 
will. Now, if this be true, it is true universally ; hence, 
A has the control over the body of B, and B has control 
over the body of C, C of that of D, &c, and Z again 
over the body of A ; that is, every separate will has the 
right of control over some other body besides its own, and 
has no right of control over its own body or intellect. 
Whether such is the constitution of human nature, or, if 
it be not, whether it would be an improvement upon the 
present constitution, may be easily decided. 

And, if it be said, that, to control one man's body by 
another man's will is impossible, for that every man acts 
as he will, since he cannot do any thing unless he will 
do it, it may be answered, that the term will is used here 
in a different sense from that intended in the preceding 
paragraph. Every one must see, that a man, who, out 
of the various ways of employing his body, set before him 
by his Creator, chooses that which he prefers, is in a very 
different condition from him who is debarred from all 
choice, excepting that he may do what his fellow-man 
appoints, or else suffer what his fellow-man chooses to 
inflict. Now, the true condition of a human being is 
that in which his will is influenced by no other circum- 
stances than those which arise from the constitution under 
which his Creator has placed him. And he who places 
his fellow-man under any other conditions of existence, is 
guilty of the most odious tyranny, and seems to me to 
arrogate to himself the authority of the Most High God. 

2. The same remarks apply to the use of the intellect. 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 



205 



If the preceding observations are just, it will follow, 
that every man, within the limit before suggested, has a 
right to use his intellect as he will. He may investigate 
whatever subjects he will, and in what manner soever he 
will, and may come to such conclusions as his investiga- 
tions may teach, provided he interfere with the happiness 
of no other human being. The denial of this right, would 
lead to the same absurdities as in the former case. 

If it be said that the individual may, by so doing, in- 
volve himself in error, and thus diminish his own happi- 
ness, the answer is at hand, namely, for this the consti- 
tution of things provides its appropriate and adequate 
punishment. He who imbibes error, suffers, in his own 
person, the consequences of error, which are misfortune 
and loss of respect. And, besides, as for his happiness, 
society is not in this case responsible : there can be no 
reason, derived from the consideration of his happiness, 
why society should interfere with the free use of this in- 
strument of happiness, which the Creator has intrusted 
solely to the individual himself. 

But, it may be asked, has not society a right to oblige 
men to acquire a certain amount of intellectual cultivation ? 
I answer, men have a right to form a society upon such 
conditions as they please ; and, of course, so to form it, 
that it shall be necessary, in order to enjoy its privileges, 
for the individual to possess a certain amount of knowl- 
edge. Having formed such a society, every one is bound 
by its provisions, so long as he remains a member of it ; 
and the enforcing its provisions upon the individual, is no 
more than obliging him to do what he, for a sufficient 
consideration, voluntarily contracted to do. And society 
may rightfully enforce this provision in either of two ways : 
it may withhold from every man who neglects to acquire 
this knowledge, the benefits of citizenship ; or it may 
grant these benefits to every one, and oblige every one to 
possess the assigned amount of knowledge. In this case, 
there is no violation of reciprocity ; for the same require- 
ments are made upon all, and every one receives his full 
equivalent, in the results of the same law upon others. 



206 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 



More than this, the individual could not justly require. 
He could not justly demand to be admitted to rights which 
presuppose certain intellectual attainments, and which can 
only be, with safety to others, enjoyed by those who have 
made these attainments, unless he be willing to conform 
to the condition necessary to the enjoyment. 

3. I have thus far considered man only in his relations 
to the present life. So far as I have gone, I have en- 
deavored to show that, provided the individual interfere 
not with the rights of others, he has a right to use his own 
body and mind as he thinks will best promote his own 
happiness ; that is, as he will. But, if he have this right, 
within these limits, to pursue his present happiness, how 
much more incontrovertible must be his right to use his 
body and mind in such manner as will best promote his 
eternal happiness ! And, besides, if, for the sake of his 
own happiness, he has a right to the unmolested enjoy- 
ment of whatever God has given him, how much more is 
he entitled to the same unmolested enjoyment, for the 
sake of obeying God, and fulfilling the highest obligation 
of which he is susceptible ! 

We say, then, that every man, provided he does not 
interfere with the rights of his neighbor, has a right, so far 
as his neighbor is concerned, to worship God, or not to 
worship him ; to worship him in any manner that he will ; 
and that, for the abuse of this liberty, he is accountable 
only to God. 

Tf it be said, that, by so doing, a man may ruin his 
own soul, the answer is obvious ; for this ruin, the indi- 
vidual himself, and not society, is responsible. And, 
moreover, as religion consists in the temper of heart, 
which force cannot affect, — and not in external observ- 
ance, which is all that force can affect, — no application 
of force can change our relations to God, or prevent the 
ruin in question. All application of force must then be 
gratuitous mischief. 

To sum up what has been said, — all men are created 
with an equal right to employ their faculties, of body or 
of mind, in such manner as will promote their own hap- 



NATURE OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. 



207 



piness, either here or hereafter ; or, which is the same 
thing, every man has a right to use his own powers, of 
body or mind, in such manner as he will ; provided he 
do not use them in such manner as to interfere with the 
rights of his neighbor. 

The exceptions to this law are easily defined. 

1 . The first exception is in the case of infancy. 

By the law of nature, a parent is under obligation to 
support his child, and is responsible for his actions. He 
has, therefore, a right to control the actions of the child, 
so long as this responsibility exists. He is under obliga- 
tions to render that child a suitable member of the com- 
munity ; and this obligation he could not discharge, unless 
the physical and intellectual liberty of the child were 
placed under his power. 

2. As the parent has supported the child during infan- 
cy, he has, probably, by the law of nature, a right to his 
services during youth, or for so long a period as may be 
sufficient to insure an adequate remuneration. When, 
however, this remuneration is received, the right of the 
parent over the child ceases for ever. 

3. This right he may, if he sees fit, transfer to another, 
as in the case of apprenticeship. But he can transfer the 
right for no longer time than he holds it. He can, there- 
fore, negotiate it away for no period beyond the child's 
minority. 

4. A man may transfer his right over his own labor for 
a limited time, and for a satisfactory equivalent. But 
this transfer proceeds upon the principle that the original 
right vests in himself, and it is, therefore, no violation of 
it. He has, however, no right to transfer the services of 
any other person except his child ; nor of his child, except 
under the limitations above specified. 

In strict accordance with these remarks, is the memora- 
ble sentence in the commencement of the Declaration of 
Independence, " We hold these truths to be self-evident : 
that all men are created equal ; that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights ; that 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- 



208 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



ness." That the equality here spoken of is not of the 
means of happiness, but in the right to use them as any 
one wills, is too evident to need illustration. 



SECTION II. 

MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL LIBERTY MAY BE "VIOLATED. 

Personal liberty may be violated in two ways: 1. By 
the individual ; 2. By society. 

Part First. Of the violation of personal liberty by 
the individual. The most common violation of personal 
liberty, under this head, is in the case of Domestic 
Slavery. 

Domestic slavery proceeds upon the principle that the 
master has a right to control the actions, physical and 
intellectual, of the slave, for his own, that is, the master's, 
individual benefit ; and, of course, that the happiness of 
the master, when it comes in competition with the hap- 
piness of the slave, extinguishes in the latter the right to 
pursue it. It supposes, at best, that the relation between 
master and slave, is not that which exists between man 
and man, but is a modification, at least, of that which 
exists between man and the brutes. 

Now, this manifestly supposes that the two classes of 
beings are created with dissimilar rights : that the master 
possesses rights which have never been conceded by the 
slave ; and that the slave has no rights at all over the 
means of happiness which God has given him, whenever 
these means of happiness can be rendered available to 
the service of the master. It supposes that the Creator 
intended one human being to govern the physical, intel- 
lectual and moral actions of as many other human beings 
as by purchase he can bring within his physical power ; 
and that one human being may thus acquire a right to 
sacrifice the happiness of any number of other human 
beings, for the purpose of promoting his own. 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



209 



Slavery thus violates the personal liberty of man as a 
physical, intellectual, and moral being. 

1. It purports to give to the master a right to control 
the physical labor of the slave, not for the sake of the 
happiness of the slave, but for the sake of the happiness 
of the master. It subjects the amount of labor, and the 
kind of labor, and the remuneration for labor, entirely 
to the will of the one party, to the entire exclusion of the 
will of the other party. 

2. But if this right in the master over the slave be con- 
ceded, there are of course conceded all other rights neces- 
sary to insure its possession. Hence, inasmuch as the 
slave can be held in this condition only while he remains 
in the lowest state of mental imbecility, it supposes the 
master to have the right to control his intellectual devel- 
opment, just as far as may be necessary to secure entire 
subjection. Thus, it supposes the slave to have no right 
to use his intellect for the production of his own happiness ; 
but, only to use it in such manner as may conduce to his 
master's profit. 

3. And, moreover, inasmuch as the acquisition of the 
knowledge of his duty to God could not be freely made 
without the acquisition of other knowledge, which might, 
if universally diffused, endanger the control of the master, 
slavery supposes the master to have the right to determine 
how much knowledge of his duty a slave shall obtain, the 
manner in which he shall obtain it, and the manner in 
which he shall discharge that duty after he shall have 
obtained a knowledge of it. It thus subjects the duty of 
man to God entirely to the will of man ; and this for the 
sake of pecuniary profit. It renders the eternal happiness 
of the one party subservient to the temporal happiness of 
the other. And this principle is commonly carried into 
effect in slave-holding countries. 

If argument were necessary to show that such a system 
as this must be at variance with the ordinance of God, it 
might be easily drawn from the effects which it produces 
both upon morals and upon national wealth. 

1. Its effects must be disastrous upon the morals of both 



210 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



parties. By presenting objects on whom passion may be 
satiated without resistance and without redress, it culti- 
vates in the master, pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness and 
licentiousness. By accustoming the slave to subject his 
moral principles to the will of another, it tends to abolish 
in him all moral distinction ; and thus fosters in him lying, 
deceit, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield 
himself up to minister to the appetites of his master. That 
in all slave-holding countries there are exceptions to this 
remark, and that there are principles in human nature 
which, in many cases, limit the effects of these tendencies, 
may be gladly admitted. Yet, that such is the tendency 
of slavery, as slavery, we think no reflecting person can 
for a moment hesitate to allow. 

2. The effects of slavery on national wealth, may be 
easily seen from the following considerations : 

1. Instead of imposing upon all the necessity of labor, 
it restricts the number of laborers, that is of producers, 
within the smallest possible limit, by rendering labor dis- 
graceful. 

2. It takes from the laborers the natural stimulus to 
labor, namely, the desire in the individual of improving 
his condition ; and substitutes, in the place of it, that 
motive which is the least operative and the least constant, 
namely, the fear of punishment without the consciousness 
of moral delinquency. 

3. It removes, as far as possible, from both parties, the 
disposition and the motives to frugality. Neither the 
master learns frugality from the necessity of labor, nor 
the slave from the benefits which it confers. And here, 
while the one party wastes from ignorance of the laws of 
acquisition, and the other because he can have no motive 
to economy, capital must accumulate but slowly, if indeed 
it accumulate at all. 

And that such are the tendencies of slavery, is manifest 
from observation. No country, not of great fertility, can 
long sustain a large slave population. Soils of more than 
ordinary fertility cannot sustain it long, after the first rich- 
ness of the soil has been exhausted. Hence, slavery in 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



211 



this country is acknowledged to have impoverished many 
of our most valuable districts ; and, hence, it is continu- 
ally migrating from the older settlements, to those new 
and untilled regions, where the accumulated manure of 
centuries of vegetation has formed a soil, whose produc- 
tiveness may, for a while, sustain a system at variance 
with the laws of nature. Many of our free and of our 
slave-holding States were peopled at about the same time. 
The slave-holding States had every advantage, both in 
soil and climate, over their neighbors. And yet the ac- 
cumulation of capital has been greatly in favor of the lat- 
ter. If any one doubts whether this difference be owing 
to the use of slave labor, let him ask himself what would 
have been the condition of the slave-holding States, at 
this moment, if they had been inhabited, from the begin- 
ning, by an industrious yeomanry ; each one holding his 
own land, and each one tilling it with the labor of his 
own hands. 

But let us inquire what is the doctrine of revelation on 
this subject. 

I. The moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically 
opposed to slavery. They are, Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself, and all things whatsoever ye would 
that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them. 

The application of these precepts is universal. Our 
neighbor is every one whom vje may benefit. The obli- 
gation respects all things whatsoever. The precept, 
then, manifestly, extends to men, as men, or men in every 
condition ; and if to all things whatsoever, certainly to a 
thing so important as the right to personal liberty. 

Again. By this precept, it is made our duty to cherish 
as tender and delicate a respect for the right which the 
meanest individual possesses over the means of happiness 
bestowed upon him by God, as we cherish for our own 
right over our own means of happiness, or as we desire 
any other individual to cherish for it. Now, were this 
precept obeyed, it is manifest that slavery could not in 
fact exist for a single instant. The principle of the pre- 
cept is absolutely subversive of the principle of slavery. 
19 



212 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



That of the one is the entire equality of right ; that of the 
other, the entire absorption of the rights of one in the 
rights of the other. 

If any one doubts respecting the bearing of the Scrip- 
ture precept upon this case, a few plain questions may 
throw additional light upon the subject. For instance, — 

1. Do the precepts and the spirit of the gospel allow 
me to derive my support from a system, which extorts 

i labor from my fellow-men, without allowing them any 
voice in the equivalent which they shall receive ; and 
which can only be sustained by keeping them in a state 
of mental degradation, and by shutting them out, in a 
great degree, from the means of salvation ? 

2. Would the master be willing that another person 
should subject him to slavery, for the same reasons, and 
on the same grounds, that he holds his slave in bondage ? 

3. Would the gospel allow us, if it were in our power, 
to reduce our fellow-citizens of our own color to slavery ? 
But the gospel makes no distinction between men on the 
ground of color or race. God has made of one blood all 
the nations that dwell on the earth. 1 think that these 
questions will easily ascertain the gospel principles on 
this subject. 

But to this it is objected, that the gospel never forbids 
slavery ; and, still more, that, by prescribing the duties of 
masters and servants, it tacitly allows it. This objection 
is of sufficient importance to deserve attentive consid- 
eration. 

The following will, I think, be considered by both 
parties a fair statement of the teaching of the New Tes- 
tament on this subject. The moral principles of the 
gospel are directly subversive of the principles of slavery ; 
but, on the other hand, the gospel neither commands 
masters to manumit their slaves, nor authorizes slaves to 
free themselves from their masters ; and, also, it goes fur- 
ther, and prescribes the duties suited to both parties in 
their present condition. 

1. Now, if this be admitted, it will, so far as 1 see, be 
sufficient for the argument. For if the gospel be dia- 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



213 



metrically opposed to the principle of slavery, it must be 
opposed to the practice of slavery; and, therefore, were 
the principles of the gospel fully adopted, slavery could 
not exist. 

2. This very course which the gospel takes on this 
subject, seems to have been the only one that could have 
been taken, in order to effect the universal abolition of 
slavery. The gospel was designed, not for one race, or 
for one time, but for all races, and for all times. It looked 
not at the abolition of this form of evil for that age alone, 
but for its universal abolition. Hence, the important ob- 
ject of its Author was, to gain it a lodgment in every part 
of the known world ; so that, by its universal diffusion 
among all classes of society, it might quietly and peace- 
fully modify and subdue the evil passions of men ; and 
thus, without violence, work a revolution in the whole 
mass of mankind. In this manner alone could its object, 
a universal moral revolution, have been accomplished. 
For, if it had forbidden the evil, instead of subverting the 
principle; if it had proclaimed the unlawfulness of slave- 
ry, and taught slaves to resist the oppression of their 
masters ; it would instantly have arrayed the two parties 
in deadly hostility, throughout the civilized world : its 
announcement would have been the signal of servile war ; 
and the very name of the Christian religion would have 
been forgotten amidst the agitations of universal blood- 
shed. The fact, under these circumstances, that the 
gospel does not forbid slavery, affords no reason to sup- 
pose that it does not mean to prohibit it ; much less does 
it afford ground for belief, that Jesus Christ intended to 
authorize it. 

3. It is important to remember that two grounds of 
moral obligation are distinctly recognized in the gospel. 
The first is our duty to man, as man ; that is, on the 
ground of the relation which men sustain to each other ; 
the second is our duty to man, as a creature of God ; that 
is, on the ground of the relation which we all sustain to 
God. On this latter ground, many things become our 
duty which would not be so on the former. It is on this 



214 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



ground, that we are commanded to return good for evil, 
to pray for them that despitefully use us, and when we 
are smitten on one cheek, to turn also the other. To act 
thus is our duty, not because our fellow-man has a right 
to claim this course of conduct of us, nor because he has 
a right to inflict injury upon us, but because such conduct 
in us will be well pleasing to God. And when God 
prescribes the course of conduct which will be well pleas- 
ing to him, he by no means acknowledges the right of 
abuse in the injurious person, but expressly declares, 
Vengeance is mine, and I will repay it, saith the Lord. 
Now, it is to be observed, that it is precisely upon this 
latter ground, that the slave is commanded to obey his 
master. It is never urged, like the duty of obedience to 
parents, because it is right ; but because the cultivation 
of meekness and forbearance under injury, will be well 
pleasing unto God. Thus, servants are commanded to 
be obedient to their own masters, "in singleness of heart, 
as unto Christ ;" " doing the will of God from the heart, 
with good will doing service as to the Lord, and not to 
men." Eph. vi, 5 — 7. " Servants are commanded to 
count their masters worthy of all honor, that the name of 
God and his doctrine be not blasphemed." 1 Tim. vi, 
1. " Exhort servants to be obedient to their own mas- 
ters," &c, " that they may adorn the doctrine of God 
our Savior in all things." Titus iii, 9. The manner 
in which the duty of servants or slaves is inculcated, 
therefore, affords no ground for the assertion, that the 
gospel authorizes one man to hold another in bondage, 
any more than the command to honor the king, when 
that king was Nero, authorized the tyranny of the em- 
peror ; or than the command to turn the other cheek, 
when one is smitten, justifies the infliction of violence by 
an injurious man. 

in a word, if the gospel rule of conduct is directly at 
variance with the existence of slavery ; if the manner in 
which it treats it, is the only manner in which it could 
attempt its utter and universal extermination ; and if it 
inculcates the duty of slaves on principles which have no 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



215 



connection with the question of the right of masters over 
them ; I think it must be conceded that the precepts of 
the gospel in no manner countenance, but are entirely 
opposed to, the institution of domestic slavery. 

Before closing this part of the subject, it may be proper 
to consider the question, what is the duty of masters and 
slaves, under a condition of society in which slavery now 
exists ? 

I. As to masters. 

If the system be w r rong, as we have endeavored to 
show, if it be at variance with our duty both to God and 
to man, it must be abandoned. If it be asked when, I 1/ 
ask again, when shall a man begin to cease doing wrong? 
Is not the answer, immediately 1 If a man is injuring us, 
do we ever doubt as to the time when he ought to cease ? 
There is then no doubt in respect to the time when we 
ought to cease inflicting injury upon others. 

But it may be said, immediate abolition would be the 
greatest possible injury to the slaves themselves. They 
are not competent to self-government. 

This is a question of fact, which it is not the province 
of moral philosophy to decide. It very likely may be so. 
So far as I know, the facts are not sufficiently known to 
warrant a full opinion on the subject. We will, there- 
fore, suppose it to be the case, and ask, what is the duty 
of masters under these circumstances ? 

1. The situation of the slaves, in which this obstacle 
to their emancipation consists, is not by their own act, * 
but by the act of their masters ; and, therefore, the mas- 
ters are bound to remove it. The slaves were brought 
here without their own consent, they have been continued 
in their present state of degradation without their own 
consent, and they are not responsible for the consequences. 
If a man have done injustice to his neighbor, and have 
also placed impediments in the way of remedying that 
injustice, he is as much under obligation to remove the 
impediments in the way of justice, as he is to do justice. 
Were it otherwise, a man might, by the accumulation o 
19* 



216 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



injury, at last render the most atrocious injury innocent 
and right. 

2. But it may be said, this cannot be done, unless the 
slave is held in bondage until the object be accomplished. 
This is also a question of fact, on which I will not pretend 
to decide. But suppose it to be so, the question returns, 
what then is the duty of the master ? I answer, supposing 
such to be the fact, it may be the duty of the master to 
hold the slave ; not, however, on the ground of right 

v over him, but of obligation to him, and of obligation to 
him, for the purpose of accomplishing a particular and 
specified good. And, of course, he who holds him for 
any other purpose, holds him wrongfully, and is guilty of 
the sin of slavery. In the mean while, he is innocent in 
just so far as he, in the fear of God, holds the slave, not 

J for the good of the master, but for the good of the slave, 
and with the entire and honest intention of accomplishing 
the object as soon as he can, and of liberating the slave 
as soon as the object is accomplished. He thus admits 
the slave to equality of right. He does unto another as 
he would that another should do unto him ; and, thus 
acting, though he may in form hold a fellow-creature in 
bondage, he is in fact innocent of the crime of violation 
of liberty. This opinion, however, proceeds upon the 
supposition that the facts are as above stated. As to the 
question of fact, I do not feel competent to a decision. 

II. The duty of slaves is also explicitly made known 
in the Bible. They are bound to obedience, fidelity, sub- 
mission, and respect to their masters, not only to the good 
and kind, but also to the unkind and froward ; not, however, 
on the ground of duty to man, but on the ground of duty 
to God. This obligation extends to every thing but mat- 
ters of conscience. When a master commands a slave to 
do wrong, the slave ought not to obey. The Bible does 
not, as I suppose, authorize resistance to injury ; but it 
commands us to refuse obedience in such a case, and suf- 
fer the consequences, looking to God alone, to whom 
vengeance belongeth. Acting upon these principles, the 
slave may attain to the highest grade of virtue, and may 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



217 



exhibit a sublimity and purity of moral character, which, 
in the condition of the master, is absolutely unattainable. 

Thus we see that the Christian religion not only forbids 
slavery, but that it also provides the only method in which, 
after it has once been established, it may be abolished, 
and that with entire safety and benefit to both parties. 
By instilling the right moral dispositions into the bosom of 
the master and of the slave, it teaches the one the duty of 
reciprocity, and the other the duty of submission ; and 
thus, without tumult, without disorder, without revenge, 
but, by the real moral improvement of both parties, re- 
stores both to the relation towards each other intended by 
their Creator. 

Hence, if any one will reflect on these facts, and re- 
member the moral law of the Creator, and the terrible 
sanctions by which his laws are sustained, and also the 
provision which in the gospel of reconciliation, He has 
.made for removing this evil after it has once been estab- 
lished ; he must, 1 think, be convinced of the imperative 
obligation which rests upon him to remove it without the 
delay of a moment. The Judge of the whole earth will 
do justice. He hears the cry of the oppressed, and he 
will, in the end, terribly vindicate right. And, on the 
other hand, let those who suffer wrongfully, bear their 
sufferings with patience, committing their souls unto him 
as unto a faithful Creator. 

Secondly. The right of personal liberty may be vio- 
lated by society. 

As the right to use the means of happiness which God 
has given him in such manner as he will, provided he ^ 
do not violate the corresponding rights of others, is con- 
ferred upon the individual by his Creator, it is manifest 
that no being but the Creator can rightly restrict it. The 
individual is just as truly, in this sense, independent of 
society, as he is of individuals. Society is composed of V 
individuals, and can have no other rights than the in- 
dividuals of which it is composed, only in just so far as 
the individual voluntarily, and for an equivalent, has con- 
ceded to it, in given and limited respects, some of the 



218 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



rights of which he was originally possessed. Whenever 
society interferes with these original rights, unless in the 
cases in which they have been voluntarily ceded, then the 
right of personal liberty is violated. Thus, the Declaration 
of Independence, above quoted, after having asserted the 
universality of the equality of men, by virtue of their 
creation, and that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness, proceeds to state, " that, to 
secure these rights, governments were instituted among 
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed;" (that is, by the concession of the individual 
to society ;) " that, when any form of government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to 
alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, 
laying its foundation in such principles, and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to 
effect their safety and happiness." 

Society may violate the personal rights of the indi- 
vidual. 

1. By depriving him unjustly of his physical liberty. 
This is done, 6rst, whenever any individual is imprisoned, 
except for crime. 

2. Whenever, although he may have been guilty of 
crime, he is imprisoned without a fair and impartial trial ; 
for, as every man is presumed to be innocent until he shall 
have been proved to be guilty, to imprison him without 
such proof is to imprison him while he is innocent. This 
remark, however, does not apply to the detention of pris- 
oners in order for trial. The detention in this case is not 
for the purposes of punishment, but simply to prevent es- 
cape, and as a necessary means for the execution of justice. 
It is also no injustice ; for it is a power over their persons 
which the individuals have, for mutual good, conceded to 
society. 

3. Inasmuch as every individual has the right to go 
where he pleases, under the limitations above specified, 
this right is violated, not merely by confining him to a 
particular place, but also by forbidding his going to any 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



219 



particular place within the limits of the society to which 
he belongs, or by forbidding him to leave it when and 
how he pleases. As his connection with the society to 
which he belongs is a voluntary act, his simple will is an 
ultimate reason why he should leave it ; and the free ex- 
ercise of this will cannot, without injustice, be restrained. 

The great clause in the Magna Charta on this general 
subject, is in these memorable words : " Let no freeman 
be imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or in any man- 
ner injured or proceeded against by us, otherwise than by 
the legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." 
And the full enjoyment of this right is guaranteed to every 
individual in this country and in Great Britain, by the 
celebrated act of Habeas Corpus : by which, upon a 
proper presentation of the case before a judge, the judge 
is under obligation, if there be cause, to command the 
person who has the custody of another, to bring him im- 
mediately before him ; and is also obliged to set the pris- 
oner at large, unless it appear to him that he is deprived 
of his liberty for a satisfactory reason. 

2. Society may violate the rights of the individual by 
restraining his intellectual liberty. 

I have before stated that a man has the right to the use 
of his intellect in such manner as he pleases, provided he 
interfere not with the rights of others. This includes, first, 
the right to pursue what studies he pleases ; and, secondly, 
to publish them when and where he pleases, subject to the 
above limitation. 

1. This right is violated, first, when society, or gov- 
ernment, which is its agent, prohibits any course of study 
or investigation to which the inclination of the individual 
may determine him. 

2. When government prohibits him from publishing 
these results, and from attempting, by the use of argument, 
to make as many converts to his opinions as he can, in 
both cases within the limits specified. If it be said, the 
man may thus be led into error, the answer is, for this error 
the individual himself, and not his neighbor, is responsi- 
ble ; and, therefore, the latter has no authority to interfere. 



220 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



These remarks apply to those cases only, in which the 
use of the individual's intellect is without injury to the 
rights of others. They, however, by the terms of the 
case, exclude those modes of intellectual employment, 
which do thus interfere. It is obvious, that a man has 
no more right to restrict, by the use of his intellecl, my 
just control over the means of happiness bestowed upon 
me, than by the use of his body, or the use of his property. 
What I have said, therefore, in no manner precludes the 
right of society to restrict the use of the individual's intel- 
lect, in those cases where this violation exists. 

But when this violation is supposed to exist, by what 
rule is society to be governed, so as, in the exercise of 
the right of restraint, to avoid infringement of the law of 
intellectual liberty ? I am aware that the decision of this 
question is attended with great difficulties. I shall, how- 
ever, endeavor to suggest such hints as seem to me to 
throw light upon it, in the hope that the attention of 
some one better able to elucidate it, may be thus more 
particularly attracted to the discussion. 

1. Society is bound to protect those rights of the indi- 
vidual which he has committed to its charge. Among 
these, for instance, is reputation. As the individual re- 
linquishes the right of protecting his own reputation, as 
well as his property, society undertakes to protect it for him. 

2. Society has the right to prevent its own destruction. 
As, without society, individual man would, almost univer- 
sally, perish ; so men, by the law of self-preservation, have 
a right to prohibit those modes of using a man's mind, as 
well as those of using his body, by which society would 
be annihilated. 

3. As society has the right to employ its pow T er to pre- 
vent its own dissolution, it also has the same right to protect 
itself from causeless injury. A man has no more right to 
carry on a trade by which his neighbor is annoyed, than 
one by which he is poisoned. So, if the employment of 
a man's intellect be not of such a character as to be posi- 
tively fatal, yet, if it be positively mischievous, and if such 
be its tendency, society has a right to interfere and pro- 
hibit it. 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



221 



4. It is, however, a general principle, that society is 
not to interfere, while the individual has in himself the 
means of repelling, or rendering nugatory, the injury. 
Whenever, therefore, although the publication of opinions 
be confessedly injurious, the injury is of such a nature, 
that every individual can protect himself from it, society 
leaves the individual to the use of that power which he 
still retains, and which is sufficient to remedy the evil. 

If I mistake not, these principles will enable us to dis- 
tinguish between those cases in which it is, and those in 
which it is not, the duty of society to interfere with the 
freedom of the human intellect. 

1. Whenever the individual possesses within himself 
the means of repelling the injury, society should not inter- 
fere. As, for instance, so far as an assertion is false, and 
false simply, as in philosophical or mathematical error, 
men have, in their own understandings and their instinct- 
ive perception of truth, a safeguard against injury. And, 
besides this, when discussion is free, error may be refuted 
by argument ; and in this contest, truth has always, from 
the constitution of things, the advantage. It needs not, 
therefore, physical force to assist it. The confutation of 
error is also decisive. It reduces it absolutely to nothing. 
Whereas the forcible prohibition of discussion leaves 
things precisely as they were, and gives to error the addi- 
tional advantage of the presumption, that it could not be 
answered by argument ; that is, that it is the truth. 

2. But, suppose the matter made public is also injuri- 
ous, and is either false, or, if true, is of such a nature as 
directly to tend to the destruction of individual or social 
happiness, and the individual has not in himself the power 
of repelling the injury. Here, the facts being proved, 
society is bound to interfere, and impose such penalty, 
and render such redress, as shall, if possible, remunerate 
the injured party ; or, at least, prevent the repetition of 
the offence. 

Under this head, several cases occur : 
1. If a man use his intellect for the purpose of destroy- 
ing his neighbor's reputation, it is the duty of society to 



222 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



interfere. There is here a manifest injury, inasmuch as 
reputation is a means of happiness, and as much the 
property of an individual, as his house or lands, or any 
other result of his industry. He has, besides, no method 
of redress within himself ; for he may be ruined by a 
general assertion, which is in its nature incapable of being 
disproved. As if A asserted that B had stolen ; this, if 
believed, would ruin B ; but he could not disprove it, 
unless he could summon all the men with whom, in his 
whole life, he had ever had any transactions. Besides, 
if he could do this, he could never convey the facts to all 
persons to whom A had conveyed the scandal. Were 
such actions allowed, every one might be deprived of his 
reputation, one of his most valuable means of happiness. 
It is the duty of society, therefore, in this case, to guard 
the rights of the individual, by granting him redress, and 
preventing the repetition of the injury. 

2. Inasmuch as men are actuated by various passions, 
which are only useful when indulged within certain re- 
straints, but which, when indulged without these restraints, 
are destructive of individual right, as well as of society 
itself; society has a right to prohibit the use of intellect 
for the purpose of exciting the passions of men beyond 
those limits. As he is guilty who robs another, so is he 
also guilty who incites another to robbery ; and still more, 
he who incites, not one man, but a multitude of men, to 
robbery. Hence, society has a right to prohibit obscene 
books, obscene pictures, and every thing of which the ob- 
ject and tendency is to promote lasciviousness. On the 
same ground, it has a right to prohibit incendiary and 
seditious publications, and every thing which would pro- 
voke the enmity or malice of men against each other. 

The reason of this is, first, injury of this kind cannot 
be repelled by argument, for it is not addressed to the 
reason ; and the very mention of the subject excites those 
imaginations, from which the injury to society arises. As 
the evil is susceptible of no other remedy than prohibition, 
and as the welfare of society requires that a remedy be 
found, prohibition is the right and the duty of society. 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



223 



Another reason, applicable to most publications of this 
sort, is found in the nature of the parental relation. The 
parent, being the guardian of his child's morals, has the 
right of directing what he shall and what he shall not 
read. Hence, all the parents of a community, that is, 
society at large, have a right to forbid such books as 
shall, in their opinion, injure the moral character of their 
children. 

3. Again. Society may be dissolved, not merely by 
the excitation of unlawful passion, but by the removal of 
moral restraint. Every one must see that, if moral dis- 
tinctions were abolished, society could not exist for a 
moment. Men might be gregarious, but they would 
cease to be social. If any one, therefore, is disposed to 
use his intellect for the purpose of destroying, in the minds 
of men, the distinction between virtue and vice, or any 
of those fundamental principles on which the existence of 
society depends, society has a right to interfere and pro- 
hibit him. 

This right of society is founded, first, upon the right 
of self-preservation ; and, secondly, upon the ground of 
common sense. Society is not bound to make, over and 
over again, an experiment which the whole history of 
man has proved always to end in licentiousness, anarchy, 
misery, and universal blood-shed. Nor can any man 
claim a right to use his mind in a way which must, if 
allowed, produce unmixed misery and violation of right, 
wherever its influence is exerted. 

Besides, in this, as in the other cases specified, society 
has no means of counteracting the injury by argument ; 
because such appeals are made, not to reason and the 
conscience, but to the rapacious passions of men ; and, 
also, because those persons who would listen to such sug- 
gestions, would rarely, if ever, be disposed to read, much 
less to examine and reflect upon, any argument that could 
be offered. 

But it may be objected, that a society constituted on 
these principles, might check the progress of free inquiry, 
20 



224 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL. 



and, under the pretext of injurious tendency, limit the 
liberty of fair discussion. 

To this it may be answered, — 

It is no objection to a rule, that it is capable of abuse ; 
for this objection will apply to all laws and to all arrange- 
ments that man has ever devised. In the present imper- 
fect condition of human nature, it is frequently sufficient 
that a rule prevents greater evil than it inflicts. 

It is granted that men may suppose a discussion injuri- 
ous when it is not so, and may thus limit, unnecessarily, 
the freedom of inquiry. But let us see in what manner 
this abuse is guarded against. 

The security, in this case, is the trial by jury. When 
twelve men, taken by lot from the whole community, sit 
in judgment, and specially when the accused has the right 
of excepting, for cause, to as many as he will, he is sure 
of having, at least, an impartial tribunal. These judges 
are themselves under the same law which they administer 
to others. As it is not to be supposed that they would 
wish to abridge their own personal liberty, it is not to be 
supposed that they would be willing to abridge it for the 
sake of interfering with that of their neighbor. The 
question is, therefore, placed in the hands of as impartial 
judges as the nature of the case allows. To such a tri- 
bunal, no reasonable man can, on principle, object. To 
their decision, every candid man would, when his duty to 
God did not forbid, readily submit. 

Now, as it must be granted that no man has a right to 
use his intellect to the injury of a community, the only 
question in any particular case, is, whether the use com- 
plained of is injurious, and injurious in such a sense as to 
require the interference of society. It surely does not 
need argument to show that the unanimous decision of 
twelve men is more likely to be correct than the decision 
of one man ; and specially that the decision of twelve 
men, who have no personal interest in the affair, is more 
likely to be correct, than that of one man who is liable to 
all the influences of personal vanity, love of distinction, 
and pecuniary emolument. There surely can be no 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



225 



question whether, in a matter on which the dearest inter- 
ests of others are concerned, a man is to be a judge in 
his own case, or whether as impartial a tribunal as the 
ingenuity of man has ever devised, shall judge for him. 
If it be said that twelve impartial men are liable to error, 
and by consequence to do injustice, it may be answered, 
how much more liable is one, and he a partial man, to 
err and to do injury! If, then, a system of trial of this 
sort, not only must prevent more injury than it inflicts, 
but is free from all liability to injury, except such as results 
from the acknowledged imperfections of our nature, the 
fault, if it exist, is not in the rule, but in the nature of 
man, and must be endured until the nature of man be 
altered. 

And I cannot close this discussion without remarking, 
that a most solemn and imperative duty seems to me to 
rest upon judges, legislators, jurors and prosecuting officers, 
in regard to this subject. We hear, at the present day, 
very much about the liberty of the press, the freedom of 
inquiry, and the freedom of the human intellect. All 
these are precious blessings — by far too precious to be 
lost. But it is to be remembered, that no liberty can 
exist without restraint ; and the remark is as true of intel- 
lectual as of physical liberty. As there could be no 
physical liberty, if every one, both bad and good, did 
what he would, so there would soon be no liberty, either 
physical or intellectual, if every man were allowed to 
publish what he would. The man who publishes what 
will inflame the licentious passions, or subvert the moral 
principles of others, is undermining the foundations of the 
social fabric ; and it is kindness neither to him nor to so- 
ciety, quietly to look on until both he and we are crushed 
beneath the ruins. The danger to liberty is preeminently 
greater, at the present day, from the licentiousness than 
from the restriction of the press. It therefore becomes all 
civil and judicial officers to act as the guardians of society ; 
and, unawed by popular clamor, and unseduced by popu- 
lar favor, resolutely to defend the people against their 
worst enemies. Whatever may be the form of a govern- 



223 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



merit, it cannot long continue free, after it has refused to 
acknowledge the distinction between the liberty and the 
licentiousness of the press. And, much as we may exe- 
crate a profligate writer, let us remember that the civil 
officer who, from pusillanimity, refuses to exercise the 
power placed in his hands to restrain abuse, deserves, at 
least, an equal share of our execration. 

Thirdly. The right of religious liberty may be vio- 
lated by society. 

We have before said, that every individual has the right 
to pursue his own happiness, by worshipping his Creator 
in any way that he pleases, provided he do not interfere 
with the rights of his neighbor. 

This includes the following things : He is at liberty to 
worship God in any form that he deems most acceptable 
to Him, to worship individually or socially, and to pro- 
mote that form of worship which he considers acceptable 
to God, by the promulgation of such sentiments as he 
believes to be true, provided he leave the rights of his 
neighbors unmolested ; and of this liberty he is not to be 
restricted, unless such molestation be made manifest to a 
jury of his peers. 

As a man is at liberty to worship God individually or 
in societies collected for that purpose, if his object can 
be secured, in his own opinion, by the enjoyment of any 
of the facilities for association granted to other men for 
innocent purposes, he is entitled to them just as other 
men are. The general principle applicable to the case, 
I suppose to be this : A man, in consequence of being 
religious, that is, of worshipping God, acquires no human 
right whatever ; for it is, so far as his fellow-men's rights 
are concerned, the same thing, whether he worship God 
or not. And, on the other hand, in consequence of being 
religious, he loses no right, and for the same reason. And, 
therefore, as men are entitled to all innocent facilities 
which they need for prosecuting an innocent object, a 
religious man has the same right to these facilities for 
promoting his objects ; and it is the business of no one to 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



227 



inquire whether these be religious, scientific, mechanical, 
or any other, so long as they be merely innocent. 
Now this right is violated by society, — 

1. By forbidding the exercise of all religion ; as in the 
case of the French Revolution. 

2. By forbidding or enforcing the exercise of any form 
of religion. In so far as an act is religious, society has 
no right of control over it. If it interfere with the rights 
of others, this puts it within the control of society, and 
this alone, and solely for this reason. The power of so- 
ciety is, therefore, in this case, exercised simply on the 
ground of injury perpetrated and proved, and not on 
account of the truth or falseness, the goodness or badness, 
of the religion in the sight of the Creator. 

3. By inflicting disabilities upon men, or depriving 
them of any of their rights as men, because they are or 
are not religious. This violation occurs in all cases in 
which society interferes to deny to religious men the same 
privileges for promoting their happiness by way of reli- 
gion, as they enjoy for promoting their happiness in any 
other innocent way. Such is the case when religious 
societies are denied the right of incorporation, with all its 
attendant privileges, for the purposes of religious worship, 
and the promotion of their religious opinions. Unless it 
can be shown that the enjoyment of such privileges inter- 
feres with the rights of others, the denial of them is a vio- 
lation of religious liberty. Depriving clergymen of the 
elective franchise, is a violation of a similar character. 

4. By placing the professors of any peculiar form of 
religion under any disabilities ; as, for instance, rendering 
them ineligible to office, or in any manner making a dis- 
tinction between them and any other professors of religion, 
or any other men. As society has no right to inflict dis- 
abilities upon men, on the ground of their worshipping 
God in general, by consequence, it has no right to inflict 
disabilities on the ground of worshipping God in any 
manner in particular. If the whole subject is without 
the control of society, a part of it is also without its con- 
trol. Different modes of worship may be more or less 

20* 



228 



MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL 



acceptable to God ; but this gives to no man a right to 
interfere with those means of happiness, which God has 
conferred upon any other man. 

The question may arise here, whether society has a 
right to provide by law for the support of religious in- 
struction. I answer, if the existence of religious instruc- 
tion be necessary to the existence of society, and if there 
be no other mode of providing for its support, but by 
legislative enactment, then, I do not see any more viola- 
tion of principle in such enactment, than in that for the 
support of common schools ; provided that no one were 
obliged to attend unless he chose, and that every one 
were allowed to pay for that form of worship which he 
chose. There are other objections, however, to such a 
course, aside from that arising from supposed violation of 
civil liberty. 

1. It cannot be shown that religious teachers cannot 
be supported without legislative aid. The facts teach a 
different result. 

2. The religion of Christ has always exerted its great- 
est power when, entirely unsupported, it has been left to 
exert its own peculiar effect upon the consciences of men. 

3. The support of religion by law is at variance with 
the genius of the gospel. The gospel supposes every 
man to be purely voluntary in his service of God, in his 
choice of the mode of worship, of his religious teachers, 
and of the compensation which he will make to them for 
their services. Now, all this is reversed in the supposi- 
tion of a ministry supported by civil power. We there- 
fore conclude that, although such support might be pro- 
vided without interference with civil liberty, it could not 
be done without violation of the spirit of the gospel. 
That is, though the state might be desirous of affording 
aid to the church, the church is bound, on principle, reso- 
lutely and steadfastly to protest against in any manner 
receiving it. 

4. And I think that the facts will show that this view 
of the subject is correct. The clergy, as a profession, are 
better remunerated by voluntary support than by legal 



LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED. 



229 



enactment. When the people arrange the matter of 
compensation with their clergyman themselves, there are 
no rich and overgrown benefices, but there are also but 
few miserably poor curacies. The minister, if he deserve 
it, generally lives as well as his people. If it be said that 
high talent should be rewarded by elevated rank in this 
profession, as in any other, I answer, that such seems to 
me not to be the genius of the gospel. The gospel 
presents no inducements of worldly rank or of official 
dignity, and it scorns to hold out such motives to the re- 
ligious teacher. I answer again, official rank and luxu- 
rious splendor, instead of adding to, take from, the real 
influence of a teacher of religion. They tend to destroy 
that moral hardihood which is necessary to the success of 
him, whose object it is to render men better ; and, while 
they surround him with all the insignia of power, enervate 
that very spirit on which moral power essentially depends. 
And, besides, a religion supported by the government, 
must soon become the tool of the government ; or, at 
least, must be involved and implicated in every change 
which the government may undergo. How utterly at 
variance this must be with the principles of Him who 
declared, " My kingdom is not of this word," surely need 
not be illustrated. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



JUSTICE IN RESPECT TO PROPERTY. 
SECTION I. 

THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 

I. Definition of the right of property. 

The abstract right of property is the right to use some- 
thing in such manner as I choose. 

But, inasmuch as this right of use is common to all men, 
and as one may choose to use his property in such a way 
as to deprive his neighbor of this or of some other right, 
the right to use as I choose is limited by the restriction, that 
I do not interfere with the rights of my neighbor. The 
right of property, therefore, when thus restricted, is the 
right to use something as I choose, provided I do not so 
use it as to interfere with the rights of my neighbor. 

Thus, we see that, from the very nature of the case, the 
right of property is exclusive ; that is to say, if I have a 
right to any thing, this right excludes every one else from 
any right over that thing; and it imposes upon every one 
else the obligation to leave me unmolested in the use of it, 
within those limits to which my right extends. 

II On what the right of property is founded. 

The right of property is founded on the will of God, as 
made known to us by natural conscience, by general con- 
sequences, and by revelation. 

Ourselves, and every thing which we behold, is essen- 
tially the property of the Creator; and he has a right to 
confer the use of it upon whomsoever, and under what 
restrictions soever, he pleases. We may know in what 
relations he wills us to stand towards the things around 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 



231 



us, by the principles which he has implanted within us, 
and by the result produced in individuals and communi- 
ties by the different courses of conduct of which men are 
capable. 

Now God signifies to us his will on this subject, — 
First. By the decisions of natural conscience. This 
is known from several circumstances. 

1. All men, as soon as they begin to think, even in 
early youth and infancy, perceive this relation. They 
immediately appropriate certain things to themselves ; 
they feel injured, if their control over those things is vio- 
lated, and they are conscious of guilt, if they violate this 
right in respect to others. 

2. The relation of property is expressed by the pos- 
sessive pronouns. These are found in all languages. So 
universally is this idea diffused over the whole mass of 
human action and human feeling, that it would be scarcely 
possible for two human beings to converse for even a few 
minutes on any subject, or in any language, without the 
frequent use of the words which designate the relation of 
possession. 

3. Not only do men feel the importance of sustaining 
each other in the exercise of the right of property, but 
they manifestly feel that he who violates it has done 
wrong ; that is, has violated obligation, and hence de- 
serves punishment, on the ground, not simply of the con- 
sequences of the act, but of the guiltiness of the actor. 
Thus, if a man steal, other men are not satisfied when 
he has merely made restitution, although this may per- 
fectly make up the loss to the injured party. It is always 
considered that something more is due, either from God 
or from man, as a punishment for the crime. Hence, 
the Jewish law enjoined tenfold restitution, and modern 
law inflicts fines, imprisonment, and corporal punish- 
ment. 

Second. That God wills the possession of property, is 
evident from the general consequences which result from 
the existence of this relation. 

The existence and progress of society, nay, the very 



232 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 



existence of our race, depends upon the acknowledgment 
of this right. 

Were not every individual entitled to the results of his 
labor, and to the exclusive enjoyment of the benefits of 
these results, — 

1. No one would labor more than was sufficient for his 
own individual subsistence, because he would have no 
more right to the value which he had created than anoth- 
er person. 

2. Hence, there would be no accumulation ; of course, 
no capital, no tools, no provision for the future, no houses, 
and no agriculture. Each man, alone, would be obliged 
to contend with the elements, the wild beasts, and also 
with the rapacity of his fellow-man. The human race, 
under such circumstances, could not long exist. 

3. Under such circumstances, the race of man must 
speedily perish, or its existence be prolonged, even in fa- 
vorable climates, under every accumulation of wretched- 
ness. Progress would be out of the question ; and the 
only change which could take place, would be that arising 
from the pressure of heavier and heavier penury, as the 
spontaneous productions of the earth became rarer, from 
improvident consumption, without any corresponding labor 
for reproduction. 

4. It needs only be remarked, in addition, that just 
in proportion as the right of property is held inviolate, just 
in that proportion does civilization advance, and the com- 
forts and conveniences of life multiply. Hence it is, that, 
in free and well ordered governments, and specially during 
peace, property accumulates, all the orders of society en- 
joy the blessings of competence, arts flourish, science ad- 
vances, and men begin to form some conception of the 
happiness of which the system is capable. And, on the 
contrary, under despotism, when law spreads its protec- 
tion over neither house, land, estate, nor life, and specially 
during civil wars, industry ceases, capital stagnates, the 
arts decline, the people starve, population diminishes, and 
men rapidly tend to a state of barbarism. 

Third, The Holy Scriptures treat of the right of prop- 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 



233 



erty as a thing acknowledged, and direct their precepts 
against every act by which it is violated, and also against 
the tempers of mind from which such violation proceeds. 
The doctrine of revelation is so clearly set forth on this 
subject, that I need not delay for the sake of dwelling 
upon it. It will be sufficient to refer to the prohibitions 
in the decalogue against stealing and coveting, and to the 
various precepts in the New Testament respecting our 
duty in regard to our neighbor's possessions. 
I proceed, in the next place, to consider, — 
III. The modes in which the right of property may be \^ 
acquired. These may be divided into two classes : first, 
direct ; second, indirect. 
First. Direct. 

1. By the immediate gift of God. 

When God has given me a desire for any object, and 
has spread this object before me, and there is no rational 
creature to contest my claim, I may take that object, and 
use it as I will, subject only to the limitation of those ob- 
ligations to Him, and to my fellow-creatures, which have 
been before specified. On this principle is founded my 
right to enter upon wild and unappropriated lands, to hunt 
wild game, to pluck wild fruit, to take fish, or any thing 
of this sort. This right is sufficient to exclude the right 
of any subsequent claimant ; for, if it has been given to 
me, that act of gift is valid, until it can be shown by 
another that it has been annulled. A grant of this sort, 
however, applies only to an individual so long as he con- 
tinues the locum tenens, and no longer. He has no right 
to enter upon unappropriated land, and leave it, and then 
claim it afterward by virtue of his first possession. Were 
it otherwise, any individual might acquire a title to a 
whole continent, and exclude from it the whole of the 
rest of his species. 

2. By the labor of our hands. 

Whatever value I have created by my own labor, or 
by the innocent use of the other means of happiness which 
God has given me, is mine. This is evident from the 
principle already so frequently referred to ; namely, that 



234 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 



I have a right to use, for my own happiness, whatever 
God has given me, provided I use it not to the injury of 
another. Thus, if I catch a deer, or raise an ear of corn, 
upon land otherwise unappropriated, that deer, or that 
corn, is mine. No reason can possibly be conceived, 
why any other being should raise a claim to them, which 
could extinguish, or even interfere with mine. 

This, however, is not meant to assert, that a man has a 
right to any thing more than to the results of his labor. 
He has no right, of course, to the results of the labor of 
another. If, by my labor, I build a mill, and employ a 
man to take the charge of it, it does not follow that he 
has a right to all the profits of the mill. If 1, by my la- 
bor and frugality, earn money to purchase a farm, and 
hire a laborer to work upon it, it does not follow that he 
has a right to all the produce of the farm. The profit is, 
in this case, to be divided between us. He has a right to 
the share which fairly belongs to his labor, and I have a 
right to the share that belongs to me, as the proprietor 
and possessor of that which is the result of my antecedent 
labor. It would be as unjust for him to have the whole 
•profit, as for me to have the whole of it. It is fairly a 
case of partnership, in which each party receives his share 
of the result, upon conditions previously and voluntarily 
agreed upon. This is the general principle of wages. 

Secondly. The right of property may be acquired in- 
directly. 

1. By exchange. 

Inasmuch as I have an exclusive right to appropriate, 
innocently, the possessions which I have acquired, by the 
means stated above, and, inasmuch as every other man 
has the same right, we may, if we choose, voluntarily 
exchange our right to particular things with each other. 
If I cultivate wheat, and my neighbor cultivates corn, and 
we, both of us, have more of our respective production 
than we wish to use for ourselves, we may, on such terms 
as we can agree upon, exchange the one for the other. 
Property held in this manner is held rightfully. This ex- 
change is of two kinds : first, barter, where the exchange 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 



235 



on both sides, consists of commodities ; and, second, bar- 
gain and sale, where one of the parties gives, and the 
other receives, money for his property. 

2. By gift. 

As I may thus rightfully part with, and another party 
rightfully receive, my property, for an equivalent render- 
ed, so I may, if I choose, part with it without an equiva- 
lent ; that is, merely to gratify my feelings of benevolence, 
or affection, or gratitude. Here, I voluntarily confer upon 
another the right of ownership, and he may rightfully re- 
ceive and occupy it. 

3. By will. 

As I have the right to dispose of my property as I ; 
please, during my life-time, and may exchange it or give 
it as I will, at any time previous to my decease, so I may 
give it to another, on the condition that he shall not enter 
into possession until after my death. Property acquired 
in this manner is held rightfully. 

4. By inheritance. 

Inasmuch as persons frequently die without making a 
will, society, upon general principles, presumes upon the 
manner in which the deceased would have distributed his 
property, had he made a will. Thus, it is supposed that 
he would distribute his wealth among his widow and chil- 
dren ; or, in failure of these, among his blood relations ; 
and in proportions corresponding to their degree of con- 
sanguinity. Property may be rightfully acquired in this 
manner. 

5. By possession. 

In many cases, although a man have no moral right to 
property, yet he may have a right to exclude others from 
it ; and others are under obligation to leave him unmo- 
lested in the use of it. Thus, a man has by fraud obtain- 
ed possession of a farm, and the rightful owners have all 
died: now, although the present holder has no just title 
to the property, yet, if it were to be taken from him and 
held by another, the second would have no better title 
than the first ; and a third person would have the same 
right to dispossess the second, and in turn be himself dis- 
21 



236 



THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 



possessed, and so on for ever ; that is, there would be end- 
less controversy, without any nearer approximation to 
justice ; and hence, it is better that the case be left as it 
was in the first instance ; that is, in general, possession 
gives a right, so far as man is concerned, to unmolested 
enjoyment, unless some one else can establish a better 
title. 

6. And hence, in general, J believe it will hold, that 
while merely the laws of society do not give a man any 
moral right to property, yet, when these laws have once 
assigned it to him, this simple fact imposes a moral obli- 
gation upon all other men to leave him in the undisturbed 
possession of it. I have no more right to set fire to the 
house of a man, who has defrauded an orphan to obtain 
it, than I have to set fire to the house of any other man. 

To sum up what has been said, — property may be ori- 
ginally acquired either by the gift of God, or by our own 
labor : it may be subsequently acquired either by ex- 
change, or by gift during life, or by will ; but, in these 
cases of transfer of ownership, the free consent of the ori- 
ginal owner is necessary to render the transfer morally 
right ; and, lastly, where the individual has not acquired 
property justly, yet mere possession, though it alters not 
his moral right to possession, yet it is a sufficient bar to 
molestation, unless some other claimant can prefer a bet- 
ter title. These, I think, comprehend the most important 
modes by which the right of property can be acquired. 

That principles somewhat analogous to these are in ac- 
cordance with the laws of God is, I think, evident from 
observation of the history of man. The more rigidly 
these principles have been carried into active operation, 
the greater amount of happiness has been secured to the 
individual, and the more rapidly do nations advance in 
civilization, and the more successfully do they carry into 
effect every means of mental and moral cultivation. The 
first steps that were taken in the recovery of Europe from 
the misery of the dark ages, consisted in defining and es- 
tablishing the right of property upon the basis of equitable 



MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY, ETC. 237 

and universal law. Until something of this sort is done, 
no nation can emerge from a state of barbarism.* 

And hence we see the importance of an able, learned, 
upright, and independent judiciary, and the necessity to 
national prosperity of carrying the decisions of law into 
universal and impartial effect. It not unfrequently hap- 
pens that, for the purposes of party, the minds of the peo- 
ple are inflamed against the tribunals whose duty it is to 
administer justice ; or else, on the other hand, for the 
same purpose, a flagrant violation of justice by a popular 
favorite is looked upon as harmless. Let it be remember- 
ed, that society must be dissolved, unless the supremacy 
of the law be maintained. " The voice of the law " will 
cease to be " the harmony of the world," unless " all 
things," both high and low, " do her reverence." How 
often has even-handed justice commended the chalice to 
the lips of the demagogue ; and he has been the first to 
drink of that cup which he supposed himself to be ming- 
ling for others ! 



SECTION II. 

MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY MAY BE VIOLATED 
BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 

I have already remarked, that the right of property, so 
far as it extends, is exclusive both of the individual and 
of society. This is true in respect to both parties. Thus, 
whatever I own, I own exclusively both of society and 
of individuals ; and whatever either individuals or society 
own, they own exclusively of me. Hence, the right of 
property is equally violated in taking viciously either 
public or private property ; and it is equally violated by 
taking viciously, whether the aggressor be the public or an 
individual. And, moreover, it is exclusive to the full 
amount of what is owned. It is, therefore, as truly a viola- 



* Robertson's Preliminary Dissertation to the History of Charles V. 



238 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 



tion of the right of property, to take a little as to take 
much ; to purloin a book or a penknife as to steal money ; 
to steal fruit as to steal a horse ; to defraud the revenue as 
to rob my neighbor ; to overcharge the public as to over- 
charge my brother ; to cheat the post-office as to cheat 
my friend. 

It has already been observed, that a right to the prop- 
erty of another can be acquired only by his own voluntary 
choice. This follows, immediately from the definition of 
the right of property. But, in order to render this choice 
of right available, it must be influenced by no motives 
presented wrongfully by the receiver. Thus, if I demand 
a man's purse on the motive that I will shoot him if he 
deny me, he may surrender it rather than be shot ; but I 
have no right to present such an alternative, and the con- 
sent of the owner renders it no less a violation of the right 
of property. If I inflame a man's vanity in order to in- 
duce him to buy of me a coach which he does not want, 
the transaction is dishonest ; because I have gained his 
will by a motive which I had no right to use. So, if I 
represent an article in exchange to be different from what 
it is, I present a false motive, and gain his consent by a 
lie. And thus, in general, as I have said, a transfer of 
property is morally wrong, where the consent of the owner 
is obtained by means of a vicious act on the part of the 
receiver. 

The right of property may be violated, — 
1. By taking property without the knowledge of the 
owner, or theft. It is here to be remembered, that the 
consent of the owner is necessary to any transfer of prop- 
erty. We do not vary the nature of the act by persuad- 
ing ourselves that the owner will not care about it, or 
that he would have no objection, or that he will not know 
it, or that it will never injure him to lose it. All this 
may or may not be ; but none of it varies the moral 
character of the transaction. The simple question is, has 
the owner consented to the transfer? If he have not, so 
long as this circumstance, essential to a righteous transfer, 
is wanting, whatever other circumstances exist, it matters 
not, — the taking of another's property is theft. 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 239 



2. By taking the property of another, by consent vio- 
lently obtained. 

Such is the case in highway robbery. Here, we wick- 
edly obtain control over a man's life, and then offer him 
the alternative of death, or delivery of his property. In- 
asmuch as the consent is no more voluntary than if we 
tied his hands, and took the money out of his pocket, the 
violation of property is as great. And, besides this, we 
assume the power of life and death over an individual, 
over whom we have no just right whatever. In this case, 
in fact, we assume the unlimited control over "the life and 
possessions of another, and, on pain of death, oblige him 
to surrender his property to our will. As, in this case, 
there is a double and aggravated violation of right, it is, in 
all countries, considered deserving of condign punishment, 
and is generally rendered a capital offence. 

3. By consent fraudulently obtained, or cheating. 
This may be of two kinds : 

1. Where no equivalent is offered, as when a beggar 
obtains money on false pretences. 

2. Where the equivalent is different from what it pur- 
ports to be ; or where the consent is obtained by an im- 
moral act on the part of him who obtains it. As this in- 
cludes by far the greatest number of violations of the law 
of property, it will occupy the remainder of this section, 
and will require to be treated of somewhat at length. 

W T e shall divide it into two parts. 

1. Where the equivalent is material. 

2. Where it is immaterial. 

1. Where the equivalent is material, as in cases of bar- 
ter, and of bargain and sale ; and, when the transfer of 
the right of property is on both sides perpetual. This 
includes the law of buyer and seller. 

The principal laws of buyer and seller will be seen 
from a consideration of the relation in which they stand to 
each other. The seller, or merchant, is supposed to de- 
vote his time and capital to the business of supplying his 
neighbors with articles of use. For his time, risk, interest 
of money, and skill, he is entitled to an advance on his 
21* 



240 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 



goods ; and the buyer is under a corresponding obligation 
to allow that advance, except in those cases of a change 
in the market price to be noticed subsequently. 

Hence, 1. The seller is under obligation to furnish 
goods of the same quality as that ordinarily furnished at 
the same prices. He is paid for his skill in purchasing, 
and of course he ought to possess that skill, or to suffer the 
consequences. If he furnishes goods of this quality, and 
they are, so far as his knowledge extends, free from any 
defect, he is under obligation to do nothing more than to 
offer them. He is under no obligations to explain their 
adaptation, and direct the judgment of the buyer, unless 
by the law of benevolence. Having furnished goods to 
the best of his skill, and of the ordinary quality, his re- 
sponsibility ceases, and it is the business of the buyer to 
decide whether the article is adapted to his wants. If, 
however, the seller has purchased a bad article, and has 
been deceived, he has no right to sell it at the regular 
price, on the ground that he gave as much for it as for 
what should have been good. The error of judgment 
was his, and in his own profession ; and he must bear the 
loss by selling the article for what it is worth. That this 
is the rule, is evident from the contrary case. If he bad, 
by superior skill, purchased an article at much less than 
its value, he would consider himself entitled to the advan- 
tage, and justly. Where he is entitled, however, to the 
benefit of his skill, he must, under corresponding circum- 
stances, suffer from the want of it. Hence we say, that 
a seller is under obligation to furnish goods at the market 
price, and of the market quality, but is under no obligation 
to assist the judgment of the buyer, unless the article for 
sale is defective, and then he is under obligation to reveal it. 

The only exception to this rule is, when, from the con- 
ditions of the sale, it is known that no guarantee is offer- 
ed ; as when a horse is sold at auction, without any rec- 
ommendation. Here, every man knows that he buys at 
his own risk, and gives accordingly. 

2. Every one who makes it his business to sell, is not 
only bound to sell, but is also at liberty to sell, at the 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 



241 



market price. That he is bound to sell thus, is evident 
from the fact that he takes every means to persuade the 
public that he does so ; he would consider it a slander 
were any one to assert the contrary ; and, were the con- 
trary to be believed, his business would soon be ruined. 
Where a belief is so widely circulated, and so earnestly in- 
culcated by the seller, he is manifestly under obligation to 
fulfil an expectation which he has been so anxious to 
create. 

He is also at liberty to sell at the market price ; that 
is, as he is obliged to sell without remuneration, or even 
with loss, if the article falls in price while in his posses- 
sion, so he is at liberty to sell it at above a fair remunera- 
tion, if the price of the article advances. As he must 
suffer in case of the fall of merchandise, he is entitled to 
the corresponding gain, if merchandise rises ; and thus his 
chance on both sides is equalized. Besides, by allowing 
the price of an article to rise with its scarcity, the rise it- 
self is in the end checked ; and, by attracting an unusual 
amount of products to the place of scarcity, the price is 
most speedily reduced again to the ordinary and natural 
equilibrium of supply and demand. 

3. While the seller is under no obligation to set forth 
the quality of his merchandise, yet he is at liberty to do 
so, confining himself to truth. He has, however, no right 
to influence the will of the buyer by any motives aside 
from those derived from the real value of the article in 
question. 

Thus, he has no right to appeal to the fears, or hopes, 
or avarice, of the buyer. This rule is violated, when, in 
dealings on the exchange, false information is circulated, 
for the purpose of raising or depressing the price of stocks. 
It is violated by speculators, who monopolize an article to 
create an artificial scarcity, and thus raise the price, while 
the supply is abundant. The case is the same, when a 
salesman looks upon a stranger who enters his store, and 
deliberately calculates how he shall best influence, and 
excite, and mislead his mind, so as to sell the greatest 
amount of goods at the most exorbitant profit. And, in 



242 



MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 



general, any attempt to influence the mind of the pur- 
chaser, by motives aside from those derived from the true 
character of the article for sale, are always doubtful, and 
generally vicious. 

It is in vain to reply to this, that if this were not done, 
men could not support their families. We are not inquir- 
ing about the support of families, but about a question of 
right. And it is obvious that, were this plea allowed, it 
would put an end to all questions of morals ; for there 
never was an iniquity so infamous as not to find multitudes 
who were ready to justify it on this plea. But we deny 
the validity of the plea altogether. Were men to qualify 
themselves properly for business, and to acquire and exert 
proper skill in the management of it, that skill would be 
beneficially exerted for the community at large, and men 
would find it for their interest to employ it. He who un- 
derstood his own profession well, and industriously and 
honestly put his talents into requisition, never stood in 
need of chicanery, in order to support either himself or his 
family. 

These remarks have been made with respect to the 
seller. But it is manifest that they are just as applicable 
to the buyer. Both parties are under equally imperative 
and corresponding obligations. If the seller is bound to 
furnish an article of ordinary quality, and to sell it at the 
market price, that is, if he is obliged to exert his skill for 
the benefit of the buyer, and to charge for that skill and 
capital no more than a fair remuneration, then the buyer 
is under the same obligation freely and willingly to pay 
that remuneration. It is disgraceful to him, to wish the 
seller to labor for him for nothing, or for less than a fair 
compensation. If the seller has no right by extraneous 
considerations to influence the motives of the buyer, the 
buyer has no right, by any such considerations, to influence 
the motives of the seller. The buyer is guilty of fraud, if 
he underrates the seller's goods, or by any of the artifices 
of traffic induces him to sell at less than a fair rate of profit. 
"'Tis naught, 'tis naught, saith the buyer; but when he 
goeth his way, then he boasteth." Such conduct is as 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 243 



dishonest and dishonorable now, as it was in the days of 
Solomon. 

It should have been remarked, when treating of the 
market price, that the rule applies mainly to those, whose 
occupation is traffic in the article bought and sold. A 
dealer in china-ware is bound to sell china-ware at the 
market price ; but if a man insist upon buying his coat, 
he is under no such obligation, for this is not his business. 
Should he put himself to inconvenience by selling his 
apparel to gratify the whim of his neighbor, he may, if he 
will, charge an extra price for this inconvenience. The 
rule applies in any other similar case. It, however, 
would become an honest man fairly to state that he did 
not sell at the market price, but that he charged what he 
chose, as a remuneration for his trouble. 

A bargain is concluded, when both parties have sig- 
nified to each other, their will to make the transfer ; 
that is, that each chooses to part with his own property, 
and to receive the property of the other in exchange. 
Henceforth, all the risk of loss, and all the chances of 
gain, are, of course, mutually transferred ; although the 
articles themselves remain precisely as they were before. 
If a merchant buy a cargo of tea ; after the sale, no mat- 
ter where the tea is, the chances of loss or gain are his, 
and they are as much his in one place as in another. 

So, if the article, after the sale, become injured, before 
I take actual possession of it, I bear the loss ; because, the 
right of ownership being vested in me, I could have re- 
moved it if I chose, and no one had a right, without my 
direction, to remove it. 

The only exception to this, exists in the case where, 
by custom or contract, the obligation to deliver, is one of 
the conditions of the sale. Here the seller, of course, 
charges more for assuming the responsibility to deliver, 
and he is to bear the risk, for which he is fairly paid. It 
is frequently a question, when the act of delivery is com- 
pleted. This must be settled by precedent ; and can 
rarely be known in any country, until a decision is had in 
the courts of law. As soon as such a case is adjudicated, 
the respective parties govern themselves accordingly. 



244 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 



It has been observed above, that when the seller knows 
of any defect in his product, he is bound to declare it. 
The same rule, of course, applies to the buyer. If he 
knows that the value of the article has risen, without the 
owner's knowledge, he is bound to inform him of this 
change in its value. The sale is, otherwise, fraudulent. 
Hence, all purchases and sales affected in consequence of 
secret information, procured in advance of our neighbor, 
are dishonest. If property rises in value by the provi- 
dence of God, while in my neighbor's possession, that 
rise of value is as much his, as the property itself; and I 
may as honestly deprive him of the one, without an equiv- 
alent, as of the other. 

The ordinary pleas, by which men excuse themselves 
for violation of the moral law of property, are weak and 
wicked. Thus, when men sell articles of a different 
quality from that which their name imports — as when 
wines or liquors are diluted or compounded ; when the 
ordinary weight or measure is curtailed ; or where em- 
ployers defraud ignorant persons of their wages, as I am 
told is sometimes the case with those who employ certain 
classes of laborers — it is common to hear it remarked, 
"the competition is so great, that we could sell nothing, 
unless we adopted these methods ;" or else, " the practice 
is universal, and if we did not do thus, other persons 
would, and so the evil would not be diminished." To all 
this, it is sufficient to reply : The law of God is explicit 
on this subject. " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy- 
self;" and God allows of no excuses for the violation of 
his commands ; " He hath shewed it unto them ; there- 
fore they are without excuse." These pleas are either 
true or false. If false, they ought to be abandoned. If 
true, then the traffic itself must be given up ; for no man 
has any right to be engaged in any pursuit, in violation of 
the laws of God. 

But the transfer of the right of property is not always 
perpetual. It is sometimes only temporary ; and, in this 
case, the borrower pays a stipulated equivalent for the 
use of it. 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 245 



That he should do so is manifestly just, because the 
property in the hands of the owner is capable of producing 
an increase, and the owner, if he held it, would derive the 
benefit of that increase. If he parts with his benefit for 
the advantage of another, it is just that the other should 
allow him a fair remuneration. If the borrower could 
not, after paying this remuneration, grow richer than he 
would be without the use of his neighbor's capital, he 
would not borrow. But, inasmuch as he, by the use of 
it, can be benefitted, after paying for the use, no reason 
can be conceived why he should not pay for it. 

The remuneration paid for the use of capital, in the 
form of money, is called interest ; when in the form of 
land or houses, it is called rent. 

The principles on which the rate of this remuneration 
is justly fixed, are these : The borrower pays, first, for the 
use ; and, second, for the risk. 

1. For the use. 

Capital is more useful, that is, it is capable of producing 
a greater remuneration at some times than at others. 
Thus, a flour-mill, at some seasons of the year, is more 
productive than at others. Land, in some places, is ca- 
pable of yielding a greater harvest than in others. And 
thus, at different times, the same property may be capable 
of bringing in a very different income. And, in general, 
where the amount of capital to be loaned is great, and the 
number of those who want to borrow, small, the interest 
will be low ; and where the number of borrowers is great, 
and the amount of capital small, the rate of interest will 
be high. The reasons of all this are too obvious to need 
illustration. 

2. For the risk. 

When an owner parts with his property, it is put under 
the control of the borrower, and passes, of course, beyond 
the control of the owner. Here, there arises a risk over 
which he has no control. It varies with the character ol 
the borrower for prudence and skill. It varies with the 
business in which he is engaged. Property in ships is 
exposed to more risks than property in land. A man 



246 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 



would consider the chance of having his property return- 
ed much better, if employed in the building of dwelling- 
houses, than in the manufacture of gun-powder. Now, 
as all these circumstances of risk may enter more or less 
into every loan, it is evident that they must, in justice, 
vary the rate at which a loan may be procured. 

Hence, I think that the rate of interest, of every sort, 
being liable to so many circumstances of variation, should 
not, in any case, be fixed by law ; but should be left, in 
all cases, to the discretion of the parties concerned. 

This remark applies as well to loans of money as to 
loans of other property, because the reasons apply just as 
much to these as to any other. If it be said, men may 
charge exorbitant interest, I reply, so they may charge 
exorbitant rent for houses, and exorbitant hire for horses. 
And, I ask, how is this evil of exorbitant charges in other 
cases remedied ? The answer is plain. We allow a 
perfectly free competition, and then the man who will not 
loan his property, unless at an exorbitant price, is under- 
bidden, and his own rapacity defeats and punishes itself. 

And, on the contrary, by fixing a legal rate of interest, 
we throw the whole community into the power of those 
who are willing to violate the law. For, as soon as the 
actual value of money is more than the legal value, those 
who consider themselves under obligation to obey the laws 
of the land, will not loan ; for they can employ their pro- 
perty to better advantage. Hence, if all were obedient 
to the law, as soon as property arrived at this point of 
value, loans would instantly and universally cease. But as 
some persons are willing to evade the law, they will loan 
at illegal interest ; and, as the capital of those who are 
conscientious, is withdrawn from the market, and an arti- 
ficial scarcity is thus produced, they have it in their power 
to charge whatever they choose. 

Again, when we pay for money loaned, we pay, first, 
for the use, and, second, for the risk ; that is, we pay lit- 
erally a premium of insurance. As both of these vary 
with time, and with individuals, there is a double reason 
for variation in the rate of interest. When we have a 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 



247 



house insured, we pay only for the risk ; and, hence, there 
is only a single cause of variation. But while all gov- 
ernments have fixed the rate of interest by law, they have 
never fixed the rate of insurance ; which, being less varia- 
ble, is more properly subject to a fixed rule. This is surely 
inconsistent ; is it not also unjust ? 

Nevertheless, for the sake of avoiding disputes, and er- 
rors of ignorance, it might be wise for society to enact, by 
law, what should be the rate of interest, in cases where 
no rate is otherwise specified. This is the extent of its 
proper jurisdiction ; and doing any thing further is, I 
think, not only injurious to the interests of the community, 
but also a violation of the right of property. While, how r - 
ever, I hold this to be true, I by no means hold that, the 
laws remaining as they are, any individual is justified in 
taking or giving more than the legal rate of interest. 
When conscience does not forbid, it is the business of a 
good citizen to obey the laws ; and the faithful obedience 
to an unwise law, is generally the surest way of working 
its overthrow. 

We shall now proceed to consider the laws which gov- 
ern this mode of transfer of property. 
The loan of money. 

1. The lender is bound to demand no more than a fair 
remuneration for the use of his capital, and for the risk to 
which it is exposed. 

2. He is bound to make use of no unlawful means to 
influence the decision of the borrower. The principles 
here are the same as govern in the permanent exchange- 
of property. All rumors and false alarms, and all com- 
binations of capitalists to raise by a monopoly the price of" 
money, are manifestly dishonest ; nor are they the less so,, 
because many persons may enter into them, or because 
they have skill or power to evade the laws of the land. 

3. The borrower is bound to pay a just equivalent, as 
I have stated above ; and he is equally forbidden to use 
any dishonest motives to influence the decision of the 
lender. 

4. Inasmuch as the risk of the property is one part of 

22 



248 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 

the consideration for which the owner receives remunera- 
tion, and as this is in every case supposed to be a specified 
quantity, the borrower has no right to expose the property 
of another to any risk not contemplated in the contract. 
Hence, he has no right to invest it in a more hazardous 
trade, nor has he a right to employ it in a more hazardous 
speculation ; and if he does, he is using it in a manner for 
which he has paid no equivalent. He is also under obli- 
gation to take all the care to avoid losses which he would 
take if the property were his own ; and to use the same 
skill to conduct his affairs successfully. 

5. He is also bound to repay the loan exactly accord- 
ing to the terms specified in the contract. This requires 
that he pay the full sum promised, and that he pay it 
precisely at the time promised. A failure, in either case, 
is a breach of the contract. 

The question is often asked, whether a debtor is morally 
liberated by an act of insolvency. I think not, if he ever 
afterwards have the means of repayment. It may be said, 
this is oppressive to debtors ; but, we ask, is not the con- 
trary principle oppressive to creditors ; and are not the 
rights of one party just as valuable, and just as much 
rights, as those of the other ? It may also be remarked, 
that, were this principle acted upon, there would be fewer 
debtors, and vastly fewer insolvents. The amount of 
money actually lost by insolvency, is absolutely enormous ; 
and it is generally lost by causeless, reckless speculation, 
by childish and inexcusable extravagance, or by gambling 
and profligacy, which are all stimulated into activity by 
the facility of credit, and the facility with which debts 
may be cancelled by acts of insolvency. The more 
rigidly contracts are observed, the more rapidly will the 
capital of a country increase, the greater will be the in- 
ducements to industry, and the stronger will be the bar- 
riers against extravagance and vice. 

Of laws of other property. 

The principles which apply in this case are very similar 
to those which have been already stated. 

1. The lender is bound to furnish an article, which, so 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 249 

far as he knows, is adapted to the purposes of the borrow- 
er. That is, if the thing borrowed has any internal de- 
fect, he is bound to reveal it. If I loan a horse to a man 
who wishes to ride forty miles to-day, while I know he is 
able to go but thirty, it is a fraud. If I let to a man a 
house which I know to be in the neighborhood of a nui- 
sance, or to be, in part, uninhabitable from smoky chim- 
neys, and do not inform him, it is fraud. The loss in the 
value of the property is mine, and I have no right to 
transfer it to another. 

2. So the lender has a right to charge the market price 
arising from the considerations of use, risk, and variation 
in supply and demand. This depends upon the same 
principles as those already explained. 

3. The borrower is bound to take the same care of the 
property of another, as he would of his own, to put it to 
no risk different from that specified or understood in the 
contract, and to pay the price, upon the principle stated 
above, Neither party has any right to influence the 
other by any motives extraneous to the simple business of 
the transfer. 

4. The borrower is bound to return the property loan- 
ed, precisely according to the contract. This includes 
time and condition. He must return it at the time speci- 
fied, and in the condition in which he received it, ordinary 
wear and tear only excepted. If I hire a house for a year, 
and so damage its paper and paint, that, before it can be 
let again, it will cost half the price of the rent to put it in 
repair, it is a gross fraud. I have, by negligence, or 
other cause, defrauded the owner of half his rent. It is 
just as immoral as to pay him the whole, and then pick 
his pocket of the half of what he had received. 

The important question arises here, if a loss happen 
while the property is in the hands of the borrower, on 
whom shall it fall? The principle I suppose to be this: 

1. If it happen while the property is subject to the use 
specified in the contract, the owner bears it ; because it is 
to be supposed that he foresaw the risk, and received re- 
muneration for it. As he was paid for the risk, he, of 
course, has assumed it, and justly suffers it. 



250 



MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 



2. If the loss happen in consequence of any use not 
contemplated in the contract, then the borrower suffers it. 
He having paid nothing for insurance against this risk, 
there is nobody but himself to sustain it, and he sustains 
it accordingly. Besides, were any other principle adopt- 
ed, it must put an end to the whole business of loaning ; 
for no one would part with his property temporarily, to 
be used in any manner the borrower pleased, and be him- 
self responsible for all the loss. If a horse die while I am 
using it well, and for the purpose specified, the owner 
suffers. If it die by careless driving, I suffer the loss. 
He is bound to furnish a good horse, and I a competent 
driver. 

3. So, on the contrary, if a gain arise unexpectedly. 
If this gain was one which was contemplated in the con- 
tract, it belongs to the borrower. If not, he has no equi- 
table claim to it. If 1 hire a farm, I am entitled, without 
any additional charge for rent, to all the advantages aris- 
ing from the rise in the price of wheat, or from my own 
skill in agriculture. But if a mine of coal be discovered 
on the farm, I have no right to the benefit of working it ; 
for I did not hire the farm for this purpose. 

The case of insurance. 

Here no transfer of property is made, and, of course, 
nothing is paid for use. But the owner chooses to trans- 
fer the risk of use from himself to others, and to pay for 
their assuming this risk a stipulated equivalent. The loss 
to society, of property insured, is just the same as when 
uninsured. A town is just as much poorer when property 
is destroyed that is insured, provided it be insured in the 
town, as though no insurance were effected. The only 
difference is, that the loss is equalized. Ten men can 
more easily replace one hundred dollars apiece, who 
have nine hundred remaining, than the eleventh can re- 
place his whole property of one thousand. 

The rule in this case is simple. The insured is bound 
fully to reveal to the insurer every circumstance within 
his knowledge, which could in any measure affect the 
value of the risk ; that is to say, the property must be, so 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 



251 



far as he knows, what it purports to be, and the risks 
none other than such as he reveals them. If he expose 
the property to other risks, the insurance is void ; and 
the underwriter, if the property is lost, refuses to remu- 
nerate him ; and if it be safe, he returns the premium. If 
the loss occur within the terms of the policy, the insurer 
is bound fully and faithfully to make remuneration, pre- 
cisely according to the terms of the contract. 

As to the rate of insurance, very little need be said. 
It varies with every risk, and is made up of so many con- 
flicting circumstances, that it must be agreed upon by the 
parties themselves. When the market in this species of 
traffic is unrestrained by monopolies, the price of insur- 
ance, like that of any other commodity, will regulate itself. 

Next, where the equivalent is immaterial, as where 
one party pays remuneration for some service rendered. 

The principal cases here are these : That of master 
and servant, and that of principal and agent. 

1. Of master and servant. 

1. The master is bound to allow to the servant a fair 
remuneration. This is justly estimated by uniting the 
considerations of labor, skill, and fidelity, varied by the 
rise and fall of the price of such labor in the market. As 
this, however, would be liable to inconvenient fluctuation, 
it is generally adjusted by a rate agreed upon by the 
parties. 

2. He is bound to allow him all the privileges to which 
moral law or established usage entitles him, unless some- 
thing different from the latter has been stipulated in the 
contract ; and he is at liberty to require of him service 
upon the same principles. 

3. The servant is bound to perform the labor assigned 
him by usage, or by contract (matters of conscience only 
excepted), with all the skill which he possesses, making 
the interests of the employer his own. If either party 
fail, — that is, if the master demand service for which he 
does not render compensation, or if the servant receive 
wages for which he does not render the stipulated equiva- 
lent, — there is a violation of the right of property. Thus, 

22* 



252 



MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 



also, there is a violation of right, if the master do not fulfil 
the terms of the contract, just as it was made ; as, for in- 
stance, if he do not pay a servant punctually. When the 
service is performed, the wages belong to the servant, and 
the master has no more right to them than to the proper- 
ty of any one else. Thus saith St. James : " The hire of 
your laborers that have reaped your fields, that is kept 
back by fraud, crieth, and the cry is come into the ears of 
the Lord of Sabbaoth." And, on the contrary, the ser- 
vant is bound to use his whole skill and economy in man- 
aging the property of his master ; and if he destroy by 
negligence, or fault, he ought to make restitution. 
2. Of principal and agent. 

It frequently happens that, in the transaction of busi- 
ness, duties devolve upon an individual, which are to be 
discharged in different places at the same time. In other 
cases, in consequence of the subdivision of labor, he re- 
quires something to be done for him, which another person 
can do better than himself. In either case, from neces- 
sity, or for his own convenience and interest, he employs 
other men as agents. 

Agencies are of two kinds ; first, where the principal 
simply employs another to fulfil his own (that is, the prin- 
cipal's) will. Here, the principal's will is the rule, both 
as to the object to be accomplished, and the manner in 
which, and the means whereby, it is to be accomplished. 
Second. Where the principal only designates the objects 
to be accomplished, reposing special trust in the skill and 
fidelity of the agent as to the means by which it is to be 
accomplished. Such I suppose to be the case in regard 
to professional assistance. 

The laws on this subject respect, first, the relation ex- 
isting between the principal and the community ; and, 
second, the relation existing between the principal and 
agent. 

1. The principal is bound by the acts of the agent, 
while the agent is employed in the business in which the 
principal has engaged him ; but he is responsible no 
farther. 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 253 



Thus, it is known that a merchant employs a clerk to 
receive money on his account. For his clerk's transac- 
tions in this part of his affairs he is responsible ; but he 
would not be responsible, if money were paid to his porter 
or coachman, because he does not employ them in this 
manner. Hence, if the clerk be unfaithful, and secrete 
the money, the merchant suffers ; if the coachman receive 
the money, and be unfaithful, the payer suffers. It is the 
merchant's business to employ suitable agents ; but it is 
the business of his customers to apply to those agents 
only, whom he has employed. 

An important question arises here, namely, when is it 
to be understood that a principal has employed an agent? 
It is generally held that, if the principal acknowledge him- 
self responsible for the acts of the agent, he is hereafter 
held to be responsible for similar acts, until he gives notice 
to the contrary. 

II. Laws arising from the relation subsisting between 
the principal and the agent. 

1. The laws respecting compensation are the same as 
those already specified, and, therefore, need not be re- 
peated. 

2. The agent is bound to give the same care to the af- 
fairs of the principal, as to his own. He is another self, 
and should act in that capacity. The necessity of this 
rule is apparent from the fact, that no other rule could be 
devised, by which either party would know what justly 
to demand, or when the demands of justice were fulfilled. 

Hence, if an agent do not give all the care to the affairs 
of his principal that he would do to his own, and loss occur, 
he ought to sustain it. If a lawyer lose a cause through 
negligence, or palpable ignorance, he ought, in justice, to 
suffer the consequences. He receives fees for conducting 
the cause to the best of his ability, and, by undertaking to 
conduct it, puts it out of the power of the client to employ 
any one else. Thus, if he neglect it, and, by neglecting 
it, his client is worse off than if he had not undertaken it, 
he accepts fees for really injuring his neighbor. He ought 
to bear the loss which has occurred by his own fault. 



254 MODES IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 

A question frequently arises here of considerable im- 
portance. It is, when is he obliged to obey the instruc- 
tions of his principal ; and when is he obliged to act 
without regard to them? Although this question does 
not come under the right of property, it may be as well 
to notice it here as any where else. 

The question, I suppose, is to be answered by deciding 
to which of the above specified kinds of agencies the case 
to be considered belongs. 

1. If it be simple agency, that is, where the agent 
undertakes merely to execute the will of the principal, 
and in the manner, and by the means, specified by the 
principal, he must obey implicitly, (conscience only ex- 
cepted,) unless some fact material to the formation of a 
judgment has come to light after giving the order, which, 
if known, would have necessarily modified the intention 
of the principal. This is the law of the military service. 
Even here, when an agent disobeys, he does it at his own 
risk ; and, hence, the modifying facts should be clear and 
explicit, in order to justify the variation from the instruc- 
tions. 

2. When the agency is of the other kind, and the will 
of the principal is only supposed to direct the end, and 
that the means and manner are to be decided upon by 
the professional skill of the agent, I suppose that the agent 
is not bound to obey the directions of his principal. He 
is supposed to know more on the subject, and to be better 
able to decide what will benefit his principal, than the 
principal himself ; and he has no right to injure another 
man, even if the other man desire it ; nor has he a right 
to lend himself as an instrument by which another man, 
by consequence of his ignorance, shall injure himself. 
Besides, every man has a professional reputation to sus- 
tain, on which his means of living depend. He has no 
right to injure this, for the sake of gratifying another, es- 
pecially when, by so gratifying the other, he shall ruin 
himself also. A physician has no right to give his patient 
drugs which will poison him, because a patient wishes it. 
A lawyer has no right to bring a cause into court in such 



MAY BE VIOLATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL. 255 



a manner as will ensure the loss of it, because his client 
insists upon it. The professional agent is bound to con- 
duct the business of his profession to the best of his ability. 
This is the end of his responsibility. If it pleases his 
client, well ; if not, the relation must cease, and the prin- 
cipal must find another agent. 

A representative in Congress is manifestly an agent of 
the latter of these two classes. He is chosen on account 
of his supposed legislative ability. Hence, he is strictly 
a professional agent ; and, on these principles, he is under 
no sort of obligation to regard the instructions of his con- 
stituents. He is merely bound to promote their best in- 
terests, but the manner of doing it is to be decided by his 
superior skill and ability. 

But, secondly, is he bound to resign his seat, if he 
differ from them in opinion ? This is a question to be 
decided by the constitution of the country under which he 
acts. Society, that is, the whole nation, have a right to 
form a government as they will ; and to choose represen- 
tatives during good behavior, that is, for as long a time 
as they and their representatives entertain the same views ; 
or, setting aside this mode for reasons which may seem 
good to themselves, to elect them for a certain period of 
service. Now, if they have chosen the latter mode, they 
have bound themselves to abide by it, and have abandon- 
ed the former. If they elect him during pleasure, he is 
so elected. If they, on the contrary, elect him for two 
years, or for six years, he is so elected. And, so far as I 
can discover, here the question rests. It is in the power 
of society to alter the tenure of office, if they please ; but, 
until it be altered, neither party can claim any thing more 
or different from what that tenure actually and virtually 
expresses. 



256 RIGHT OF PROPERTY AS VIOLATED BY SOCIETY. 



SECTION III. 

RIGHT OF PROPERTY AS VIOLATED BY SOCIETY. 

I have already stated that, whatever a man possesses, 
he possesses exclusively of every man, and of all men. 
He has a right to use his property in such a manner as 
will promote his own happiness, provided he do not inter- 
fere with the rights of others. But with this right, society 
may interfere, as well as individuals ; and the injury is the 
greater here, inasmuch as it is remediless. In this world 
the individual knows of no power superior to society, and 
from its decisions, even when unjust, he has no appeal. 
A few suggestions on this part of the subject, will close 
the present chapter. 

I have mentioned that the individual has a right to use 
his property, innocently, as he will, exclusively of any 
man, or of all men. It is proper to state here, that this 
right is apparently modified by his becoming a member of 
society. When men form a civil society, they mutually 
agree to confer upon the individual certain benefits upon 
certain conditions. But as these benefits cannot be at- 
tained without incurring some expenses, as, for instance, of 
courts of justice, legislation, &c, it is just that every in- 
dividual who enters the society, and thus enjoys these 
benefits, should pay his portion of the expense. By the 
very act of becoming a member of society, he renders 
himself answerable for his portion of that burden, without 
the incurring of which, society could not exist. He has 
his option, to leave society, or to join it. But if he join 
it, he must join it on the same conditions as others. He 
demands the benefit of laws, and of protection ; but he 
has no right to demand what other men have purchased, 
unless he will pay for it an equitable price. 

From these principles, it will follow, that society has a 
natural right to require every individual to contribute his 
portion of those expenses necessary to the existence of 
society. 



RIGHT OF PROPERTY AS VIOLATED BY SOCIETY. 257 

Besides these, however, the members of a society have 
the power to agree together to contribute for objects, if 
not essential to the existence, yet important to the well- 
being of society. If they so agree, they are bound to 
fulfil this agreement ; for a contract between the individual ^ 
and society, is as binding as one between individual and 
individual. Hence, if such an agreement be made, so- 
ciety has a right to enforce it. This, however, by no 
means decides the question of the original wisdom of any 
particular compact ; much less is it meant to be asserted, 
that the individual is bound by the acts of a majority, 
when that majority has exceeded its power. These sub- 
jects belong to a subsequent chapter. What is meant to 
be asserted here, is, that there may arise cases in which 
society may rightfully oblige the individual to contribute 
for purposes which are not absolutely necessary to the 
existence of society. 

The difference, which we wish to establish, is this : In 
the case of whatever is necessary to the existence of so- 
ciety, society has a natural right to oblige the individual 
to bear his part of the burden ; that is, it has a right over 
his property to this amount, without obtaining any con- 
cession on his part. Society has, manifestly, a right to 
whatever is necessary to its own existence. 

Whatever, on the other hand, is not necessary to the 
existence of society, is not in the power of society, unless ■/ 
it has been conferred upon it by the will of the individual. 
That this is the rule, is evident from the necessity of the 
case. No other rule could be devised, which would not 
put the individual wholly in the power of society ; or, in 
other words, absolutely destroy the liberty of the indi- 
vidual. 

If such be the facts, it will follow that society has a 
right over the property of the individual, for all purposes ^ 
necessary to the existence of society ; and, secondly, in all 
respects in which the individual has conferred that power, 
but only for the purposes for which it was conferred. 

And, on the contrary, it is the duty of the individual to 
hold his property always subject to these conditions ; and, 



258 RIGHT OF PROPERTY AS VIOLATED BY SOCIETY. 

for such purposes, freely to contribute his portion of that 
expense for which he, in common with others, is receiving 
an equivalent. No one has any more right than another 
to receive a consideration without making a remuneration. 

2. The individual has a right to demand that no im- 
positions be laid upon him, unless they come under the 
one or the other of these classes. 

3. He has a right to demand, that the burdens of so- 
ciety be laid upon individuals according to some equitable 
law. This law should be founded, as nearly as possible, 
upon the principle, that each one should pay, in propor- 
tion to the benefits which he receives from the protection 
of society. As these benefits are personal and pecuniary, 
and as those which are personal are equal, it would seem 
just that the variation should be in proportion to property. 

If these principles be just, it is evident that society may 
violate the right of individual property, in the following 
ways : 

1. By taking, through the means of government, which 
is its agent, the property of the individual, arbitrarily, or 
merely by the will of the executive. Such is the nature 
of the exactions in despotic governments. 

2. When, by arbitrary will, or by law, it takes the 
property of the individual for purposes, whether good or 
bad, not necessary to the existence of society, when the 
individuals of society have not consented that it be so ap- 
propriated. This consent is never to be presumed, except 
in necessary expenditures, as has been shown. Whenever 
this plea cannot be made good, society has no right to 
touch the property of the individual, unless it can show 
the constitutional provision. Were our government to 
levy a tax to build churches, it would avail nothing to say, 
that churches were wanted, or that the good of society de- 
manded it ; it would be an invasion of the right of prop- 
erty, until the article in the constitution could be shown, 
granting to the government power over property, for this 
very purpose. 

3. Society, even when the claim is just, may violate 
the rights of the individual, by adopting an equitable rule 



RIGHT OF PROPERTY AS VIOLATED BY SOCIETY. 259 

in the distribution of the public burdens. Every individual 
has an equal right to employ his property unmolested, in 
just such manner as will innocently promote his own hap- 
piness. That is, it is to society a matter of indifference 
in what way he employs it. Provided it be innocent, it 
does not come within the view of society. Hence, in this 
respect, all modes of employing it are equal. And the 
only question to be considered, in adjusting the appropria- 
tion, is, how much does he ask society to protect ? and by 
this rule it should, as we have said before, be adjusted. 
If, then, besides this rule, another be adopted ; and an in- 
dividual is obliged, besides his pro rata proportion, to 
bear a burden levied on his particular calling, to the ex- 
emption of another, he has a right to complain. He is 
obliged to bear a double burden, and one portion of the 
burden is laid for a cause over which society professes it- 
self to have no jurisdiction. 

4. Inasmuch as the value of property depends upon 
the unrestrained use which I am allowed to make of it, v 
for the promotion of my individual happiness, society in- 
terferes with the right of property, if it in any manner 
abridges any of these. One man is rendered happy by 
accumulation, another by benevolence ; one by promoting 
science, another by promoting religion. Each one has a 
right to use what is his own, exactly as he pleases. And 
if society interfere, by directing the manner in which he 
shall appropriate it, it must be an act of injustice. It is 
as great a violation of property, for instance, to interfere 
with the purpose of the individual in the appropriation of 
his property for religious purposes, as it is to enact that a 
farmer shall keep but three cows, or a manufacturer em- 
ploy but ten workmen. 



23 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 

Character is the present intellectual, social, and moral 
condition of an individual. It comprehends his actual 
acquisitions, his capacities, his habits, his tendencies, his 
moral feelings, and every thing which enters into a man's 
state for the present, or his powers for attaining to a better 
state in the future. 

That character, in this sense, is by far the most impor- 
tant of all the possessions which a man can call his own, 
is too evident, to need discussion. It is the source of all 
that he suffers or enjoys here, and of all that he fears or 
hopes for hereafter. 

If such be the fact, benevolence would teach us the 
obligation to do all in our power to improve the character 
of our neighbor. This is its chief office. This is the 
great practical aim of Christianity. Reciprocity merely 
prohibits the infliction of any injury upon the character of 
another. 

The reasons of this prohibition are obvious. No man 
can injure his own character, without violating the laws of 
God, and also creating those tendencies which result in 
violation of the laws of man. He who, in any manner, 
becomes voluntarily the cause of this violation, is a par- 
taker, — and, not unfrequently, the largest partaker, — in 
the guilt. As he who tempts another to suicide is, in 
the sight of God, guilty of murder, so he who instigates 
another to wickedness, by producing those states ol mind 
which necessarily lead to it, is, in the sight of God, held 
responsible, in no slight degree, for the result. 

Again, consider the motives which lead men to injure 
the characters of each other. These are either pure 
malice, or reckless self-gratification. 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 261 



First, malice. Some men so far transcend the ordinary 
limits of human depravity, as to derive a truly fiend-like 
pleasure from alluring and seducing from the paths of vir- 
tue the comparatively innocent, and to exult over the 
moral desolations which they have accomplished. " They 
will compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and 
when he is made, they make him tenfold more the child 
of hell than themselves." It is scarcely necessary to add, 
that language has no terms of moral indignation that are 
capable of branding, with adequate infamy, conduct so 
intensely vicious. It is wickedness, without excuse, and 
without palliation. Or, second, take the more favorable 
case. One man wishes to accomplish some purpose of 
self-gratification, to indulge his passions, to increase his 
power, or to feed his vanity ; and, he proceeds to accom- 
plish that purpose, by means of rendering another immor- 
tal and accountable moral creature degraded for ever, — a 
moral pest henceforth, on earth, and both condemned, and 
the cause of condemnation to others, throughout eter- 
nity. Who has given this wretch a right to work so awful 
a ruin among God's creatures, for the gratification of a 
momentary and an unholy desire? And will not the 
Judge of all, when he maketh inquisition for blood, press 
to the lips of such a sinner the bitterest dregs of the cup 
of trembling ? 

With this, all the teaching of the sacred Scriptures is 
consonant. The most solemn maledictions in the Holy 
Scriptures are uttered against those who have been the 
instruments of corrupting others. In the Old Testament, 
Jeroboam is signalized as a sinner of unparalleled atrocity, 
because he made Israel to sin. In the New Testament, 
the judgment of the Pharisees has been already alluded to. 
And, again, " Whosoever shall break the least of these 
commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called 
least in the kingdom of heaven." By comparison with 
the preceding verse, the meaning of this passage is seen 
to be, that, as the doing and teaching the commandments 
of God is the great proof of virtue, so the breaking them, 
and the teaching others to break them, is the great proof 



262 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 



of vice. And, in the revelation, where God is represented 
as taking signal vengeance upon Babylon, it is because 
" she did corrupt the earth with her wickedness." 

The moral precept on this subject, then, is briefly this : 
We are forbidden, for any cause, or under any pretence, 
or in any manner, willingly to vitiate the character of 
another. 

This prohibition may be violated in two ways : 

L By weakening the moral restraints of men. 

2. By exciting their evil passions. 

I. By weakening the moral restraints or men. 

It has been already shown, that the passions of men 
were intended to be restrained by conscience ; and that 
the restraining power of conscience is increased by the 
doctrines and motives derived from natural and revealed 
religion. Whoever, therefore, in any manner, renders 
obtuse the moral sensibilities of others, or diminishes the 
power of that moral truth by which these sensibilities are 
rendered operative, inflicts permanent injury upon the 
character of his fellow-men. This also is done by all 
wicked example ; for, as we have seen before, the sight 
of wickedness weakens the power of conscience over us. 
It is done when, either by conversation or by writing, the 
distinctions between right and wrong are treated with open 
scorn or covert contempt ; by all conduct calculated to 
render inoperative the sanctions of religion, as profanity, 
or Sabbath breaking ; by ridicule of the obligations of 
morality and religion, under tbe names of superstition, 
priestcraft, prejudices of education ; or, by presenting to 
men such views of the character of God as would lead 
them to believe that He cares very little about the moral 
actions of his creatures, but is willing that every one shall 
live as he chooses ; and that, therefore, the self-denials of 
virtue are only a form of gratuitous, self-inflicted torture. 

It is against this form of moral injury that the young 
need to be specially upon their guard. The moral sedu- 
cer, if he be a practised villain, corrupts the principles of 
his victim before he attempts to influence his or her prac- 
tice. It is not until the moral restraints are silently re- 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 



263 



moved, and the heart left defenceless, that he presents 
the allurements of vice, and goads the passions to mad- 
ness. His task is then easy. If he has succeeded in the 
first effort, he will rarely fail in the second. Let every 
young man, especially every young woman, beware of 
listening for a moment to any conversation, of which the 
object is, to show that the restraints of virtue are un- 
necessary, or to diminish, in aught, the reverence and 
obedience, which are due from the creature to the law 
of his Creator. 

II. We injure the characters of men by exciting to 

ACTION THEIR EVIL DISPOSITIONS. 

1. By viciously stimulating their imaginations. No 
one is corrupt in action, until he has become corrupt in 
imagination. And, on the other hand, he who has filled 
his imagination with conceptions of vice, and who loves 
to feast his depraved moral appetite with imaginary scenes 
of impurity, needs but the opportunity to become openly 
abandoned. Hence, one of the most nefarious means of 
corrupting men, is to spread before them those images of 
pollution, by which they will, in secret, become familiar 
with sin. Such is the guilt of those who write, or pub- 
lish, or sell, or lend, vicious books, under whatever name 
or character, and of those who engrave or publish, or sell, 
or lend, or exhibit, obscene or lascivious pictures. Few 
exhibitions of human depravity are marked by deeper 
atrocity, than that of an author, or a publisher, who, from 
literary vanity, or sordid gain, pours forth over society a 
stream of moral pollution, either in prose or in poetry. 

And yet, there are not only men who will do this, but, 
what is worse, there are men, yes, and women, too, who, 
if the culprit have possessed talent, will commend it, and 
even weep tears of sympathy over the infatuated genius, 
who was so sorely persecuted by that unfeeling portion of 
the world, who would not consider talent synonymous 
with virtue, and who could not applaud the effort of that 
ability which was exerted only to multiply the victims of 
vice. 

2. By ministering to the appetites of others. Such is 

23* 



264 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 



the relation of the power of appetite to that of conscience, 
that, where no positive allurements to vice are set before 
men, conscience will frequently retain its ascendency. 
While, on the other hand, if allurement be added to the 
power of appetite, reason and conscience prove a barrier 
too feeble to resist their combined and vicious tendency. 
Hence, he who presents the allurements of vice before 
others, who procures and sets before them the means of 
vicious gratification, is, in a great degree, responsible for 
the mischief which he produces. Violations of this law 
occur in most cases of immoral traffic, as in the sale and 
manufacture of intoxicating liquors, the sale of opium to 
the Chinese, &c. Under the same class, is also compre- 
hended the case of female prostitution. 

3. By using others to minister to our vicious appetites. 
We cannot use others as ministers to our vices, without 
rendering them corrupt, and frequently inflicting an in- 
curable wound upon their moral nature. For the sake of 
a base and wicked momentary gratification, the vicious 
man, willingly ruins for ever an immortal being, who was, 
but for him, innocent ; and, yet more, not unfrequently 
considers this ruin a matter of triumph. Such is the case 
in seduction and adultery, and, in a modified degree, in all 
manner of lewdness and profligacy. 

4. By cherishing the evil passions of men. By pas- 
sion, in distinction from appetite, I mean the spiritual in 
opposition to the corporeal desires. It frequently hap- 
pens, that we wish to influence men, who cannot be 
moved by an appeal to their reason or conscience, but 
who can be easily moved by an appeal to their ambition, 
their avarice, their party zeal, their pride, or their vanity. 
An acquaintance with these peculiarities of individuals, is 
called, understanding human nature, knowing the weak 
sides of men, and is, by many persons, considered the 
grand means for great and masterly effect. But he can 
have but little practical acquaintance with a conscience 
void of offence, who does not instinctively feel that such 
conduct is unjust, mean and despicable. It is accom- 
plishing our purposes, by means of the moral degradation 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 265 



of him to whom we profess to be the friends. It is man- 
ifestly doing a man a greater injury than simply to rob 
him. If we stole his money, he would be injured only 
by being made poorer. If we procure his services or his 
money in this manner, we make him poorer ; we culti- 
vate those evil dispositions, which already expose him to 
sharpers ; and also render him more odious to the God 
before whom he must shortly stand. 

Nor do the ordinary excuses on this subject avail. It 
may be said, men would not give to benevolent objects, 
but from these motives. Suppose it true. What if they 
did not ? They would be as well off, morally, as now. 
A man is no better, after having refused from avarice, 
who, at length, gives from vanity. His avarice is no 
better, and his vanity is even worse. It may be said, the 
cause of benevolence could not be sustained without it. 
Then, I say, let the cause of benevolence perish. God 
never meant one party of his creatures to be relieved, by 
our inflicting moral injury on another. If there be no 
other way of sustaining benevolence, God did not mean 
that benevolent designs should be prosecuted. But it is 
not so. The appeal to men's better feelings is the proper 
appeal to be made to men. It will, when properly made, 
generally succeed ; and if it do not, our responsibility is 
at an end. 

I cannot leave this subject, without urging it upon those 
who are engaged in promoting the object of benevolent 
associations. It seems to me, that no man has a right to 
present any other than an innocent motive, to urge his 
fellow-men to action. Motives derived from party zeal, 
from personal vanity, from love of applause, however, 
covertly insinuated, are not of this character. If a man, 
by exciting such feelings, sold me a horse at twice its 
value, he would be a sharper. If he excites me to give 
from the same motives, the action partakes of the same 
character. The cause of benevolence is holy : it is the 
cause of God. It needs not human chicanery to approve 
it to the human heart. Let him who advocates it, there- 
fore, go forth strong in the strength of Him whose cause 



266 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER. 



he advocates. Let him rest his cause upon its own mer- 
its, and leave every man's conscience to decide whether 
or not he will enlist himself in its support. And, besides, 
were men conscientiously to confine themselves to the 
merits of their cause, they would much more carefully 
weigh their undertakings, before they attempted to enlist 
others in support of them. Much of that fanaticism, 
which withers the moral sympathies of man, would thus 
be checked at the outset. 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 

It has been already remarked, that every man is, by 
the laws of his Creator, entitled to the physical results of 
his labor ; that is, to those results which arise from the 
operation of those laws of cause and effect, which govern 
the material on which he operates. Thus, if a man form 
several trees into a house, the result of this labor, suppos- 
ing the materials and time to be his own, are his own 
also. Thus, again, if a man study diligently, the amount 
of knowledge which he gains is at his own disposal ; and 
he is at liberty, innocently, to use it as he will. And, in 
general, if a man be industrious, the immediate results of 
industry are his, and no one has any right to interfere 
with them. 

But these are not the only results. There are others, 
springing from those laws of cause and effect, which gov- 
ern the opinions and actions of men towards each other, 
which are frequently of as great importance to the indi- 
vidual, as the physical results. Thus, if a man have 
built a house, the house is his. But, if he have done it 
well, there arises, in the minds of men, a certain opinion 
of his skill, and a regard towards him on account of it, 
which may be of more value to him than even the house 
itself ; for it may be the foundation of great subsequent 
good fortune. The industrious student is entitled, not 
merely to the use of that knowledge which he has ac- 
quired, but also to the esteem which the possession of 
that knowledge gives him among men. Now, these sec- 
ondary and indirect results, though they may follow other 
laws of cause and effect, are yet as truly effects of the 
original cause, that is, of the character of the man him- 



268 JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 

self, and they as truly belong to him, as the primary and 
direct results of which we have before spoken. And, 
hence, to diminish the esteem in which a man is held by 
his fellows, to abstract from the reputation which he has 
thus acquired, is as great a violation of justice, nay, it 
may be a far greater violation of justice, than robbing him 
of money. It has, moreover, the additional aggravation 
of conferring no benefit upon the aggressor, beyond that 
of the gratification of a base and malignant passion. 

But, it may be said, the man has a reputation greater 
than he deserves, or a reputation for that which he does 
not deserve. Have I not a right to diminish it to its true 
level ? 

We answer, the objection proceeds upon the concession 
that the man has a reputation. That is, men have such 
or such an opinion concerning him. Now, the rule of 
property, formerly mentioned, applies here. If a man be 
in possession of property, though unjustly in possession, 
this gives to no one a right to seize upon that property 
for himself, or to seize it and destroy it, unless he can, 
himself, show a better title. The very fact of possession 
bars every other claimant, except that claimant whom the 
present possessor has defrauded. So, in this case, if this 
reputation injures the reputation of another, the other has 
a right to set forth his own claims ; and any one else has 
a right, when prompted by a desire of doing justice to the 
injured, to state the facts as they are ; but where this 
element of desire to do justice does not enter, no man has 
a right to diminish the esteem in which another is held, 
simply because he may believe the other to have more 
than he deserves. 

The moral rule, on this subject, I suppose to be this : 
We are forbidden to utter any thing which will be inju- 
rious to the reputation of another, except for adequate 
cause. I say, for adequate cause, because occasions 
may occur, in which it is as much our duty to speak, as 
it is at other times our duty to be silent. The considera- 
tion of these cases will be a subsequent concern. The 
precept, thus understood, applies to the cases in which 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 269 



we speak either from no sufficient motive, or from a bad 
motive. It is merely an extension of the great principle 
of the law of reciprocity, which commands us to have the 
same simple desire that every other man should enjoy, 
unmolested, the esteem in which he is held by men, that 
we have to enjoy, unmolested, the same possession our- 
selves. 

I do not here consider the cases in which we utter, 
either wilfully or thoughtlessly, injurious falsehood re- 
specting another. In these cases, the guilt of lying is 
superadded to that of slander. I merely here consider 
slander by itself ; it being understood that, when what is 
asserted is false, it involves the sin of lying, besides the 
violation of the law of reciprocity, which we here endea- 
vor to enforce. 

The precept here includes several specifications. Some 
of them it may be important to enumerate. 

I. It prohibits us from giving publicity to the bad ac- 
tions of men, without cause. The guilt here consists in 
causelessly giving publicity. Of course, it does not in- 
clude those cases in which the man himself gives publicity 
to his own bad actions. He has himself diminished his 
reputation, and his act becomes a part of public indis- 
criminate information. We are at liberty to mention this, 
like any other fact, when the mention of it is demanded ; 
but not to do it for the sake of injuring him. So, when- 
ever his bad actions are made known by the providence 
of God, it comes under the same rule. Thus, I may 
know that a man has acted dishonestly. This alone does 
not give me liberty to speak of it. But, if his dishonesty 
has been proved before a court of justice, it then becomes 
really a part of his reputation, and I am at liberty to 
speak of it in the same manner as of any other fact. Yet 
even here, if I speak of it with pleasure, or with desire of 
injury, i commit sin. 

Some of the reasons for this rule, are the following : 

1. The very act itself is injurious to the slanderer's 
own moral character, and to that of him who lends him- 
self to be his auditor. Familiarity with wrong diminishes 



270 JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 



our abhorrence of it. The contemplation of it in others 
fosters the spirit of envy and uncharitableness, and leads 
us, in the end, to exult in, rather than sorrow over, the 
faults of others. 

2. In the present imperfect state, where every individ- 
ual, being fallible, must fail somewhere, if every one were 
at liberty to speak of all the wrong and all the imperfec- 
tion of every one whom he knew, society would soon 
become intolerable, from the festering of universal ill-will. 
What would become of families, of friendships, of com- 
munities, if parents and children, husbands and wives, 
acquaintances, neighbors, and citizens, should proclaim 
every failing which they knew or heard of, respecting 
each other? Now, there can no medium be established 
between telling every thing, and forbidding every thing to 
be told which is said without cause. 

3. We may judge of the justice of the rule, by apply- 
ing it to ourselves. We despise the man who, either 
thoughtlessly or maliciously, proclaims what he considers, 
either justly or unjustly, our failings. Now, what can be 
more unjust or despicable, than to do that which our own 
conscience testifies to be unjust and despicable in others ? 

II. The same law forbids us to utter general conclu- 
sions respecting the characters of men, drawn from par- 
ticular bad actions which they may have committed. This 
is manifest injustice, and it includes, frequently, lying as 
well as slander. A single action is rarely decisive of 
character, even in respect to that department of character 
to which it belongs. A single illiberal action does not 
prove a man to be covetous, any more than a single act 
of charity proves him to be benevolent. How unjust, 
then, must it be, to proclaim a man as destitute of a whole 
class of virtues, because of one failure in virtue ! How 
much more unjust, for one fault, to deny him all claim to 
any virtue whatsoever ! Yet such is frequently the very 
object of calumny. And, in general, this form of vice is 
added to that just noticed. Men first, in violation of the 
law of reciprocity, make public the evil actions of others ; 
and then, with a malignant power of generalization, pro- 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 271 



ceed to deny their claims, not only to a whole class of 
virtues, but, not unfrequently, to all virtue whatsoever. 
The reasons, in this case, are similar to those just men- 
tioned. 

III. We are forbidden to judge, that is, to assign un- 
necessarily bad motives to the actions of men. I say 
unnecessarily, for some actions are in their nature such, 
that to presume a good motive is impossible. 

This rule would teach us, first, to presume no unworthy 
motive, when the action is susceptible of an innocent 
one. 

And, secondly, never to ascribe to an action which we 
confess to be good, any other motive than that from which 
it professes to proceed. 

This is the rule by which we are bound to be governed 
in our own private opinions of men. And if, from any 
circumstances, we are led to entertain any doubts of the 
motives of men, we are bound to retain these doubts 
within our own bosoms, unless we are obliged, for some 
sufficient reason, to disclose them. But if we are obliged 
to adopt this rule respecting our own opinions of others, 
by how much more are we obliged to adopt it in the 
publication of our opinions ! If we are not allowed, 
unnecessarily, to suppose an unworthy motive, by how 
much less are we allowed to circulate it, and thus render 
it universal^ supposed ! 

The reasons for this rule are obvious : 

1. The motives of men, unless rendered evident by 
their actions, can be known to God alone. They are, 
evidently, out of the reach of man. In assigning motives 
unnecessarily, we therefore undertake to assert for fact, 
what we at the outset confess that we have not the means 
of knowing to be such ; which is, in itself, falsehood : and 
we do all this for the sake of gratifying a contemptible 
vanity, or a wicked envy ; or, what is scarcely less repre- 
hensible, from thoughtless love of talking. 

2. There is no offence by which we are excited to a 
livelier or more just indignation, than by the misinterpre- 
tation of our own motives. This quick sensitiveness in 

24 



272 JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 



ourselves, should admonish us of the guilt which we incur, 
when we traduce the motives of others. 

IV. By the same rule, we are forbidden to lessen the 
estimation in which others are held, by ridicule, mimicry, 
or by any means by which they are brought into contempt. 
No man can be greatly respected by those to whom he is 
the frequent subject of laughter. It is but a very imper- 
fect excuse for conduct of this sort, to plead that we do 
not mean any harm. What do we mean ? Surely, rea- 
sonable beings should be prepared to answer this question. 
Were the witty calumniator to stand concealed, and hear 
himself made the subject of remarks precisely similar to 
those in which he indulges respecting others, he would 
have a very definite conception of what others mean. Let 
him, then, carry the lesson home to his own bosom. 

And, lastly, if all this be so, it will be readily seen that 
a very large portion of the ordinary conversation of per- 
sons, even in many respects estimable, is far from being 
innocent. How very common is personal character, in 
all its length and breadth, the matter of common conver- 
sation ! And in this discussion, men seem to forget that 
they are under any other law than that which is adminis- 
tered by a judge and jury. How commonly are charac- 
ters dissected, with apparently the only object of display- 
ing the power of malignant acumen possessed by the 
operators, as though another's reputation was made for 
no other purpose than the gratification of the meanest and 
most unlovely attributes of the human heart ! Well may 
we say, with the apostle James, " If any man offend not 
in word, the same is a perfect man, able to bridle the 
whole body." Well may we tremble before the declara- 
tion of the blessed Savior : " For every idle word that 
men speak, they shall give an account in the day of judg- 
ment." 

Nor is this evil the less for the veil under which it is 
frequently and hypocritically hidden. Men and women 
propagate slander under the cover of secrecy, supposing 
that, by uttering it under this injunction, the guilt is of 
course removed. But it is not so. The simple question 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 273 

is this : Does my duty to God or to man require me to 
publish this, which will injure another ? If it do, publish 
it wherever that duty requires, and do it fearlessly. If it 
do not, it is just as great guilt to publish it to one as to 
another. We are bound, in all such cases, to ask our- 
selves the question, am I under obligation to tell this fact 
to this person ? If not, we are under the contrary obli- 
gation to be silent. And still more. This injunction of 
secrecy is generally nothing better than the mere dictate 
of cowardice. We wish to gratify our love of detraction, 
but are afraid of the consequences to ourselves. We 
therefore converse under this injunction, that the injury to 
another may be with impunity to ourselves. And hence 
it is, that in this manner the vilest and most injurious 
calumnies are generally circulated. 

The following extract from Bishop Wilson, on this sub- 
ject, breathes the spirit of true Christian philanthropy : 
" It is too true, that some evil passion or other, and to 
gratify our corruption, is the aim of most conversations. 
We love to speak of past troubles ; hatred and ill-will 
make us take pleasure in relating the evil actions of our 
enemies. We compare, with some degree of pride, the 
advantages which we have over others. We recount, 
with too sensible a pleasure, the worldly happiness which 
we enjoy. This strengthens our passions, and increases 
our corruption. God grant that I may watch against a 
weakness that has such evil consequences ! May I never 
hear, and never repeat with pleasure, such things as may 
dishonor God, hurt my own character, or injure my neigh- 
bor ! " — Bishop Wilson's Sacra Privata. 

The precepts of the Scriptures, on this subject, are 
numerous and explicit. It will be necessary here to refer 
only to a few, for the sake of illustrating their general 
tendency : " Judge not, that ye be not judged : for with 
what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged ; and with 
what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. 
And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's 
eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own 
eye ? " Matthew vii, 1 — 5. " Let all bitterness, and 



274 JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 



wrath, and clamor, and evil-speaking, be put away from 
you." Ephesians iv, 31. "Speak evil of no man." 
Titus iii, 2. " He that will love life, and see good days, 
let him refrain his tongue from evil." 1 Peter iii, 10. 

See also James, third chapter, for a graphic delineation 
of the miseries produced by the unlicensed use of the 
tongue. 

Secondly. I have thus far considered the cases in 
which silence, respecting the evil actions of others, is our 
duty. It is our duty, when we have no just cause, either 
for speaking at all, or for speaking to the particular per- 
son whom we address. But where there is a sufficient 
cause, we are under an equally imperative obligation to 
speak, wherever and whenever that cause shall demand 
it. The common fault of men is, that they speak when 
they should be silent, and are silent only when they 
should speak. 

The plain distinction, in this case, is the following : We 
are forbidden, causelessly, to injure another, even if he 
have done wrong. Yet, whenever justice can be done, 
or innocence protected, in no other manner than by a 
course which must injure him, we are under no such pro- 
hibition. No man has a right to expect to do wrong with 
impunity ; much less has he a right to expect that, in 
order to shield him from the just consequences of his 
actions, injustice should be done to others, or that other 
men shall, by silence, deliver up the innocent and unwary 
into his power. 

The principle by which we are to test our own motives, 
in speaking of that which may harm others, is this : When 
we utter any thing which will harm another, and we do 
it either without cause, or with pleasure, or thoughtlessly, 
we are guilty of calumny. When we do it with pain 
and sorrow for the offender, and from the sincere motive 
of protecting the innocent, of promoting the ends of 
public justice, or for the good of the offender himself 
and speak of it only to such persons, and in such manner, 
as is consistent with these ends, we may speak of the evil 
actions of others, and yet be wholly innocent of calumny. 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 275 



We are therefore bound to speak of the faults of others, 

1. To promote the ends of public justice. He who 
conceals a crime against society, renders himself a party 
to the offence. We are bound here, not merely to speak 
of it, but also to speak of it to the proper civil officer, in 
order that it may be brought to trial and punishment. 
The ordinary prejudice against informing is unwise and 
immoral. He who, from proper motives, informs against 
crime, performs an act as honorable as that of the judge 
who tries the cause, or of the juror who returns the ver- 
dict. That this may be done from improper motives, 
alters not the case. A judge may hold his office for the 
love of money, but this does not make the office des- 
picable. 

2. To protect the innocent. When we are possessed 
of a knowledge of certain facts in a man's history, which, 
if known to a third person, would protect him from im- 
portant injury, it may frequently be our duty to put .that 
person on his guard. If A knows that B, under the pre- 
tence of religion, is insinuating himself into the good opin- 
ion of C, for the purpose of gaining control over his prop- 
erty, A is bound to put C upon his guard. If I know 
that a man who is already married, is paying his addresses 
to a lady in another country, I am bound to give her the 
information. So, if I know of a plan laid for the purpose 
of seduction, I am bound to make use of that knowledge 
to defeat it. All that is required here, is, that I know 
what I assert to be fact ; and that I use it simply for the 
purposes specified. 

3. For the good of the offender himself. When we 
know of the crimes of another, and there is some person 
— for instance, a parent, a guardian, or instructer — who 
might, by control or advice, be the means of the offender's 
reformation, it is our duty to give the necessary informa- 
tion. It is frequently the greatest kindness that we can 
manifest to both parties. Were it more commonly prac- 
tised, the allurements to sin would be much less attractive, 
and the hope of success in correcting the evil habits of 
the young, much more encouraging. No wicked person 

24* 



*276 JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 



has a right to expect that the community will keep his 
conduct a secret from those who have a right specially to 
be informed of it. He who does so is partaker in the 
guilt. 

4. Though we may not be at liberty to make public 
the evil actions of another, yet no obligation exists to 
conceal his fault by maintaining towards him our former 
habits of intimacy. Tf we know him to be unworthy of 
our confidence or acquaintance, we have no right to act a 
lie, by conducting towards him, in public or in private, as 
though he was worthy of it. By associating with a man, 
we give to the public an assurance, that we know of 
nothing to render him unworthy of our association. If 
we falsify this assurance, we are guilty of deception, and 
of a deception by which we benefit the wicked at the 
expense of the innocent, and, so far as our example can 
do it, place the latter in the power of the former. And 
still more, if we associate, on terms of voluntary intimacy, 
with persons of known bad character, we virtually declare 
that such offences constitute no reason why the persons 
in question are not good enough associates for us. We 
tnus virtually become the patrons of their crime. 

5. From what has been remarked, we see what is the 
nature of an historian's duty. He has to do with facts 
which the individuals themselves have made public, or 
which have been made public by the providence of God. 
He records what has already been made known. What 
has not been made known, therefore, comes not within 
his province ; but whatever has been made known, comes 
properly within it. This latter he is bound to use, without 
either fear, favor or affection. If, from party zeal or sec- 
tarian bigotry, or individual partiality, he exaggerate, or 
conceal, or misrepresent, if he " aught extenuate, or set 
down aught in malice," he is guilty of calumny of the 
most inexcusable character. It is calumny perpetrated 
deliberately, under the guise of impartiality, and perpe- 
trated in a form intended to give it the widest publicity 
and the most permanent duration. 

These remarks have had respect, principally, to the 



JUSTICE AS IT RESPECTS REPUTATION. 277 

publication of injurious truth or falsehood, by conversation. 
But it will be immediately seen that they apply, with 
additional force, to the publication of whatever is injurious 
by the press. If it be wrong to injure my neighbor's 
reputation within the limited circle of my acquaintance, 
how much more wrong must it be to injure it throughout 
a nation ! If it be, by universal acknowledgment, mean, 
to underrate the talents or vilify the character of a per- 
sonal rival, how much more so, that of a political oppo- 
nent ! If it would be degrading in me to do it myself, by 
how much is it less degrading to cause it to be done by 
others, and to honor or dishonor with my confidence, and 
reward with political distinction, those who doit? Be- 
cause a man is a political opponent, does he cease to be 
a creature of God ; and do we cease to be under obliga- 
tions to obey the law of God in respect to him ? or rather, 
I might ask, do men think that political collisions banish 
the Deity from the throne of the universe ? Nor do these 
remarks apply to political dissensions alone. The con- 
ductor of a public press possesses no greater privileges 
than any other man, nor has he any more right than any 
other man, to use, or suffer to be used, his press, for the 
sake of gratifying personal pique, or avenging individual 
wrong, or holding up individuals, without trial, to public 
scorn. Crime against society is to be punished by soci- 
ety, and by society alone ; and he who conducts a public 
press has no more right, because he has the physical 
power, to inflict pain, than any other individual. If one 
man may do it because he has a press, another may do it 
because he has muscular strength ; and thus, the govern- 
ment of society is brought to an end. Nor has he even 
a right to publish cases of individual vice, unless the 
providence of God has made them public before. While 
they are out of sight of the public, they are out of his 
sight, unless he can show that he has been specially ap- 
pointed to perform this service. 



CLASS FIRST. 



. DUTIES TO MEN, AS MEN. 
VERACITY. 

Every individual, by necessity, stands in most impor- 
tant relations, both to the past and to the future. With- 
out a knowledge of what has been, and of what, so far as 
his fellow-men are concerned, will be, he can form no 
decision in regard to the present. But this knowledge 
could never be attained, unless his constitution were made 
to correspond with his circumstances. It has, therefore, 
been made to correspond. There is, on the one hand, in 
men, a strong a priori disposition to tell the truth ; and 
it controls them, unless some other motive interpose : and 
there is, on the other hand, a disposition to believe what 
is told, unless some counteracting motive is supposed to 
operate. 

Veracity has respect to the past and present, or to 
the future. We shall consider them separately. 



CHAPTER FIRST. 

VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS THE PAST AND PRESENT. 

Veracity, in this sense, always has respect to a fact ; 
that is, to something done, or to something which we be- 
lieve to be doing. 

Moral truth consists in our intention to convey to 
another, to the best of our ability, the conception of a 
fact, exactly as it exists in our own minds. 

Physical truth consists in conveying to another the con- 
ception of a fact, precisely as it actually exists, or existed. 

These two, it is evident, do not always coincide. 

I may innocently have obtained an incorrect concep- 
tion of a fact myself, and yet may intend to convey it to 
another precisely as it exists in my own mind. Here, 
then, is a moral truth, but a physical untruth. 

Or, again, I may have a correct conception of a fact, 
supposing it to be an incorrect one, and may convey it to 
another with the intention to deceive. Here, then, is a 
moral falsehood, and a physical truth. Pure truth is 
communicated, only, when I have a correct conception 
of a fact, and communicate it, intentionally, to another, 
precisely as it exists in my own mind. 

The law on this subject is, that, when we profess to 
convey a fact to another, we, to the best of our ability, 
convey to him the impression which exists in our own 
minds. This implies, first, that we convey the impres- 
sion which exists, and not another ; and, secondly, that 
impression, without diminution or exaggeration. In other 
words, we are obliged, in the language of jurisprudence, 
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth. 

This law, therefore, forbids, — - 



280 



VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS 



1. The utterance, as truth, of what we lenow to be 
false. I say the utterance as truth, for we sometimes 
imagine cases, for the sake of illustration, as parables or 
fictitious writing, where it is known beforehand, that we 
merely address the imagination. Since we utter it as 
fiction, and wish it not to be believed, there is no false- 
hood if it be not true. 

2. Uttering as truth what we do not Tcnoiv to be true. 
Many things which men assert they cannot know to be 
true ; such, for instance, are, in many cases, the motives 
of others. There are many other things which may be 
probable, and we may be convinced that they are so, but 
of which we cannot arrive at the certainty. There are 
other things which are merely matters of opinion, con- 
cerning which every several man may hold a different 
opinion. Now, in any such case, to utter as truth what 
we cannot know, or have not known to be truth, is false- 
hood. If a man utter any thing as truth, he assumes the 
responsibility of ascertaining it to be so. If he, who 
makes the assertion, be not responsible, where shall the 
responsibility rest? And, if any man may utter what he 
chooses, under no responsibility, there is the end of all 
credibility. 

But, it will be said, are we never to utter any thing 
which we do not know to be true ? I answer : we are 
never to utter as truth what we do not know to be true. 
Whatever is a matter of probability we may utter as a 
matter of probability ; whatever is a matter of opinion, 
we may state as a matter of opinion. If we convey to 
another a conception as true, of which we have only the 
impression of probability, we convey a different concep- 
tion from that which exists in our own minds, and of 
course we do, in fact, speak falsely. 

3. Uttering what may be true in fact, but uttering it 
in such a manner, as to convey a false impression to the 
hearers. 

As, l. By exaggerating some or all of the circumstan- 
ces attendant upon the facts. 

2. By extenuating some or all of the circumstances 
attendant upon the facts. 



THE PAST AND PRESENT. 



281 



3. By exaggerating some, and extenuating others. 

4 . By stating the facts just as they existed, but so ar- 
ranging them as to leave a false impression upon the 
hearer. As, for instance, I might say, A entered B's 
room, and left it at ten o'clock ; within five minutes after 
he left it, B discovered that his watch had been stolen. 
Now, although I do not say that A stole B's watch, yet, 
if I intentionally so arrange and connect these facts as to 
leave a false impression upon the mind of the hearer, I 
am guilty of falsehood. This is a crime to which pleaders 
and partial historians, and all party narrators, are specially 
liable. 

4. As the crime, here considered, consists in making a 
false impression, with intention to deceive, the same effect 
may be produced by the tones of the voice, a look of the 
eye, a motion of the head, or any thing by which the 
mind of another may be influenced. The same rule, 
therefore, applies to impressions made in this manner, as 
to those made by words. 

5. As this rule applies to our intercourse with men as 
intelligent agents, it applies to our intercourse with men 
under all the possible relations of life. Thus, it forbids 
parents to lie to children, and children to lie to parents ; 
instructors to pupils, and pupils to instructers ; the old to 
the young, and the young to the old ; attorneys to jurors, 
and jurors to attorneys ; buyers to sellers, and sellers to 
buyers. That is, the obligation is universal, and cannot 
be set aside, by any of the complicated relations in which 
men stand to each other. 

Nor can it be varied, by the considerations, often intro- 
duced, that the person with whom we are conversing has no 
right to know the truth. This is a sufficient reason why 
we should not tell the truth, but it is no reason why we 
should tell a falsehood. Under such circumstances we 
are at liberty to refuse to reveal any thing, but we are not 
at liberty to utter what is false. 

The reason for this, is the following : The obligation to 
veracity does not depend upon the right of the inquirer to 
know the truth. Did our obligation depend upon this, it 



282 



VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS 



would vary with every person with whom we conversed ; 
and, in every case before speaking, we should be at liber- 
ty to measure the extent of our neighbor's right, and to 
tell him truth or falsehood accordingly. And, inasmuch 
as the person whom we address, would never know at 
what rate we estimated his right, no one would know how 
much to believe, any more than we should know how 
much truth or falsehood we were at liberty to tell. This 
would at once destroy every obligation to veracity. On 
the contrary, inasmuch as we are under obligation to utter 
nothing but truth in consequence of our relations to God, 
this obligation is never affected by any of the circumstan- 
ces under which we are called upon to testify. Let no 
one, therefore, excuse himself, on the ground that he tells 
only innocent lies. It cannot be innocent to do that 
which God has forbidden. " Lie not one to another, 
brethren, seeing ye have put off the old man with his 
deeds." 

That obedience to this law is demanded by the will of 
God, is manifest from several considerations : 

1. We are created with a disposition to speak what is 
true, and also to believe what is spoken. The fact that 
we are thus constituted, conveys to us an intimation that 
the Creator wills us to obey this constitution. The inten- 
tion is as evident as that which is manifested in creating 
the eye for light, and light for the eye. 

2. We are created with a moral constitution, by which 
we suffer pain whenever we violate this law, (unless our 
moral susceptibility shall have been destroyed,) and by 
which also we receive pleasure whenever, under circum- 
stances which urge to the contrary, we steadfastly obey it. 

3. We are so constituted that obedience to the law of 
veracity is absolutely necessary to our happiness. Were 
we either to lose our feeling of obligation to tell the truth, 
or our disposition to receive as truth whatever is told to 
us, there would at once be an end to all science and all 
knowledge, beyond that which every man had obtained 
by his own personal observation and experience. No 
man could profit by the discoveries of his contemporaries, 



THE FAST AND PRESENT. 



283 



much less by the discoveries of those men who have gone 
before him. Language would be useless, and we should 
be but little removed from the brutes.. Every one must 
be aware, upon the slightest reflection, that a community 
of entire liars could not exist in a state of society. The 
effects of such a course of conduct upon the whole, show 
us what is the will of God in the individual case. 

4. The will of God is abundantly made known to us in 
the holy Scriptures. I subjoin a few examples: 

"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neigh- 
bor." Ex. xx, 16. " Lying lips are an abomination to 
the Lord." Prov. vi, 16. " Keep thy tongue from evil, 
and thy lips that they speak no guile." Psalm xxxiv, 13. 
Those that speak lies are called children of the devil, that 
is, followers, imitators of the actions of the devil. John viii, 
44. See also the cases of Ananias and Sapphira, and of 
Gehazi. Acts v, and 2 Kings v, 20—27. " All liars 
shall have their portion in the lake that burnetii with 6re 
and brimstone." Rev. xxi, 8. " There shall in no wise 
enter therein (into heaven) any thing that maketh a lie." 
Ibid, verse 27. 

From what has been said, the importance of strict ad- 
herence to veracity is too evident to need further remark. 
I will, however, add, that the evil of falsehood in small 
matters, in lies told to amuse, in petty exaggerations, and 
in complimentary discourse, is not by any means duly es- 
timated. Let it be always borne in mind, that he who 
knowingly utters what is false, tells a lie ; and a lie, 
whether white, or of any other color, is a violation of the 
command of that God by whom we must be judged. 
And let us also remember that there is no vice which, 
more easily than this, stupifies a man's conscience. He 
who tells lies frequently, will soon become an habitual liar ; 
and an habitual liar will soon lose the power of readily 
distinguishing between the conceptions of his imagination 
and the recollections of his memory. I have known a 
few persons, who seemed to have arrived at this most de- 
plorable moral condition. Let every one, therefore, be- 
ware of even the most distant approaches to this detestable 
25 



284 VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS THE PAST, ETC. 

vice. A volume might easily be written on the miseries 
and loss of character which have grown out of a single lie ; 
and another volume of illustrations of the moral power 
which men have gained by means of no other prominent 
attribute than that of bold, unshrinking veracity. 

If lying be thus pernicious to ourselves, how wicked 
must it be to teach it, or specially to force it upon others ! 
What shall we say, then, of parents, who, to accomplish 
a momentary purpose, will not hesitate to utter to a child 
the most flagitious falsehoods ? Or what shall we say of 
those heads of families, who direct their children or ser- 
vants deliberately to declare that they are not at home, 
while they are quietly sitting in their parlor or their study ? 
What right has any one, for the purpose of securing a 
momentary convenience, or avoiding a petty annoyance, to 
injure for ever the moral sentiments of another? How 
can such a man or woman expect to hear the truth from 
those whom they have deliberately taught to lie ? The 
expectation is absurd ; and the result will show that such 
men, in the end, drink abundantly of the cup which they 
themselves have mingled. Before any man is tempted 
to lie, let him remember that God governs this universe 
on the principles of veracity, and that the whole consti- 
tution of things is arranged by him so as to vindicate 
truth, and to expose falsehood. Hence, the first lie always 
requires a multitude of lies to conceal it ; each one of 
which plunges the criminal into more inextricable embar- 
rassment ; and, at last, all of them will combine to cover 
him with shame. The inconveniences of truth, aside 
from the question of guilt and innocence, are infinitely 
less than the inconveniences of falsehood. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 

The future is, within some conditions, subject to our 
power. We may, therefore, place ourselves under moral 
obligations to act, within those conditions, in a particular 
manner. When we make a promise, we voluntarily place 
ourselves under such a moral obligation. The law of 
veracity obliges us to fulfil it. 

This part of the subject includes promises and contracts. 

I. Of promises. 

In every promise, two things are to be considered : the 
intention and the obligation. 

1. The intention. The law of veracity, in this respect, 
demands that we convey to the promisee the intention as 
it exists in our own minds. When we inform another 
that we intend to do a service for him to-morrow, we 
have no more right to lie about this than about any other 
matter. 

2. The obligation. The law of veracity obliges us to 
fulfil the intention just as we made it known. In other 
words, we are under obligation to satisfy, precisely, the 
expectation which we voluntarily excited. The rule of 
Paley is, " a promise is binding in the sense in which the 
promiser supposed the promisee to receive it." 

The modes in which promises may be violated, and 
the reasons for believing the obligation to fulfil promises 
to be the law of God, are so similar to those mentioned in 
the preceding chapter, that I will not repeat them. 

I therefore proceed to consider in what cases promises 
are not binding. The following are, I think, among the 
most important : 

Promises are not binding, — - 



286 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 



1. When the performance is impossible. We cannot 
be under obligation to do what is plainly out of our power. 
The moral character of such a promise, will, however, 
vary with the circumstances under which the promise was 
made. If I knew nothing of the impossibility, and hon- 
estly expressed an intention which I designed to fulfil, I 
am, at the bar of conscience, acquitted. The providence 
of God has interfered with my intention, and 1 am not to 
blame. If, on the other hand, I knew of the impossibili- 
ty, I have violated the law of veracity. I expressed an 
intention which I did not mean to fulfil. I am bound to 
make good to the other party all the loss which he may 
have sustained by my crime. 

2. When the promise is unlawful. No man can be 
under obligation to violate obligation ; for this would be 
to suppose a man to be guilty for not being guilty. 
Much less, can he be under moral obligation to violate 
his obligations to God. Hence, promises to lie, to steal, 
or in any manner to violate the laws of society, are not 
binding. And the duty of every man, who has placed 
himself under any such obligation, is, at once, to confess 
his fault, to declare himself free from his engagement, and 
to endeavor to persuade others to do the same. Here, as 
in the former instance, there are two cases. Where the 
unlawfulness was not Tcnown, the promiser is under no 
other obligation than that of informing the promisee of 
the facts as soon as possible. Where the unlawfulness 
was Icnoivn to the promiser, and not to the promisee, I 
think that the former is bound to make good the loss to 
the latter, if any occur. When it is known to both par- 
ties, either is at liberty to disengage himself, and neither 
is under any obligation to make any restitution ; for the 
fault is common to both, and each should bear his own 
share of the inconvenience. 

3. Promises are not binding where no expectation is 
voluntarily excited by the promiser. He is bound only 
to fulfil the expectation which he voluntarily excites; 
and if he have excited none, he has made no promise. 
If A tell B that he shall give a horse to C, and B, with- 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 



281 



out A's knowledge or consent, inform C of it, A is not 
bound. But, if he directed B to give the information, he 
is as much bound as though he informed C himself. 

4. Promises are not binding when they are known 
by both parties to proceed upon a condition, which con- 
dition is subsequently, by the promiser, found not to 
exist. As, if A promises to give a beggar money on the 
faith of his story, and the story is subsequently found to 
be a fabrication, A, in such a case, is manifestly not 
bound. 

5. As the very conception of a promise implies an 
obligation entered into between two intelligent moral 
agents, I think there can be no such obligation entered 
into where one of the parties is not a moral agent. 1 do 
not think we can properly be said to make a promise to a 
brute, nor to violate it. I think the same is true of a 
madman. Nevertheless, expediency has, even in such 
cases, always taught the importance of fulfilling expecta- 
tion which we voluntarily excite. I think, however, that 
it stands on the ground of expediency, and not of obliga- 
tion. I do not suppose that any one would feel guilty for 
deceiving a madman, in order to lead him to a madhouse. 

These seem to me to be the most common cases in 
which promises are not binding. The mere inconvenience 
to which we may be exposed by fulfilling a promise, is 
not a release. We are at liberty, beforehand, to enter 
into the obligation, or not. No man need promise unless 
he please : but, having once promised, he is holden until 
he be morally liberated. Hence, as, after the obligation 
is formed, it cannot be recalled, prudence would teach us 
to be extremely cautious in making promises. Except in 
cases where we are, from long experience, fully acquaint- 
ed with all the ordinary contingencies of an event, we 
ought never to make a promise without sufficient oppor- 
tunity for reflection. It is a good rule, to enter into no 
important engagement on the same day in which it is first 
presented to our notice. And I believe that it will be 
generally found, that those who are most careful in prom- 
ising, are the most conscientious in performing ; and that, 
25* 



288 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 



on the contrary, those who are willing, on all occasions, 
to pledge themselves on the instant, have very little diffi- 
culty in violating their engagements with corresponding 
thoughtlessness. 
Of contracts. 

The peculiarity of a contract is, that it is a mutual 
promise : that is, we promise to do one thing, on the 
condition that another person does another. 

The rule of interpretation, the reasons for its obligato- 
riness, and the cases of exception to the obligatoriness, 
are the same as in the preceding cases, except that it has 
a specific condition annexed, by which the obligation is 
limited. 

Hence, after a contract is made, while the other party 
performs his part, we are under moral obligation to per- 
form our part ; but, if either party fail, the other is, by the 
failure of the condition essential to the contract, liberated. 

But this is not all. Not only is the one party liberated, 
by the failure of the other party to perform his part of the 
contract ; the first has, moreover, upon the second, a claim 
for damages to the amount of what he may have suffered 
by such failure. 

Here, however, it is to be observed, that a distinction 
is to be made between a simple contract, that is, a con- 
tract to do a particular act, and a contract by which we 
enter upon a relation established by our Creator. Of the 
first kind, are ordinary mercantile contracts to sell or de- 
liver merchandise at a particular place, for a specified 
sum, to be paid at a particular time. Here, if the price 
is not paid, we are under no obligation to deliver the 
goods ; and, if the goods are not delivered, we are under 
no obligation to pay the price. Of the second kind, are 
the contract of civil society, and the marriage contract. 
These, being appointed by the constitution under which 
God has placed us, may be dissolved only for such rea- 
sons as he has appointed. Thus, society and the individ- 
ual enter mutually into certain obligations with respect to 
each other ; but it does not follow, that either party is 
liberated by every failure of the other. The case is the 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 



289 



same with the marriage contract. In these instances, 
each party is bound to fulfil its part of the contract, not- 
withstanding the failure of the other. 

It is here proper to remark, that the obligation to ve- 
racity is precisely the same, under what relations soever 
it may be formed. It is as binding between individuals 
and society, on both parts, and upon societies and socie- 
ties, as it is between individuals. There is no more ex- 
cuse for society, when it violates its obligation to an indi- 
vidual, or for an individual when he violates his obligations 
to society, than in any other case of deliberate falsehood. 
By how much more are societies or communities bound 
to fidelity, in their engagements with each other, since 
the faith of treaties is the only barrier which interposes to 
shield nations from the appeal to bloodshed in every case 
of collision of interests ! And the obligation is the same, 
under what circumstances soever nations may treat with 
each other. A civilized people has no right to violate its 
solemn obligations, because the other party is uncivilized. 
A strong nation has no right to lie to a weak nation. 
The simple fact, that two communities of moral agents 
have entered into engagements, binds both of them equally 
in the sight of their common Creator. And He, who is 
the Judge of all, in His holy habitation, will assuredly 
avenge, with most solemn retributions, that violation of 
faith, in which the peculiar blessings bestowed upon one 
party are made a reason for inflicting misery upon the 
other party, with whom he has dealt less bountifully. 
Shortly before the death of the Duke of Burgundy, the 
pupil of Fenelon, a cabinet council was held, at which he 
was present, to take into consideration the expediency of 
violating a treaty ; which it was supposed could be done 
with manifest advantage to France. The treaty was 
read ; and the ministers explained in what respects it 
operated unfavorably, and how great an accession of ter- 
ritory might be made to France, by acting in defiance of 
its solemn obligations. Reasons of state were, of course, 
offered in abundance, to justify the deed of perfidy. The 
Duke of Burgundy heard them all in silence. When 



290 



VERACITY OF THE FUTURE. 



they had finished, he closed the conference by laying his 
hand upon the instrument, and saying, with emphasis, 
" Gentlemen, there is a treaty." This single sentiment 
is a more glorious monument to his fame, than a column 
inscribed with the record of an hundred victories. 

It is frequently said, partly by way of explanation, and 
partly by way of excuse, for the violation of contracts by 
communities, that corporate bodies have no conscience. 
In what sense this is true, it is not necessary here to in- 
quire. It is sufficient to know that every one of the cor- 
porators has a conscience, and is responsible to God for 
obedience to its dictates. Men may mystify before each 
other, and they may stupify the monitor in their own 
bosoms, by throwing the blame of perfidy upon each 
other; but it is yet worthy to be remembered, that they 
act in the presence of a Being with whom the night 
shineth as the day, and that they must appear before a 
tribunal where there will be " no shuffling." For beings 
acting under these conditions, there surely can be no wiser 
or better course, than that of simple, unsophisticated ver- 
ity, under what relations soever they may be called upon 
to act. 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



OF OATHS. 

I. The Theory of oaths. 

It is frequently of the highest importance to society, that 
the facts relating to a particular transaction should be dis- 
tinctly and accurately ascertained. Unless this could be 
done, neither the innocent could be protected, nor the 
guilty punished; that is, justice could not be administered, 
and society could not exist. 

To almost every fact, or to the circumstances which de- 
termine it to be fact, there must be, from the laws ol cause 
and effect, and from the social nature of man, many wit- 
nesses. The fact can, therefore, be generally known, if the 
witnesses can be induced to testify, and to testify the truth. 

To place men under such circumstances, that, upon the 
ordinary principles of the human mind, they shall be most 
likely to testify truly, is the design of administering an 
oath. 

In taking an oath, besides incurring the ordinary civil 
penalties incident to perjury, he who swears, calls upon 
God to witness the truth of his assertions ; and, also, either 
expressly or by implication, invokes upon himself the 
judgments of God, if he speak falsely. The ordinary 
form of swearing in this country, and in Great Britain, is 
to close the promise of veracity with the words, " So help 
me God ;" that is, may God only help me as I tell the 
truth. Inasmuch as, without the help of God, we must 
be miserable for time and for eternity ; to relinquish his 
help, if we violate the truth, is, on this condition, to im- 
precate upon ourselves the absence of the favor of God, 
and, of course, all possible misery for ever. 

The theory of oaths, then, I suppose to be as follows : 



292 



OF OATHS. 



1. Men naturally speak the truth, when there is no 
counteracting motive to prevent it ; and, unless some such 
motive be supposed to supervene, they expect the truth 
to be spoken. 

2. When, however, by speaking falsely, some imme- 
diate advantage can be gained, or some immediate evil 
avoided, they will frequently speak falsely. 

3. But, when a greater good can be gained, or a greater 
evil avoided, by speaking the truth, than could possibly 
be gained or avoided by speaking falsely, they will, on 
the ordinary principles of the human mind, speak the 
truth. To place them under such circumstances, is the 
design of an oath. 

4. Now, as the favor of God is the source of every 
blessing which man can possibly enjoy, and as his dis- 
pleasure must involve misery utterly beyond the grasp of 
our limited conceptions, if we can place men under such 
circumstances that, by speaking falsely, they relinquish 
all claim to the one, and incur all that is awful in the 
other, we manifestly place a stronger motive before them 
for speaking the truth, than can possibly be conceived for 
speaking falsehood. Hence, it is supposed, on the ordi- 
nary principles of the human mind, that men, under such 
circumstances, will speak the truth. 

Such I suppose to be the theory of oaths. There can 
be no doubt that, if men acted upon this conviction, the 
truth would be, by means of oaths, universally elicited. 

But, inasmuch as men may be required to testify, whose 
practical conviction of these great moral truths is at best 
but weak, and who are liable to be more strongly influ- 
enced by immediate than by ulterior motives, human pun- 
ishments have always been affixed to the crime of perjury. 
These, of course, vary in different ages, and in different 
periods of society. The most equitable provision seems to 
be that of the Jewish law, by which the perjurer was 
made to suffer precisely the same injury which he had 
designed to inflict upon the innocent party. The Mosaic 
enactment seems intended to have been, in regard to this 
crime, unusually rigorous. The judges are specially com- 



OF OATHS. 



293 



manded not to spare, but to exact an eye for an eye, a tooth 
for a tooth. It certainly deserves serious consideration, 
whether modern legislators might not derive important in- 
struction from this feature of Jewish jurisprudence. 

II. The lawfulness of oaths. On this subject, a di- 
versity of opinion has been entertained. It has been urged, 
by those who deny the lawfulness of oaths, — 

1. That oaths are frequently forbidden in the New Tes- 
tament ; and that we are commanded to use yes for our af- 
firmative, and no for our negative; for the reason that, 
" whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil, or of the 
evil one." 

2. That no man has a right to peril his eternal salva- 
tion, upon a condition which, from intellectual or moral 
imbecility, he would be so liable to violate. 

3. That no one has a right to oblige another to place 
himself under such conditions. 

4. That the frequent use of oaths tends, by abating our 
reverence for the Deity, to lessen the practical feeling of 
obligation to veracity. 

5. That no reason can be assigned, why this crime should 
be treated so differently from every other. Other crimes, 
so far as man is concerned, are left to human punishments ; 
and there can be no reason why this crime should involve 
the additional punishment intended by the imprecation of 
the loss of the soul. 

6. It is said that those sects who never take an oath, are 
as fully believed, upon their simple affirmation, as any oth- 
ers ; nay, that false witness among them is more rare than 
among other men taken at random. This is, I believe, 
acknowledged to be the fact. 

Those who defend the lawfulness of oaths urge, on the 
contrary, — 

1. That those passages in the New Testament which 
have been referred to, forbid, not judicial oaths, but merely 
profanity. 

2. That our Savior responded, when examined upon 
oath. This, however, is denied, by the other party, to be a 
fair interpretation. 



294 



OF OATHS. 



3. That the Apostles on several occasions, call God to 
witness, when they are attesting to particular facts. The 
instances adduced are such phrases as these : "God is my 
witness ;" " Behold, before God I lie not." The example 
in this case is considered sufficient to assure us of the law- 
fulness of this sort of appeal. 

4. That the importance of truth to the purposes of jus- 
tice, warrants us in taking other measures for the preven- 
tion of perjury than are taken for the prevention of other 
crimes ; and specially, as this is a crime to the commission 
of which there may always exist peculiarly strong temp- 
tations. 

These are, I believe, the principal considerations which 
have been urged on both sides of the question. It seems 
to me to need a more thorough discussion than can be 
allowed to it in this place. One thing, however, seems 
evident, that the multiplication of oaths, demanded by the 
present practice of most Christian nations, is not only 
very wicked, but that its direct tendency is to diminish 
our reverence for the Deity ; and thus, in the end, to lead 
to the very evil which it is intended to prevent. 

III. Interpretation of oaths. 

As oaths are imposed for the safety of the party admin- 
istering them, they are to be interpreted as he understands 
them. The person under oath has no right to make any 
mental reservation, but to declare the truth, precisely in 
the manner that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, is expected of him. On no other principle 
would we ever know what to believe or to expect from a 
witness. If, for the sake of personal friendship, or person- 
al advantage, or from fear of personal inconvenience, or 
from the excitement of party partiality, he shrink from 
declaring the whole truth, he is as truly guilty of perjury 
as though he swore falsely for money. 

IV. Different kinds of oaths. 

Oaths respect either the past or the future, that is, are 
either assertory or promissory. 

1. The oath respecting the past, is definite. A trans- 
action either took place, or it did not take place, and we 



OF OATHS. 



295 



either have or have not some knowledge respecting it. It 
is, therefore, in our power either to tell what we know, or 
to tell what, and in how much, we do not know. This is 
the proper occasion for an oath. 

2. The oath respecting the future is of necessity indefi- 
nite, as when we promise upon oath to discharge, to the 
best of our ability, a particular office. Thus, the parties 
may have very different views of what is meant, by dis- 
charging an office according to the best of our ability ; 
or this obligation may conflict with others, such as domes- 
tic or personal obligations ; and the incumbent may not 
know, even with the best intentions, which obligation 
ought to take the precedence, that is, w 7 hat is the best of 
his ability. Such being the case, who, that is aware of 
the frailty of human nature, will dare to peril his eternal 
salvation upon the performance, to the best of his ability y 
of any official duty ? And, if these allowances are under- 
stood by both parties, how are they to be limited ; and, if 
they be not limited, what is the value of an oath ?, Such 
being the case, it is, at best, doubtful, whether promissory 
oaths of office ought ever to be required. Much less ought 
they to be required, as is frequently the case, in the most 
petty details of official life. They must be a snare to the 
conscience of a thoughtful man ; and must tend to oblite- 
rate moral distinctions from the mind of him who is, as is 
too frequently the case, unfortunately thoughtless. Why 
should one man, who is called upon to discharge the du- 
ties of a constable, or of an overseer of common schools, 
or even of a counsellor or a judge, be placed under the pains 
and perils of perjury, or under peril of his eternal salva- 
tion, any more than his neighbor, who discharges the duty 
of a merchant, of an instructer of youth, a physician, or a 
clergyman ? It seems to me that no man can take such 
an oath of office, upon reflection, without such mental 
reservation as must immediately convince him that the re- 
quirement is nugatory ; and, if so, that it must be injurious. 
26 



CLASS SECOND. 



DUTIES WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SEXES. 

It has already been remarked, that the very fact, that 
our Creator has constituted us with a capacity for a par- 
ticular form of happiness, and has provided means for the 
gratification of that desire, is, in itself, an intimation that 
he intended that this desire should be gratified. But, as 
our happiness is the design of this constitution, it is equally 
evident, that he intended this desire to be gratified only in 
such manner as would conduce to this result; and that, in 
estimating that result, we must take into view the whole 
nature of man, as a rational and accountable being, and 
not only man as an individual, but man also as a society. 

1. The subject upon which we now enter, presents a 
striking illustration of the truth of these remarks. On the 
one hand, it is evident that the principle of sexual desire, 
is a part of the constitution of man. That it was intend- 
ed to be gratified, is evident from the fact, that, without 
such gratification, the race of man would immediately 
cease to exist. Again, if it were not placed under re- 
strictions, that is, were promiscuous intercourse permitted, 
the race would perish from neglect of offspring, and uni- 
versal sterility. Thus, universal celibacy and unlimited 
indulgence, would both equally defeat the end of the 
Creator. It is, therefore, as evident that our Creator has 
imposed a limit to this desire, as a part of our constitution, 
as that he has implanted within us the desire itself. It is 
the object of the law of chastity to explain and enforce 
this limit. 

2. As it is manifestly the object of the Creator, that 
the sexes should live together, and form a society with 
each other, in many respects dissimilar to every other 



DUTIES WHICH ARISE, ETC. 



297 



society, producing new relations, and imposing new obli- 
gations, the laws of this society need to be particularly 
explained. This is the law of marriage. 

3. As the result of marriage is children, a new relation 
arises out of this connection, namely, the relation of parent 
and child. This imposes special obligations upon both 
parties, namely, the duties and rights of parents, and the 
duties and rights of children. 

This class of duties will, therefore, be treated of in the 
following order : 

Chapter 1. The general duty of chastity. 
" 2. The law of marriage. 
" 3. The rights and duties of parents. 
" 4. The rights and duties of children. 



CHAPTER FIRST. 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

The sexual appetite being a part of our constitution, 
and a limit to the indulgence of it being fixed by the 
Creator, the business of moral philosophy is to ascertain 
this limit. 

The moral law on this subject is as follows : 
The duty of chastity limits the indulgence of this de- 
sire, to individuals who are exclusively united to each 
other for life. 

Hence it forbids, — 

1. Adultery, or intercourse between a married person 
and every other person except that person to whom he 
or she is united for life. 

2. Polygamy, or a plurality of wives or of husbands. 

3. Concubinage, or the temporary cohabitation of indi- 
viduals with each other. 

4. Fornication, or intercourse with prostitutes, or with 
any individual under any other condition than that of the 
marriage covenant. 

5. Inasmuch as unchaste desire is strongly excited by 
the imagination, the law of chastity forbids all impure 
thoughts ; all unchaste conversation, looks, or gestures ; the 
reading of obscene or lascivious books, and every thing 
which would naturally produce in us a disposition of mind 
to violate this precept. 

That the above is the law of God on this subject, is 
manifest, both from natural and from revealed religion. 
The law, as above recited, contains two restrictions : 

1. That the individuals be exclusively united to each 
other; and, — 

2. That this exclusive union be for life. 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 



Let us examine the indications of natural religion upon 
both of these points. 

I. The indulgence of the desire referred to, is, by the 
law of God, restricted to individuals exclusively united to 
each other. This may be shown from several considera- 
tions. 

1. The number of births, of both sexes, under all cir- 
cumstances, and in all ages, has been substantially equal. 
Now, if single individuals be not exclusively united to 
each other, there must arise an inequality of distribution, 
unless we adopt the law of promiscuous concubinage. 
But as the desire is universal, it cannot be intended that 
the distribution should be unequal ; for thus, many would, 
from necessity, be left single. And the other alternative, 
promiscuous concubinage, would very soon lead, as we 
have already remarked, to the extinction of society. 

2. The manifest design of nature is to increase the hu- 
man species, in the most rapid ratio consistent with the 
conditions of our being. That is always the most happy 
condition of a nation, and that nation is most accurately 
obeying the laws of our constitution, in which the number 
of the human race is most rapidly increasing. Now it is 
certain, that, under the law of chastity, as it has been ex- 
plained, that is, where individuals are exclusively united 
to each other, the increase of population will be more 
rapid, than under any other circumstances. 

3. That must be the true law of the domestic relations 
which will have the most beneficial effect upon the main- 
tenance and education of children. Under the influence 
of such a law as I have described, it is manifest, that chil- 
dren will be incomparably better provided for than under 
that of any other. The number of children produced by 
a single pair thus united, will ordinarily be as great as can 
be supported and instructed by two individuals. And, be- 
sides, the care of children, under these circumstances, be- 
comes a matter, not merely of duty, but of pleasure. On 
the contrary, just in so far as this law is violated, the love 
of offspring diminishes. The care of a family, instead of 
a pleasure, becomes an insupportable burden ; and, in the 

26* 



300 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 



worst states of society, children either perish by multitudes 
from neglect, or are murdered by their parents in infancy. 
The number of human beings who perish by infanticide, 
in heathen countries, is almost incredible. And in coun- 
tries not heathen, it is a matter of notoriety, that neglect 
of offspring is the universal result of licentiousness in pa- 
rents. The support of foundlings, in some of the most 
licentious districts in Europe, has become so great a pub- 
lic burden as to give rise to serious apprehension. 

4. There can be no doubt that man is intended to 
derive by far the greatest part of his happiness from soci- 
ety. And of social happiness, by far the greatest, the 
most exquisite, and the most elevating portion, is that 
derived from the domestic relations ; not only those of 
husband and wife, but those of parent and child, of brother 
and sister, and those arising from the more distant grada- 
tions of collateral kindred. Now, human happiness, in 
this respect, can exist only in proportion to our obedience 
to the law of chastity. What domestic happiness can be 
expected in a house continually agitated by the ceaseless 
jealousy of several wives, and the interminable quarrels 
of their several broods of children ? How can filial love 
dwell in the bosoms of children, the progeny of one father 
by several concubines? This state of society existed 
under the most favorable circumstances, in the patriarchal 
age ; and its results even here are sufficiently deplorable. 
ISo one can read the histories of the families of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob, and David, without becoming convinced 
that no deviation can be made from the gospel law of 
marriage, without creating a tendency to wrangling with- 
out end, to bitterness and strife, nay, to incest and murder. 
And if this be the result of polygamy and concubinage, 
in what language is it possible to describe the effects of 
universal licentiousness ? By this, the very idea of home 
would be abolished. The name of parent would signify 
no more in man than in the brutes. Man, instead of be- 
ing social, would become nothing more than a gregarious 
animal, distinguished from his fellow-animals by nothing 
else than greater intellectual capacity, and the more dis- 
gusting abuse of it. 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 301 

5. No reason can be assigned, why the intellectual, 
moral and social happiness of the one sex is not as valu- 
able, in the sight of the Creator, as that of the other. Much 
less can any reason be assigned, why the one sex should 
be to the other merely a source of sensual gratification. 
But, just as we depart from the law of chastity, as it has 
been here explained, woman ceases to be the equal and 
the companion of man, and becomes either his timid and 
much abused slave, or else the mere instrument for the 
gratification of his lust. No one can pretend to believe 
that the Creator ever intended that one human being 
should stand in such a relation as this to any other human 
being. 

II. The second part of the law of chastity requires that 
this union should be for life. 

Some of the reasons for this are as follows : 

1. In order to domestic happiness, it is necessary that 
both parties should cultivate a spirit of conciliation and 
forbearance, and mutually endeavor to conform their 
individual peculiarities to each other. Unless this be 
done, instead of a community of interests, there will arise 
incessant collision. Now, nothing can tend more directly 
to the cultivation of a proper temper, than the considera- 
tion that this union is indissoluble. A mere temporary 
union, liable to be dissolved by every ebullition of pas- 
sion, would foster every impetuous and selfish feeling of 
the human heart. 

2. If the union be not for life, there is no other limit to 
be fixed to its continuance than the will of either party. 
This would speedily lead to promiscuous concubinage, 
and all the evils resulting from it, of which I have already 
spoken. 

3. Children require the care of both parents until they 
have attained to maturity ; that is, generally, during the 
greater part of the lifetime of their parents, at least, dur- 
ing all that period of their life in which they would be 
most likely to desire a separation. Besides, the children 
are the joint property of both parents ; and, if the domes- 
tic society is dissolved, they belong to one no more than 



302 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 

to the other ; that is, they have no protector, but are cast 
out defenceless upon the world. 

4. Or, if this be not the case, and they are protected 
by one parent, they must suffer an irreparable loss by the 
withdrawment of the other parent from his or her share 
of the parental responsibility. In general, the care would 
fall upon the mother, whose parental instincts are the 
strongest, but who is, from her peculiar situation, least 
able to protect them. The whole tendency of every 
licentious system is, to take advantage of the parental 
tenderness of the mother; and, because she would rather 
die than leave her children to perish, basely to devolve 
upon her a burden which she is wholly unable to sustain. 

5. Parents themselves, in advanced years, need the 
care of their children, and become dependent, in a great 
measure, for their happiness upon them. But all this 
source of happiness is dried up by any system which al- 
lows of the disruption of the domestic society, and the 
desertion of offspring, simply at the will of the parent. 

The above considerations may perhaps be deemed 
sufficient to establish the general law, and to show what 
is the will of the Creator on this subject. But it may be 
suggested, that all these consequences need not follow 
occasional aberrations, and that individual cases of licen- 
tious indulgence should be exempted from the general 
rule. To this 1 answer, — 

1. The severity of the punishment which God has 
affixed to the crime in general, shows how severe is his 
displeasure against it. God is no respecter of persons, 
but he will visit upon every one the strict reward of his 
iniquity. And he does thus act. In woman, this vice is 
immediately fatal to character; and in man, it leads di- 
rectly to those crimes which are the sure precursors of 
temporal and eternal perdition. 

2. The God who made us all, and who is the Father 
and the Judge of his creatures, is omniscient ; and he will 
bring every secret thing into judgment. Let the seducer 
and the profligate remember that each must stand, with 
his victim and his partner in guilt, before the Judge of 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 303 

quick and dead, where a recompense will be rendered to 
every man according to his deeds. 

3. Let it be remembered that a female is a moral and 
accountable being, hastening with us to the bar of God ; 
that she is made to be the centre of all that is delightful 
in the domestic relations ; that, by her very nature, she 
looks up to man as her protector, and loves to confide in 
his hands her happiness for life ; and that she can be ru- 
ined only by abusing that confidence, proving false to that 
reliance, and using the very loveliest trait in her character 
as the instrument of her undoing. And then let us con- 
sider the misery into which a loss of virtue must plunge 
the victim and her friends for ever ; the worth of that soul, 
which, unless a miracle interpose, must, by the loss of 
virtue, be consigned to eternal despair; and I ask whether, 
in the whole catalogue of human crime, there be one 
whose atrocity more justly merits the deepest damnation, 
than that which, for the momentary gratification of a law- 
less appetite, will violate all these obligations, outrage all 
these sympathies, and work out so wide-spreading, so in- 
terminable a ruin ? 

Such is the lesson of natural religion on this subject. 

III. The precepts of revealed religion may be very 
briefly stated : 

1. The seventh commandment is, "Thou shaft not 
commit adultery." Ex. xx, 14. By the term adultery, 
is meant every unlawful act and thought. The Mosaic 
law enacted that he who seduced a woman should marry 
her. Ex. xxii, 16, 17. This is, doubtless, the equitable 
rule ; and there is no reason why it should not be strictly 
enforced now, both by the civil law and by the opinions 
of the community. 

2. The punishment of adultery was, under the same 
law, death to both parties. Lev. x, 22. Deut. xxii, 22. 
That this should now be enforced, no one will contend. 
But it is sufficient to show in what abhorrence the crime 
is held by the Creator. 

3. The consequences of whoredom and adultery are 
frequently set forth in the prophets, and the most awful 



304 THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 



judgments of God are denounced against them. This 
subject is also treated with graphic power by Solomon, in 
the book of Proverbs. See Proverbs v, 3 — 29; vii, 
5—26. 

4. Our Savior explains the law of chastity and marriage 
in his sermon on the mount, and declares it equally to 
respect unclean thoughts and actions: " Ye have heard 
that it hath been said by them of old time, thou shalt not 
commit adultery. But I say unto you, that whosoever 
looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed 
adultery with her already in his heart. And if thy right 
eye offend thee (or cause thee to offend), pluck it out 
and cast it from thee ; for it is profitable for thee that one 
of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole 
body should be cast into hell." Matt, v, 27—32. That 
is, as I suppose, eradicate from your bosom every impure 
thought, no matter at what sacrifice; for no one who 
cherishes impurity, even in thought, can be an inheritor 
of the kingdom of heaven. 

Uncleanness is also frequently enumerated among the 
crimes which exclude men from the kingdom of heaven : 

Ephesians v, 5, 6 : " No whoremonger or unclean 
person hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and 
God." 

Galatians v, 19 — 21 : " Now, the works of the flesh 
are manifest, which are these : adultery, fornication, un- 
cleanness, lasciviousness ; of the which I tell you before, 
as 1 have told you in times past, that they which do such 
things shall not inherit the kingdom of God." 

Colossians iii, 5, 6 : " Mortify, therefore, your mem- 
bers, which are upon the earth : fornication, uncleanness, 
inordinate affections ; for which things' sake, the wrath 
of God cometh upon the children of disobedience." 

Let every one remember, therefore, that whoever vio- 
lates this command, violates it in defiance of the most 
clearly revealed command of God, and at the peril of his 
own soul. He must meet his act, and the consequences 
of it, at that day when the secrets of all hearts are made 
manifest, when every hidden thing will be brought to 



THE GENERAL DUTY OF CHASTITY. 305 



light, and when God will judge every man according to 
his deeds. 

I remarked above, that the law of chastity forbade the 
indulgence of impure or lascivious imaginations, the har- 
boring such thoughts in our minds, or the doing of any 
thing by which such thoughts should be excited. Of no 
vice is it so true as of this, that " lust, when it is cherish- 
ed, bringeth forth sin ; and sin, when it is finished, bring- 
eth forth death." Licentiousness in outward conduct 
never appears, until the mind has become defiled by im- 
pure imaginations. When, however, the mind has become 
thus defiled, nothing is wanted but suitable opportunity to 
complete the moral catastrophe. Hence, the necessity 
of the most intense vigilance in the government of our 
thoughts, and in the avoiding of all books, and all pictures, 
and all society, of which the tendency is to imbue our 
imaginations with any thing at variance with the purest 
chastity. Whatever, in other respects, may be the fasci- 
nations of a book, if it be impure or lascivious, let it be 
eschewed. Whatever be the accomplishments of an ac- 
quaintance, if he or she be licentious in conversation or 
action, let him or her be shunned. No man can take fire 
in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned. We cannot 
mingle with the vile, let that vileness be dressed in ever 
so tasteful a garb, without becoming defiled. The only 
rule of safety is, to avoid the appearance of evil; for thus 
alone shall we be able to avoid the reality. Hence it is, 
that a licentious theatre (and the tendency of all theatres 
is to licentiousness), immodest dancing, and all amuse- 
ments which tend to inflame the passions, are horribly 
pernicious to the morals of a community. It would be 
interesting to learn on what principle of morals a virtuous 
woman would justify her attendance upon an amusement, 
in which she beholds before her a once lovely female 
uttering covert obscenity in the presence of thousands, 
and where she is surrounded by hundreds of women, also 
once lovely, but now abandoned, whose ruin has been 
consummated by this very means, and who assemble in 
this place, with the more certain assurance of thus being 
able, most successfully, to effect the ruin of others. 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 

It has been already remarked, in the preceding section, 
that the law of chastity forbids all sexual intercourse be- 
tween persons who have not been exclusively united for 
life. In the act of marriage, two persons, under the most 
solemn circumstances, are thus united ; and they enter 
into a mutual contract thus to live in respect to each 
other This relation having been established by God, the 
contract thus entered into has all the solemnity of an oath. 
Hence he who violates it is guilty of a twofold crime : 
first, the violation of the law of chastity ; and, secondly, of 
the law of veracity, — a veracity pledged under the most 
solemn circumstances. 

But this is by no means all that is intended by the in- 
stitution of marriage. By the contract thus entered into, 
a society is formed, of a most interesting and important 
character, which is the origin of all civil society ; and in 
which, children are prepared to become members of that 
great community. As our principal knowledge of the 
nature and obligations of this institution is derived from 
the sacred Scriptures, I shall endeavor briefly to explain 
the manner in which they treat of it, without adding any 
thing to what I have already said, in regard to the teach- 
ing of natural religion. 

I shall consider, first, the nature of this contract, and, 
secondly, the duties which it enjoins, and the crimes 
which it forbids. 

I. The nature of the contract. 

1. The contract is for life, and is dissoluble for one 
cause only, — the cause of whoredom : 

Matthew xix, 3 — 6, 9. "Then came some of the 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



307 



Pharisees to him, and, tempting him, asked, Can a man, 
upon every pretence, divorce his wife? He answered, 
Have ye not read, that at the beginning, when the Crea- 
tor made man, he formed a male and female; and said, 
for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and 
adhere to his wife ; and they two shall be one flesh. 
Wherefore, they are no longer two, but one flesh. What 
then God hath conjoined, let not man separate. Where- 
fore, I say unto you, whosoever divorceth his wife, except 
for whoredom, and marrieth another, committeth adultery." 
I use here the translation of Dr. Campbell, which, T think, 
conveys more correctly than the common version the 
meaning of the original. 

2. We are here taught that marriage, being an institu- 
tion of God, is subject to his laws alone, and not to the 
laws of man. 

3. This contract is essentially mutual. By entering 
into it, the members form a society, that is, they have 
something in common. Whatever is thus in common, 
belongs equally to both. And, on the contrary, what is 
not thus surrendered, remains as before in the power of 
the individual. 

4. The basis of this union is affection. Individuals 
thus contract themselves to each other, on the ground not 
merely of mutual regard, but also of a regard stronger 
than that which they entertain for any other persons else. 
If such be not the condition of the parties, they cannot be' 
united with any fair prospect of happiness. 

5. Now, such is the nature of the human affections, that 
we derive a higher and a purer pleasure from rendering 
happy those whom we love than from self-gratification. 
Thus, a parent prefers self-denial, for the sake of a child r 
to self-indulgence. The same principle is illustrated in 
every case of pure and disinterested benevolence. This; 
is the essential element, on which depends the happiness 
of the married state. To be in the highest degree happy, 
we must each prefer the happiness of another to our own. 

6. I have mentioned above, that, this being a voluntary 
compact, and forming a peculiar society, there were some^ 

27 



308 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



things which, by this compact, each surrendered to the 
other, and also other things which were not surrendered. 
It is important that these be distinguished from each other. 
1 remark, then, — 

Neither party surrenders to the other any control over 
any thing appertaining to the conscience. From the na- 
ture of our moral constitution, nothing of this sort can be 
surrendered to any created being. For either party to in- 
terfere with the discharge of those duties, which the other 
party really supposes itself to owe to God, is therefore 
wicked and oppressive. 

Neither party surrenders to the other any thing which 
would violate prior and lawful obligations. Thus, a husband 
does not promise to subject his professional pursuits to the 
will of his wife. He has chosen his profession, and, if he 
pursue it lawfully, it does not interfere with the contract. 
So, also, his duties as a citizen, are of prior obligation; 
and, if they really interfere with any others, those subse- 
quently formed must be construed in subjection to them. 
Thus, also, the filial duties of both parties remain, in some 
respects, unchanged after marriage, and the marriage con- 
tract should not be so interpreted as to violate them. 

On the other hand, I suppose that the marriage contract 
binds each party, whenever individual gratification is con- 
cerned, to prefer the happiness of the other party to its 
own. If pleasure can be enjoyed by both, the happiness 
of both is increased by enjoying it in common. If it can 
be enjoyed but by one, each should prefer that it be en- 
joyed by the other. And if there be sorrow to be endur- 
ed, or inconvenience to be suffered, each should desire, if 
possible, to bear the infliction for the sake of shielding the 
other from pain. 

And, as I have remarked before, the disposition to do 
this arises from the very nature of the principles on which 
the compact is formed, that is, unreserved affection. This 
is the very manner in which affection always displays it- 
self. This is the very means by which affection is created. 
" She loved me for the dangers I had seen, and I loved 
her that she did pity them." — Shakspeare, Othello. 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



309 



And this is the only course of conduct by which affection 
can be retained. And the manifestation of this temper is, 
under all circumstances obligatory upon both parties. 

7. As, however, in all societies, there may be differen- 
ces of opinion, even where the harmony of feeling remains 
unimpaired, so there may be differences here. Where 
such differences of opinion exist, there must be some ul- 
timate appeal. In ordinary societies, such questions are 
settled by a numerical majority. But as, in this case, 
such a decision is impossible, some other principle must be 
adopted. The right of deciding must rest with either the 
one or the other. As the husband is the individual who 
is responsible to civil society, as his intercourse with the 
world is of necessity greater, the voice of nature and of 
revelation unite in conferring the right of ultimate author- 
ity upon him. By this arrangement the happiness of the 
wife is increased no less than that of the husband. Her 
power is always greatest in concession. She is graceful 
and attractive while meek and gentle ; but when angered 
and turbulent, she loses the fascination of her own sex, 
without attaining to the dignity of the other. 

" A woman moved is like a fountain troubled, 

Muddy, ill-seeming, and bereft of beauty." Shaks. 

Secondly. I come now to speak of the duties imposed 
by the marriage relation. 

I. The marriage relation imposes upon both parties, 
equally, the duty of chastity. 

1. Hence it forbids adultery, or intercourse with any- 
other person than that one to whom the individual is 
united in marriage. 

2. And, hence, it forbids all conduct in married persons, 
or with married persons, of which the tendency would be 
to diminish their affection for those to whom they are 
united in marriage, or of which the tendency would be 
to give pain to the other party. This is evident from 
what we have before said. For, if the contract itself 
proceed upon the principle of entire and exclusive affec- 
tion, any thing must be a violation of it, which destroys 
or lessens that affection ; and that which causes this af- 



310 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



fection to be doubted, produces to the party in which the 
doubt exists, the same misery that would ensue from ac- 
tual injury. 

The crime of adultery is of an exceedingly aggravated 
nature. As has been before remarked, aside from being 
a violation of the law of chastity, it is also a violation of a 
most solemn contract. The misery which it inflicts upon 
parents and children, relatives and friends, the total an- 
nihilation of domestic happiness, and the total disruption 
of parental and filial ties which it necessarily produces, 
mark it for one of the basest forms of human atrocity. 
Hence, as might be expected, it is spoken of in the 
Scriptures as one of those crimes on which God has set 
the seal of his peculiar displeasure. In addition to the 
passages already quoted on this subject, I barely mention 
the following : 

Matthew v, 28. " Whosoever looketh on a woman to 
cherish impure desire, hath committed adultery with her 
already in his heart." Hebrews xiii, 4. " Marriage is 
honorable in all, and the bed undefiled ; but whoremon- 
gers and adulterers God will judge." Revelations xxi, 8. 
" Murderers and the lascivious shall have their part in the 
lake that burnetii with fire and brimstone, which is the 
second death." Throughout the writings of the prophets, 
in numberless instances, this crime is singled out, as one 
for which God visits with the most awful judgments, both 
nations and individuals. And, if any one will reflect that 
the happiness and prosperity of a country must depend 
on the virtue of the domestic society more than on any thing 
else, he cannot fail to perceive that a crime, which, by a 
single act, sunders the conjugal tie, and leaves children 
worse than parentless, must be attended with more abun^ 
dant and remediless evils, than almost any other that can 
be named. The taking of human life can be attended 
with no consequences more dreadful. In the one case, 
the parental tie is broken, but the victim is innocent ; in 
the other, the tie is broken, with the additional aggrava- 
tion of an irretrievable moral stain, and a wide-spreading 
dishonor that cannot be washed away. 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



311 



II. The law of marriage enforces the duty of mutual 
affection. 

Affection towards another is the result of his or her ac- 
tions and temper towards us. Admiration and respect 
may be the result of other manifestations of character, but 
nothing is so likely, as evidence of affection towards our- 
selves, to beget in us affection towards others. 

Hence the duty of cultivating affection, imposes upon 
each party the obligation to act in such manner as to 
excite affection in the bosom of the other. The rule is, 
" as ye would that others should do unto (or be affected 
towards) you, do ye even so unto (or be ye so affected 
towards) them." And the other gospel rule is here also 
verified : " Give, and it shall be given unto you, good 
measure, pressed down, and heaped together, and running 
over, shall men give into your bosom." To cultivate 
affection, then, is not to strive to excite it by any direct 
effort of abstract thinking, but to show, by the whole tenor 
of a life of disinterested goodness, that our happiness is really 
promoted by seeking the happiness of another. It con- 
sists in restraining our passions, in subduing our selfishness, 
in quieting our irritability, in eradicating from our minds 
every thing which could give pain to an ingenuous spirit, 
and in cherishing a spirit of meekness, forbearance, for- 
giveness, and of active, cheerful, and incessant desire for 
the happiness of those whom we love. At no less price 
than this can affection be purchased ; and those who are 
willing to purchase it at this price, will rarely have reason 
to complain of the want of it. 

III. The law of marriage imposes the duty of mutual 
assistance. 

In the domestic society, as in every other, there are 
special duties devolving upon each member ; this is no 
more than to say that it is not the duty of every member 
of a society to do every thing. So here, there are duties 
devolving of right upon the husband, and other duties de- 
volving of right upon the wife. Thus, it is the duty, in 
the first instance, of the husband, to provide for the wants 
of the family ; and of the wife to assume the charge of 
27* 



3L2 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



the domestic affairs of the household. His sphere of duty 
is without, her sphere of duty is within. Both are under 
obligation to discharge these duties, specially because they 
are parties to this particular compact. The Apostle Paul 
affirms, that he who does not provide for his own, special- 
ly for those of his own house, hath denied the faith, and 
is worse than an infidel. That man is worthily despised, 
who does not qualify himself to support that family, of 
which he has voluntarily assumed the office of protector. 
Nor surely is that woman less deserving of contempt, who, 
having consumed the period of youth in frivolous reading, 
dissipating amusement, and in the acquisition of accom- 
plishments, which are to be consigned, immediately after 
marriage, to entire forgetfulness, enters upon the duties of 
a wife, with no other expectation, than that of being a 
useless and prodigal appendage to a household, ignorant 
of her duties, and of the manner of discharging them ; and 
with no other conceptions of the responsibilities which she 
has assumed, than such as have been acquired from a life 
of childish caprice, luxurious self-indulgence, and sensi- 
tive, feminine, yet thoroughly finished selfishness. And 
yet I fear that the system of female education, at present 
in vogue, is, in many respects, liable to the accusation of 
producing precisely this tendency. 

I have remarked, that the duties of the husband and 
wife are thus, in the first instance, apportioned. Yet, if 
one be disabled, all that portion of the duty of the disabled 
party, which the other can discharge, falls upon that other. 
If the husband cannot alone support the family, it is the 
duty of the wife to assist him. If the wife is, through 
sickness, unable to direct her household, the husband is 
bound, in so far as it is possible, to assume her care. In 
case of the death of either, the whole care of the children 
devolves upon the survivor ; nor has the survivor a right to 
devolve it upon another person, if he or she can discharge 
it alone. 

IV. The law of marriage, both from Scripture and from 
reason, makes the husband the head of the domestic so- 
ciety. Hence, when difference of opinion exists (except 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



313 



as stated above, where a paramount obligation binds), the 
decision of the husband is ultimate. Hence the duty of 
the wife is submission and obedience. The husband, how- 
ever, has no more right than the wife to act unjustly, op- 
pressively, or unkindly ; nor is the fact of his possessing 
authority in the least an excuse for so acting. But as 
differences of opinion are always liable to exist, and as, 
in such case, one or the other party must yield, to avoid the 
greatest of all evils in such a society, — continual dissen- 
sion, — the duty of yielding devolves upon the wife. And 
it is to be remembered, that the act of submission is, in 
every respect, as dignified and as lovely as the act of au- 
thority ; nay, more, it involves an element of virtue which 
does not belong to the other. It supposes neither supe- 
rior excellence nor superior mind in the party which gov- 
erns ; but merely an official relation, held for the mutual 
good of both parties and of their children. The teaching 
of Scripture on this subject is explicit ; see 1 Peter iii, 1 
—7 : " Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own 
husbands, that if any obey not the word, they also may, 
without the word, be won by the conversation of the 
wives ; while they behold your chaste conversation united 
with respect. Whose adorning, let it not be that outward 
adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, and 
of putting on of apparel ; but let it be the inward disposi- 
tion of the mind, which is not corruptible, even the orna- 
ment of a meek and quiet spirit, which is, in the sight of 
God, of great price. Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with 
your wives according to knowledge, as with the weaker 
party ; rendering respect to them, as heirs with you of the 
grace of life." That is, if I understand the passage, con- 
duct towards them, as knowing that they are weak ; that 
is, needing support and protection ; and, at the same time, 
rendering them all that respect which is due to those who 
are, as much as yourselves, heirs to a blessed immortality. 
A more beautiful exhibition of the duties of the marriage 
relation cannot be imagined. 

I shall close this chapter with the following well known 
extract from a poet, whose purity of character and ex- 



314 



THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. 



quisite sensibility have done more than any other in our 
language, to clothe virtue in her own native attractiveness : 

Domestic happiness, thou only bliss 

Of Paradise, that has survived the fall! 

Though few now taste thee unimpaired and pure, 

Or, tasting, long enjoy thee! too infirm, 

Or too incautious, to preserve thy sweets 

Unmixed with drops of bitter, which neglect 

Or temper sheds into thy crystal cup: 

Thou art the nurse of virtue ; in thine arms 

She smiles, appearing, as in truth she is, 

Heaven-born, and destined to the skies again. 

Thou art not known where pleasure is adored, — 

That reeling goddess, with her zoneless waist 

And wandering eyes, still leaning on the arm 

Of novelty, her fickle, frail support; 

For thou art meek and constant, hating change, 

And finding in the calm of truth-tried love, 

Joys which her stormy rapture never yield. 

Forsaking thee, what shipwreck have we seen, 

Of honor, dignity, and fair renown! 

'Till prostitution elbows us aside 

In all our crowded streets. Task, 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 

The adaptation of the physical and moral laws under 
which man is placed, to the promotion of human happiness, 
is beautifully illustrated in the relation which exists be- 
tween the law of marriage and the law of parent and 
child. Were the physical or moral conditions of marriage 
different in any respect from those which exist, the evils 
which would ensue would be innumerable. And, on the 
contrary, by accurately observing these conditions, we shall 
see that they not only contain a provision for the well- 
being of successive generations, but also establish a tenden- 
cy to indefinite social progress. 

For instance, we see that mankind are incapable of sus- 
taining the relation of parent until they have arrived at the 
age of maturity, attained to considerable knowledge and 
experience, and become capable of such labor as will en- 
able them to support and protect their offspring. Were 
this otherwise, were children liable to become parents — 
parent and child growing up together in physical and in- 
tellectual imbecility — the progress of man in virtue and 
knowledge would be impossible, even if the whole race 
did not perish from want and disease. 

Again, the parent is endowed with a love of his offspring, 
which renders it a pleasure to him to contribute to its wel- 
fare, and to give it, by every means in his power, the ben- 
efit of his own experience. And, on the contrary, there is 
in the child, if not a corresponding love of the parent, a 
disposition to submit to the parent's wishes, and to yield 
(unless its instincts have been mismanaged) to his authority. 
Were either of these dispositions wanting, it is evident that 
the whole social system would be disarranged, and incalcu* 
lable misery entailed upon our race, 



316 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



Again, it is evident that civil society is constituted by 
the surrender, by the individual, of his personal desires and 
propensities to the good of the whole. It of course in- 
volves the necessity of self-restraint — that is, of habitual 
self-government. Now, in this point of view, the domestic 
society is designed to be, as has been frequently remarked, 
the nursery for the state. 

Thus, the parent being of age and experience sufficient 
to contol and direct the child, and being instinctively im- 
pelled to exert this control for the child's benefit ; and the 
child being instinctively disposed to yield to his authority, 
when judiciously exerted ; the child grows up under a system 
in which he yields to the will of another, and thus he learns 
at home to submit to the laws of that society of which he 
is soon to become a member. And hence it is that the 
relaxation of parental authority has always been found one 
of the surest indications of the decline of social order, and 
the unfailing precursor of public turbulence and anarchy. 

But still more, it is a common remark, that children are 
influenced by example more readily than by any other 
means. Now, by the marriage constitution, this principle 
of human nature is employed as an instrument of the great- 
est possible good. We stated that the basis of the marriage 
covenant is affection, and that it supposes each party to pre- 
fer the happiness of the other to its own. While the do- 
mestic society is governed by this principle, it presents to 
the children a continual example of disinterestedness and 
self-denial,and of the happiness which results from the exer- 
cise of these virtues. And yet more, the affection of the 
parents prompts them to the exercise of the same virtues in 
behalf of their children ; and, hence, the latter have before 
their eyes a constantly operating motive to the cultivation 
of these very dispositions. And, lastly, as the duty of the 
wife is submission, children are thus taught, by the example 
of one whom they respect and love, that submission is both 
graceful and dignified ; and that it in no manner involves 
the idea of baseness or servility. 

1. From these considerations, we learn the relation 
which exists, by nature, between parents and children. It 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



317 



is the relation of a superior to an inferior. The right of 
the parent is to command ; the duty of the child is to obey. 
Authority belongs to the one, submission to the other. 
This relation is a part of our constitution, and the obli- 
gation which arises from it is, accordingly, a part of our 
duty.' It is not a matter of convenience or of expediency, 
but it belongs to the relations under which we are cre- 
ated ; and to the violation of it, our Creator has affixed 
peculiar and afflicting penalties. 

2. While this is the relation, yet the motive which 
should govern the obligation, on both sides, is affection. 
While the authority to command rests with the parent, 
and the duty of submission is imposed upon the child, yet 
the parent is not at liberty to exercise this authority from 
caprice, or from love of power, or for his own advantage, 
but from simple love to the child, and for the child's ad- 
vantage. The constitution under which we are placed, 
renders it necessary that the parent should exercise this 
power; but that parent abuses it, that is, he uses it for 
purposes for which it was not conferred, if he exercise it 
from any other motive than duty to God, and love to his 
offspring. 

3. This relation being established by our Creator, and 
the obligations consequent upon it being binding upon 
both parties, the failure in one party does not annihilate 
the obligations of the other. If a child be disobedient, 
the parent is still under obligation to act towards it for its 
own good, and not to exert his authority for any other 
purpose. If a parent be unreasonable, this does not re- 
lease the child ; he is still bound to honor, and obey, and 
reverence his parent. 

The duty of parents is, then, generally, to educate, or 
to bring up, their children in such a manner as they be- 
lieve will be most for their future happiness, both tempo- 
ral and eternal. 

This comprehends several particulars : 

1. Support, or maintenance. That it is the duty of 
the parents to keep alive the helpless being whom they 
have brought into existence, need not be proved. As to 



318 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



the expensiveness of this maintenance, I do not know that 
any thing very definite can be asserted. The general 
rule would seem to be, that the mode of life adopted by 
the parent, would be that which he is required to provide 
for the child. This, however, would be modified by some 
circumstances. If a parent of large wealth brought up 
his family in meanness and ignorance, so that they would 
be specially unfitted for the opulence which they were 
hereafter to enjoy, he would act unjustly. He is volun- 
tarily placing them in circumstances of great temptation. 
So, on the other hand, if a parent, destitute of means to 
render his children independent of labor, brings them up, 
whether male or female, in idleness and expensiveness, 
he violates his duty as a parent ; he is preparing them for 
a life, not of happiness, but of discontent, imbecility and 
misery. The latter, owing to the natural weakness of 
parental affection, is, by far, the most common error, and 
is liable to become peculiarly prevalent in the social con- 
dition of this country. 
2. Physical education. 

A parent is under obligation to use all the means in 
his power to secure to his children a good physical con- 
stitution. It is his duty to prescribe such food, and in 
such quantity, as will best conduce to their health ; to 
regulate their labor and exercise, so as fully to develop 
all the powers, and call into exercise all the functions, of 
their physical system ; to accustom them to hardship, and 
render them patient of labor. Every one knows how 
greatly the happiness of a human being depends upon 
early physical discipline ; and it is manifest that this dis- 
cipline can be enforced by no one but a parent, or by one 
who stands in the place of a parent. 

By the same rule, we see the wickedness of those pa- 
rents who employ their children in such service, or oblige 
them to labor in such manner, as will expose them to 
sickness, infirmity, disease, and premature death. In 
many manufacturing countries, children are forced to labor 
before they are able to endure confinement and fatigue, 
or to labor vastly beyond their strength ; so that the 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



319 



stamina of their constitutions are destroyed even in infan- 
cy. The power of the parent over the child, was given 
for the child's good, and not to gratify the parent's selfish- 
ness, or minister to his love of gain. It is not improper 
to add, that the guilt and the shame of this abuse of the 
rights of children, are equally shared between the parent 
who thus sells his child's health and life for gold, and the 
heartless agent who thus profits by his wickedness. Nor 
is this form of violation of parental obligation confined to 
any one class of society. The ambitious mother, who, 
for the sake of her own elevation, or the aggrandizement 
of her family, and without any respect to the happiness 
of her child, educates her daughter in all the trickery of 
fashionable fascination, dwarfing her mind, and sensualiz- 
ing her aspirations, for the chance of negotiating for her a 
profitable match, regardless of the character or habits of 
him to whom she is to be united for life, falls under pre- 
cisely the same condemnation. 

3. Intellectual education. A child enters into the 
world utterly ignorant, and possessed of nothing else than 
a collection of impulses and capabilities. It Can be happy 
and useful only as this ignorance is dispelled by education, 
and these impulses and capabilities are directed and en- 
larged by discipline and cultivation; To some knowledge 
and discipline the parent has, from the necessity of the 
case, attained ; and, at least, so much as this he is bound 
to communicate to his children. In some respects, how- 
ever, this duty can be discharged more effectively by others 
than by the parent ; and it may, therefore, very properly, 
be thus devolved upon a teacher. The parental obliga- 
tion requires that it be done either by a parent himself, or 
that he procure it to be done by another. 

I have said that it can, in part, be discharged by the 
teacher. But, let it be remembered, it can be done only 
in part. The teacher is only the agent; the parent is 
the principal. The teacher does not remove from the 
parent any of the responsibility of his relation. Several 
duties devolve upon the one, which cannot be rightfully- 
devolved upon the other. 

28 



320 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



For instance, — 

1. He is bound to inform himself of the peculiar habits, 
and reflect upon the probable future situation, of his child, 
and deliberately to consider what sort of education will 
most conduce to his future happiness and usefulness. 

2. He is bound to select such instructers as will best 
accomplish the results which he believes will be most 
beneficial. 

3. He is bound to devote such time and attention to 
the subject, as will enable him to ascertain whether the 
instructer of his child discharges his duty with faithfulness. 

4. To encourage his child, by manifesting such interest 
in his studies as shall give to diligence and assiduity all 
the assistance and benefit of parental authority and friend- 
ship. 

5. And, if a parent is under obligation to do this, he is, 
of course, under obligation to take time to do it, and so 
to construct the arrangements of his family and business, 
that it may be done. He has no right to say that he has 
no time for these duties. If God have required them of 
him, as is the fact, he has time exactly for them ; and 
the truth is, he has not time for those other occupations 
which interfere with them. If he neglect them, he does 
it; to the injury of his children, and, as he will ascertain 
when it shall be too late, to his own disappointment and 
misery. 

Nor let it be supposed that this will ever be done with- 
out bringing with it its own reward. God has always 
connected together, indissolubly, our own personal benefit 
and the discharge of every duty. Thus, in the present 
case, a parent who assiduously follows his children through- 
out the various steps of their education, will find his own 
knowledge increased, and his own education carried for- 
ward, vastly beyond what he would at first have con- 
ceived. There are very few things which a child ought 
to learn, from the study of which an adult will not derive 
great advantage, especially if he go through the process 
of simplification and analysis, which are so necessary in 
order to communicate knowledge to the mind of the 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



321 



young. And yet more. It is only thus that the parent 
will be able to retain that intellectual superiority which it 
is so much for the interest of both parties that he should, 
for a long time, at least, possess. It is an unfortunate 
circumstance, for a child to suppose that he knows more 
than his parent ; and, if his supposition be true, he will 
not be slow to entertain it. The longer the parent main- 
tains his superiority in knowledge and wisdom, the better 
will it be for both parties. But this superiority cannot 
be retained, if, as soon as the parent enters upon active 
business, he desists from all effort after intellectual culti- 
vation, and surrenders himself a slave to physical labor, 
while he devotes his child to mere intellectual cultivation, 
and thus renders intellectual intercourse between himself 
and his children almost impossible. 

If this be so, it is evident that the violation of parental 
obligation is more common, among even indulgent parents, 
than would generally be supposed. 

1. Parents who render themselves slaves to fashionable 
society and amusement, violate this obligation. The 
mother who is engaged in a perpetual round of visiting 
and company, and who, from the pressure of engagements 
to which she subjects herself, has no leisure to devote tor 
the mental and moral culture of her children, violates her 
most solemn duties. She has no right to squander away, 
in frivolous self-gratification, the time which belongs to 
her offspring. She will reap the fruits of her folly, when, 
in a few years, her children, having grown up estranged 
from her affection, shall thwart her wishes, disappoint her 
hopes, and neglect, if they do not despise, the mother who 
bare them. 

2. The father who plunges into business so deeply that 
he has no leisure for domestic duties and pleasures, and 
whose only intercourse with his children consists in a brief 
and occasional word of authority, or a surly lamentation 
over their intolerable expensiveness, is equally to be pitied 
and to be blamed. What right has he to devote to other 
pursuits the time which God has allotted to his children ? 
Nor is it any excuse, to say that he cannot support his 



322 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



family in their present style of living, without this effort. 
I ask, by what right can his family demand to live in a 
manner which requires him to neglect his most solemn 
and important duties ? Nor is it an excuse, to say that 
he wishes to leave them a competence. Is he under ob- 
ligation to leave them that competence which he desires? 
Is it an advantage to them to be deprived of the necessity 
of labor? Besides, is money the only desirable bequest 
which a father can leave to his children ? Surely, well 
cultivated intellects, hearts sensible to domestic affection, 
the love of parents and brethren and sisters, a taste for 
home pleasures, habits of order, regularity and industry, a 
hatred of vice and of vicious men, and a lively sensibility 
to the excellence of virtue, are as valuable a legacy as an 
inheritance of property, simple property, purchased by the 
loss of every habit which could render that property a 
blessing. 

3. Nor can thoughtful men be always exculpated from 
the charge of this violation. The duties of a parent are 
established by God, and God requires us not to violate 
them. While the social worship of God is a duty, it 
ought not to interfere with parental duty. Parents who 
spend that time which belongs to their children, in offices 
of public social worship, have mistaken the nature of their 
special obligation. I do not pretend to say what time, or 
how much time, any individual shall spend in any religious 
service. This question does not belong to the present 
discussion. But I say that this time must be taken out 
of that which belongs to ourselves ; and it might easily 
be abstracted from that devoted to visiting, company, or 
idleness : it should not be taken from that which belongs, 
by the ordinance of God, to our children. 

It will be easily seen, that the fulfilment of these obli- 
gations, in the manner I have suggested, would work a 
very perceptible change in the whole fabric of society. 
It would check the eager desire of accumulation, repress 
the ardor of ambition, and allay the feverish thirst for self- 
ish gratification. But it would render a family, in truth, 
a society. It would bring back parents and children to 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



323 



the relations to each other which God has established. It 
would restore to home a meaning, and to the pleasures of 
home a reality, which they are in danger of losing alto- 
gether. Forsaking the shadow of happiness, we should 
find the substance. Instead of a continual round of phys- 
ical excitation, and the ceaseless pursuit of pleasures 
which, as every one confesses, end in ennui and disap- 
pointment, we should secure 

*' A sacred and home-felt delight, 
A sober certainty of waking bliss," 

of which, previously, we could have had no conception. 
4. Moral education. 

The eternal destiny of the child is placed, in a most 
important sense, in the hands of its parents. The parent 
is under obligation to instruct, and cause his child to be 
instructed, in those religious sentiments which he believes 
to be according to the will of God. With his duty in 
this respect, until the child becomes able to decide for 
himself, no one has a right to interfere. If the parent be 
in error, the fault is not in teaching the child what he 
believes, but in believing what is false, without having 
used the means which God has given him to arrive at the 
truth. But, if such be the responsibility, and so exclusive 
the authority of the parent, it is manifest that he is under 
a double obligation to ascertain what is the will of God, 
and in what manner the future happiness of an immortal 
soul may be secured. As soon as he becomes a parent, 
his decisions on this subject involve the future happiness 
or misery, not only of his own soul, but also of that of 
another. Both considerations, therefore, impose upon 
him tbe obligation of coming to a serious and solemn de- 
cision upon his moral condition and prospects. 

But, besides that of making himself acquainted with 
the doctrines of religion, the relation in which he stands 
imposes upon the parent several other duties. 

It is his duty, — 

1. To teach his child its duties to God and man, and 
produce in its mind a permanent conviction of its moral 

28* 



324 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



responsibility. This is to be done, not merely by direct, 
but also by indirect, precept ; and by directing it to such 
trains of observation and reflection as shall create a correct 
moral estimate of actions and of their consequences. And 
specially should it be the constant effort of the parent to 
cultivate in his child a spirit of piety, or a right feeling 
towards God, the true source of every other virtue. 

2. Inasmuch as the present state of man is morally 
imperfect, and every individual is a sharer in that imper- 
fection, it is the duty of the parent to eradicate, so far as 
is in his power, the wrong propensities of his children. 
He should watch, with ceaseless vigilance, for the first 
appearances of pride, obstinacy, malice, envy, vanity, 
cruelty, revenge, anger, lying, and their kindred vices ; 
and, by steadfast and unwearied assiduity, strive to extir- 
pate them before they have gained firmness by age, or 
vigor by indulgence. There cannot be a greater unkind- 
ness to a child, than to allow it to grow up with any of 
its evil habits uncorrected. Every one would consider a 
parent cruel, who allowed a child to grow up without 
having taken means to cure a limb which had been 
broken ; but how much worse is an evil temper than a 
broken limb ! 

3. Inasmuch as precept will be of no avail without a 
corresponding example, a parent is under obligations, not 
only to set no example by which the evil dispositions of 
his child will be cherished, but to set such an example as 
will be most likely to remove them. A passionate, selfish, 
envious man must expect that, in spite of all his precepts, 
his children will be passionate, envious, and selfish. 

4. Inasmuch as all our efforts will be fruitless without 
the blessing of God, that parent must be convicted of 
great neglect of duty, who does not habitually pray for 
that direction which he needs in the performance of these 
solemn obligations, as well as for that blessing upon his 
efforts, without which, though ever so well directed, they 
will be utterly in vain. 

5. Inasmuch as the moral character of the child is 
greatly influenced by its associations and companions, it 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



325 



is the duty of the parent to watch over these with vigi- 
lance, and to control them with entire independence. He 
is false to his trust, if, for the sake of gratifying the desires 
of his child, or of conciliating the favor of others, or avoid- 
ing the reputation of singularity or preciseness, he allows 
his child to form associations which he believes, or even 
fears, will be injurious to him. And, on the other hand, if 
such be the duty of the parent, he ought to be considered 
as fully at liberty to perform it, without remark, and with- 
out offence. In such matters, he is the ultimate and the 
only responsible authority. He who reproaches another 
for the exercise of this authority, is guilty of slander. He 
who, from the fear of slander, shrinks from exercising it, is 
justly chargeable with a pusillanimity wholly unworthy of 
the relation which he sustains. 

6. As the parent sustains the same relation to all his 
children, it is manifest that his obligations to them all are 
the same. Hence, he is bound to exercise his authority 
with entire impartiality. The want of this must always 
end in jealousy, envy and malice, and cannot fail to ren- 
der the domestic society a scene of perpetual bickering 
and contention. A striking exemplification of all this is 
recorded in the history of Joseph and his brethren. 

The Rights of Parents. 

The right of the parent over his child is, of course, com- 
mensurate with his duties. If he be under obligation to 
educate his child in such manner as he supposes will most 
conduce to the child's happiness and the welfare of socie- 
ty, he has, from necessity, the right to control the child in 
every thing necessary to the fulfilment of this obligation. 
The only limits imposed are, that he exert this control no 
further than is necessary to the fulfilment of his obligation, 
and that he exert it with the intention for which it was 
conferred. While he discharges his parental duties within 
these limits, he is, by the law of God, exempt from inter- 
ference both from the individual and from society. 

Of the duration of this obligation and this right. 

1 In infancy, the control of the parent over the child is 
absolute ; that is, it is exercised without any respect what- 
ever to the wishes of the child. 



326 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



2. When the child has arrived at majority, and has as- 
sumed the responsibility of its own conduct, both the re- 
sponsibility and the right of the parent cease altogether. 

The time of majority is fixed in most civilized nations 
by statute. In Great Britain and in the United States, 
an individual becomes of age in his twenty-first year. 
The law, therefore, settles the rights and obligations of 
the parties, so far as civil society is concerned, but does not 
pretend to decide upon the moral relations of the parties. 

3. As the rights and duties of the parent at one period 
are absolute, and at another cease altogether, it is reason- 
able to infer, that the control of the parent should be ex- 
ercised on more and more liberal principles, that a wider 
and wider discretion should be allowed to the child, and 
that his feelings and predilections should be more and 
more consulted, as he grows older ; so that, when he 
comes to act for himself, he may have become prepared 
for the responsibility which he assumes, by as extensive 
an experience as the nature of the case admits. 

4. Hence, I think that a parent is bound to consult the 
wishes of his child, in proportion to his age, whenever this 
can be done innocently ; and also, to vary his modes of 
enforcing authority, so as to adapt them to the motives of 
which the increasing intellect of the child is susceptible. 
While it is true that the treatment proper for a young 
man, would ruin a child, it is equally true that the treat- 
ment proper for a child, might very possibly ruin a young 
man. The right of control, however, still rests with the 
parent, and the duty of obedience still is imposed upon 
the child. The parent is merely bound to exercise it in 
a manner suited to the nature of the being over whom it 
is to be exerted. 

The authority of instructers is a delegated authority, 
derived immediately from the parent. He, for the time 
being, stands to the pupil in loco parentis. Hence, the 
relation between him and the pupil is analogous to that 
between parent and child ; that is, it is the relation of 
superiority and inferiority. The right of the instructer is 
to command ; the obligation of the pupil is to obey. The 



THE LAW OF PARENTS. 



327 



right of the instructer is, however, to be exercised, as I 
before stated, when speaking of the parent, for the pupil's 
benefit. For the exercise of it, he is responsible to the 
parent, whose professional agent he is. He must use his 
own best skill and judgment, in governing and teaching 
his pupil. If he and the parent cannot agree, the con- 
nection must be dissolved. But, as he is a professional 
agent, he must use his own intellect and skill in the exer- 
cise of his own profession, and, in the use of it, he is to be 
interfered with by no one, 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 

1 shall consider in this chapter the duties and the 
rights of children, and their duration. 
The Duties of Children. 

I. Obedience. By this I mean, that the relation be- 
tween parent and child obliges the latter to conform to the 
will of the former because it is his will, aside from the 
consideration that what is required seems to the child best 
or wisest. The only limitation to this rule is the limitation 
of conscience. A parent has no right to require a child to 
do what he believes to be wrong ; and a child has no 
right, in such a case, to obey the commands of a parent. 
The child must obey God, and meekly suffer the conse- 
quences. It has even in this case no right to resist. 

The reasons of this rule are manifest. 

1. The design of the whole domestic constitution would 
be frustrated without it. This design, from what has been 
already remarked, is, to enable the child to avail itself both 
of the wisdom, and knowledge, and experience, of the pa- 
rent ; and also^of that affection which prompts the parent to 
employ all these for the well-being of the child. But of 
these advantages the child can never avail himself, unless 
he yield obedience to the parent's authority, until he have 
acquired that age and experience which are necessary to 
enable him to direct and to govern himself. 

2. That this is the duty of children is made apparent by 
the precepts of the Holy Scriptures : 

Exodus xx, 12. " Honor thy father and thy mother, 
that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy 
God giveth thee." This, as St. Paul remarks, Eph. vi, 
2, 3, is the only commandment in the decalogue, to which 
a special promise is annexed. 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 



329 



In the book of Proverbs no duty is more frequently incul- 
cated than this ; and of no one are the consequences of 
obedience and disobedience more fully set forth. 

A few examples may serve as a specimen : 

Proverbs i, 8, 9. "My son, keep the instruction of 
thy father, and forsake not the law of thy mother. They 
shall be an ornament of grace unto thy head (that is, a 
graceful ornament), and chains about thy neck." 

Proverbs vi, 20. " Keep thy father's commandment, 
and forsake not the law of thy mother." 

Proverbs xiii, 1. "A wise son heareth his father's 
instructions, but a scorner heareth not rebuke." 

The same duty is frequently inculcated in the New Tes- 
tament : 

Ephesians vi, 1. " Children, obey your parents in the 
Lord, for this is right." The meaning of the phrase, 
" in the Lord," I suppose to be, in accordance with the 
will of the Lord. 

Colossians iii, 20. "Children, obey your parents in 
all things, for this is well pleasing unto the Lord." The 
phrase, " well pleasing unto the Lord," is here of the 
same meaning as " in the Lord," above. 

The displeasure of God against those who violate this 
command, is also frequently denounced in the Scriptures : 

Deuteronomy xxvii, 16. "Cursed be he that setteth 
light by his father or his mother ; and all the people shall 
say Amen." 

Proverbs xv, 5. "A fool despiseth his father's instruc- 
tions." 

Proverbs xxx, 17. " The eye that mocketh at his 
father, and despiseth to obey his mother, the ravens of the 
valley shall pluck it out, and the young eagles shall eat it." 
That is, he shall perish by a violent death ; he shall come 
to a miserable end. 

From such passages as these, and I have selected only 
a very few from a great number that might have been 
quoted, we learn, 1. That the Holy Scriptures plainly 
inculcate obedience to parents as a command of God. 
He who is guilty of disobedience, therefore, violates not 



330 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 



merely the command of man, but of God. And it is, 
therefore, our duty always to urge it, and to exact it, 
mainly on this ground. 

2. That they consider obedience to parents as no in- 
dication of meanness and servility ; but, on the contrary, 
as the most honorable and delightful exhibition of charac- 
ter that can be manifested by the young. It is a graceful 
ornament, which confers additional beauty upon that 
which was otherwise lovely. 

3. That the violation of this commandment exposes 
the transgressor to special and peculiar judgments. And, 
even without the light of revelation, I think that the ob- 
servation of every one must convince him, that the curse 
of God rests heavily upon filial disobedience, and that his 
peculiar blessing follows filial obedience. And, indeed, 
what can be a surer indication of future profligacy and 
ruin, than that turbulent impatience of restraint, which 
leads a youth to follow the headlong impulses of passion, 
in preference to the counsels of age and experience, even 
when conveyed in the language of tender and disinterest- 
ed affection ? 

II. Another duty of children to parents, is reverence. 
This is implied in the commandment, " honor thy father 
and thy mother." By reverence, I mean that conduct 
and those sentiments which are due from an inferior to a 
superior. The parent is the superior, and the child the 
inferior, by virtue of the relation which God himself has 
established. Whatever may be the rank or attainments 
of the child, and how much soever they may be superior 
to those of the parent, these can never abrogate the pre- 
vious relation which God has established. The child is 
bound to show deference to the parent, whenever it is pos- 
sible, to evince that he considers him his superior ; and to 
perform for him services which he would perform for no 
other person. And let it always be remembered, that in 
this, there is nothing degrading, but every thing honorable. 
No more ennobling and dignified trait of character can 
be exhibited, than that of universal and profound filial 
respect. The same principle, carried out, would teach 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 



331 



us universal and tender respect for old age, at all times, 
and under all circumstances. 

III. Another duty of children is filial affection, or the 
peculiar affection due from a child to a parent, because he 
is a parent. A parent may be entitled to our love, be- 
cause he is a man, or because he is such a man, that is, 
of such excellencies of character ; but, besides all this, 
and aside from it all, he is entitled to our affection on ac- 
count of the relation in which he stands to us. This 
imposes upon us the duty not only of hiding his foibles, 
of covering his defects, of shielding him from misfortune, 
and of seeking his happiness by whatever means Provi- 
dence has placed in our power, but also of performing all 
this, and all the other duties of which we have spoken, 
from love to him, because he is our parent, — a love 
which shall render such services not a burden, but a 
pleasure, under what circumstances soever it may be our 
duty to render them. 

IV. It is the duty of the child, whenever it is by the 
providence of God rendered necessary, to support his 
parent in his old age. That man would deserve the 
reputation of a monster, who would not cheerfully deny 
himself, in order to be able to minister to the comforts of 
the declining years of his parent. 

The Rights or Children. 

1. Children have a right to maintenance, and, as has 
been remarked before, a maintenance corresponding to 
the circumstances and condition of the parent. 

2. They have a right to expect that the parent will 
exert his authority, not for his own advantage, nor from 
caprice, but for the good of the child, according to his 
best judgment. If the parent act otherwise, he violates 
his duty to his children and to God. This, however, in 
no manner liberates the child from his obligations to his 
parent. These remain in full force, the same as before. 
The wrong of one party is no excuse for wrong in the 
other. It is the child's misfortune, but it can never be 
alleviated by domestic strife, and still less by filial dis- 
obedience and ingratitude. 

29 



332 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 



Of the duration of these rights and obligations. 

1. Of obedience. The child is bound to obey the 
parent so long as he remains in a state of pupilage, that 
is, so long as the parent is responsible for his conduct, 
and he is dependent upon his parent. This period, so 
far as society is concerned, as has been remarked, is fixed, 
in most countries, by statute. Sometimes, by the consent 
of both parties, it ceases before that period ; at other 
times, it continues beyond it. With the termination of 
minority, let it occur when it will, the duty of obedience 
ceases. After this, however, the advice of the parent is 
entitled to more deference and respect than that of any 
other person ; but, as the individual now acts upon his 
own responsibility, it is only advice, since it has ceased to 
be authoritative. 

2. The conscience of a child becomes capable of de- 
liberate decision long before its period of pupilage ceases. 
Whenever this decision is fairly and honestly expressed, 
the parent ought not to interfere with it. It is his duty 
to strive to convince his child, if he think it to be in error; 
but, if he cannot succeed in producing conviction, he 
must leave the child, like any other human being, to obey 
God in the manner it thinks will be most acceptable to 
Him. 

3. The obligation of respect and. affection for parents, 
never ceases, but rather increases with advancing age. 
As the child grows older, he becomes capable of more 
disinterested affection, and of the manifestation of more 
delicate respect ; and, as the parent grows older, he feels 
more sensibly the need of attention ; and his happiness is 
more decidedly dependent upon it. As we increase in 
years, it should, therefore, be our more assiduous endeavor 
to make a suitable return to our parents for their kindness 
bestowed upon us in infancy and youth, and to manifest 
our repentance for those acts of thoughtlessness and way- 
wardness which formerly may have grieved them, by un- 
remitting attention, and delicate and heartfelt affection. 

That a peculiar insensibility exists to the obligations of 
the parental and filial relation, is, I fear, too evident to 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 



333 



need any extended illustration. The notion, that a family 
is a society, and that a society must be governed, and 
that the right and the duty of governing this society rest 
with the parent, seems to be rapidly vanishing from the 
minds of men. In the place of it, it seems to be the 
prevalent opinion, that children may grow up as they 
please ; and that the exertion of parental restraint is an 
infringement upon the personal liberty of the child. But 
all this will not abrogate the law of God, nor will it avert 
the punishments which he has connected, indissolubly, 
with disobedience. The parent who neglects his duty to 
his children, is sowing thickly, for himself and for them, the 
seeds of his future misery. He who is suffering the evil 
dispositions of his children to grow up uncorrected, will 
find that he is cherishing a viper by which he himself will 
first be stung. That parent who is accustoming his chil- 
dren to habits of thoughtless caprice and reckless expendi- 
ture, and who stupidly smiles at the ebullitions of youthful 
passion, and the indulgence in fashionable vice, as indica- 
tions of a manly spirit, needs no prophet to foretell, that, 
unless the dissoluteness of his family leave him early 
childless, his gray hairs will be brought down with sorrow 
to the grave. 

I remarked, at the close of the last chapter, that the 
duty of instructers was analogous to that of parents, and 
that they stood to pupils in a relation essentially parental. 
It is proper here to add, that a pupil stands to his instruc- 
tor in a relation essentially filial. His duty is obedience : 
first to his parent ; and, secondly, to the professional agent 
to whom he has been committed by his parent. The 
equals, in this relation, are the parent and the instructer: 
to both of them is the pupil the inferior ; and to both is he 
under the obligation of obedience, respect and reverence. 

Now, such being the nature of the relation, it is the 
duty of the instructer to enforce obedience, and of the 
pupil to render it. It would be very easy to show, that, 
on the fulfilment of this duty on the part of the instructer, 
the interests of education, and the welfare of the young, 
vitally depend. Without discipline, there can be formed 



334 



THE LAW OF CHILDREN. 



no valuable habit. Without it, when young persons are 
congregated together, far away from the restraints of do- 
mestic society, exposed to the allurements of ever-present 
temptation, and excited by the stimulus of youthful pas- 
sion, every vicious habit must be cultivated. The young 
man may applaud the negligent and pusillanimous in- 
structer; but, when that man, no longer young, suffers 
the result of that neglect and pusillanimity, it is well if a 
better spirit have taught him to mention the name of that 
instructer without bitter execration. 

" In colleges and halls in ancient days, 

There dwelt a sage called Discipline. 

His eye was meek and gentle, and a smile 

Played on his lips ; and in his speech was heard 

Paternal sweetness, dignity, and love. 

The occupation dearest to his heart 

Was to encourage goodness. Learning grew, 

Beneath his care, a thriving vigorous plant. 

The mind was well-informed, the passions held 

Subordinate, and diligence was choice. 

If e'er it chanced, as sometimes chance it must, 

That one, among so many, overleaped 

The limits of control, his gentle eye 

Grew stern, and darted a severe rebuke. 

His frown was full of terror, and his voice 

Shook the delinquent with such fits of awe, 

As left him not, till penitence had won 

Lost favor back again, and closed the breach. 

But discipline at length, 
O'erlooked and unemployed, grew sick, and died. 
Then study languished, emulation slept, 
And virtue fled. The schools became a scene 
Of solemn farce, where ignorance in stilts, 
His cap well lined with logic not his own. 
With parrot tongue, performed the scholar's part, 
Proceeding soon a graduated dunce. 

What was learned, 
If aught was learned in childhood, is forgot; 
And such expense as pinches parents blue, 
And mortifies the liberal hand of love, 
Is squandered in pursuit of idle sports 
And vicious pleasures." Task. 



CLASS THIRD. 



DUTIES TO MAN, AS A MEMBER OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

To this class belong the duties of magistrates and citi- 
zens. As these, however, would be but imperfectly under- 
stood, without a knowledge of the nature of civil society, 
and of the relations subsisting between society and the 
individual, it will be necessary to consider these latter, 
before entering upon the former. I shall, therefore, at- 
tempt to explain, first, The Nature and Limitations of 
Civil Society ; secondly, Government, or the Manner in 
which the Obligations of Society are Discharged ; third- 
ly, The Duties of Magistrates ; fourthly, The Duties of 
Citizens. 



29* 



CHAPTER FIRST. 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

As civil society is a somewhat complicated conception, 
it may be useful, in the first place, to consider the nature 
of a society in its simplest form. This chapter will, there- 
fore, be divided into two sections. The first treats of the 
constitution of a simple society ; the second, of the con- 
stitution of civil society. 



SECTION I. 

OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 

1. A society of any sort originates in a peculiar form 
of contract, entered into between each several individual, 
forming the society on the one part, and all the other 
members of the society on the other part. Each party 
promises to do certain things to or for the other, and puts 

^ itself under moral obligation to do so. Hence, we see 
that conscience, or the power of recognising moral obliga- 
tion, is, in the very nature of things, essential to the ex- 
istence of a society. Without it, a society could not be 
formed. 

2. This contract, like any other, respects those things, 
and those things only, in which the parties have thus 
bound themselves to each other. As the individual is 

^ under no obligation to belong to the society, but the obli- 
gation is purely voluntary, he is bound in no other man- 
ner, and for no other purpose, than those in and for which 



OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 



337 



he has bound himself. In all other respects, he is as free 
as he was before. 

3. Inasmuch as the formation of a society involves the 
idea of a moral obligation, each party is under moral ob- 
ligation to fulfil its part of the contract. The society is 
bound to do what it has promised to every individual, and 
every individual is bound to do what he has promised to 
the society. If either party cease to do this, the compact, 
like any other mutual contract, is dissolved. 

4. Inasmuch as every individual is, in all respects ex- 
cepting those in which he has bound himself, as free as 
he was before, the society has no right to impose upon 
the individual any other obligation than those under which 
he has placed himself. For, as he has come under no 
such obligation to them, they have no more control over 
him than any other men. And, as their whole power is 
limited to that which has been conferred upon them by 
individuals, beyond this limit, they are no society ; they 
have no power ; their act is really out of the society, and 
is, of course, binding upon no member of the society, any 
more than upon any other man. 

5. As every member of the society enters it upon the 
same terms, that is, as every one comes under the same 
obligations to the society, and the society comes under 
the same obligations to him, they are, by consequence, so 
far as the society is concerned, all equals or fellows. All 
have equal rights, and are all subject to the same obli- 
gations. 

6. That which defines the obligations under which the 
individual and the society have come, in respect to each 
other, is called the constitution of the society. It is in- 
tended to express the object of the association, and the 
manner in which that object is to be accomplished : that 
is to say, it declares what the individual promises to do 
for the society, what the society promises to do for the 
individual, and the object for which this association be- 
tween the parties is formed. 

7. As the union of individuals in this manner is volun- 
tary, every member naturally has a right to dissolve the 



338 



OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 



connection when he pleases ; and the society have also a 
corresponding right. As, however, this would frequently 
expose both parties to inconvenience, it is common, in the 
articles of the constitution, or the form of compact, to 
specify on what terms this may be done. When this 
part of the agreement has thus been entered into, it of 
course becomes as binding as any other part of it. 

Of the manner in which such a society shall he gov- 
erned. 

The object of any such association is to do something. 
But it is obvious that they can act only on one of three 
suppositions : by unanimity, by a minority, or by a ma- 
jority. To expect unanimity in the opinions of a being 
so diversified in character as man, is frivolous. To sus- 
pend the operation of many upon the decisions of one, is 
manifestly unjust, would be subversive of the whole object 
of the association, and would render the whole society 
more inefficient than the separate individuals of which it 
is composed. To suppose a society to be governed by a 
minority, would be to suppose a less number of equals 
superior in wisdom and goodness to a greater number, 
which is absurd. It remains, therefore, that every society 
must of necessity be governed by a majority. 

Of the limits within which the power of the majority 
is restricted. 

The majority, as we have just seen, is vested with the 
whole power of the society. But it derives its power 
wholly and exclusively from the society, and of course it 
can have no power beyond, or diverse from, that of the 
society itself. Now, as the power of the society is limited 
by the concessions made by each individual respectively, 
and is bound by its obligations to each individual, the 
power of the majority is manifestly restricted within pre- 
cisely the same limits. 

Thus, to be more particular, a majority has no right to 
do any thing which the individuals forming the society 
have not authorized the society to do : 

L They have no right to change the object of the so- 
ciety. If this be changed, another society is formed, and 



OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 



339 



the individual members are, as at first, at liberty to unite 
with it or not. 

2. They have no right to do any thing beyond, or dif- 
ferent from, the object of the society. The reasons are 
the same as in the former instance. 

3. Nor have they a right to do any thing in a manner 
different from that to which the members, upon entering 
the society, agreed. The manner set forth in the consti- 
tution, was that by which the individuals bound them- 
selves, and they are bound by nothing else. 

4. Nor have they a right to do any thing which vio- 
lates the principle of the entire social equality of the 
members. As all subjected themselves equally to the 
same rules, any act which supposes a difference of right, 
is at variance with the fundamental principle of the com- 
pact. 

And, hence, from the nature of the compact, it is obvi- 
ous, that, while a majority act within the limits of the au- 
thority thus delegated to it, the individual is under a moral 
obligation to obey their decisions ; for he has voluntarily 
placed himself under such obligation, and he is bound to 
fulfil it. 

And, on the other hand, the society is bound to fulfil 
to the individual the contract which they have formed 
with him, and to carry forward the object of the associa- 
tion in the manner and in the spirit of the contract entered 
into. Nor is this a mere matter of form or expediency : 
it is a matter of moral obligation voluntarily entered into ; 
and it is as binding as any other contract formed under 
any other circumstances. 

And, again, if the society or the majority act in violation 
of these engagements, or if they do any thing not com- 
mitted to them by the individual, such act is not binding 
upon any member; and he is under no more obligation to 
be governed by it, than he would be if it were done by 
any other persons, or if not done at all. 

If these principles be correct, they will, I think, throw 
some light upon the question of the durability of corpora- 
tions. A corporation is a society established for certain 



340 



OF A SIMPLE SOCIETY. 



purposes, which are to be executed in a certain manner. 
He who joins it, joins it under these conditions ; and the 
whole power of the society consists in power to do these 
things in this manner. If they do any thing else, they, 
when doing it, are not this society, but some other. And 
of course those, whether the minority or the majority, who 
act according to the original compact, are the society ; 
and the others, whether more or less, are something else. 
The act of incorporation is governed by the same princi- 
ples. It renders the persons so associated a body politic, 
and recognised in law, but it does not interfere with the 
original principles of such an association. The corpora- 
tion, therefore, are the persons, whether more or less, who 
adhere to the original agreement ; and any act declaring 
any thing else to be the society, is unjust and void. 

But suppose they have all altered their sentiments. 
The society is then, of course, dissolved. They may, if 
they choose, form another society ; but they are not an- 
other, of course, nor can they be such until they form 
another organization. 

Again, suppose they have property given under the 
original association, and for the promotion of its objects, 
and the whole society, or a majority of them, has changed 
its objects. I answer, if a part still remain, and prosecute 
the original object, they are the society ; and the others, 
by changing the object, have ceased to be the society. 
The right of property vests with those who adhere to the 
original constitution. If all have changed the object, the 
society is dissolved ; and all ownership, so far as the 
property is concerned, ceases. It therefore either belongs 
to the public, or reverts to the heirs at law. A company 
of men united for another object, though retaining the 
same name, have no more right to inherit it than any 
other citizens. The right of a legislature to give it to 
them by special act, is even very questionable. Legisla- 
tures are not empowered to bestow property upon men at 
will ; and such grant, being beyond the power conceded 
to the legislator, seems to me to be null and void. 

The principles of this section seem to me to demand 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



341 



the special attention of those who are at present engaged 
in conducting the business of voluntary associations. It 
should always be remembered, that he who joins a volun- 
tary association, joins it for a specified object, and for no 
other. The association itself has one object, and no other. 
This object, and the manner in which it is to be accom- 
plished, ought to be plainly set forth in the constitution. 
Now, when a majority, or the whole society, attempt to 
do any thing not comprehended within this object thus 
set forth, or in a manner at variance with that prescribed, 
they violate the fundamental article of the compact, and 
the society is virtually dissolved. And against such in- 
fraction of right it is the duty of the individual to protest ; 
and if it be persisted in, it is his duty to withdraw. And 
it seems to me that, otherwise, the whole benefit of volun- 
tary associations will be lost. If the objects of such asso- 
ciations be not restricted, their increasing complication 
will render them unmanageable by any form of agency. 
If an individual, when he unites with others for one object, 
knows not for how many objects, nor for what modes of 
accomplishing them, he shall be held responsible, who 
will ever unite in a benevolent enterprise ? And, if masses 
of men may be thus associated in every part of a country 
for one professed object, and this object may be modified, 
changed, or exceeded, according to the will of an acci- 
dental majority, voluntary associations will very soon be 
transformed into the tools of intriguing and ambitious men, 
and thus will become a curse instead of a blessing. 



SECTION II. 

OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 

In order to consider this subject correctly, it will be 
necessary to consider society as distinct from government. 
It may exist without government. At some time it must 
so have existed. And in all cases, government is merely 



342 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



the instrument by which it accomplishes its purposes. 
Government is the agent. Society is the principal. 

The first consideration which meets us, in the discussion 
of this subject, is, that civil society is an institution 
of God ; or, in other words, it is the will of God that 
man should live in a state of society. This may be shown 
both from the original impulses common to all men, and 
from the necessities of man, arising out of the conditions 
of his present existence. 

I. From the original impulses of man. 

1. One of the strongest and most universal impulses of 
our nature, is a general love for society. It commences, 
as every one must have observed, with early infancy, and 
continues, unabated, to the close of life. The poets can 
conceive of no situation more afflictive, or more intolerable, 
than that of a human being in a state of perfect loneliness. 
Hence, solitary confinement is considered, by all mankind, 
as one of the severest forms of punishment. And, hence, 
a disposition to separate one's self from society is one of 
the surest indications of mental derangement. Now, the 
natural result of this intense and universal impulse is a 
willingness to surrender what is inconsistent with it, or a 
disposition to control such other desires as shall be incon- 
sistent with it. Wherever these dispositions exist, a num- 
ber of human beings will as readily and naturally form a 
society as they will do any other thing on which their 
happiness depends. A constitution of this sort manifestly 
shows what is the will of our Creator concerning us. 

2. The various forms of human attachment illustrate 
the same truth. 

Thus, the attachment between the sexes at once forms 
a society, which is the origin of every other. Of this 
union, the fundamental principle is a surrender of the 
happiness of each to that of the other, and the consequent 
attainment of an increased return of happiness. From 
this arises the love of parents to children, and that of chil- 
dren to parents, and all the various modifications of affec- 
tion resulting from collateral and more distant relation- 
ships. 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 343 

Besides these, there must continually arise the feeling 
of friendship between individuals of similar habits and of 
corresponding pursuits ; the love of benevolence towards 
those who need our succor, or awaken our sympathy ; 
and the love of approbation, which will stimulate us to 
deny ourselves for the sake of acquiring the good opinion 
of those by whom we are surrounded. Now, the ten- 
dency of all these instincts is manifestly twofold : first, 
as in the former instance, as these propensities can be 
gratified only by society, we shall be disposed to surren- 
der whatever would be inconsistent with the enjoyment 
of society ; and, secondly, since it is, as we have seen 
before, in the very nature of affection, to surrender our 
own personal gratification for the happiness of those whom 
we love, affection renders such a surrender one of the 
very sources of our individual happiness. Thus, patriot- 
ism, which is only one form of the love of society, not 
only supposes a man to be willing to surrender something 
personal for the sake of something general, which he 
likes better, but also to derive happiness from that very 
surrender, and to be actually happier when acting from 
these principles than from any other. It is almost need- 
less to add, that the Creator's intention, in forming beings 
with such impulsions, is too evident to be mistaken. 

II. The same truth is taught by the necessities imposed 
upon us by the conditions of our being, 

1. Suppose the human race entirely destitute of these 
social principles ; to have been scattered abroad over the 
face of the earth as mere isolated individuals. It is evi- 
dent that, under such circumstances, the race must quickly 
have perished. Man, thus isolated, could never contend, 
either with the cold of the northern, or with the wild 
beasts of the temperate and warmer, regions. He has 
neither muscular power, nor agility, nor instinct, to pro- 
tect him from the one, nor any natural form of clothing 
to shield him from the other. 

2. But suppose that, by any means, the race of man 
could be continued. Without society, the progressive 
melioration of his condition would be impossible. 

30 



344 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



Without society, there could be no division of labor. 
Every one must do every thing for himself, and at the 
greatest possible disadvantage. Without society, there 
could be neither any knowledge of the agents of nature, 
nor any application of them to the production of value. 
A man's instruments would be almost exclusively limited 
to his teeth and nails. Without society, there could be 
no acknowledged right of property. Hence, from these 
causes, there could be no accumulated capital ; and each 
successive generation of men must, like the brutes, remain 
precisely in the condition of their predecessors. It is 
equally evident, that, under these circumstances, there 
could exist no possibility of either intellectual or moral 
improvement. In fact, take the most civilized, intellect- 
ual, and moral condition in which man has ever existed, 
and compare it with the condition of man naked, wan- 
dering, destitute, exposed to the peltings of every tempest, 
and liable to become the prey of every ferocious beast, 
and the difference between these two conditions is wholly 
the result of society. If it be granted that God is benev- 
olent, and wills the happiness of man, nay, if it be even 
granted that God wills the existence of man, it must be 
conceded that He also wills that condition on which, not 
merely his happiness, but even his very existence, de- 
pends. 

Now, if this be the fact, that is, if civil society be an 
institution of God, several important conclusions will be 
seen to follow from it : 

1. A very important distinction may be observed be- 
tween civil society and a simple or voluntary society, 
such as is described in the last section. In a simple so- 
ciety, the contract is voluntary, and is, like any other 
contract, dissolved at the pleasure of the parties; or it 
ceases to be binding upon either party, if its conditions 
are violated by the other party. But, civil society being 
an institution of God, specific duties are imposed upon 
both parties, which remain unchanged even after the 
other party may, in various respects, have violated his 
part of the contract. In civil society, we are under obli- 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



345 



gation to God as well as to man, and the former obliga- 
tion remains even after the other has been annulled. In 
this respect, it follows the analogy of the other relations 
established by God, as that of husband and wife, parent 
and child, in which the one party is bound to act in obe- 
dience to the will of God, and according to the obligations 
of the relation, whether the other does so or not. 

2. Civil society being an ordinance of God, it cannot 
be justly established, upon any principles whatsoever, at 
the will of the parties, but it must be established upon » 
the principles which God has intended. If it be estab- 
lished upon any other principles, the evidence of his dis- 
pleasure will be seen in the mutual evil which both parties 
suffer, in consequence of violating a law of their being. 
Such is the case with marriage. This is a form of society 
established by God. Men have no right to enter into it 
as they please, but only according to the laws which God 
has established ; and, if they act otherwise, mutual misery 
will be the result. 

3. If society be an ordinance of God, it follows tha-t 
every man who conforms to the social laws of God has a 
right to it. For if, in the formation of civil society, men 
are under obligation to act according to the will of God, 
they have no right to construct it upon such principles as 
will exclude any man who is willing to obey the social 
laws of his Maker. No man can, therefore, justly be v 
excluded from society, unless he have committed some 
overt act by which he has forfeited his right. His original 
right is to be taken for granted ; the proof of forfeiture 
rests with those who would exclude him. Hence, it is 
not enough, to say, if a man does not like this society, he 
may go to another. So long as he violates none of his 
Maker's social laws, he has a right to this society, and he 
cannot be excluded from it without injustice. Any course \/ 
of legislation, therefore, which obliges men to leave a 
society, unless their forfeiture of social right is proved, is 
oppressive and unjust. 

4. As society is an ordinance of God, it is evidently 
the will of God that its existence be preserved. Hence, 



346 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



society has the right to take all means which may be 
necessary to prevent those crimes which, if permitted, 
must destroy society itself. Hence is derived the power 
to punish criminals, to enforce contracts, and to establish 
such forms of government as may best conduce to the 
well-being of the social institution. 

I suppose it to have been from a misconception of these 
principles, that our forefathers erred. They conceived 

i that, in forming a civil society here in the wilderness, they 
had a right to frame its provisions in such manner as they 
chose. Hence, they made the form of religious belief a 
subject of civil legislation, and assumed the right of ban- 
ishing from their society those who differed from them in 
the mode of worshipping God. Their first assumption I 
conceive to be an error. If society be an ordinance of 
God, whenever and wherever men form it, they must 

^ form it in obedience to his laws. But he has never in- 
tended that religious belief, or religious practice, if they 
interfere not with the rights of others, should be subject 
to human legislation. 

Second. Of the nature and limitations of the 
contract entered into between the individual and civil 
society. 

It has been already remarked, that every society is 
essentially a mutual compact, entered into between every 
individual and all the rest of those who form the society. 
As all these individuals enter the society upon the same 
terms, that is, put themselves under the power of society 
in the same respects, the power of the society over the 
\ individual is derived from the concession of every individ- 
ual, and is no other, and in no wise different from what 
these individuals have made it. And, on the other hand, 
as every member of the society is a party to the contract 
which the society made with the individual, every mem- 
ber of the society is bound faithfully to execute the con- 
tract thus entered into. 

But, as it was also remarked, this society differs from 
a simple or voluntary society, inasmuch as it is an ordi- 
nance of God, and it is subject to the laws which he has 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



347 



imposed upon it. That every man is bound to become a 
member of civil society, need not be asserted ; all that I 
affirm is, that, if he form a civil society, he is bound to 
form it according to the laws which God has appointed. 
He cannot form it according to any other principles, with- 
out violating the rights of his fellow-men, and disobeying 
the laws of his God. 

The question, then, which meets us as of the first im- 
portance, is this : What are the laws under which God 
has subjected civil society ? On this question I now pro- 
ceed to offer a few suggestions, considering, first, what is 
essential to the existence of society; and, secondly, what 
is merely accidental. 

I. Of what is essential to the existence of civil society. 

1. As God wills the existence of civil society, it is 
manifest that he must forbid whatever would be incon- 
sistent with its existence. And, on the other hand, he 
who chooses to enter society, virtually contracts to abstain 
from whatever is, from the constitution of things, incon- 
sistent with its existence. This, 1 think, is as evident as 
that a man cannot honestly enter into a contract to do 
any two things in their nature essentially at variance. 

2. Suppose, now, a number of men to meet together 
to form a society, all being perfectly acquainted with the 
law of reciprocity, and all perfectly inclined to obey it. 
I think it is manifest that such persons would have to 
surrender nothing whatever, in order to form a civil soci- 
ety. Every one would do just as he pleased, and yet 
every one would enjoy fully all the benefit of the social 
nature of man ; that is, every one would enjoy all the 
blessings arising both from his individual and from his 
social constitution. This, I suppose, would be the most 
perfect state of human society of which we are able to 
conceive. 

As, therefore, society, in its most perfect state, may 
exist without the individual's surrendering up the right to 
do any thing which is consistent with the law of reci- 
procity, the existence of society presents no reason why he 
should surrender any right not inconsistent with this law. 
30* 



348 



GF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



Whatever other reasons there may be, as those of benev- 
olence, mercy, or religion, they belong not to this ques- 
tion. As every man has, originally, the right to do as he 
pleases, provided he interferes not with the rights of his 
neighbors, and as the existence of civil society presents 
no reason why this right should be restricted, it remains, 
notwithstanding the existence of such society, just as it 
was before ; that is, the right vests, without change, in 
the individual himself. 

3. Suppose, now, any individual to violate the law of 
reciprocity ; as, for instance, that A. steals the property 
of B, or violates a contract into which they have mutually 
entered. If this be allowed, that is, if every man were 
to steal at will the property of his neighbor, it is manifest 
that the right of property would be at an end, and every 
man would be obliged to retire as far as possible from 
every other man ; that is, society would be dissolved. 

4. Again, suppose that B takes the work of redress 
into his own hands, being, at once, his own legislator, 
judge and executioner. From the native principles of 
the human heart, it is evident that, from being the ag- 
grieved party, he would, in turn, become the aggressor/ 
This would lead to revenge on the part of A, — a revenge 
to be repeated by the other party, until it ended either in 
the destruction of one or of both. Hence, every differ- 
ence would lead to interminable war and unbridled feroci- 
ty ; and society would cease, because every man would 
prefer a quiet solitude to ceaseless hostility. 

To allow one's self, therefore, in any violation of the 
law of reciprocity, or to assume the right of redressing 
one's own wrongs, is to pursue a course inconsistent with 
the existence of society ; for, were such a course to be 
pursued universally, society could not exist. 

Again, on the other hand, since, in a company of mor- 
ally imperfect beings, injury is likely to occur, and since, 
if injury were not prevented, the virtuous would become 
the prey of the vicious, and society would, as before, be 
destroyed by universal violence, it is manifestly necessary 
that injury be prevented, that is, that the virtuous be pro- 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



349 



tected, and that wrongs be redressed. But, as we have 
shown that the rights of individual self-protection and 
redress are inconsistent with the existence of society, as 
the individual must not redress them, the duty devolves 
upon the other party, that is, upon society. Society is, ^ 
therefore, bound to do for the individual what he has re- 
linquished the right to do for himself ; that is, to protect 
him from violation of the law of reciprocity, or to redress 
his wrong, if this right be violated. 

Hence, we see the nature of the compact entered into 
between the individual and society. It essentially involves 
the following particulars : 

1. Every individual, by entering society, promises that 
he will abstain from every violation of the law of reci- 
procity, which, if universally permitted, would destroy so- 
ciety. For, if he, be allowed to violate it, the allowance 
to violate it must be extended to all, since all are equals ; 
and thus society would be destroyed. But as, by the 
destruction of society, he would gain nothing but solitude, 
which he could enjoy without depriving others of what is 
to them a source of happiness, there can be no reason as- 
signed why he should diminish their happiness to procure 
what he could equally well enjoy by leaving them alone. 
If he join the society, he must conform to whatever is 
necessary to its existence ; if he be unwilling to do so, he 
must remain alone. 

2. Every individual promises to surrender to society 
the right of self-protection. 

3. And, lastly, every individual promises to surrender 
to society the right to redress his own wrongs. 

And, on the other hand, society promises, — 

1. To protect the individual in the enjoyment of all his 
rights ; that is, to enforce upon every individual, within 
certain limits, obedience to the law of reciprocity. 

2. To redress wrongs whenever they may occur, either 
by obliging the offender to do justly, or else by inflicting 
such punishment as may be most likely to prevent a repe- 
tition of the injury, either by the offender or by others. 

It is important here to remark, that this surrender on 



350 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



the one part, and this obligation on the other part, are 
mutual and universal : that is to say, the individual, on 
his part, surrenders wholly and entirely the right either to 
defend or to redress himself ; and, on the other hand, 
society guarantees to defend him, and to do him justice 
to the utmost ; that is, no matter in how small a right, 
and no matter at how great an expense. 

Hence, we see the anti-social tendency of all those 
secret societies, of which the object, either avowed or in 
fact, is to protect the individual members in opposition to 
the laws, that is, in opposition to society. In this case, 
while the individual receives from civil society the same 
benefits as other men, and expects from it the fulfilment 
of its part of the contract, he does not make, on his part, 
the corresponding surrender. He expects to be protected 
and redressed, but he reserves also the right of protecting 
and redressing himself, and it may be in opposition to the 
just operation of those laws which he enforces upon 
others. 

And hence we see the obligation of every one to exert 
himself to the uttermost, in order to enforce the execution 
of the laws, no matter in how small a matter, or in the 
case of how obscure an individual. The execution of the 
laws is what we all promise, and we are all bound to fulfil 
it. And if laws are not executed, that is, if individuals 
are not protected, and wrongs are not redressed by socie- 
ty, the individuals will redress them themselves, and thus 
society will be dissolved. The frequent occurrence of 
mobs, that is, of extra-legal modes of redress for supposed 
grievances, are among the most decisive indications of a 
state of society verging towards dissolution. 

But, while this contract is thus universal and obligatory, 
it is to be remarked, that it is so only in respect to those 
things in which the parties have respectively bound them- 
selves. The individual, by entering into society, promises 
to abstain from whatever is inconsistent with the existence 
of society ; but, by entering into society, he promises 
nothing more. Society promises to restrain and to redress 
whatever would be destructive to society, but it promises 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



351 



no more. In all other respects, the parties are exactly 
in the situation in which they were before the establish- 
ment of society. Thus freedom, both of person, of intel- 
lect, and of conscience, remain, by the fact of the existence 
of society, untouched. Thus also freedom of property 
remains as before, except simply in so far as a portion of 
every man's property is pledged to meet the necessary 
expenses of government. So long as he obeys the law of 
reciprocity, society has no further demands upon him, 
unless his assistance be demanded in enforcing this obedi- 
ence upon others. 

By this compact, every individual is very greatly the 
gainer. 

1. He promises to obey the law of reciprocity, which is 
the law of his nature, and by the obedience to which alone 
he can be happy. 

2. He surrenders the right of self-protection, which 
without society he can exert in but a very impefect man- 
ner, and with nothing but the force of his individual arm ; 
and he receives in return the right to wield in his defence 
the whole power of society. 

3. He surrenders the right of redressing his own griev- 
ances, and receives in return the right to have his griev- 
ances redressed, at whatever expense, by the whole power 
of the society. 

And, hence, as God wills the happiness of man, we see 
another reason why society is in obedience to his will ; 
and why the laws necessary to the existence of society 
may be considered, as they are in fact considered in the 
Scriptures, as enacted by His authority. 

And, again, we see that, from the very nature of society, 
the individual is perfectly within its physical power. 
This power of the whole, which they are bound to use only 
for his protection and defence, they may use for his injury 
and oppression. And as the whole power of the society 
is in the hands of the majority, the whole happiness of the 
individual or of the minority is always in the control of the 
majority. Hence we see there is no safeguard against 
oppression, except that which exists in the conditions of the 



352 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



compact on which the society is formed, and the feeling 
of moral obligation to observe that compact inviolably. 
That is to say, the real question of civil liberty is not con- 

sj cerning forms of government, but concerning the respective 
limits and obligations of the individual and of society. 
When these are correcty adjusted and inviolably observed, 
there can be no oppression under any form of government. 
When these are not understood or not observed, there will 
be tyranny under any form whatsoever. And to a man of 
sense it is a matter of very small consequence whether 
oppression proceeds from one or from many ; from an he- 
reditary tyrant, or from an unprincipled majority. The 

v latter is rather the more galling, and surely at least as diffi- 
cult of remedy. 

And supposing the limits to have been correctly adjusted,, 
it is obvious that they will be of no avail, unless there be 
in the community sufficient virtue to resist the temptations 
which continually occur to violate them. In the absence 
of this, the best constitution is valueless, or worse than 

g valueless. Hence we see the necessity of individual virtue 
to the existence of civil freedom. And, hence, whatever 
tends to depress the standard of individual virtue, saps the 
very foundations of liberty. And hence religion, in its 
purest form, and under its most authoritative sanctions, is 
the surest hope of national as well as of individual happi- 
ness. 

Of the accidental modifications of civil society. 

1 have thus far treated of what is essential to the social 
compact. Without such a contract as 1 have suggested, 
society could not exist. I by no means, however, intend 
to assert that these limits are exclusive ; and that men, in 
forming society, may not enter into contract in other re- 
spects, besides those which I have stated. 

Some of the incidental additions to the original forms of 
contract are the following : 

1. After having adjusted the limits of the respective ob- 
ligations, both of the society and of the individual, men may 
i choose whatever form of government they please for the 
purpose of carrying forward the objects of society. But, 
having adopted a particular form of government, they bind 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



353 



themselves to whatever is necessary to the existence of 
that government. Thus, if men choose a republican form of 
government, in which the people are acknowledged to be 
the immediate fountain of all power, they come under obli- 
gation to educate their children intellectually and morally ; 
for, without intellectual and moral education, such a form 
of government cannot long exist. And, as the intellectual 
education of the young can be made properly a subject of 
social enactment, this duty may be enforced by society. 
And the only reason why religious education does not come 
under the same rule is, that it is not, for reasons which 
have been before given, a subject for social enactment. 

2. I have said that, by the essential principles of the 
social compact, every man is bound to contribute his part 
to the expenses of civil society ; but that, beyond this, he 
is not in any respect bound. Still, this does not exclude 
other forms of contract. Men may, if they choose, agree 
to hold their whole property subject to the will of the 
whole, so that they shall be obliged to employ it, not each 
one for his own good, but each one for the benefit of the 
whole society. 1 say, that such a state of things might 
exist, but it is manifest that it is not essential to society ; 
and that, being not essential, it is by no means to be pre- 
sumed ; and that it cannot exist justly, unless this right 
has been expressly conceded by the individual to society. 
If society exerts such a power when it has not been ex- 
pressly conceded to it, it is tyranny. The common fact 
has been, that society has presumed upon such powers, and 
has exercised them without reflection, and very greatly 
to social and individual injury. 

3. Men have very generally been disposed to take for 
granted these accidental powers, and to question or limit 
the essential powers of society. An instance in point oc- 
curs in the question of war. The very idea of war suppo- 
ses the society to have the right of determining the moral 
relations in which the individuals of one nation shall stand 
to the individuals of another nation. Now, this power of 
society over the individual has never, that I know of, been 
questioned. And yet, I think it would be very difficult 



354 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



to establish it. The moral precept is, " If thine enemy 
hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him drink." And 1 do 
not see that society has a right to abrogate this command, 
or to render void this obligation ; or that any moral agent 
has the right to commit to other individuals the power of 
changing his relations to any creature of God. Forgive- 
ness and charity to men are dispositions which we owe to 
God. And I do not see that society has any more right 
to interfere with the manifestation of these dispositions, 
than with the liberty to inculcate them and to teach them. 

To conclude. Whatever concessions on the part of 
the individual, and whatever powers on the part of society, 
are necessary to the existence of society, must, by the very 
fact of the existence of society, be taken for granted. 
Whatever is not thus necessary is a matter of con- 
cession and mutual adjustment ; and has no right to be 
presumed, unless it can be shown to have actually been 
surrendered. That is, in general, a man is bound by what 
he has agreed to ; he is not bound by any thing else. 

I think no one can reflect upon the above considerations 
without being led to the conclusion, that the cultivation of 
the moral nature of man is the grand means for the improve- 
ment of society. This alone teaches man, whether as an 
individual or as a society, to respect the rights of man, as 
an individual or as a society. This teaches every one to ob- 
serve inviolate the contract into which, as a member of 
society, he has entered. Now, since, as we have before 
shown, the light of conscience and the dictates of natural 
religion are insufficient to exert the requisite moral power 
over man, our only hope is in that revelation of his will 
which God has made in the Holy Scriptures. In these 
books all our duties to man are taken under the immediate 
protection of Almighty God. On pain of his eternal dis- 
pleasure, he commands us to love every man as ourselves. 
Here he holds forth the strongest inducements to obedience, 
and here he presents the strongest, motives, not merely to 
reciprocity, but also to benevolence. Were it not so 
solemn, it would be amusing to hear the levity with which 
some politicians, and, as they would persuade us to believe, 



OF CIVIL SOCIETY. 



355 



statesmen, speak of the religion of Jesus Christ ; to observe 
how complacently they talk of using it as an instrument, 
convenient enough for directing the weak, but which a 
man of sense can well enough do without ; and which is 
a mere appendage to the forces that, by his constitution, 
are destined to act upon man. Is it not probable that they 
do not yet thoroughly understand the subject ? 

31 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



OF THE MODE IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF SOCIETY ARE ACCOM- 
PLISHED. 

We have thus far treated merely of the constitution of 
a society, of the contract entered into between the indi- 
vidual and society, and of the obligations hence devolving 
upon each. The obligations of society are to protect the 
individual from infractions of the law of reciprocity, and 
to redress his wrongs if he have been injured. 

But it is manifest that this obligation cannot be dis- 
charged by the whole of society as a body. If a man 
steal from his neighbor, the whole community cannot 
leave their occupations, to detect, to try, and to punish 
the thief. Or, if a law is to be enacted respecting the 
punishment of theft, it cannot be done by the whole 
community, but must of necessity be intrusted to dele- 
gates. On the principle of division of labor, it is manifest 
that this service will be both more cheaply and more per- 
fectly done, by those who devote themselves to it, than 
by those who are, for the greater part of the time^ en- 
gaged in other occupations. 

Now I suppose a government to be that system of dele- 
gated agencies, by which these obligations of society to 
the individual are fulfilled. 

And, moreover, as every society may have various en- 
gagements to form with other independent societies, it is 
convenient, in general, that this business should be trans- 
acted by this same system of agencies. These two offices 
of government, though generally united, are in their na- 
ture distinct. Thus we see, in our own country, the state 
governments are, to a considerable degree, intrusted with 



MODES IN WHICH THE OBJECTS, ETC. 357 

the first, while a part of the first, and all the latter power, 
vests in the general government. 

A government thus understood is naturally divided into 
three parts. 

1. An individual may from ignorance violate the rights 
of his neighbor, and thus innocently expose himself to 
punishment. Or, if he violate his neighbor's rights ma- 
liciously, and justly merit punishment, a punishment may 
be inflicted more severe than the nature of the case de- 
mands. To avoid this, it is necessary that the various 
forms of violation be as clearly as possible defined, and 
also that the penalty be plainly and explicitly attached 
to each. This is a law. This, as we have shown, must 
be done by delegates. These delegates are called a 
legislature, and the individual members of it are legis- 
lators. 

From what we have said, their power is manifestly 
limited. They have no power except to execute the ob- 
ligations which society has undertaken to fulfil towards 
the individual. This is all that society has conferred, for 
it is all that society had to confer. 

If legislators originate any power in themselves, or ex- 
ercise any power conferred, for any purpose different from 
that for which it was conferred, they violate right, and are 
guilty of tyranny. 

2. But suppose a law to be enacted, that is, a crime to 
be defined, and the penalty to be affixed. It has reference 
to no particular case, for, when enacted, no case existed 
to be affected by it. Suppose now an individual to be 
accused of violating this law. Here it is necessary to ap- 
ply the law to this particular case. In order to do this, 
we must ascertain, first, whether the accused did commit 
the act laid to his charge ; secondly, whether the act, if it 
be proved to have been done, is a violation of the law ; 
that is, whether it come within the description of actions 
which the law forbids ; and, thirdly, if this be proved, it is 
necessary to declare the punishment which the law assigns 
to this particular violation. This is the judicial branch of 
the government, 



358 



MODES IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF 



3. After the law has been thus applied to this particu- 
lar case, it is necessary that it be carried into effect. This 
devolves upon the third, or the executive branch of a gov- 
ernment. 

Respecting all of these three branches of government, 
it may be remarked in general, that they are essentially 
independent of each other ; that each one has its specific 
duties marked out by society, within the sphere of which 
duties it is responsible to society, and to society alone. 
Nor is this independence at all affected by the mode of 
appointment. Society may choose a way of appointing 
an agent, but that is by no means a surrender of the claim 
which it has upon the agent. Thus, society may impose 
upon a legislature, or an executive, the duty of appointing 
a judiciary ; but the judiciary is just as much independent 
of the executive, or of the legislature, as though it were ap- 
pointed in some other way. Society, by conferring upon 
one branch the right of appointment, has conferred upon 
it no other right. The judge, although appointed by the 
legislator, is as independent of him, as the legislator would 
be if appointed by the judge. Each, within his own 
sphere, is under obligation to perform precisely those du- 
ties assigned by society, and no other. And hence arises 
the propriety of establishing the tenure of office, in each 
several branch, independently of the other. 

The two first of these departments are frequently sub- 
divided. 

Thus, the legislative department is commonly divided 
into two branches, chosen under dissimilar conditions, for 
the purpose of exerting a check upon each other, by rep- 
resenting society under different aspects, and thus pre- 
venting partial and party legislation. 

The judiciary is also generally divided. The judges 
explain and interpret the law ; while it is the province of 
the jury to ascertain the facts. 

The executive is generally sole, and executes the law 
by means of subordinate agents. Sometimes, however, a 
council is added, for the sake of advice, without whose 
concurrence the executive cannot act. 



SOCIETY ARE ACCOMPLISHED. 



359 



Sometimes the fundamental principles of the social 
compact are expressed, and the respective powers of the 
different branches of the government are defined, and the 
mode of their appointment described in a written docu- 
ment. Such is the case in the United States. At other 
times, these principles and customs have grown up in the 
progress of society, and are the deductions drawn from, or 
principles established by, uncontested usage. The latter 
is the case in Great Britain. In either case, such prin- 
ciples and practices are called the constitution of a 
country. 

Nations differ widely in the mode of selection to office, 
and the tenure by which office is held. Thus, under 
some constitutions, the government is wholly hereditary. 
In others, it is partly hereditary and partly elective. In 
others, it is wholly elective. 

Thus, in Great Britain, the executive and one branch 
of the legislature are hereditary ; the other branch of the 
legislature is elective. The judiciary is appointed by the 
executive, though they hold office, except in the case of 
the lord high chancellor, during good behavior. 

In the United States, the executive, and both branches 
of the legislature, are elective. The judiciary is appoint- 
ed by the executive, by and with the advice and consent 
of the senate. In the state government, the mode of ap- 
pointment is various. 

If it be asked, which of these is the preferable form of 
government? the answer, I think, must be conditional. 
The best form of government for any people, is the best 
that its present moral condition renders practicable. A 
people may be so entirely surrendered to the influence of 
passion, and so feebly influenced by moral restraint, that 
a government which relied upon moral restraint, could not 
exist for a day. In this case, a subordinate and inferior 
principle yet remains, — the principle of fear ; and the 
only resort is to a government of force, or a military des- 
potism. And such do we see- to be the fact. An anarchy 
always ends in this form of government. After this has 
been established, and habits of subordination have been 
31* 



360 



MODES IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF 



formed, while the moral restraints are too feeble for self- 
government, an hereditary government, which addresses 
itself to the imagination, and strengthens itself by the in- 
fluence of domestic connections, may be as good a form 
as a people can sustain. As they advance in intellectual 
and moral cultivation, it may advantageously become 
more and more elective ; and, in a suitable moral con- 
dition, it may be wholly so. For beings, who are willing 
to govern themselves by moral principle, there can be no 
doubt, that a government relying upon moral principle, is 
the true form of government. There is no reason why a 
man should be oppressed by taxation, and subjected to 
fear, who is willing to govern himself by the law of re- 
ciprocity. It is surely better for an intelligent and moral 
being to do right from his own will, than to pay another 
to force him to do right. And yet, as it is better that 
he should do right than wrong, even though he be forced 
to it, it is well that he should pay others to force him, if 
there be no other way of insuring his good conduct. God 
has rendered the blessing of freedom inseparable from 
moral restraint in the individual ; and hence it is vain 
for a people to expect to be free, unless they are first 
willing to be virtuous. 

It is on this point, that the question of the permanency 
of the form of government of the United States turns. 
That such a form of government requires, of necessity, a 
given amount of virtue in the people, cannot, I think, be 
doubted. If we possess that required amount of virtue, 
or if we can attain to it, the government will stand ; if 
not, it will fall. Or, if we now possess that amount of 
virtue, and do not maintain it, the government will fall. 
There is no self-sustaining power in any form of social 
organization. The only self-sustaining power is in indi- 
vidual virtue. And the form of a government will always 
adjust itself to the moral condition of a people. A virtu- 
ous people will, by their own moral power, frown away 
oppression, and, under any form of constitution, become 
essentially free. A people surrendered up to their own 
licentious passions, must be held in subjection by force ; 



SOCIETY ARE ACCOMPLISHED. 



361 



for every one will find, that force alone can protect him 
from his neighbors ; and he will submit to be oppressed, 
if he may only be protected. Thus, in the feudal ages, 
the small independent landholders frequently made them- 
selves slaves of one powerful chief, to shield themselves 
from the incessant oppression of twenty. 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



THE DUTY OF THE OFFICERS OF A GOVERNMENT. 

From what has been said, the duties of the officers of 
a government may be stated in a few words. 

It will be remembered that a government derives its au- 
thority from society, of which it is the agent ; that society 
derives its authority from the compact formed by individ- 
uals ; that society, and the relations between society and 
individuals, are the ordinance of God : of course the offi- 
cer of a government, as the organ of society, is bound as 
such by the law of God, and is under obligation to ad- 
minister according to this law. And, hence, it makes no 
difference how the other party to the contract may exe- 
cute their engagements ; he, as the servant of God, set 
apart for this very thing, is bound, nevertheless, to act 
precisely according to the principles by which God has 
declared that this relation should be governed. 

The officers of a government are legislative, judicial, 
and executive. 

I. Of legislative officers. 

1. It is the duty of a legislator to understand the social 
principles of man, the nature of the relation which subsists 
between the individual and society, and the mutual obli- 
gations of each. By these are his power and his obliga- 
tions limited ; and, unless he thus inform himself, he can 
never know respecting any act, whether it be just, or 
whether it be oppressive. Without such knowledge, he 
can never act with a clear conscience. 

2. It is the duty of a legislator to understand the pre- 
cise nature of the compact which binds together the par- 
ticular society for which he legislates. This involves the 
general conditions of the social compact, and something 



THE DUTY OF THE OFFICERS, ETC. 363 



more. It generally specifies conditions which the former 
does not contain, and, besides, establishes the limit of the 
powers of the several branches of the government. He 
who enters upon the duties of a legislator, without such 
knowledge, is not only wicked, but contemptible. He is 
the worst of all empirics ; he offers to prescribe for a 
malady, and knows not whether the medicine he uses be 
a remedy or a poison. The injury which he inflicts is 
not on an individual, but on an entire community. There 
is probably no method in which mischief is done so reck- 
lessly, and on so large a scale, as by ignorant, and 
thoughtless, and wicked legislation. Were these plain 
considerations duly weighed, there would be somewhat 
fewer candidates for legislative office, and a somewhat 
greater deliberation on the part of the people in selecting 
them. 

3. Having made himself acquainted with his powers 
and his obligations, he is bound to exert his power pre- 
cisely within the limits by which it is restricted, and for 
the purposes for which it was conferred, to the best of his 
knowledge and ability, and for the best good of the whole 
society. He is bound impartially to carry into effect the 
principles of the general and the particular compact, just 
in those respects in which the carrying them into effect is 
committed to him. For the action of others he is not re- 
sponsible, unless he has been made so responsible. He 
is not the organ of a section, or of a district, much less of 
a party, but of the society at large. And he who uses 
his power for the benefit of a section, or of a party, is 
false to his duty, to his country, and to his God. He is 
engraving his name on the adamantine pillar of his coun- 
try's history, to be gazed upon for ever as an object of 
universal detestation. 

4. It is his duty to leave every thing else undone. 
From no plea of present necessity, or of peculiar circum- 
stances, may he overstep the limits of his constitutional 
power, either in the act itself, or the purpose for which 
the act is done. The moment he does this, he is a tyrant. 
Precisely the power committed to him exists, and no other. 



364 



THE DUTY OF THE OFFICERS 



If he may exercise one power not delegated, he may 
another, and all ; thus, on principle, he assumes himself 
to be the fountain of power ; restraint upon encroachment 
ceases, and all liberty is henceforth at an end. If the 
powers of a legislator are insufficient to accomplish the 
purposes of society, inconveniences will arise. It is better 
that these should be endured until the necessity of some 
modification be made apparent, than to remedy them on 
principles which destroy all liberty, and thus remove one 
inconvenience by taking away the possibility of ever re- 
moving another. 

II. Of judicial officers. 

1. The judicial officer forms an independent branch of 
the government, or a separate and distinct agent, for ex- 
ecuting the contract which society has made with the in- 
dividual. As I have said before, it matters not how he is 
appointed : as soon as he is appointed, he is the agent of 
society, and of society alone. 

The judge, precisely in the same manner as the legis- 
lator, is bound by the principles of the social contract ; 
and by those of the particular civil compact of the society 
in whose behalf he acts. This is the limit of his authori- 
ty ; and it is on his own responsibility if he transcend it. 

2. The provisions of this compact, as they are em- 
bodied in laws, he is bound to enforce. 

And hence we see the relation in which the judge 
stands to the legislator. Both are equally limited by the 
principles of the original compact. The acts of both are 
valid, in so far as they are authorized by that compact. 
Hence, if the legislator violate his trust, and enact laws at 
variance with the constitution, the judge is bound not to 
enforce them. The fact, that the one has violated the 
constitution, imposes upon the other no obligation to do 
the same. Thus the judge, inasmuch as he is obliged to 
decide upon the constitutionality of a law before he en- 
forces it, becomes accidentally, but in fact, a coordinate 
power, without whose concurrence the law cannot go into 
force. 

Hence we see that the duty of a judge is to understand, 



OF A GOVERNMENT. 



365 



L The principles of that contract from which he de- 
rives his power ; 

2. The laws of the community, whose agent he is ; 

3. To explain these laws without fear, favor, or affec- 
tion ; and to show their bearing upon each individual case, 
without bias, either towards the individual, or towards so- 
ciety ; and, 

4. To pronounce the decision of the law, according to 
its true intent. 

5. As the jury are a part of the judicial agents of the 
government, they are bound in the same manner to de- 
cide upon the facts, according to their best knowledge 
and ability, with scrupulous and impartial integrity. 

III. Of executive officers. 

The executive office is either simple or complex. 

1. Simple ; as where his only duty is, to perform what 
either the legislative or judicial branches of the govern- 
ment have ordered to be done. 

Such is the case with sheriffs, military officers, he. 

Here the officer has no right to question the goodness 
or wisdom of the law ; since for these he is not responsi- 
ble. His only duty is to execute it, so long as he retains 
his office. If he believe the action required of him to be 
morally wrong, or at variance with the constitution, he 
should resign. He has no right to hold the office, and 
refuse to perform the duties which others have been em- 
powered to require of him. 

2. Complex; where legislative and executive duties 
are imposed upon the same person ; as where the chief 
magistrate is allowed a vote, on all acts of the other 
branches of the legislature. 

As far as his duties are legislative, he is bound by the 
same principles as any other legislator. 

Sometimes his power is limited to a vote on mere con- 
stitutional questions ; and at others, it extends to all ques- 
tions whatsoever. Sometimes his assent is absolutely ne- 
cessary to the passage of all bills ; at others, it is only 
conditionally necessary, that is, the other branches may r 
under certain circumstances, enact laws without it. 



366 THE DUTY OF THE OFFICERS, ETC. 



When this legislative power of the executive has been 
exerted within its constitutional limits, he becomes merely 
an executive officer. He has no other deliberative power 
than that conferred upon him by the constitution. He is 
under the same obligations as any other executive officer, 
to execute the law, unless it seem to him a violation of 
moral or constitutional obligation. In that case, it is his 
duty to resign. He has no more right than any other 
man, to hold the office, while he is, from any reason what- 
ever, unable to discharge the duties which the office im- 
poses upon him. That executive officer is guilty of gross 
perversion of official and moral obligation, who, after the 
decision of the legislative or judicial branch of a govern- 
ment has been obtained, suffers his own personal views to 
influence him in the discharge of his duty. The exhibi- 
tion of such a disposition is a manifest indication of an 
entire disqualification for office. It shows that a man is 
either destitute of the ability to comprehend the nature of 
his station, or fatally wanting in that self-government, so 
indispensably necessary to him who is called to preside 
over important business. 

And not only is an executive officer bound to exert no 
other power than that committed to him ; he is also bound 
to exert that power for no other purposes than those for 
which it was committed. A power may be conferred for 
the public good ; but this by no means authorizes a man 
to use it for the gratification of individual love or hatred ; 
much less for the sake of building up one. political party, 
or of crushing another. Political corruption is in no re- 
spect the less wicked, because it is so common. Dishon- 
esty is no better policy in the affairs of state than in any 
other affairs ; though men may persuade themselves and 
others to the contrary. 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 

From what has already been stated, it will be seen 
that the duties of a citizen are of two kinds : first, as an 
individual ; and, second, as a member of society. A few 
remarks on each of these will close this part of the sub- 
ject. 

First. As an individual. 

Every citizen, as an individual, is bound to observe, 
in good faith, the contract which he has made with soci- 
ety. This obliges him, — 

1. To observe the law of reciprocity, in all his inter- 
course with others. 

The nature of this law has been already explained. It 
is only necessary to remark, that society furnishes an ad- 
ditional reason for observing it, — a reason founded both 
in voluntary compact, and also in the necessity of obe- 
dience to our own happiness. It may also be added, that 
the nature of the law of reciprocity binds us, not merely 
to avoid those acts which are destructive to the existence 
of society, but also those which would interfere with its 
happiness. The principle is, in all cases, the same. If 
we assume the right to interfere with the smallest means 
of happiness possessed by our neighbor, the admission of" 
that assumption would excuse every form of violation. 

2. To surrender the right of redressing our wrongs 
wholly to society. This has been considered already, in 
treating of the social compact. Aggression and injury in 
no case justify retaliation. If a man's house be attacked, 
he may, so far as society is concerned, repel the robber, 
because here society is unable, at the instant, to assist 
him ; but he is at liberty to put forth no other effort than 

32 



368 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 



that necessary to protect himself, or to secure the aggres- 
sor, for the purpose of delivering him over to the judgment 
of society. If, after having secured him, we put him to 
death, this is murder. 

3. To obey all laws made in accordance with the con- 
stituted powers of society. Hence, we are in no manner 
released from this obligation, by the conviction that the 
law is unwise or inexpedient. We have confided the 
decision of this question to society, and we must abide by 
that decision. To do otherwise, would be to constitute 
every man the judge in his own case ; that is, to allow 
every man to obey or disobey as he pleased, while he 
expected from every other man implicit obedience. Thus, 
though a man were convinced that laws regulating the 
rate of interest were inexpedient, this would give him no 
right to violate these laws. He must obey them until he 
is able to persuade society to think as he does. 

Secondly. The citizen is under obligations as a con- 
stituent member of society. By these obligations, on the 
other hand, he is bound to fulfil the contract which he has 
made with every individual. 

Hence, he is bound, — 

1. To use all necessary exertion to secure to every 
individual, from the highest and most powerful to the 
lowest and most defenceless, the full benefit of perfect 
protection in the enjoyment of his rights. 

2. To use all necessary exertion to procure for every 
individual just and adequate redress for wrong. 

3. To use all necessary exertion to carry into effect 
the laws of civil society, and to detect and punish crime, 
whether committed against the individual or against soci- 
ety. Wherever he knows these laws to be violated, he 
is bound to take all proper steps to bring the offenders to 
justice. 

And here it is to be remarked, that he is to consider, 
not merely his property, but his personal service, pledged 
to the fulfilment of this obligation. He who stands by, 
and sees a mob tear down a house, is a partaker in the 
guilt. And, if society knowingly neglect to protect the 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 



369 



individual in the enjoyment of his rights, every member 
of that society is, in equity, bound, in his proportion, to 
make good that loss, how great soever it may be. 

4. It is the duty of the citizen to bear, cheerfully, his 
proportionate burden of the public expense. As society 
cannot be carried on without expense, he, by entering 
into society, obliges himself to bear his proportion of it. 
And, besides this, there are but few modes in which we 
receive back so much for what we expend, as when we 
pay money for the support of civil government. The 
gospel, I think, teaches us to go farther, and be ready to 
do more than we are compelled to do by law. The pre- 
cept, " If a man compel thee to go a mile, go with him 
twain," refers to labor in the public service, and exhorts 
us to do more than can be in equity demanded of us. 

5. Besides this, I think a citizen is under moral obliga- 
tion to contribute his proportion to every effort which 
affords a reasonable prospect of rendering his fellow-citi- 
zens wiser and better. From every such successful effort, 
he receives material benefit, both in his person and estate. 
He ought to be willing to assist others in doing that from 
which he himself derives important advantage. 

6. Inasmuch as society enters into a moral obligation 
to fulfil certain duties, which duties are performed by 
agents which the society appoints, for their faithful dis- 
charge of those duties, society is morally responsible. As 
this is the case, it is manifestly the duty of every member 
of society to choose such agents as, in his opinion, will 
truly and faithfully discharge those duties to which they 
are appointed. He who, for the sake of party prejudice 
or personal feeling, acts otherwise, and selects individuals 
for office without regard to these solemn obligations, is 
using his full amount of influence to sap the very founda- 
tions of society, and to perpetrate the most revolting in- 
justice. 

Thus far, we have gone upon the supposition that soci- 
ety has exerted its power within its constituted limits. 
This, however, unfortunately, is not always the case. 
The question then arises, what is the duty of an individu- 
al, when such a contingency shall arise ? 



370 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 



Now, there are but three courses of conduct, in such a 
case., for the individual to pursue : passive obedience, 
resistance, and suffering in the cause of right : 

L Passive obedience, in many cases, would be mani- 
festly wrong. We have no right to obey an unrighteous 
law, since we must obey God at all hazards. And, aside 
from this, the yielding to injustice forms a precedent for 
wrong, which may work the most extensive mischief to 
those who shall come after us. It is manifest, therefore, 
that passive obedience cannot be the rule of civil conduct. 

2. Resistance by force. 

Resistance to civil authority, by a single individual, 
would be absurd. It can succeed only by the combina- 
tion of the aggrieved against the aggressors, terminating in 
an appeal to physical force ; that is, by civil war. 

The objections to this course are the following : 

1. It is, at best, uncertain. It depends mainly on the 
question, which party is, under the present circumstances, 
the stronger ? Now, the oppressor is as likely to be the 
stronger as the oppressed, as the history of the world has 
abundantly shown. 

2. It dissolves the social fabric, and thus destroys 
whatever has thus far been gained in the way of social 
organization. But it should be remembered that few 
forms of society have existed for any considerable period, 
in which there does not exist much that is worth pre- 
serving. 

3. The cause of all oppression is the wickedness of 
man. But civil war is, in its very nature, a most demor- 
alizing process. It never fails to render men more wicked. 
Can it then be hoped that a form of government can be 
created, by men already worse than before, better than 
that which their previous but less intense wickedness ren- 
dered intolerable ? 

4. Civil war is, of all evils which men inflict upon 
themselves, the most horrible. It dissolves not only social 
but domestic ties, overturns all the security of property, 
throws back, for ages, all social improvement, and accus- 
toms men to view, without disgust and even with pleasure^ 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 



37 i 



all that is atrocious and revolting. Napoleon, accustomed 
as he was to bloodshed, turned away with horror from the 
contemplation of civil war. This, then, cannot be con- 
sidered the way designed by our Creator for rectifying 
social abuses. 

3. The third course is that of suffering in the cause 
of right. Here we act as we believe to be right, in defi- 
ance of oppression, and bear patiently whatever an op- 
pressor may inflict upon us. 

The advantages of this course are, — 

1. Tt preserves entire whatever exists that is valuable 
in the present organization. 

2. It presents the best prospect of ultimate correction 
of abuse, by appealing to the reason and the conscience 
of men. This is, surely, a more fit tribunal to which to 
refer a moral question, than the tribunal of physical 
force. 

3. It causes no more suffering than is actually necessary 
to accomplish its object ; for, whenever men are convinced 
of the wickedness of oppression, the suffering, of itself, 
ceases. 

4. Suffering in the cause of right has a manifest ten- 
dency to induce the injurious to review their conduct, 
under all the most favorable circumstances for conviction. 
It disarms pride and malevolence, and enlists sympathy 
in favor of the sufferer. Hence, its tendency is to make 
men better. 

5. And experience has shown that the cause of civil 
liberty has always gained more by martyrdom than by 
war. It has rarely happened that, during civil war, the 
spirit of true liberty has not declined. Such was the case 
in the time of Charles I, in England. How far the love 
of liberty had declined in consequence of civil war, is evi- 
dent from the fact, that Cromwell succeeded immediately 
to unlimited power, and Charles II returned with acclama- 
tion, to inflict upon the nation the most odious and heart- 
less tyranny by which it was ever disgraced. During the 
suffering for conscience under his reign, the spirit of lib- 
erty revived, hurled his brother from the throne, and es- 

32* 



372 



THE DUTIES OF CITIZENS. 



tablished British freedom upon a firm, and, we trust, an 
immovable foundation. 

6. Every one must be convinced, upon reflection, that 
this is really the course indicated by the highest moral 
excellence. Passive obedience may arise from servile 
fear ; resistance, from vain-glory, ambition, or desire of 
revolution. Suffering for the sake of right can arise only 
from a love of justice and a hatred of oppression. The 
real spirit of liberty can never exist, in any remarkable 
degree, in any nation where there is not this willingness 
to suffer in the cause of justice and liberty. Ever so 
little of the spirit of martyrdom is always a more favorable 
indication for civilization, than ever so much dexterity of 
party management, or ever so turbulent protestation of 
immaculate patriotism. 



DIVISION II. 



THE LAW OF BENEVOLENCE. 



CHAPTER FIRST. 

GENERAL OBLIGATION AND DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 

We have thus far considered merely the law of recipro- 
city ; that is, the law which prevents our interference with 
those means of happiness which belong to our neighbor, 
from the fact that they are the gift of God to him. But it 
is manifest that this is not the only law of our present 
constitution. Besides being obliged to abstain from doing 
wrong to our neighbor, we are also obliged to do him 
good ; and a large part of our moral probation actually 
comes under this law. 

The law of benevolence, or the law which places us 
under obligation to be the instruments of happiness to others, 
who have no claim upon us on the ground of reciprocity, 
is manifestly indicated by the circumstances of our consti- 
tution. 

1. We are created under a constitution in which we 
are of necessity dependent upon the benevolence of others. 
Thus we are all exposed to sickness, when we become 
perfectly helpless, and when, were it not for the kindness 
of others, we must perish. We grow old, and by age lose 
the power of supporting ourselves. Were benevolence to 
be withdrawn, many of the old would die of want. The 
various injuries, arising from accident as well as from 
disease, teach us the same lesson. And, besides, a world 
in which every individual is subject to death, must abound 
with widows and orphans, who, deprived by the hand of 



374 



GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 



God of their only means of support, must frequently either 
look for sustenance and protection to those on whom they 
have no claim by the law of reciprocity, or they must die. 
Now, as we live under a constitution in which these things 
are of daily occurrence, and many of them by necessity 
belonging to it, and as we are all equally liable to be in 
need of assistance, it must be the design of our Creator 
that we should, under such circumstances, help each 
other. 

2. Nor do these remarks apply merely to the necessity 
of physical support. Much of the happiness of man 
depends upon intellectual and moral cultivation. But it 
is generally the fact, that those who are deprived of these 
means of happiness are ignorant of their value ; and would, 
therefore, remain for ever deprived of them, were they not 
awakened to a conviction of their true interests by those 
who have been more fortunate. Now, as we ourselves 
owe our intellectual happiness to the benevolence, either 
near or more remote, of others, it would seem that an 
obligation was imposed upon us to manifest our gratitude 
by extending the blessings which we enjoy to those who 
are destitute of them. We cannot requite our actual ben- 
efactors, but we may benefit others less happy than our- 
selves ; and thus, in a more valuable manner, promote the 
welfare of the whole race to which we belong. 

3. This, being manifestly an obligation imposed upon 
us by God, it cannot be affected by any of the actions of 
men ; that is, we are bound by the law of benevolence, 
irrespective of the character of the recipient. It matters 
not though he be ungrateful, or wicked, or injurious; this 
does not affect the obligation under which we are placed 
by God, to treat our neighbor according to the law of 
benevolence. Hence, in all cases, we are bound to govern 
ourselves, not by the treatment which we have received at 
his hands, but according to the law by which God has 
directed our intercourse with him to be governed. 

And yet more. It is evident that many of the virtues 
most appropriate to human nature, are called into exercise 
only by the miseries or the vices of others. How could 



DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 



375 



there be sympathy and mercy, were there no suffering ? 
How could there be patience, meekness, and forgiveness, 
were there no injury ? Thus we see, that a constitution 
which involves, by necessity, suffering, and the obligation 
to relieve it, is that which alone is adapted to the perfection 
of our moral character in our present state. 

This law of our moral constitution is abundantly set 
forth in the Holy Scriptures. 

It is needless here to speak of the various passages in 
the Old Testament which enforce the necessity of mercy 
and charity. A single text from our Savior's Sermon on 
the Mount will be sufficient for my purpose. It is found, 
Luke vi, 32 — 36, and Matthew v, 43 — 48. I quote the 
passage from Luke : 

" If ye love them that love you, what thank have ye ? 
for sinners also love those that love them. And if ye do 
good to those that do good to you, what thank have ye ? 
for sinners also do even the same. And if ye lend to them 
of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye ? for 
sinners also lend to sinners, to receive as much again. 
But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping 
for nothing again ; and your reward shall be great, and ye 
shall be the children of the Highest, for he is kind unto 
the unthankful and to the evil. Be ye, therefore, merci- 
ful, as your Father in heaven is merciful." In Matthew 
it is said, <c Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, 
do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that 
despitefully use you and persecute you ; that ye may be 
the children of (that is, that ye may imitate,) your Father 
which is in heaven, for he maketh his sun to rise upon the 
evil and upon the good, and sendeth rain upon the just 
and upon the unjust." 

The meaning of this precept is obvious from the context. 
To be merciful, is to promote the happiness of those who 
have no claim upon us by the law of reciprocity, and from 
whom we can hope for nothing by way of remuneration. 
We are to be merciful, as our Father who is in heaven 
is merciful. 

1. God is the independent source of happiness to every 



376 



GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 



thing that exists. None can possibly repay him, and yet 
his bounty is unceasing. All his perfections are continu- 
ally employed in promoting the happiness of his creation. 
Now, we are commanded to be imitators of him ; that is, 
to employ all our powers, not for our own gratification, 
but for the happiness of others. We are to consider this 
not as an onerous duty, but as a privilege ; as an opportu- 
nity conferred upon us of attaining to some resemblance 
to the Fountain and Author of all excellence. 

2. This precept teaches us that our obligation is not 
altered by the character of the recipient. God sends rain 
on the just and on the unjust, and causeth his sun to shine 
on the evil and on the good. " God commendeth his 
love to us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ 
died for us." In imitation of this example, we are com- 
manded to do good to, and promote the happiness of, the 
evil and the wicked. We are to comfort them when they 
are afflicted ; to relieve them when they are sick ; and 
specially, by all the means in our power, to strive to reclaim 
them to virtue. We are not, however, to give a man the 
means of breaking the laws of God ; as to furnish a drunk- 
ard with the means of intemperance : this would be to 
render ourselves partakers of his sin. What is here com- 
manded is merely the relieving his misery as a suffering 
human creature. 

3. Nor is our obligation altered by the relation in 
which the recipient may stand to us. His being our 
enemy in no manner releases us from obligation. Every 
wicked man is the enemy of God ; yet God bestows even, 
upon such, the most abundant favors. 

" God so loved the world, that he sent his only begot- 
ten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not 
perish, but have everlasting life." Jesus Christ spent his 
life in acts of mercy to his bitterest enemies. He died 
praying for his murderers. So we are commanded to love 
our enemies, to overcome evil with good, and to follow 
the example of St. Paul, who declares to the Corinthians, 
" I desire to spend and be spent for you ; though the 
more abundantly 1 love you, the less I be loved." 



DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 



377 



In a word, God teaches us in the Holy Scriptures, that 
all our fellow-men are his creatures as well as ourselves ; 
and, hence, that we are not only under obligation, under 
all circumstances, to act just as he shall command us, but 
that we are specially under obligation to act thus to our 
fellow-men, who are not only our brethren, but who are 
also under his special protection. He declares that they 
are all his children ; that, by showing mercy to them, we 
manifest our love to him ; and that this manifestation is 
the most valuable, when it is the most evident that we are 
influenced by no other motive than love to him. 

Shakspeare has treated this subject very beautifully in 
the following passages : 

'Tis mightiest in the mightiest ; it becomes 

The throned monarch better than his crown. 

His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, 

The attribute to awe and majesty, 

Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 

But mercy is above the sceptred sway. 

It is enthroned in the heart of kings. 

It is an attribute of God himself; 

And earthly power doth then show likest God's, 

When mercy seasons justice. 

Mer. of Venice, Act 4, Scene 2. 

Alas! alas! 

Why all the souls that are, were forfeit once; 
And He that might the advantage best have took, 
Found out the remedy. How would you be, 
If He, who is the top of judgment, should 
But judge you as you are? 

Measure for Measure, Act 2, Scene 2. 

The Scriptures enforce this duty upon us for several 
reasons : 

I. From the example of God. He manifests himself 
to us as boundless in benevolence. He has placed us 
under a constitution in which we may, at humble distance, 
imitate him. This has to us all the force of law, for we 
are surely under obligation to be as good as we have the 
knowledge and the ability to be. And as the goodness 
of God is specially seen in mercy to the wicked and the 
injurious, by the same principles we are bound to follow 
the same example. 



378 



GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 



2. We live, essentially and absolutely, by the bounty 
and forbearance of God. It is meet that we should show 
the same bounty and forbearance to our fellow-men. 

3. Our only hope of salvation is in the forgiveness of 
God — of that God whom we have offended more than we 
can adequately conceive. How suitable is it, then, that 
we forgive the little offences of our fellow-men against us ! 
Our Savior illustrates this most beautifully in his parable 
of the two servants, Matthew xviii, 23 — 35. 

4. By the example of Christ, God has shown us what 
is the type of virtue, which, in human beings, is most ac- 
ceptable in his sight. This was an example of perfect for- 
bearance, meekness, benevolence and forgiveness. Thus, 
we are not only furnished with the rule, but also with the 
exemplification of the manner in which the rule is to be 
kept. 

5. These very virtues, which are called forth by suffer- 
ing from the wickedness and injury of our fellow-men, are 
those which God specially approves, and which he de- 
clares essentia] to the character that shall fit us for heaven. 
Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. 
Blessed are the meelc, blessed are the peace-makers, &;c. 
A thousand such passages might easily be quoted. 

6. God has declared that our forgiveness with him de- 
pends upon our forgiveness of others. "If ye forgive not 
men their trespasses, neither will your Father, who is in 
heaven, forgive you your trespasses." " He shall have 
judgment without mercy, that showeth no mercy ; but 
mercy rejoiceth against judgment ;" that is, a merciful 
man rejoices or is confident in the view of the judgment 
day. 

If it be asked, what is the Christian limit to benevo- 
lence, I answer, that no definite rule is laid down in the 
Scriptures, but that merely the principle is inculcated. 
All that we possess is God's, and we are under obligation 
to use it all as He wills. His will is that we consider 
every talent as a trust, and that we seek our happiness 
from the use of it, not in self-gratification, but in minister- 
ing to the happiness of others. Our doing thus he con- 



DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT. 



379 



siders as the evidence of our love to him ; and therefore 
he fixes no definite amount which shall be abstracted from 
our own immediate sources of happiness for this purpose, 
but allows us to show our consecration of all to him, just 
as fully as we please. If this be a privilege, and one of 
the greatest privileges, of our present state, it would seem 
that a truly grateful heart would not ask how little, but 
rather how much, may I do to testify my love for the God 
who preserves me, and the Savior who has redeemed me. 

And, inasmuch as our love to God is more evidently 
displayed in kindness and mercy to the wicked and the 
injurious than to any others, it is manifest that we are 
bound, by this additional consideration, to practise these 
virtues toward them, in preference to any others. 

And hence we see that benevolence is a religious act, 
in just so far as it is done from love to God. It is lovely, 
and respectable, and virtuous, when done from sympathy 
and natural goodness of disposition. It is pious, only 
when done from love to God. 



33 



CHAPTER SECOND. 



OF BENEVOLENCE TO THE UNHAPPY. 

A man may be simply unhappy from either his physical 
or his intellectual condition. We shall consider these 
separately. 



SECTION I. 

UNHAPPINESS FROM PHYSICAL CONDITION. 

The occasions of unhappiness from this cause, are sim- 
ple poverty, or mere want of the necessities and conven- 
iences of life, and sickness and decrepitude, either alone, 
or when combined with poverty. 

1. Of poverty. Simple poverty, or want, so long as 
a human being has the opportunity of labor sufficiently 
productive to maintain him, does not render him an object 
of charity. " If a man will not work, neither shall he 
eat," is the language no less of reason than of revelation. 
If a man be indolent, the best discipline to which he can 
be subjected, is, to suffer the evils of penury. Hence, all 
that we are required to do in such a case, is, to provide 
such a person with labor, and pay him accordingly. This 
is the greatest kindness, both to him and to society. 

2. Sometimes, however, from the dispensations of 
Providence, a family is left so destitute that their labor is 
insufficient to maintain themselves. Such is frequently 
the case with widows and orphans. This forms a mani- 
fest occasion for charity. The individuals have become, 
by the dispensation of God, unable to help themselves, 
and it is our duty and our privilege to help them. 



UNHAPPINESS FROM PHYSICAL CONDITION. 381 

3. Sickness. Here the ability to provide for ourselves 
is taken away, and an additional necessity of assistance is 
created. In such cases, the rich stand frequently in need 
of our aid, our sympathy, and our services. If this be 
the case with them, how much more must it be with the 
poor, from whom the affliction which produces suffering 
takes away the power of providing the means necessary 
for alleviating it ! It is here that the benevolence of the 
gospel is peculiarly displayed. Our Savior declares, 
" inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of 
these, ye have done it unto me." Bishop Wilson, on 
this passage, has the following beautiful remark : " ' Inas- 
much? (as often) ; who, then, would miss any occasion 1 
e The least f who, then, would despise any object? ' To 
me f so that, in serving the poor, we serve Jesus Christ." 

4. Besides sickness, age also frequently brings with it 
decrepitude of body, if not imbecility of mind. This 
state calls for our sympathy and assistance, and all that 
care and attention which the aged so much need, and 
which it is so suitable for the young and vigorous to 
bestow. 

The above are, I believe, the principal occasions for 
the exercise of benevolence towards man's physical suffer- 
ings. We proceed to consider the principles by which 
our benevolence should be regulated. These have re- 
spect both to the recipient and to the benefactor. 

I. Principles which relate to the recipient. 

It is a law of our constitution, that every benefit which 
God confers upon us, is the result of labor, and generally 
of labor in advance ; that is, a man pays for what he re- 
ceives, not after he has received it, but before. This 
rule is universal, and applies to physical, intellectual, and 
moral benefits, as will be easily seen upon reflection. 

Now, so universal a rule could not have been estab- 
lished without both a good and a universal reason ; and, 
hence, we find, by experience, that labor, even physical 
labor, is necessary to the healthful condition of man, as a 
physical, an intellectual, and a moral being. And, hence, 
it is evident that the rule is just as applicable to the poor 



382 UNHAPPINESS FROM PHYSICAL CONDITION. 



as to the rich. Or to state the subject in another form : 
Labor is either a benefit or a curse. If it be a curse, 
there can be no reason why every class of men should 
not bear that portion of the infliction which God assigns 
to it. If it be a benefit, there can be no reason why 
every man should not enjoy his portion of the blessing. 

And, hence, it will follow that our benevolence should 
cooperate with this general law of our constitution. 

1. Those who are poor, but yet able to support them- 
selves, should be enabled to do so by means of labor, and 
on no other condition. If they are too indolent to do this, 
they should suffer the consequences. 

2. Those who are unable to support themselves wholly, 
should be assisted only in so far as they are thus unable. 
Because a man cannot do enough to support himself, 
there is no reason why he should do nothing. 

3. Those who are unable to do any thing, should have 
every thing done for them which their condition requires. 
Such are infants, the sick, the disabled, and the aged. 

Benevolence is intended to have a moral effect upon 
the recipient, by cultivating kindness, gratitude, and uni- 
versal benevolence among all the different classes of men. 
That mode of charity is therefore most beneficial to its 
object, which tends, in the highest degree, to cultivate the 
kinder and better feelings of his nature. Hence, it is far 
better for the needy, for us to administer alms ourselves, 
than to employ others to do it for us. The gratitude of 
the recipient is but feebly exercised by the mere fact of 
the relief of his necessities, unless he also have the oppor- 
tunity of witnessing the temper and spirit from which the 
charity proceeds. 

II. Principles which relate to the benefactor. 

The Christian religion considers charity as a means of 
moral cultivation, specially to the benefactor. It is al- 
ways, in the New Testament, classed with prayer, and is 
governed essentially by the same rules. This may be 
seen from our Savior's Sermon on the Mount. 

Hence, 1. That method of charity is always the best 
which calls into most active exercise the virtues of self- 



UNHAPPINESS FROM PHYSICAL CONDITION. 383 

denial and personal sacrifice, as they naturally arise from 
kindness, sympathy and charity, or universal love to God 
and man. And, on the contrary, all those modes of be- 
nevolence must be essentially defective, in which the 
distresses of others are relieved, without the necessary 
exercise of these virtues. 

2. As charity is a religious service, and an important 
means of cultivating love to God, and as it does this in 
proportion as all external and inferior motives are with- 
drawn, it is desirable, also, that, in so far as possible, it 
be done secretly. The doing of it in this manner, ab- 
stracts the motives derived from love of applause, and 
leaves us simply those motives which are derived from 
love to God. Those modes of benevolence which are, 
in their nature, the farthest removed from human observa- 
tion, are, cceteris paribus, the most favorable to the culti- 
vation of virtue, and are, therefore, always to be preferred. 

Hence, in general, those modes of charity are to be 
preferred, which most successfully teach the object to 
relieve himself, and which tend most directly to the moral 
benefit of both parties. And, on the contrary, those 
modes of charity are the worst, which are the farthest 
removed from such tendencies. 

These principles may easily be applied to some of the 
ordinary forms of benevolence. 

I. Public provision for the poor by poor laws will be 
found defective in every respect. 

1. It makes a provision for the poor because he is 
poor. This, as I have said, gives no claim upon charity. 

2. It in no manner teaches the man to help himself ; 
but, on the contrary, tends to take from him the natural 
stimulus for doing so. 

3. Hence, its tendency is to multiply paupers, vagrants, 
and idlers. Such have been its effects, to an appalling 
degree, in Great Britain ; and such, from the nature of the 
case, must they be every where. It is taking from the 
industrious a portion of their earnings, and conferring 
them, without equivalent, upon the idle. 

4. It produces no feeling of gratitude towards the bene- 

33* 



384 UNHAPPINESS FROM PHYSICAL CONDITION. 



factor, but the contrary. In those countries where poor- 
rates are the highest, the poor will be found the most 
discontented and lawless, and the most inveterate against 
the rich. 

5. It produces no moral intercourse between the parties 
concerned, but leaves the distribution of bounty to the 
hand of an official agent. Hence, what is received, is 
claimed by the poor as a matter of right ; and the only 
feeling elicited is that of displeasure, because it is so 
little. 

6. It produces no feeling of sympathy or of compassion 
in the rich ; but, being extorted by force of law, is viewed 
as a mere matter of compulsion. 

Hence, every principle would decide against poor laws 
as a means of charity. If, however the government, un- 
dertake the control of the whole capital of society, and 
manage it as they will, and by this management make 
paupers by thousands, I do think they are under obliga- 
tion to support them. If, however, they insist upon pur- 
suing this course, it would be better that every poor-house 
should be a work-house ; and that the poor-rates should 
always be given as the wages of some form of labor. 

I would not, however, be understood to decide against 
all public provision for the necessitous. The aged and 
infirm, the sick, the disabled, and the orphan, in the 
failure of their relatives, should be relieved, and relieved 
cheerfully and bountifully, by the public. I only speak 
of provision for the poor, because they are poor, and 
do not refer to provision made for other reasons. Where 
the circumstances of the recipient render him an object 
of charity, let him be relieved, freely and tenderly. But, 
if he be not an object of charity, to make charitable pro- 
vision for him is injurious. 

II. Voluntary associations for purposes of charity. 

Some of the inconveniences arising from poor-laws are 
liable to ensue, from the mode of conducting these institu- 
tions. 

1. They do not make the strongest appeal to the moral 
feelings of the recipient. Gratitude is much diminished, 



UNHAPPINESS FROM PHYSICAL CONDITION. 385 

when we are benefited by a public charity, instead of a 
private benefactor. 

2. This is specially the case, when a charity is funded; 
and the almoner is merely the official organ of a distribution, 
in which he can have but a comparatively trifling personal 
interest. 

3. The moral effect upon the giver is much less than it 
would be, if he and the recipient were brought immediately 
into contact. Paying an annual subscription to a charity, 
has a very different effect from visiting and relieving, with 
our own hands, the necessities and distresses of the sick 
and the afflicted. 

I by no means, however, say that such associations are 
not exceedingly valuable. Many kinds of charity cannot 
well be carried on without them. The comparatively 
poor are thus enabled to unite in extensive and important 
works of charity. In many cases, the expenditure of 
capital, necessary for conducting a benevolent enterprise, 
requires a general effort. I however say, that the rich, 
who are able to labor personally in the cause of charity, 
should never leave the most desirable part of the work to 
be done by others. They should be their own almoners. 
If they will not do this, why then let them furnish funds 
to be distributed by others ; but let them remember, that 
they are losing, by far the most valuable, that is, they 
are losing, the moral benefit which God intended they 
should enjoy. God meant every man to be charitable as 
much as to be prayerful ; and he never intended that the 
one duty, any more than the other, should be done by a 
deputy. The same principles would lead us to conclude, 
what, I believe, experience has always shown to be the 
fact, that a fund for the support of the poor of a town, 
has always proved a nuisance instead of a benefit. And, 
in general, as charity is intended to be a means of moral 
improvement to both parties, and specially to the benefac- 
tor, those modes of charity which do not have in view the 
cultivation of moral excellence, are, in this respect, essen- 
tially defective. 



386 



OF UNHAPPINESS FROM 



SECTION II. 

OF UNHAPPINESS FROM INTELLECTUAL CONDITION. 

To an intellectual being, in a cultivated state of socie- 
ty, a certain amount of knowledge may be considered a 
necessary of life. If he do not possess it, he is shut out 
from a vast source of enjoyment ; is liable to become the 
dupe of the designing, and to sink down into a mere ani- 
mal existence. By learning how to read, he is enabled 
to acquire the whole knowledge which is contained within 
a language. By writing, he can act where he cannot be 
personally present ; and can, also, benefit others by the 
communication of his own thoughts. By a knowledge 
of accounts, he is enabled to be just in his dealings with 
others, and to be assured that others are just in their deal- 
ings with men. 

So much as this may be considered necessary ; the rest 
is not so. The duty of thus educating a child, belongs, 
in the first instance, to the parent. But since, as so much 
knowledge as this is indispensable to the child's happiness, 
if the parent be unable to furnish it, the child becomes, in 
so far, an object of charity. And, as it is for the benefit 
of the whole society, that every individual should be thus 
far instructed, it is properly, also, a subject of social regu- 
lation. And, hence, provision should be made, at public 
expense, for the education of those who are unable to 
procure it. 

Nevertheless, this education is a valuable consideration 
to the receiver; and, hence, our former principle ought 
not to be departed from. Although the provision for this 
degree of education be properly made a matter of public 
enactment, yet every one should contribute to it, in so 
far as he is able. Unless this be done, he will cease to 
value it, and it will be merely a premium for idleness. 
And, hence, I think it will be found that large permanent 



INTELLECTUAL CONDITION. 



387 



funds for the purpose of general education, are commonly 
injurious to the cause of education itself. A small fund, 
annually appropriated, may be useful to stimulate an un- 
lettered people to exertion ; but it is, probably, useful for 
no other purpose. A better plan, perhaps, would be to 
oblige each district to support schools at its own expense. 
This would produce the greatest possible interest in the 
subject, and the most thorough supervision of the schools. 
It is generally believed that the school funds of some of 
our older states have been injurious to the cause of com- 
mon education. 

In so far, then, as education is necessary to enable us 
to accomplish the purposes of our existence, and to per- 
form our duties to society, the obligation to make a pro- 
vision for the universal enjoyment of it, comes within the 
law of benevolence. Beyond this, it may very properly 
be left to the arrangements of Divine Providence ; that 
is, every one may be left to acquire as much more as his 
circumstances will allow. There is no more reason why 
all men should be educated alike, than why they should 
all dress alike, or live in equally expensive houses. As 
civilization advances, and capital accumulates, and labor 
becomes more productive, it will become possible for 
every man to acquire more and more intellectual cultiva- 
tion. In this manner, the condition of all classes is to be 
improved ; and not by the impracticable attempt to ren- 
der the education of all classes, at any one time, alike. 

While I say this, however, I by no means assert that 
it is not a laudable and excellent charity, to assist, in the 
acquisition of knowledge, any person who gives promise 
of peculiar usefulness. Benevolence is frequently exerted, 
under such circumstances, with the greatest possible bene- 
fit, and produces the most gratifying and the most abun- 
dant results. There can surely be no more delightful 
mode of charity, than that which raises from the dust 
modest and despairing talent, and enables it to bless and 
adorn society. Yet, on such a subject as this, it is mani- 
fest that no general rule can be given. The duty must 
be determined by the respective condition of the parties. 



388 



OF UNHAPP1NESS FROM 



It is, however, proper to add, that aid of this kind should 
be given with judgment ; and never in such a manner as 
to remove from genius the necessity of depending on it- 
self. The early struggle for independence, is a natural 
and a salutary discipline for talent. Genius was given, 
not for the benefit of its possessor, but for the benefit of 
others= And the sooner its possessor is taught the neces- 
sity of exerting it to practical purpose, the better is it for 
him, and the better for society. The poets tell us much 
of the amount of genius which has been nipped in the 
bud by the frosts of adversity. This, doubtless, is true ; 
but let it not be forgotten that, by the law of our nature, 
early promise is frequently delusive. The poets do not 
tell us how great an amount of genius is also withered by 
the sun of prosperity. It is probable that a greater pro- 
portion of talent is destroyed, or rendered valueless, by 
riches than by poverty ; and the rapid mutations of socie- 
ty, I think, demonstrate this to be the fact. 

The same principles will, in substance, apply to the 
case, in which, for a particular object, as for the promo- 
tion of religion, it is deemed expedient to increase the 
proportion of professionally educated men. 

In this, as in every other instance, if we would be truly 
useful, our charities must be governed by the principles 
which God has marked out in the constitution of man. 

The general principle of God's government is, that, for 
all valuable possessions, we must render a consideration ; 
and experience has taught, that it is impossible to vary 
from this rule, without the liability of doing injury to the 
recipient. The reason is obvious ; for we can scarcely, 
in any other manner, injure another so seriously, as by 
leading him to rely on any one else than himself, or to 
feel that the public are under obligations to take charge 
of him. 

Hence, charity of this sort should be governed by the 
following principles : 

1. The recipient should receive no more than is neces- 
sary, with his own industrious exertions, to accomplish 
the object. 



INTELLECTUAL CONDITION. 



389 



2. To loan money is better than to give it. 

3. It should be distributed in such manner as most 
successfully to cultivate the good dispositions of both 
parties. 

Hence, private and personal assistance, when practica- 
ble, has some advantages over that derived from associa- 
tions. And, hence, such supervision is always desirable, 
as will restrict the charity to that class of persons for 
whom it was designed, and as will render it of such a 
nature, that those of every other class would be under the 
least possible temptation to desire it. 

And, in arranging the plan of such an association, it 
should always be borne in mind, that the sudden change 
in all the prospects of a young man's life, which is made 
by setting before him the prospect of a professional edu- 
cation, is one of the severest trials of human virtue. 

Public provision for scientific education, does not come 
under the head of benevolence. Inasmuch, however, as 
the cultivation of science is advantageous to all classes of 
a community, it is for the interest of the whole that it be 
cultivated. But the means of scientific education, as 
philosophical instruments, libraries, and buildings, could 
never be furnished by instructers, without rendering this 
kind of education so expensive as to restrict it entirely to 
the rich. It is, therefore, wise for a community to make 
these provisions out of the common stock, so that a fair 
opportunity of improvement may be open to all. When, 
however, the public fails to discharge this duty, it is fre- 
quently, with great patriotism and benevolence, assumed 
by individuals. I know of no more interesting instances 
of expansive benevolence, than those in which wealth is 
appropriated to the noble purpose of diffusing over all 
coming time, " the light of science and the blessings of 
religion." Who can estimate the blessings which the first 
founders of Oxford and Cambridge universities have con- 
ferred upon the human race ! 



CHAPTER THIRD. 



BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED. 

We now come to treat of a form of benevolence, in 
which other elements are combined. What is our duty 
to our fellow-men who are wicked? 

A wicked man is, from the nature of the case, unhappy. 
He is depriving himself of all the pleasures of virtue; he 
is giving strength to those passions, which, by their un- 
governable power, are already tormenting him with in- 
satiable and ungratified desire ; he is incurring the pains 
of a guilty conscience here, and he is, in the expressive 
language of the Scriptures, " treasuring up wrath, against 
the day of wrath and of righteous indignation." It is mani- 
fest, then, that no one has stronger claims upon our pity, 
than such a fellow-creature as this. 

So far, then, as a wicked man is miserable or unhappy, 
he is entitled to our pity, and, of course, to our love and 
benevolence. But this is not all. He is also wicked ; 
and the proper feeling with which we should contemplate 
wickedness, is that of disgust, or moral indignation. Hence, 
a complex feeling in such a case naturally arises — that of 
benevolence, because he is unhappy ; and, that of moral 
indignation, because he is sinful. These two sentiments, 
however, in no manner conflict with, but on the contrary, 
if properly understood, strengthen each other. 

The fact of a fellow-creature's wickedness, affects not 
our obligation to treat him with the same benevolence as 
would be demanded in any other case. If he is neces- 
sitous, or sick, or afflicted, or ignorant, our duty to re- 
lieve, and sympathize with, and assist, and teach him, are 
the same as though he were virtuous. God sends his rain 
on the evil and on the good. 



BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED. 391 



But especially, as the most alarming source of his mis- 
ery is his moral character, the more we detest his wicked- 
ness, the more strongly would benevolence urge us to 
make every effort in our power to reclaim him. This, 
surely, is the highest exercise of charity ; for virtue is the 
true solace against all the evils incident to his present life, 
and it is only by being virtuous that he can hope for eternal 
felicity. 

We are bound, then, by the law of benevolence, to la- 
bor to reclaim the wicked. 

1. By example, by personal kindness, by conversation, 
and by instructing them in the path of duty, and per- 
suading them to follow it. 

2. As the most efficacious mode of moral reformation, 
yet discovered, is found to be the truths of the Holy 
Scriptures, it is our imperative duty to bring these truths 
into contact with the consciences of men. This duty is, 
by our Savior, imposed upon all his disciples: " Go ye 
into all the world, and preach the gospel to every crea- 
ture." 

3. As oilmen are our brethren, and as all men equally 
need moral light, and as experience has abundantly 
shown, that all men will be both wicked and unhappy 
without it, this duty is binding upon every man towards 
the whole human race. The sentiments of Dr. Johnson 
on this subject, in his letter on the translation of the 
Scriptures into the Gaelic language, are so apposite to my 
purpose, that I beg leave to introduce them here, though 
they have been frequently published. " If obedience to 
the will of God be necessary to happiness, and knowledge 
of his will necessary to obedience, I know not how he 
that withholds this knowledge, or delays it, can be said to 
love his neighbor as himself. He that voluntarily con- 
tinues in ignorance is guilty of all the crimes which that 
ignorance produces ; as, to him that should extinguish the 
tapers of a light-house, might be justly imputed the ca- 
lamities of shipwrecks. Christianity is the highest per- 
fection of humanity ; and as no man is good but as he 
wishes the good of others, no man can be good in the 

34 



392 



BENEVOLENCE TO THE WICKED. 



highest degree who wishes not to others the largest meas- 
ures of the greatest good." — Life, Anno 1766. 

W e see, then, that, in so far as wicked men are by their 
wickedness miserable, benevolence renders it our duty to 
reclaim them. And to such benevolence the highest re- 
wards are promised. " They that turn many to righteous- 
ness shall shine as the stars for ever and ever." But this 
is not all. If we love our Father in heaven, it must pain 
us to see his children violating his just and holy laws, 
abusing his goodness, rendering not only themselves but 
also his other children miserable, and exposing themselves 
and others to his eternal displeasure. The love of God 
would prompt us to check these evils, and to teach our 
brethren to serve, and love, and reverence our common 
Father, and to become his obedient children, both now 
and for ever. 

Nor is either of these sentiments inconsistent with the 
greatest moral aversion to the crime. The more hateful 
to us is the conduct of those whom we love, the more 
zealous will be our endeavors to bring them back to vir- 
tue. And surely the more we are sensible of the evil of 
sin against God, the more desirous must we be to teach 
his creatures to love and obey him. 

The perfect exemplification of both of these sentiments 
is found in the character of our Lord and Savior Jesus 
Christ. While, in all his conduct and teachings, we ob- 
serve the most intense abhorrence of every form of moral 
evil, yet we always find it combined with a love for the 
happiness, both temporal and spiritual, of man ; which, in 
all its bearings, transcends the limits of finite comprehen- 
sion. This is the example which God has held forth for 
our imitation. It would be easy to show that the im- 
provement of the moral character of our fellow-men is 
also the surest method of promoting their physical, intel- 
lectual, and social happiness. 



CHAPTER FOURTH. 



BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 

The cases to be considered here are three : 

I. Where injury is committed by an individual upon an 
individual. 

II. Where injury is committed by an individual upon 
society. 

III. Where injury is committed by a society upon a 
society. 

I. Where an injury is committed by an individual upon 
an individual. 

In this case, the offender is guilty of wickedness, and 
of violation of our personal rights. 

1. In so far as the action is wicked, it should excite 
our moral detestation, just as in the case in which wrong 
is done to any one else. 

2. In so far as the wicked man is unhappy, he should 
excite our pity, and our active effort to benefit him. 

3. As the cause of this unhappiness is moral wrong, it 
is our duty to reclaim him. 

4. Inasmuch as the injury is done to us, it is our duty 
to forgive him. On this condition alone can we hope to 
be forgiven. 

5. Yet more ; inasmuch as the injury is done to us, it 
gives us an opportunity of exercising special and peculiar 
virtue. It is therefore our special duty to overcome it by 
good; that is, the duty of reclaiming him from wrong 
rests specially upon us ; and it is to be fulfilled by mani- 
festing towards him particular kindness, and the most 
cheerful willingness to serve him. " Be not overcome of 
evil, but overcome evil with good." That is, it is our 
special duty, by an exhibition of peculiar benevolence, to 
reclaim the injurious person to virtue. 



394 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 



Such is plainly the teaching of the Holy Scriptures. It 
will require but a few words to show that this is the 
course of conduct indicated by the conditions of our being. 

1. I think that every one must acknowledge this to be 
the course pointed out by the most exalted virtue. Every 
man's conscience testifies, that to reward evil with good is 
noble, while the opposite course is mean. There is no- 
thing more strongly indicative of littleness of spirit, than 
revenge. 

2. This mode of treating injuries has a manifest ten- 
dency to put an end to injury, and every form of ill-will : 

For, 1. No man can long continue to injure another, 
who requites injury with nothing but goodness. 

2. It improves the heart of the offender, and thus not 
only puts an end to the injury at that particular time, but 
also greatly diminishes the probability of its recurrence at 
any subsequent time. Were this course universally pur- 
sued, there would be done on earth the least possible 
injury. 

3. It affords an opportunity for the exercise of the most 
godlike virtue on the part of the offended. 

In a word, the tendency of this mode of treating an in- 
jurious person, is to diminish indefinitely the liability to 
injury, and to render all parties both happier and better. 

On the contrary, the tendency of retaliation is exactly 
the reverse. We should consider, 

1. That the offender is a creature of God, and we are 
bound to treat him as God has commanded. Now, no 
treatment which we have received from another, gives us, 
by the law of God, any right to treat him in any other 
manner than with kindness. That he has violated his 
duty towards us and towards God, affords no reason why 
we should be guilty of the same crimes. 

2. The tendency of retaliation is, to increase, and fos- 
ter, and multiply wrongs, absolutely without end. Such 
we see is its effect among savage nations. 

3. Retaliation renders neither party better, but always 
renders both parties worse. The offended party who re- 
taliates, does a mean action when he might have done a 
noble one. 



BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 395 



Such, then, is the scriptural mode of adjusting individ- 
ual differences. 

II. When the individual has committed an injury 
against society. 

Such is the case when an offender has violated a law 
of society, and comes under its condemnation. In what 
way and on what principles is society bound to treat 
him ? 

1. The crime being one which, if permitted, would 
greatly injure if not destroy society, it is necessary that it 
be prevented. Society has, therefore, a right to take 
such measures as will insure its prevention. This pre- 
vention may always be secured by solitary confinement. 

But, this being done, society is under the same obliga- 
tions to the offender, as the several individuals composing 
the society are under to him. Hence, — 

2. They are bound to seek his happiness by reclaiming 
him ; that is, to direct all treatment of him, while under 
their care, with distinct reference to his moral improve- 
ment. This is the law of benevolence, and it is obliga- 
tory no less on societies than on individuals. Every one 
must see that the tendency of a system of prison discipline 
of this kind must be to diminish crime ; while that of any 
other system must be, and always has been, to increase it. 

Nor is this chimerical. The whole history of prisons 
has tended to establish precisely this result. Prisons 
which have been conducted on the principle of retaliation, 
have every where multiplied felons ; while those which 
have been conducted on the principle of rendering a 
prison a school of moral reformation, have, thus far, suc- 
ceeded beyond even the anticipations of their friends. 
Such a prison is also the greatest terror to a wicked man ; 
and it ceases not to be so, until he becomes, at least, 
comparatively virtuous. The whole experience of John 
Howard is summed up by himself in a single sentence: 
"It is in vain to punish the wicked, unless you seek to 
reclaim them." 

By what 1 have said above, I would not be understood 
to deny the right of society to punish murder by death. 
34* 



3^8 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 



This right, I think, however, is to be established, not by 
the [>rinciples of natural law, but by the command of God 
to Noah. The precept, in this case, seems to me to have 
been given to the whole human race, and to be still obli- 
gatory. 

III. Where one society violates the rights of another 
society. The principles of the gospel, already explained, 
apply equally to this as to the preceding cases. 

1. The individual has, by the law of God, no right to 
return evil for evil ; but is bound to conduct towards 
every other iridividual, of what nation soever, upon the 
principle of charity. 

2. The individual has no right to authorize society to 
do any thing contrary to the law of God ; that is to say, 
men connected in societies are under the same moral law 
as individuals. What is forbidden to the one is forbidden 
also to the other. 

3. Hence, I think we must conclude that an injury is 
to be treated in the same manner ; that is, that we are 
under obligation to forgive the offending party, and to 
strive to render him both better and happier. 

4. Hence, it would seem that all wars are contrary to 
the revealed will of God, and that the individual has no 
right to commit to society, nor society to commit to gov- 
ernment, the power to declare war. 

Such, I must confess, seems to me to be the will of 
our Creator ; and, hence, that, to all arguments brought 
in favor of war, it would be a sufficient answer, that God 
has forbidden it, and that no consequences can possibly 
be conceived to arise from keeping his law, so terrible as 
those which must arise from violating it. God commands 
us to love every man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, 
as ourselves; and the act neither of society nor of gov- 
ernment can render it our duty to violate this command. 

But let us look at the arguments offered in support of 
war. 

The miseries of war are acknowledged. Its expense, 
at last, begins to be estimated. Its effects upon the 
physical, intellectual, and moral condition of a nation, are 



BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 397 



deplored. It is granted to be a most calamitous remedy 
for evils, and the most awful scourge that can be inflicted 
upon the human race. It will be granted, then, that the 
resort to it, if not necessary, must be intensely wicked ; 
and that if it be not in the highest degree useful, it ought 
to be universally abolished. 

It is also granted, that the universal abolition of war 
would be one of the greatest blessings that could be con- 
ferred upon the human race. As to the general prin- 
ciple, then, there is no dispute. The only question which 
arises is, whether it be not necessary for one nation to act 
upon the principle of offence and defence so long as other 
nations continue to do the same ? 

I answer, first. It is granted that it would be better 
for man in general, if wars were abolished, and all means, 
both of offence and defence, abandoned. Now, this seems 
to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has 
created man. But this being admitted, the question seems 
to be at an end ; for God never places men under circum- 
stances in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, 
to violate his laws. Is it for the advantage of him who 
lives among a community of thieves, to steal ; or for one 
who lives among a community of liars, to lie ? On the 
contrary, do not honesty and veracity, under these very 
circumstances, give him additional and peculiar advanta- 
ges over his companions ? 

Secondly. Let us suppose a nation to abandon all 
means, both of offence and of defence, to lay aside all 
power of inflicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation 
solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the moral 
effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon 
the consciences of men. How would such a nation pro- 
cure redress of grievances! and how would it be protec- 
ted from foreign aggression ? 

I. Of redress of grievances. Under this head would 
be comprehended violation of treaties, spoliation of prop- 
erty, and ill-treatment of its citizens. 

I reply, 1. The very fact that a nation relied solely 
upon the justice of its measures, and the benevolence of 



398 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 



its conduct, would do more than any thing else to prevent 
the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of every 
human community would rise in opposition to injury in- 
flicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful. Thus, 
by this course, the probabilities of aggression are rendered 
as few as the nature of man will permit. 

2. But suppose injury to be done. I reply, the proper 
appeal for moral beings upon moral questions, is not to 
physical force, but to the consciences of men. Let the 
wrong be set forth, but be set forth in the spirit of love ; 
and in this manner, if in any, will the consciences of men 
be aroused to justice. 

3. But suppose this method to fail. Why, then, let us 
suffer the injury. This is the preferable evil of the two. 
Because they have injured us a little, it does not follow 
that we should injure ourselves much. But it will be said, 
what is then to become of our national honor ? I answer, 
first, if we have acted justly, we surely are not dishonored. 
The dishonor rests upon those who have done wickedly. 
I answer again, national honor is displayed in forbearance, 
in forgiveness, in requiting faithlessness with fidelity, and 
grievances with kindness and good will. These virtues 
are surely as delightful and as honorable in nations as in 
individuals. 

But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and 
continued aggression ? I answer, first, not instruments of 
destruction, but the moral principle which God has placed 
in the bosom of every man. I think that obedience to 
the law of God, on the part of the injured, is the surest 
preventive against the repetition of injury. I answer, 
secondly, suppose that acting in obedience to the law of 
benevolence will not prevent the repetition of injury, will 
acting upon the principle of retaliation prevent it? This 
is really the true question. The evil tempers of the hu- 
man heart are allowed to exist, and we are inquiring in 
what manner shall we suffer the least injury from them ; 
whether by obeying the law of benevolence, or that of 
retaliation ? It is not necessary, therefore, to show, that, 
by adopting the law of benevolence, we shall not suffer 



BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 399 

at all; but that, by adopting it we shall suffer less than 
by the opposite course ; and that a nation would actually 
thus suffer less upon the whole than by any other course, 
cannot, I think, be doubted by any one who will calmly 
reflect upon the subject. 

II. How would such a nation be protected from exter- 
nal attack and entire subjugation ? I answer, by adopt- 
ing the law of benevolence, a nation would render such 
an event in the highest degree improbable. The causes 
of national war are most commonly, the love of plunder, 
and the love of glory. The first of these is rarely, if ever, 
sufficient to stimulate men to the ferocity necessary to 
war, unless when assisted by the second. And by adopt- 
ing as the rule of our conduct the law of benevolence, all 
motive arising from the second cause is taken away. 
There is not a nation in Europe that could be led on to 
war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless 
people. 

But suppose such a case really should occur, what are 
we then to do ? I answer, suffer injury with forgiveness 
and love, looking up to God, who, in his holy habitation, 
is the Judge of the whole earth. And if it be said, we 
shall then all be subjected and enslaved, J answer again, 
have wars prevented men from being subjected and en- 
slaved ? Is there a nation on the continent of Europe 
that has not been overrun by foreign troops several times, 
even w r ithin the present century ? And still more is it 
not most commonly the case, that the very means by 
which we repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes 
over us a military despotism at home ? Since, then, the 
principle of retaliation will not, with any certainty, save a 
country from conquest, the real question, as before, is, by 
obedience to which law will a nation be most likely to 
escape it, by the law of retaliation, or by that of benevo- 
lence ? It seems to me, that a man who will calmly 
reflect, can have but little doubt on this matter. 

But I go still farther. The Scriptures teach us that 
God has created men, both as individuals and as societies, 
under the law of benevolence ; and that he intends this 



400 BENEVOLENCE TOWARD THE INJURIOUS. 



law to be obeyed. Societies have never yet thought of 
obeying it in their dealings with each other ; and states- 
men would generally consider the allusion to it as puerile. 
But this alters not the law of God, nor the punishments 
which he inflicts upon nations for the violation of it. This 
punishment I suppose to be war. I believe aggression 
from a foreign nation to be the intimation from God that 
we are disobeying the law of benevolence, and that this 
is his mode of teaching nations their duty, in this respect, 
to each other. So that aggression seems to me to be in 
no manner a call to retaliation and injury, but rather a 
call to special kindness and good will. And still farther, 
the requiting evil with good, tends just as strongly to the 
cessation of all injury, in nations as in individuals. Let 
any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expendi- 
ture, and the awful waste of human life, which the wars 
of the last hundred years have occasioned, and then I will 
ask him whether it be not self-evident, that the one hun- 
dredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed in 
the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, 
would, long before this time, have banished wars from the 
earth, and rendered the civilized world like the garden of 
Eden. 

If this be true, it will follow, that the cultivation of a 
military spirit, is the cultivation of a great curse to a com- 
munity ; and that all means, both of offence and defence, 
are worse than useless, inasmuch as they aggravate the 
very source of the evil, the corrupt passions of the human 
heart, by the manner in which they ineffectually attempt 
to check the evil itself. 

I am aware that all this may be called visionary, ro- 
mantic, and chimerical. This, however, neither makes it 
so, nor shows it to be so. The time to apply these epi- 
thets will be, when the justness of their application has 
been proved. And if it be said, these principles may all 
be very true, but you can never induce nations to act upon 
them ; I answer, this concession admits that such is the 
law of God. If this be the case, that nation will be the 
happiest and the wisest, which is the first to obey it 



OUR DUTY TO BRUTES. 



401 



And if it be said, it would be wisest and best to obey the 
law of benevolence, but men will never obey it ; I an- 
swer, here is manifestly the end of the argument. If we 
show men what is wisest and best, and according to the 
will of their Creator, we can do no more. If they dis- 
obey it, this is a matter to be settled between them and 
their God. It remains, however, to be seen, whether 
God will or will not cause his laws to be obeyed ; and 
whether omniscience and omnipotence have not the means 
of teaching his creatures submission to his will. 

Note. I should be guilty of injustice to one class of 
my fellow-creatures, if 1 should close this treatise upon 
human duty, without a single remark upon our obligations 
to brutes. 

Brutes are sensitive beings, capable of, probably, as 
great degrees of physical pleasure and pain as ourselves. 
They are endowed with instinct which is, probably, a 
form of intellect inferior to our own, but which, bein£ 
generically unlike to ours, we are unable to understand. 
They differ from us chiefly in being destitute of any 
moral faculty. 

We do not stand to them in the relation of equality. 
" Our right is paramount, and must extinguish theirs." 
We have, therefore, a right to use them to promote our 
comfort, and may innocently take their life, if our neces- 
sities demand it. This right over them, is given us by 
the revealed will of God. But, inasmuch as they, like 
ourselves, are the creatures of God, we have no right to 
use them in any other manner than that which God has 
permitted. They, as much as ourselves, are under his 
protection. 

We may, therefore, use them, 1. For our necessities. 
We are designed to subsist upon animal food; and we 
may innocently slay them for this purpose. 

2. We may use them for labor, or for innocent physi- 
cal recreation, as when we employ the horse for draught, 
or for the saddle. 

3. But, while we so use them, we are bound to treat 



402 



OUR DUTY TO BRUTES. 



them kindly, to furnish them with sufficient food, and with 
convenient shelter. He who cannot feed a brute well, 
ought not to own one. And when we put them to death, 
it should be with the least possible pain. 

4. We are forbidden to treat them unkindly on any 
pretence, or for any reason. There can be no clearer 
indication of a degraded and ferocious temper, than cruel- 
ty to animals. Hunting, in many cases, and horse-racing, 
seem to me liable to censure in this respect. Why should 
a man, for the sake of showing his skill in marksmanship, 
shoot down a poor animal, which he does not need for 
food? Why should not the brute, that is harming no 
living thing, be permitted to enjoy the happiness of its 
physical nature unmolested? "There they are privi- 
leged ; and he that hurts or harms them there, is guilty 
of a wrong." 

5. Hence, all amusements which consist in inflicting 
pain upon animals, such as bull-baiting, cock-fighting, 
&c, are purely wicked. God never gave us power over 
animals for such purposes. I can scarcely conceive of a 
more revolting exhibition of human nature, than is seen 
when men assemble to witness the misery which brutes 
inflict upon each other. Surely, nothing can tend more 
directly to harden men in worse than brutal ferocity. 



